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Introduction  
The emergence of water scarcity as an environmental theme  
Throughout history, water has been a central element in human life. As a basic human 
need, it has lain at the basis of human survival strategies for time immemorial. In the 
two million years leading up to the Neolithic revolution, hunters and gatherers migrated 
in the wake of the natural migrations of their prey, which in turn migrated from water 
source to water source in the rhythm of the seasons. Alternatively, they resided in well-
watered areas which sustained their staple foods such as fruits, nuts and wild grains and 
supplemented their diet with game and fish. In both cases, the natural availability of 
water was the foundation upon which sustenance was based.1  
In the period after the last Ice Age, some 15000 years ago, the earth experienced a 
protracted period of global warming, releasing huge quantities of freshwater from the 
melting ice sheets and (amongst other things) creating a number of hot, arid zones 
across the world. Stone Age man developed a series of simple, flexible responses to this 
climate change that included migration to better watered areas and the falling back on 
less desirable food sources in times of drought. At the same time, the increase in 
average temperatures led to a concomitant increase in biomass production, which in turn 
increased the human population that could be sustained on a given piece of land.2  
 The population increase led to a more intensive exploitation3 of food resources based 
on technological advances that some argue lay at the basis of the agricultural revolution4. 
Agriculture emerged around 10 000 years ago in fertile areas where the availability of 
water was conducive to high productivity. As technology developed, so did the human 
capacity to transform the natural environment. Before very long, control over the 
availability of water entered the equation and for the first time, through human 
intervention, water could be relocated from its natural setting to a point of human 
                                                 
1  See for instance Leakey, R (1981): The Making of Mankind. London: Rainbird Publishing, pp. 198- 
217;  
2  See Fagan, B (2000): Floods, Famines and Emperors. London: Random House, pp. 73-97 
3  Such as seasonal harvesting of nuts and fruit.   
4  Some authors would argue that population pressure ‘pushed’ humanity into agriculture, others argue  
that cultural and technical innovation enabled higher productivity and thus higher population densities.   
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demand. 7 500 years ago, the early Sumerians developed the first known irrigation 
systems along the Euphrates and Tigris rivers in present day Iraq5. This set the stage 
both for more dependable food production and for the development of strong states that 
could coordinate irrigation development and regulate food distribution in times of 
drought and/or famine. Some 5000 years ago, Ancient Egypt began to emerge based on 
flood irrigation along the Nile River. The Egyptians cut canals through the levees along 
the banks of the Nile, leading floodwaters and rich silt to lands located to the east and 
west of the river. In ancient Egyptian culture, the year was divided into three seasons, 
known as Akhet (flooding), Peret (planting) and Shemu (harvest/drought)6. In the long 
time span between the Mesopotamian civilisations and the present day, an enormous 
variety of water control systems have been developed, whereby natural water systems 
and the ecological zones which they served have been colonised and harnessed to 
mankind’s needs. To an ever larger extent, water was used for economic purposes and it 
therefore obtained an ever larger value in production processes. However, for thousands 
of years, agriculture was the mainstay of economies, and with a few exceptions such as 
ancient Rome and Persia which featured urban water control systems, water was used 
overwhelmingly for irrigation.  
 Since the beginning of the industrial revolution, there has been an exponential 
increase in the demand for fresh water as well as a powerful diversification of the uses 
to which it is put. The latter include the crushing of ore, the dilution of industrial waste, 
the cooling of plants for power generation, urban domestic use and its use in 
biologically sterile recreation facilities 7 . McNeil estimates an increase in global 
freshwater consumption from 110 km³/annum in 1700, 243 km³/annum in 1800, 580km³ 
in 1900 and 5,190km³ in 20008. This increase in consumption is taking place at two and 
a half to three times the rate of world population growth9. To satisfy this spectacular 
increase in demand, a host of engineering solutions have been unleashed upon natural 
water systems in order to trap it and reroute it from its natural location to the points of 
anthropocentric demand. As will be set out in more detail later, the twentieth century 
featured an unprecedented boom in dam building, bulk water supply systems and 
purification facilities. For instance, in the 1990s, every year, spread around the world, 
construction commenced on some 170 new large dams, while an average of two large 
dams were completed every day10 . This was coupled to an anarchic expansion of 
groundwater extraction technology around the world, leading to rapid depletion of 
‘groundwater capital’ in many areas11. The industrialisation of agriculture, under the 
                                                 
5  Pearce, F. (1992): The Dammed. Rivers, Dams and the Coming World Water Crisis. London: The  
Bodley Head, pp. 1-50.  
6  See Fagan, B (2000): Op. Cit, pp. 99-117;  
7  For instance swimming pools, saunas, fountains and other such constructs.  
8  McNeill (2000): Something New Under the Sun. An environmental history of the twentieth century.  
London: Penguin Press, p. 121  
9  Ohlson, L. (1995): Hydropolitics. Conflicts over water as a development constraint. London: Zed  
Press, p. 186 
10  From Postel, S. (1992): The last oasis. Facing water scarcity. London: Earthscan, p. 38. 
11  United Nations (2003): Water for People, Water for Life. World Water Development Report. New  
 York: UN; 
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banner of the Green Revolution, accounted for the lion’s share of global water demand12, 
but with the gradual urbanisation of the world’s population, municipal and industrial 
demand began to erode the hegemony of rural water utilisation. And as towns and cities 
expanded, so problems of deteriorating water quality began to be superimposed upon 
the problem of securing sufficient quantities of freshwater to satisfy exponentially 
increasing demand13.  
 The expansion of water supply infrastructure had an organisational correlate in the 
burgeoning of organisations tasked with managing the resource or providing a water-
related service. National ministries needed to be assigned with the task of planning of 
and investment in water supply infrastructure, water boards were established to cater for 
bulk supply, irrigation boards managed the distribution of agricultural water, municipal 
departments rolled out urban water reticulation, roads departments constructed conduits 
for urban runoff, and so forth. And as long as water was in ample supply, these 
institutions generally remained the domain of engineers, being centres where the 
technical issues involved in bringing supply and demand together were mapped out and 
supply policies implemented.  
 However, the growth in water demand associated with the continuous expansion of 
world production and consumption of agricultural and industrial commodities has led to 
the increasing scarcity of water in many areas. Water is increasingly coming under 
human control, and as a result, its distribution is increasingly being determined by 
economic, political and cultural factors, while the relevance of its natural location is 
declining. Inequities in access to water, to the extent that these are man-made, tend to 
politicise this technocratic realm and bring ‘hydropolitics’ into water management 
institutions. Interestingly, the word ‘river’ and the word ‘rival’ have the same Latin 
source, namely the word ‘rivus’ meaning stream, from which the word ‘rivalis’ or 
‘those sharing the same stream’ is derived14. This serves to indicate the extent to which 
water management institutions, while being bodies concerned with technical matters, 
equally have to deal with matters of water allocation among competing users.    
 At present, the global expansion of dams, irrigation works and water supply systems 
is topping off as the most logical sites for dam construction have already been occupied 
and the remaining options become steadily less feasible 15 . The costs of building 
additional storage and conveyance infrastructure are increasing rapidly. The expansion 
of water supply, therefore, is slowing down. On the other hand, human demand for fresh 
water is still rising swiftly. If only population growth is taken into account (i.e. 
excluding demand increases from agriculture and industry), the total volume of fresh 
water per person on earth has dropped by 33% since 197016. 
 A growth in demand given limited supply implies increased competition for water at 
a global level. Water is becoming a scarce resource, and competing demands for water 
                                                 
12  About 65% of total consumption  
13  I am not suggesting that irrigation does not have associated problems of water quality: of course it 
does, but urbanisation and industrialisation rapidly added to the pollution loads of freshwater sources.  
14  Taken from Ohlson, L. (1995): Op Cit.  
15  See Malin Falkenmark and Jan Lundqvist: Looming Water Crisis: New Approaches are Inevitable. In:  
 Ohlson, L. (1995): Op. Cit, p. 184.  
16  From Postel, S. (1992): Op. Cit.  
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are leading to the eruption of conflicts over access rights. The water crisis in North 
Africa and the Middle East is particularly prominent and urgent, involving interstate 
tensions in the Jordan River Basin, the Euphrates River basin and the Nile River basin17. 
However, there are no countries which are free of declining water supplies, and within 
many countries a range of different stakeholders place competing and often conflicting 
demands on the existing resource base, leading to both latent and manifest conflicts. 
The institutions that have been created for the management of water are ill equipped to 
deal with the allocation of water between competing demands, the financing of the ever-
increasing costs of supply, the challenge of water pollution or the need to roll out water 
infrastructure in step with population increases. Scarcity, therefore, is generating a 
demand for new organisational or institutional responses, and it is important to 
understand both what these responses have been and what their effect has been until 
now.  
 In terms of public awareness, the rising scarcity of water could in many ways be seen 
as a ‘new’ environmental issue. It is a topic that has unfortunately been less well 
researched and documented than for instance deforestation or climate change, but which 
nevertheless needs equally to be fitted into existing thought on the issue of the 
environmental sustainability of human activity. In the 1990’s and early 2000’s, however, 
a spate of publications by such as Clarke (1991), Donkers (1994), Falkenmark (1989), 
Gleick (1993), McCully (1996), Ohlson (1995), Pearce (1992), Postel (1992), and the 
World Bank (1994) drew attention to the issue of water scarcity18. Generally speaking, 
these authors presented quantitative overviews of water utilisation trends in arguments 
that emphasised the limits to growth and questioned the development of ever grander 
schemes to green the desert or to facilitate economic growth beyond the limits of the 
supply capacity of local water resources. Falkenmark developed a quantitative scale for 
water scarcity and became a point of orientation in the water scarcity debate, setting the 
stage for an initial focus on numbers rather than on institutions. Because of the role of 
dams in development and due to controversies surrounding the displacement of peoples 
during the construction of dams, the issue of freshwater scarcity appeared on the agenda 
of both international advocacy bodies and multilateral institutions in the same period. 
Thus the International Rivers Network, for instance, which was established in 1985, 
began to campaign on human rights issues related to dam building. The Worldwatch 
Institute, for its part, began to include critical chapters on water scarcity in its ‘State of 
the World’ reports from 1993 onwards. And the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature began to publish on the decline of wetlands and regional or 
global water scarcity issues from the mid-1990’s onwards19.  
                                                 
17  See for instance Dodds, F (2000): Earth Summit 2002. A New Deal. London: Earthscan, pp. 182-185. 
18  See Clarke, R (1991): Water: The International Crisis. London: Earthscan; Donkers, H (1994): De  
Witte Olie. Water, vrede en duurzame ontwikkeling in het Midden Oosten. Utrecht: Van Arkel;  
Gleick, P (1993): Water in Crisis. A Guide to the World’s Fresh Water Resources. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press; McCully, P. (1996): Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams;  
Pearce, F. (1992): The Dammed. Rivers, Dams and the Coming World Water Crisis. London: The  
Bodley Head; Postel, S. (1992): The last oasis. Facing water scarcity. London: Earthscan; Ohlson, L.  
(1995): Hydropolitics. Conflicts over water as a development constraint. London: Zed Press 
19  I cite three examples, but of course they are far from being a comprehensive overview. 
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 In the realm of multilateral government action, the issue of water resource 
management also appeared on the scene in the early 1990’s. Before this, the only 
multilateral event of note related to water resources was the UN Conference on Water at 
Mar del Plata in 1977. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, water generally featured on the 
international development agenda when it could be directly related to poverty related 
issues such as access to drinking water and sanitation or the expansion of irrigation. 
Thus the UN for instance declared the years from 1981 to 1990 to be an International 
Drinking Water and Sanitation Decade devoted to the rollout of drinking water supplies 
and sanitation facilities around the world. In this period water was seen as a basic 
human need, and fresh water tended to be seen as a renewable resource - which of 
course it is as long as the rate of abstraction remains below the rate of natural 
replenishment. At times the management of water as a resource was highlighted, but 
attention stopped short of bringing the water crisis forward as an issue for discussion. It 
is only sine the 1990’s, then, that publications and public statements by professionals in 
the field began to draw attention to the fact that water was increasingly being ‘mined’ 
above its rate of natural replenishment.  
 1992 was a landmark year for water resources research and policy in that the 
problem of dwindling freshwater resources was placed on the agenda of two major 
international conferences that became the point of reference for policy makers, 
practitioners, activists and researchers for the next decade. These were the International 
Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin and the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro.  
 The Dublin conference was the first global event marking wide international concern 
for the world’s water resources. It was attended by representatives of some one hundred 
nations and some eighty non-governmental or intergovernmental organisations, who 
worked together to present a statement (the ‘Dublin declaration’) to UNCED in Rio five 
months later. The Dublin declaration called for a fundamentally new approach to the 
management of water resources based on the recognition of interdependence between 
population groups and between humanity and nature with regard to the utilisation of 
water. From the point of view of providing recognition for the issue of water scarcity, 
the Dublin declaration was important in that its first underlying principle was the fact 
that freshwater supply is limited. The declaration stated that “fresh water is a finite and 
vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development and the environment”20. From 
the point of view of setting in motion practical interventions, Dublin was important in 
two respects. Firstly, it placed water resource management firmly on the agenda for 
UNCED, and secondly, it made the first call for a World Water Forum under the 
auspices of a World Water Council.  
 Thanks to ‘Dublin’, the broad environmental agenda hammered out at UNCED 
contained an 18th chapter on the protection of the quality and supply of freshwater 
resources. Apart from reiterating a broad recognition of the problem of water scarcity, 
                                                 
20  United Nations (1992): The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development. Preamble.  
Principles two and three underscored the need for participatory planning, an issue that was set to 
become crucial in South African water resource management issues. Principle four announced that  
water has an economic value in all its competing uses, an issue that has led a life of its own and has 
become particularly important in the debate on the ‘privatisation’ of water.   
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this chapter laid the cause of scarcity at the door of the knock on effects of multiple ad 
hoc local interventions across economic sectors. It called for a panoptic view, stating 
that “the widespread scarcity, widespread destruction and aggravated pollution of 
freshwater resources in many world regions, along with the progressive encroachment 
of incompatible activities, demand integrated water resources planning and 
management”21. At the time, water scarcity was placed in the context of declining 
environmental security, that is to say that a growing world population, faced with a 
diminishing resource base (land, water, forests), faced a growing potential for conflict at 
various levels22. Coordination and integration were seen as key elements of a conflict 
management strategy that could offer a way out of this trap, and thus the integrated 
planning of water resources at the river basin level (catchment management) became a 
key element of strategies aimed at reducing environmental insecurity. At the global 
level, a concern for the ‘fragmented’ management of the world’s water resources led to 
the reiteration of the Dublin call for the establishment of a World Water Council. This 
was taken forward by the International Water Resources Association, which passed a 
resolution on the World Water Council (WWC) in 1994 that led to its ultimate 
establishment as a UN body based in Marseilles in 1996. From 1996 onwards, the 
problem of the world’s water resources was firmly on the international agenda, and the 
WWC organised four successive world water forums in Marrakech (1997), The Hague 
(2000), Kyoto (2003) and Mexico City (2006). These meetings produced statements of 
intent with regard to the alleviation of scarcity. Each was important in its own right, but 
in the field of scarcity the Declaration of The Hague on Water Security for the 21st 
century laid particular emphasis on scarcity, operationalising the term in terms of 
meeting basic needs, securing food supply, protecting ecosystems, sharing water 
resources, managing risks, valuing water and governing water wisely23.    
 The World Bank, for its part, also began to pay attention to the issue of increasing 
water scarcity in the 1990’s. In 1994, the Bank published a report entitled a strategy for 
managing water in the Middle East and North Africa. This report focused on the area of 
the world in which water scarcity was the most acute, the 1994 per capita water 
availability having been reduced to 30% of its 1960 levels as compared with 60% for 
the rest of the world. In a vein similar to the declarations of the United Nations, the 
report declared that “unless there are fundamental changes to the way in which water 
resources are managed and used, the region as a whole will experience a worsening 
crisis of water scarcity and decline” 24 . These changes included the UN call for 
‘integrated’ water resources management and greater participation but added the more 
technical elements of ‘using water more efficiently’ and ‘seeking alternative sources of 
water’ which provided a point of entry for the Bank’s technical intervention 
programmes. Also, with some sleight of hand, the concept of ‘participation’ in water 
                                                 
21  United Nations (1992): United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21:  
environment and development agenda. Nairobi: UNEP, chapter 18 section 3  
22  From Dodds (2000): Op. Cit, pp. 179-201 
23  World Water Forum (2000): Ministerial declaration of The Hague on Water Security in the 21st  
Century. Marseille: World Water Council. 
24  World Bank (1994): A Strategy for Managing Water in the Middle East and North Africa.  
Washington: IBRD  
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resource management was given two new connotations. One, ‘participation’ was 
interpreted as a call to develop ‘partnerships’ which, it was added, should include 
‘private participation’. Through this Trojan horse, public-private partnerships were 
slipped in as an organisational prescription for water scarcity problems. Two, against 
the background of widespread community resistance to a series of socially and 
environmentally risky dams (the Narmada dam in India, the Three Gorges dam in China 
and the Katse and Mohale dams of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project) in the 1990s, 
it was stated that “participation in water sector decisions[…] should increase 
community acceptance”25. Despite these rather contorted interpretations of the new 
organisational responses to scarcity, the report was certainly a radical change from the 
standard supply orientation of the Bank in which water scarcity was equated with a call 
for more dam building. One year later, the new approach was given backing by another 
report entitled ‘Towards Sustainable Management of Water Resources’. This report 
overtly called for a move away from supply orientation and towards both integrated 
management and demand management:  
 
“These lessons are reflected in a global consensus […] to move away from an emphasis on developing 
new water supplies towards a focus on comprehensive management, economic behaviour, policies to 
overcome market and government failures, incentives to provide users with better services, and 
technologies to increase the efficiency of water use. This new focus on demand stresses integrated 
water management based on the perception of water not just as a basic human need but also as an 
integral part of the ecosystem, a natural resource, and a social and economic good”26    
 
In 1995, the Bank began to include water availability statistics in its word development 
reports, and it began to provide support for the formulation of national water strategies 
in the various countries of the Middle East and North Africa, based on a cross-sectoral 
assessment of availability and demand.  
 However, World Bank initiatives in the field of water resource management 
continued to generate civil society opposition around the world. The rising social and 
ecological costs of large scale water infrastructure development projects were leading to 
bitter struggles between the proponents and opponents of dam building as a force in 
development. Dialogue was breaking down, and in response to this the World Bank and 
the IUCN initiated a broad based international stakeholder meeting that led to the 
creation of the World Commission on Dams in 1997. The WCD was chaired by Prof. 
Kader Asmal, at the time South African Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, and its 
aim was to hammer out internationally acceptable criteria for the building of large dams. 
Ultimately, the WCD published a new framework for decision making on dams and 
development in 2000. An important side effect of the WCD was the immediacy of the 
bridge between the state of world thinking on water resources development and the 
development of new water resource management policy in South Africa, which made 
South Africa all the more relevant as a case for research.     
                                                 
25  Ibid, p. 2 
26  World Bank (1995): Towards Sustainable Management of Water Resources. Washington: IBRD, p.  
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The need for academic research into water scarcity  
Clearly, the worldwide call for policy attention to the question of water scarcity had 
implications for the academic community. This was recognised at the first World Water 
Forum, as the Marrakech declaration stated that  
 
“We recognise and note the urgent need for a better understanding of all the complex issues – 
quantitative and qualitative, political and economic, legal and institutional, social and financial, 
educational and environmental – that must go into shaping a water policy for the next millennium”27. 
 
It was recognised that a new water policy was needed, and it was equally recognised 
that this new policy model being advocated called for nothing less than a revolution in 
water management institutions in ensuring water security and managing conflict. Indeed, 
at the opening of the Third World Water Forum in Kyoto, the then Secretary General of 
the UN, Kofi Annan, called for a ‘blue revolution’ in water management in order to 
avert conflict28. Agenda 21 had called for more participatory planning and for more 
‘integrated’ planning. And with the convening of the various world water forums, the 
concept of water security gained strength, with connotations of ‘equity’ and 
‘sustainability’ contained also in the concept of a blue revolution.  
 However, these calls were made at international multi-stakeholder platforms in the 
search for consensus and common ground, and the inherent complexity of water 
management or of its underlying concepts was skimmed over. It was not asked why 
planning should be more participatory, what ‘integration’ entails in organisational 
practice, how greater efficiency, equity or sustainability should be achieved, or in fact 
what the highly problematic concept of scarcity itself means29. And yet it is precisely on 
a deeper understanding of the processes and components involved in redesigning water 
management institutions that such a transformation must rest if the changes are to have 
the intended effects of increasing security, channelling conflict and mitigating water 
scarcity. In the academic realm, writing on water scarcity issues by Clarke, Falkenmark 
Gleick, Ohlsson, Lundquist, Pearce, Postel and others tended to focus on the emerging 
empirical issue of water scarcity, spreading the awareness of this new environmental 
theme. However, these while these authors did much to locate the problem, quantify it 
and develop basic concepts, they fell short of a deeper analysis of the ways in which 
water scarcity was affecting water management institutions. Commenting on Gleick, 
Ohlsson, Homer-Dixon and others in 2000, Du Plessis writes that they do not  
 
“Explicitly contextualise the water discourse in a particular theoretical mode, and they do not 
purposively construct a theory of water politics”30.  
                                                 
27  UN (1993): Marrakech declaration of the first World Water Forum 
28  UN (2003): Annan calls for ‘blue revolution’ for global sharing of freshwater. New York: UN Press  
Statement  
29  Although the Marrakech Declaration did state that “we recognise and note the urgent need for a better  
understanding of all the complex issues – quantitative and qualitative, political and economic, legal 
and institutional, social and financial, educational and environmental - that must go into shaping a 
water policy for the next millennium”. See United Nations (1997): Marrakech Declaration 
30  Du Plessis (2000): Charting the course of the water discourse. In Solomon, Hussein and Turton,  
Anthony (2000): Water Wars: Enduring Myth or Impending Reality. Pretoria: University of Pretoria /  
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 It was in this context that I submitted my proposal for research towards this 
dissertation in 1995. My argument was that for both academic and policy reasons, it is 
important that explorative research be carried out in those regions where competing 
demands on a limited resource base are being manifested. It was also important to carry 
out research that could explore the praxis of ‘scarcity’, ‘integration’, ‘participation’, 
‘efficiency’, ‘equity’ and ‘sustainability’ in a local organisational setting. Such research 
could provide a deeper meaning to the discussion on the organisational responses to 
scarcity and perhaps begin to indicate what the opportunities and constraints are for the 
implementation of a ‘blue revolution’ in a particular context. There was an obvious need 
to catalogue societal competitions for water and the resultant responses in order to 
gauge the potential for sustainable usages of water. But in addition to this, there was yet 
much work to be done in developing perspectives which can improve our understanding 
of the underlying structures and constituent parts of processes of struggle for water and 
shifts in its overall allocation in society.  
 To analyse the complexities of organisational responses to scarcity, it seemed evident 
that the standard case study should be applied. The case study is well suited to the in-
depth exploration of certain aspects of a phenomenon, being characterised by the fact 
that social processes are studied in the context of a particular unit in the full complexity 
in which they appear. With as little reification, simplification or stereotyping as possible, 
the data is collected in such a way as to maintain the unitary character of the study 
object, and all relevant factors are studied in the integrity of their interrelationships. The 
goal is to provide insight into the factors that cause the social phenomena within the 
context of the case itself31. Thus the slogan of the blue revolution can be unpacked and 
held against the light of its key concepts of scarcity, organisational change, integration, 
participation, efficiency, equity and sustainability in order to make sense of the ways 
that these ideas are embedded within an actually existing organisational project which is 
in turn enmeshed in the broader dynamics of society at large. 
  
Developing the analytic tools for water scarcity research  
At an analytic level, the key concept in this domain is of course the concept of scarcity 
itself. To understand organisational responses to scarcity, the phenomenon of scarcity 
needs to be examined in detail. However, this is not as straightforward as it may seem at 
first glance. There are a variety of contrasting theories on scarcity that deal either with 
scarcity as an overall phenomenon in society, i.e. broad theories of scarcity, or with the 
distributional element of scarcity, i.e. with scarcity as localised dearth or deprivation. 
As to the former, it is possible to classify the broader social theories of scarcity with the 
aid of a categorisation of social theories of the environment proffered by Benton and 
Redclift 32 . Benton and Redclift subdivide social theories of the environment into 
                                                                                                                                               
ACCORD.  
31  Wester, F. (1981): De Case Studie. In: Albinski et al. (1981): Onderzoekstypen in de Sociologie.  
Assen: van Gorcum. (The case study. In: Albinski et al. (1981): Research types in sociology). Pgs 24- 
32.  
32  Benton, T. and Redclift, M. (1994): Social Theory and the Global Environment. London: Routledge.  
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sociological reductionism, technological reductionism and naturalistic reductionism. 
The category of sociological reductionism, I argue, is represented in the realm of 
scarcity theory by thinkers such as Achterhuis and Xenos who see scarcity as a modern 
invention and who describe modernity amongst other things as a period in which human 
wants are increasingly presented as needs and in which wealth signifies status instead of 
status signifying wealth. Under the heading of technological reductionism the influential 
work by Judith Rees could be advanced, in which she argues that technological progress 
provides an escape option from the increasing resource scarcities in growing economies, 
as well as providing some nuance with respect to the different impacts of society on 
different kinds of natural resources, especially non-renewable versus renewable 
resources. In the class of naturalist reductionists, one could point out writers like Ophuls, 
Meadows et al., and Michael Jacobs, who emphasise the fact that humanity is 
fundamentally embedded within a natural system, who also point out the disappearance 
of escape options in terms of new natural frontiers that existed over the past centuries, 
and warn of an imminent ‘return’ to scarcity.  
 These three theoretical categories of sociological reductionism, technological 
reductionism and naturalistic reductionism, however, are all reductionisms in my view, 
and are based on a structuralist approach which of course can be contrasted with 
theories that allow for more human agency in generating or alleviating scarcity. The 
latter theories place less emphasis on scarcity as a phenomenon featuring across society 
and, by contrast, tend to focus on the distributional aspects of scarcity, i.e. scarcity as 
deprivation. In general terms, the more agency-oriented theories tend to view scarcity as 
a question of access to resources - some of which could be natural resources – through 
entitlements. Entitlements, in this view, underlie livelihood strategies of various kinds 
and actors make decisions based on their resource endowments and the opportunities 
provided by their environment. This line of thought was pioneered by Amartya Sen, and 
the main thrust of its argument was both broadened and refined in different directions 
by authors such as Blaikie, Chambers, Dietz and de Haan. It was later incorporated into 
UNDP approaches under the banner of the quest for ‘sustainable livelihoods’33. Arguing 
through an appropriate approach to scarcity requires a careful analysis of these the 
various connotations and interpretations of scarcity linked to an analysis of those 
institutions in society which provide the focal points for interaction with regard to 
claims to water.  
 A second key concept in the analysis of scarcity is the concept of institutions. The 
control over water in society is mediated through organisations which feature 
regularised or institutionalised practices, and therefore the analysis of water scarcity 
needs to proceed through institutional analysis. An old problem raises its head here, i.e. 
the distinction between institutions as regularised practices on the one hand and 
organisations which may foster institutions on the other hand. Given the fact that 
institutions are often equated with organisations in day to day parlance, one tends to 
come across terms such as ‘water management institutions’ which actually mean water 
management organisations. However, this should be distinguished from the theoretical 
                                                 
33  De Haan, L. (2000): Livelihood, Locality and Globalisation. Nijmegen: Nijmegen University Press,  
p. 22.  
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notion of an institution as a chronically replicated practice.  In looking at the theoretical 
notion of institutional analysis, one needs to take cognisance of the fact that the existing 
stock of (neo) structuralist development thinking is stunted by a tendency to use broad 
brush stokes only and by an inability to explain diversity, reducing actors to passive 
recipients of structural influences. Work in this direction is already well trodden, with 
major contributions having been delivered by authors such as Giddens, Jacobs, Long, 
Ostrom and Sen. In particular the definition of institutions provided by Giddens as 
chronically reproduced social systems which are in turn regularised practices, is helpful 
in opening the way for the development of an open-ended historical materialism.  
 Institutional analysis also needs to take cognisance of the limitations of (neo)classical, 
agency-oriented approaches to scarcity which argue that the market is the only 
institution through which resource utilisation (and thus water utilisation) can be 
optimised. This view reduces humanity to a collectivity of atomic individuals seeking 
nothing else than to maximise their personal utility. It sidesteps the ‘utility’ of other 
institutions in society such as religion or the state, it overlooks the transaction costs 
involved in obtaining information in the market, and in the realm of natural resources, it 
attempts to attach an exclusively monetary value to water, whales or trees that have 
other sources of ‘value’ such as aesthetic or intrinsic value. (Neo) classical approaches 
do not therefore obviate the need for institutional analysis. 
 A combination of the approaches offered by Long and Giddens offer an institutional 
approach to the analysis of resource (and thus water) utilisation that can both explain 
diversity and does not necessarily privilege the market as the distributor of resources 
par excellence. This boils down to an actor approach which recognises that the day to 
day replication (or transformation) of social practices that characterises institutions is 
mediated by actors. Institutions are embedded practices involving the allocation of 
resources, and thus institutions constitute embedded social practices that utilise 
resources and replicate or transform relations of property and authority among actors.  
  Actors, however, operate in a framework in which a prominent role is played by the 
state through regulation and planned intervention. The state regulates overall relations 
of property and authority and is thus a central point of reference for actors with regard 
to (water) resource utilisation. Various elements within the state, in formulating and 
implementing policy, come into contact with government officials and provide a context 
for action in the realm of claims on (water) resources. In this process, both state and 
non-state actors are involved in an ongoing transformational process defined by a wide 
variety of processes including local political dynamics, national events, the initiatives of 
other actors and natural events. Analysing organisational responses to water scarcity, 
therefore, also necessitates the anchoring of institutional analysis within the broader 
framework of government policy formulation and implementation.  
 
Selecting a case for research  
In order to examine the ‘new’ organisational responses to scarcity, it was necessary to 
identify an area in which policies aimed at enhancing water security were in place. The 
actors involved would have to envisage a wholesale transformation of existing water 
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management organisations. Furthermore, the level of water scarcity being experienced 
would have to be sufficiently critical as to generate chronic problems in satisfying 
demand.  
 On all points, South Africa presented an ideal case for research. To treat the latter 
point first, the hydrologist Malin Falkenmark developed a five-point scale of water 
scarcity ranging from ‘no problems or few problems’ at more than 10 000 m³ per capita 
per annum to ‘absolute scarcity’ at less than 500m³ per capita per annum34. In 1995, 
South Africa as a whole was crossing the threshold from 3 to 4 or from ‘regular water 
scarcity ’to‘ chronic water scarcity’ on Falkenmark’s 5-point scale35. It was therefore 
entering a period in its history in which scarcity problems were no longer incidental or 
even regular but were rather becoming an issue of chronic recurrence requiring urgent 
policy attention.  
 Secondly, South Africa did indeed envisage a wholesale transformation of its water 
management institutions in this period. The country experienced its first democratic 
elections in April 1994, in which the question of insufficient access to water among the 
majority of the population was a key campaign issue. The dominant party, the African 
National Congress, called for a ‘Reconstruction and Development Programme’ aimed 
amongst other things at ‘meeting basic needs’ and ‘democratising state and society’ in 
the context of an ‘integrated and sustainable programme’. Broadening the access to such 
a basic need as water and doing so on a sustainable basis was absolutely central to the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme. It was envisaged that this would involve 
“modernising the structures and functioning of government in pursuit of the objectives 
of efficient, effective, responsive, transparent and accountable government”36. In the 
specific case of the transformation of the institutions of water management, this was 
translated into the blue revolution concepts of secure and sustainable access to water. In 
his description of the country’s new water policy, the Minister of Water Affairs and 
Forestry in the Mandela cabinet stated that: 
 
“The need for the review of South African water law and for a fundamental change in our approach to 
water management is underpinned by the Constitution, both in relation to the creation of a more just 
and equitable society and, in relation to the broad need for more appropriate and sustainable use of our 
scarce natural resources, driven by the duty to achieve the right of access to sufficient water”37.  
 
South Africa, therefore, provided a unique opportunity for research in that it was 
planning to fundamentally transform its water management institutions in the same 
                                                 
34  The other points on the scale were ‘incidental or local problems’ at between 1,670 m³/capita/annum to  
 10000m³/capita/annum, ‘regular problems’ at 1000 m³/capita/annum to 1670m³/capita/annum, and  
 ‘chronic problems’ at 500m³/capita/annum to 1000m³/capita/annum. See Donkers, H (1994): De Witte  
 Olie. Water, vrede en duurzame ontwikkeling in het Midden Oosten [White Oil. Water, peace and  
 sustainable development in the Middle East]. Utrecht: Van Arkel, p. 17. 
35  The number of cubic metres per person per annum in South Africa dropped from 3,250 in 1955 to  
1,349 in 1990. Large regions within South Africa already have critical water scarcity. See South  
Africa Yearbook 1995:88. 
36  African National Congress (1994): The Reconstruction and Development Programme. Johannesburg:  
 Umanyano 
37  Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (1997): White Paper on a National Water Policy for South  
Africa. Pretoria: DWAF. The author was Kader Asmal.  
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period that it was beginning to experience chronic water scarcity. This opened the 
opportunity to explore the organisational issues associated with the quest for greater 
efficiency, equity and sustainability in a country which sought to bring these ideas to 
immediate effect.  
 A key thrust of organisational transformation, it was clear, was to be the idea of 
catchment management. Integrated Water Resources Management, it was argued at 
UNCED, should be carried out at the level of the catchment basin38. South African 
water management policy supported the establishment of catchment management 
agencies39, but this was to have organisational consequences throughout the various 
echelons of water management from the local level to the national level. On the one 
hand the national department was to swerve away from its engineering and operational 
focus towards a multidisciplinary and facilitatory role, on the other hand local 
stakeholders were to be brought in to participatory platforms for water management at 
the catchment and sub - catchment level40.  
 Among the various catchments that could be selected for a case study, the Crocodile 
River Catchment draining west from the Witwatersrand stood out for a number of 
reasons. First, South African water scarcity is located predominantly in the west of the 
country. The average annual rainfall in the country is 497 mm (against a world average 
of 860mm) and the country becomes progressively drier as one moves from east to west, 
with regions in the east receiving over 800mm per annum and over 1000mm in places, 
whereas 21% of the country, located in the west, receives less than 200mm per annum. 
In addition, water supply is increasingly unpredictable as one moves westward, because 
evaporation rates are high, rainfall periodicity (dependability) is very weak and the 
natural variability in river flow overwhelms any predictability annual rainfall might 
have41. Secondly, water demand is geographically concentrated in South Africa and the 
Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal area which accounts for about half of the country’s GDP. 
This industrial complex is located largely in the Crocodile River basin, and its 
juxtaposition alongside large irrigation schemes and impoverished ex-homeland areas 
located in the same catchment made for an interesting set of challenges with regard to 
equity, efficiency and sustainability.  
Research question and methodology 
Given the above, it was reasoned that the Crocodile River catchment would be well 
suited to explorative research into institutional responses to water scarcity. The central 
research question and aims as submitted at the onset of the project were as follows:   
Central Research Question:  
What are the options and constraints for efficient, sustainable and equitable catchment-
level water management in the Crocodile River catchment in South Africa? 
                                                 
38  United Nations (1992): United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21,  
Op. Cit, chapter 18.9 
39  Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (1997): Op. Cit, p. 30. 
40  Ibid. 
41  DWAF (1986): Management of the Water Resources of the Republic of South Africa. Pretoria:  
 Department of Water Affairs, pp. 6.11 and 1.13.   
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Central Research aims: This research has a double aim. The first is to create a 
conceptual and analytic framework with which to explore and analyse water scarcity 
and competition for water use. The second is to provide a number of realistic policy 
options for sustainable and equitable catchment water management in the Crocodile 
River catchment. 
 The central research question is complex and contains a number of dimensions, each 
of which points in the direction of further questions, i.e. sub-questions, which are 
operationalisations of the central theme. As time passed and I embarked upon the 
research, the issue of ‘institutional responses to water scarcity’ began to take hold as 
ingrained shorthand for the central research question. This took place for several 
reasons. Firstly, ‘catchment management’, as described above, has organisational 
prerequisites from the local to the national level, and thus it is this panoply of responses 
that I am referring to when using the term ‘catchment management’ in the central 
research question. Secondly, the policy related concepts of ‘options’ and ‘constraints’, 
as well as the adjectives ‘efficient’, ‘sustainable’ and ‘equitable’, belong more to the 
operationalisation of the central research question than to the central research question 
itself. They illustrate the themes which I wished to explore in the research and, as long 
as this is kept in mind, the central research question could thus be summarised further to 
read: ‘what are the organisational responses to water scarcity in the Crocodile River 
Catchment in South Africa?’   
Methodology 
The period of organisational change being analysed is the ten years from 1994 to 2004. 
This covers South Africa’s first ‘development decade’42, or the period in which the new 
democracy strove to come to terms with the multiple tasks of democratisation, 
reconciliation, combating poverty, generating economic growth and becoming a newly 
accepted player on the world stage in the era of globalisation. It is with good reason that 
the short-lived RDP office which was to coordinate the nation’s Reconstruction and 
Development Programme was often jokingly called the ‘Ministry of Everything’. It was 
a period in which almost all organisations within the state and in civil society were in a 
state of flux, and within this transition, a transition also took place within the water 
management organisations that existed in the country. The main aim within the research 
was therefore to extract the process of policy formulation and implementation relevant 
to organisational responses to water scarcity from the broader background of massive 
organisational change. This involved the identification of the key events that shaped the 
later future of water management organisations, especially as regards issues affecting 
water scarcity. In order to provide landmarks in the research gathering process, a 
number of goals were formulated for the research process itself, namely:  
 
(a) Describe the development of water scarcity in South Africa 
The research was intended as an analysis of a societal process which has its roots in the 
past. The water management organisations and water management infrastructure 
                                                 
42  Term coined by Padyachee et al in Padyachee (ed) (2006): The Development Decade. Economic and  
 Political change in South Africa, 1994-2004. Pretoria: HSRC.  
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established in the past are a legacy for the present which cannot simply be removed and 
replaced by something new. In South Africa, understanding apartheid is essential to 
understanding the spatial, economic, and political heritage in water use. It resulted in the 
duplication of management structures, the depopulation of some areas and the 
overcrowding of others, the empowerment of certain sections of the population and the 
disempowerment of others, the provision of water supplies to some areas and the 
disregards for others, etc. The research therefore needed to delve into the historical 
development of water scarcity during the apartheid era in order to understand the state 
of affairs in 1994. This involved cataloguing societal transitions that were brought about 
by new thrusts in legislation such as the 1912 Irrigation and Conservation of Waters act, 
the 1913 Land Act, the 1956 Water Act, the 1970 Commission of Inquiry into Water 
Matters, the new (1996) South African constitution and the 1998 Water Act. It also 
involved studying the evolution of land use, i.e. the emergence of the city of 
Johannesburg, the occupation and settlement of the Crocodile River valley by Boer 
farmers, the development of apartheid and the creation of homelands such as 
Bophutatswana, etc. These events provided the kinds of 'instructive events' which cast 
light on the changing ways in which scarcity was responded to over time.  
 
(b) Describe the material parameters of water supply and demand in the Crocodile 
River Catchment. 
Water scarcity is at its most basic a material lack of water in sufficient quantity or 
quality. This has material and technical aspects that can relate to the natural supply of 
water, to its composition, to its location, and to changes in human demand, all of which 
can be affected by technological intervention. Technology is taken as the interface 
between man and nature which lays the physical foundations for a societal allocation of 
water. Thus describing water scarcity requires one to delve into material considerations 
such as climate, physical surroundings, and technological infrastructure which affect the 
structure of local economies and polities. The capture and relocation of water is a 
physical process which physically reveals which groups in society are enjoying the 
benefits of investments in water resource development and which groups remain on the 
losing end. The relationships between the location of various population groups within a 
catchment and the natural and man-made supply of water are revealing in this regard. 
Interventions have taken place against the background of a given resource endowment 
that creates opportunities for water resource development but also places limitations 
such as how much water can be collected in a given period of time, where it can be 
collected, how costly this will be, and how costly it will be to transport it to the various 
points of demand. The intention of the research was therefore to describe these material 
parameters of water supply and demand in the Crocodile River Catchment.  
 
(c) Describe the entitlements to water in the Crocodile River Catchment 
Entitlements consist of ownership titles, entitlements to use and entitlements to 
intervene in natural resources43. Rooted in the economy (such as through exchange 
entitlements), politics (such as through the authority to intervene in river catchments), 
                                                 
43 Dietz (1996): Op. Cit, p. 42. 
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and culture (such as the legitimacy of ownership in market economies), entitlements are 
fundamental to an understanding of human decision-making with regard to the 
environment. Formal entitlements and entitlement relationships reveal the way in which 
water is allocated and distributed in society as well as the rules of the game from an 
organisational point of view. In some societies and in certain historical periods it was or 
is possible to own water privately, while in other societies or historical periods this was 
or is out of the question. In all societies, both historical and modern, the utilisation of 
water is prescribed in some manner or other that relates to the use to which it may be 
put (irrigation, recreation, drinking, sanitation, industrial cleaning, industrial cooling, 
etc.) at a particular location and the quality it should have before and/or after use. Both 
these prescriptions and the public reaction to these prescriptions set in motion the 
organisational dynamics of water management, and therefore it is essential that they be 
described in the context of an analysis of organisational responses to scarcity. The 
research therefore aimed to provide an overview of the entitlements of owners, users 
and interveners in the Crocodile River catchment and sketch the ways in which these 
have changed in response to scarcity.  
 
(d) Describe the water use economy in the Crocodile River Catchment 
Apart from considerations of composition and location, scarcity is also caused by rising 
and diversifying human demand, which is in turn related to the development of the 
economy. Water is a key input for a wide variety of production processes, and it is 
available as a standard prerequisite in most production sites even if it is not directly 
utilised in production. Access to water is a means to other ends such as health (clean 
drinking water, sanitation, personal hygiene), food (irrigation), production of goods 
(industry), and recreation (services). In a very direct way, therefore, changes in an 
economy have an impact on the way in which water is used. Health standards change as 
an economy develops and domestic demand increases with the standard of living. The 
diversification of diet and changes in food consumption patterns change the overall 
demand for foodstuffs of various kinds on the market and this changes the demand for 
the water involved in producing these foods. Industrial production requires large 
quantities of water in a concentrated geographical area and releases all manner of 
pollutants into water courses as effluent which has an impact on users downstream. 
Recreation, for its part, is often associated with the availability of water, and requires 
water of high quality to be available in a ‘pleasant’ setting. Overall, there is a direct 
relationship between the increase in per capita GDP of a country and per capita water 
withdrawal44. In general, therefore, it was therefore necessary to look at economic 
demand and catalogue its main sources in the catchment, looking at the causes of 
demand growth, (in)efficiency of use, and at inequities in access to the resource in spite 
of existing demand.  
 
(e) Describe the process of organisational transition in the management of water 
resources in the Crocodile River Catchment 
                                                 
44  See Gleick, P (1993): Water in Crisis. A guide to the World’s Fresh Water Resources. Oxford: Oxford  
 University Press, p. 81 
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Of course an inquiry into organisational responses to scarcity requires analysis of the 
organisational changes in water management that have taken place in South Africa 
during the first decade after the advent of democracy. This involves changes at the 
national level, within the Department of Water and Forestry, at the meso-level, with 
regard to the regional offices of the department and the establishment of a catchment 
management agency for the Crocodile River Catchment, and at the local level, with the 
emergence of Water User Associations, Water Services Authorities and Water Services 
Providers. This means that across the board, management strategies have been changed, 
new organisations have been formed, a new relationship with civil society is being 
forged, and new policies have been developed and are being translated into practise or 
revised.  
 With respect to water, improved access to the resource for poor communities, 
enhanced accountability and more developmental orientation of water management 
organisations were envisaged as being are important ingredients for future management. 
This change of emphasis has resulted in changes in the distribution of responsibilities 
amongst government organisations capable of affecting decisions in water use, the 
changes in the number and type of organisations themselves, and the changes in policies 
(incentives, regulations, interventions) implemented by these organisations - within or 
affecting the Crocodile River Catchment. Describing organisational change therefore 
requires looking at elements such as shifts in responsibilities and organisational 
identities, the articulation and championing of new policies, the strategies employed by 
the various actors located in this arena, as well as the concrete outcomes of all these 
changes and interactions at the end of the ten year period.  
 In attempting to achieve these five aims, the following further considerations are 
relevant: 
 
(i). Efficiency, equity and sustainability were central points of attention during the 
research. This means that a 'conceptual grid' was operative during the research (i.e. 
guiding the formulation of questions) that acted as a matrix with on one axis the three 
concepts of efficiency, equity and sustainability, and on the other axis the above five 
components of the central research question. 
(ii). the research is intentionally cross-sectoral: water scarcity is created precisely 
through the multitude of purposes to which it is put. Therefore an attempt is made to 
describe the aggregate effects of developments in irrigation, land denudation, industrial 
consumption, cooling and pollution, recreation, domestic use, etc. - on overall quantity 
and quality.  
   
Data gathering and data sources  
In general the data gathered for this work was derived from interviews and secondary 
literature. The interviews took place with a broad range of informants close to or 
familiar with the process of water management in government and in civil society. This 
involved the collection of commentaries on organisational responses to scarcity at the 
various institutional levels from the national level down to the local level. Thus it 
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involved interviewing government officials at the national, provincial and local levels, 
but also officials attached to water boards, irrigation boards and water services agencies, 
as well as stakeholders and experts in civil society such as academics, NGO staff, 
commercial stakeholders, farmers and consultants.  
 In the realm of secondary literature I drew on government reports, speeches by 
government officials, legislation and draft legislation, independent studies and 
evaluations, donor reports, reports of water management organisations, newspaper 
articles and a wide range of ancillary background readings. Thirdly, given the historical 
orientation of the research, data was gathered in the form of archival material consisting 
of the transcripts of water court cases in the state archives in Pretoria, the reports of the 
Department of Irrigation and later the Department of Water Affairs from 1912 onwards 
in the government archives of the University of the Witwatersrand, reports by Rand 
Water Board located in the same archives, and old reports in the library of the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. Lastly, and unexpectedly, data was captured 
by virtue of my direct participation in policy formulation processes, which in 
themselves were rich source of information on the nature of the organisational transition 
taking place. Each of these data sources is treated in more detail below. 
 
Data sources 
a). Interviews. A total of some 70 interviews were held during the research period. It 
was originally expected that both unstructured and semi-structured interviews would be 
of vital importance as a source of data. While this was certainly the case, a number of 
qualifications are in order. Firstly, because of my unanticipated involvement in policy 
processes themselves, the interviews became an ancillary source of information 
alongside the information that emerged from my participation in organisational 
processes. The interviews were necessary in order to add to and fill in information 
gleaned during policy processes: participatory research cannot be steered to the same 
extent that can be achieved using arms-length techniques such as interviews. In many 
cases, the interviews were also probably less impersonal and more candid than they 
might have been had I not been involved with the various government departments. 
Secondly, the interviews were less structured than originally anticipated, as I found that 
much pertinent information can often be gleaned by allowing the interviewee to reflect 
on processes that they considered to be important rather than to impose upon the 
interview a series of questions informed by my preconceptions. However I usually did 
retain a list of points which I wished to discuss and to return to in cases in which the 
information yielded was not particularly relevant to my quest. In general areas of query 
were local scarcities and local physical/technological foundations for social 
distributions of water, local government, business and community entitlements to water, 
changes in entitlements and conflicts over entitlements to water, reasons for demand 
growth, efficiency of use and incentives for efficiency, types of discharge into streams 
and water courses, local effects of water scarcity, access to and perceptions of water 
delivery organisations, organisational processes within delivery agencies, organisational 
motives, reasons for or reactions to policy choices, etc. Interviewed persons varied 
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widely from engineers, civil servants, water specialists, to representatives of social 
movements, residents in poorer communities, environmentalists, and so on. 
The interview strategy consisted primarily of face to face interviews, telephone 
interviews, and follow-up phone calls or queries through e-mail. I initially expected face 
to face interviews to be more flexible and more conducive to revealing personal motives 
and opinions that a more distant or ‘businesslike’, telephone call. However I have since 
come to revise that point of view: telephone calls also provide a certain anonymity 
which can be useful in drawing out a narrative. At any rate, the usual distractions of 
body language, coffees, ringing telephones, etc, are filtered out and I have come to find 
telephone interviews no less informative than face to face interviews. The interviews 
were carried out with the mutual understanding that any information obtained can/will 
be used for publication unless the interviewee expresses the desire to present 
information either off the record or anonymously.  
 
b). Literature research. Much of the necessary quantitative data on Northern Transvaal 
water demand and supply, dam yields, water quality, etc., is available through the 
Department of Water Affairs and the Water Research Commission. In my descriptions 
of quantitative changes in water supply and demand I have often depended on these 
sources. Much ancillary secondary literature was accessed in government, university or 
NGO libraries and documentation centres in Johannesburg, Midrand and Pretoria. In 
addition, much qualitative research has been carried out by government organisations, 
parastatals, non-governmental organisations, and professional research institutions. The 
construction of an historical narrative with regard to the development of water resources 
at various institutional levels was to a large degree sourced from annual reports of water 
boards and the predecessors of the current Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
dating back to before the first World War. Much of the narrative of organisational 
change is contained within these documents, and because of the historical slant to my 
analysis of organisational change, secondary literature was an important ancillary 
source of information. However, in each case the material in question needs to be seen 
in the context of a particular policy process or public debate: knowledge itself is a 
resource inserted into public intervention processes by a range of different actors with 
different interests.  
 
c). Participatory research  
As mentioned earlier the research took on a participatory aspect which I had not 
anticipated before leaving for South Africa. I arrived in the country in 1996, just two 
years after the first national elections, and joined in an exciting public debate on the 
future of water resource management policy. Being based first at the Land and 
Agricultural Policy Centre and later at the Centre for Policy Studies, the lines to Pretoria 
were short and I soon found myself being asked to write opinion pieces on particular 
policy topics. More and more, I was drawn into the fray of policy formulation and 
implementation exercises. My supervisors and I were of the opinion that taking active 
part in the transition process would yield information about the day to day practice of 
organisational change in a way that I could not have obtained as an outsider looking in. 
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I therefore accepted the roles that were offered to me and utilised the information gained 
by participating in them to strengthen my research by adding another perspective. 
Concretely, in terms of products rather than processes, these roles included the 
following: 
 
• Writing the water and sanitation input paper to the national poverty and 
inequality study. The study was commissioned from the office of the Deputy 
President because little poverty data had been gathered in South Africa, which in 
turn frustrated planning; 
• Writing a paper commissioned by the department of Agriculture on the 
harmonisation of water policy with that of sustainable agriculture; 
• Researching and writing a policy discussion document commissioned by the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry on means to ensure access for poorer 
communities in the establishment of catchment management agencies; 
• Participating as part of the drafting team in an interdepartmental policy 
document intended to align line departments in the efforts to revitalise South 
Africa’s agricultural crop water use for local economic development; 
• Drafting a policy document for the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry on 
the role of water user associations in poverty alleviation. 
 
Many of the observations I make throughout this manuscript have been influenced by 
my participation in these processes. I was able to enter boardrooms from which I 
normally would have been excluded, and I could thus observe directly how water 
management organisations in South Africa were viewed from the point of view of the 
flipcharts in Pretoria or the provincial capitals. It provided me, above all, with an insight 
into interdepartmental politics and intradepartmental bureaucracy of the various 
departments which had a stake in water management and who thrashed out their turf 
issues in many of the meetings which I attended.  
 
 
d). Archival research  
As stated earlier, I conducted archival research in the state archives in Pretoria, as well 
as in the government publications library of the University of the Witwatersrand and the 
library of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry to yield much of the historical 
material contained in this work. On the one hand this involved working through cases 
that were brought before the water court in the early and definitive stages of South 
Africa’s water law in the period directly after the declaration of Union, i.e. after 1910. 
These cases laid down the basic framework for the allocation of water in the Crocodile 
River catchment and provided insights into the evolving system of thought with regard 
to water management, the practical limitations on decision making such as the lack of 
adequate data on rainfall and river flow, and the differences of opinion amongst 
claimants with regard to how the water should be allocated. On the other hand it 
involved working through annual reports of and studies commissioned by the then 
Department of Irrigation and Rand Water Board. These reports and studies provided 
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insight into the problems faced by these institutions and the key events that shaped their 
history in the management of water in the area.   
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2 
Exploring the dynamics of natural 
resource scarcity: A framework for 
research and for policy analysis  
Introduction 
A little more can be said about water than the fact that it runs through a pipe and exits at 
a tap1. Although the topic of water management may often be seen as the preserve of 
engineers charged with the fairly mundane task of transporting water from one place to 
another, to approach the subject in this way is to highlight only the technical aspects of 
water delivery and to rob the topic of its importance in the environmental and political 
fields. After all, water is crucial to life itself: it shapes the lithosphere, it is a habitat in 
and of itself as the hydrosphere, it regulates climate in the atmosphere, and it is present 
in all the forms of life that constitute the biosphere. Fundamental changes in the flow, 
quantity or quality of the world’s water can therefore be expected to have powerful 
effects on all aspects of the natural environment. Similarly, water is present everywhere 
in human life: at home, at work, in our places of recreation, and so on. The 
pervasiveness of water in our everyday lives requires the presence of organisations 
devoted to the task of bringing supply and demand together, and these organisations are 
embedded in broader society. While the business of water management has traditionally 
                                                 
1  In this passage I am using the word ‘tap’ for rhetorical purposes: of course not all water is piped, and  
not all pipes end in a tap.   
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been a technical one, a field dominated by engineers and water quality specialists, water 
management organisations deal with a resource that is crucial to life itself, and these 
organisations are thus subject to both public scrutiny and to claims from stakeholders 
wishing to secure their access to the resource. As water scarcity increases, so the role of 
these organisations becomes more important and the issues they face more pressing.  
In recent times, the spectacularly large scale rollout of water supply systems all 
across the world has also led to the burgeoning of organisations tasked with managing 
the resource or providing a water-related service. In this process, the essentially 
technical business of capturing water and rerouting it to point of human demand was 
embedded in institutional processes that affected society and were in turn affected by 
society. For each of the billions of taps, hoses, drains, sprinklers, furrows, drip irrigation 
systems, steam nozzles, and so on in operation across the world today, the natural flow 
of water has been interrupted at some point, the water has been rerouted to an 
alternative destination, and this new route falls under the responsibility of at least one, 
but usually many more, organisations. This process of harnessing water is also a very 
old one: for more than seven thousand years, engineers and other technical specialists 
have been engaged in what Fred Pearce calls ‘replumbing the planet’2. It is also a 
process that has been growing exponentially over time, until the point at which, in the 
current era, the more arid nations and regions of the world are approaching the upper 
limits of their water supply capacity. The phenomenon of water scarcity3, which has 
always been present but has never before approached omnipresence, is now beginning 
to penetrate the institutional fabric of water management organisations – and other 
organisations - on an unprecedented scale. This phenomenon raises important questions 
about the way in which water is being managed. Furthermore, when coupled to the 
increasing instability of natural water systems as evidenced by droughts, floods and 
other extreme weather events, it raises questions about to what extent water can be 
managed.             
This dissertation analyses the institutional responses to freshwater scarcity in South 
Africa during the transition4. South Africa is a water scarce country in the sense that it 
has diverse, competing and increasing needs for an ultimately fixed annual supply of 
fresh water. Its need for water is growing, but the supply of this water cannot be 
expanded much further, and at the same time the state has promised to deliver on the 
claims of millions of South Africans who have historically been excluded from access 
to the resource. Over time, water scarcity is increasing, and this increase brings with it a 
set of challenges to those organisations whose core function it is to manage either water 
resources or water services or both of these. It is the analysis of the concrete responses 
to scarcity that is at the heart of this work. However, such an analysis cannot limit its 
scope to water management organisations alone, as they do not exist in a vacuum but 
are embedded within broader processes of social change. The interventions of state 
                                                 
2  Pearce, F. (1992): The Dammed. Rivers, Dams and the Coming World Water Crisis. London: The  
 Bodley Head; 
3  I use the concept of scarcity to include dearth, or the idea that some people do not have enough water  
for even their basic human needs. It is not only an overall relationship between demand and supply  
but can refer to localised dearth in circumstances of water surplus.   
4  As will be explained later on, it does so with the aid of historical analysis.   
 25
agencies or civil society bodies in the water management process are not discrete or 
clearly bounded from the social reality that surrounds them, and as a result an 
understanding of how these organisations act can only be gleaned from a framework 
that places them, embedded as they are, within the chain of events and interrelations 
between individuals and organisations that practically affect their functioning. On the 
one hand, there is a broad band of organisations in civil society - farmers’ organisations, 
mines, forestry enterprises, environmentalists, social activists, etc. – for whom gaining 
or maintaining access to and control over water is an important issue and for whom 
interaction with water management organisations is imperative. The ‘projects’ of water 
management organisations cannot be understood in isolation from the ‘projects’ of such 
stakeholders5.  
On the other hand, there are economic and political realities in society that have little 
or nothing to do with water scarcity but which nevertheless fundamentally shape the 
functioning of water management organisations. In particular, the transition to a 
democratic society in South Africa has had a powerful impact upon various kinds of 
water management organisations at different levels of operation. Having taken control 
of the machinery of the state, the liberation movement embarked upon the reversal of 
the effects of decades of repression and strove to replace these with both democracy and 
an emphasis on development, or the pursuit of greater equity6. Out of this transition 
arose a plethora of both new organisations and plans for the transformation of old 
institutions, of which old and new water management organisations are but a small part. 
The implementation of a new water management regime cannot be separated from this 
transition – on the contrary, much of it is explained by the nature of the transition. In 
essence, the transition made it possible for entrenched and outdated systems of water 
allocation and management to be overhauled as part and parcel of a broader 
transformation of rules and institutions that were designed to further the aims of 
participatory governance. Loaded onto the bandwagon of transition would be a new 
water management regime, designed to overcome the pent-up problems of the past.  
There is of necessity an inherent duality in the institutional analysis that this work 
tackles, as the movement of the load (and the bumps and bruises it suffers from other 
loads) cannot be explained without reference to the movement of the wagon. 
Furthermore, the theoretical stock from which the work draws must be up to the task of 
capturing this duality. The conceptual and analytic apparatus that is required to 
undertake such an analysis is drawn from a range of fields, the most important of which 
are sociology, development studies, and political science. Essentially this cocktail is a 
result of the fact that the analysis of institutions ‘belongs’ to the realm of sociology, 
while the analysis of asymmetries in the distribution of resources in (an ex-colonial 
African) society ‘belongs’ to development studies, and the study of political transition 
‘belongs’ to the field of political science. In order to create a framework that can be 
utilised to analyse organisational responses to scarcity during a political transition, it is 
                                                 
5  Here I refer to the concept of a project as developed by Long and elaborated further down in the text,  
in which citizens are not seen as passive recipient of state development projects but themselves also  
devote time and resources to the unrolling of their own projects which may or may not clash with state  
projects.   
6  To what extent this has actually occurred is of course a matter for debate.  
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necessary first of all to unpack in some detail the meaning attached to the concepts of 
institution and scarcity. In addition, it is necessary to place these concepts within a 
‘living’ model or framework which serves to explain how organisations, faced with 
scarcity, may respond to the contingencies that arise during a political transition. To 
achieve this, it is necessary first to propose a particular understanding of the concept of 
an institution, in particular with regard to the ways in which resources are utilised in 
organisations. Part one of this chapter is devoted to this purpose. Second, and in part 
two of this chapter, it is necessary to locate this understanding of institutions within a 
framework that can be used to understand organisational responses to the contingencies 
faced during a transition. Finally, it is necessary to unpack the concept of scarcity and to 
look at the ways in which the scarcity debate has been approached. In particular, it is 
necessary to apply the lens of institutional analysis (developed in sections one and two) 
to the scarcity debate in order to explore whether new forms of institutional analysis 
may assist in obtaining fresh leverage over what is by now a very old debate. This is the 
task of section three. 
 
Institutions – the concept  
The control over water in society is mediated through institutions, and therefore the 
analysis of water scarcity needs to proceed through institutional analysis. Essentially the 
problem of increasing global water scarcity on its own is not relevant to the social 
sciences, because the characteristics of the water cycle and the physical effects of 
human interventions in natural water courses belong to the realm of the natural sciences. 
However, the increase in the scarcity of a crucial resource in society does have 
institutional and organisational consequences, and these kinds of consequences are of 
central concern to social enquiry. Therefore scarcity is of concern to the extent that it 
enters the organisational arena and water allocation becomes the subject of claim 
making in society. A range of different actors may claim access to the resource, and 
more generally speaking, claims over access to water may enter the broader fray of 
claims over access to a wide range of other resources in society. Organisations process 
such claims and entrench practices with regard to the management and distribution of 
the resource in society. Therefore a study of increasing water scarcity must of needs be 
a study of the organisations in which social practices with regard to this scarce resource 
are mediated.  
Before attempting to tackle the question how organisations could respond to an 
increase in the scarcity of water, it is necessary to pan out from the narrow field of water 
management institutions per se and to look at the functioning of organisations more 
generally. To lay the foundations for an understanding of organisational responses to 
scarcity, an answer must first be provided to the question what role claims over access 
to water can play in organisations. This question, in turn, has two parts to it. The first 
part relates to the intrinsic nature of institutions – what are they, how do they operate, 
and what are they subject to. The second part relates to the role of resources in 
institutions – how do resources enter into the processes of decision making that take 
place within institutions. These two issues are dealt with in this section.  
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The conceptual apparatus utilised for the analysis of institutions has undergone 
considerable change in the past few decades, as development theory began to emerge 
from an impasse in the early 1990’s7.  A key feature of this impasse was the fact that the 
critiques of in particular structuralist modes of analysis – Marxism and its development 
studies derivatives - had reached a crescendo, without much clarity having been 
provided with regard to possible new avenues for theoretical exploration. The impasse 
was felt to be deepest within theory that had a broadly Marxist heritage, although 
neoclassical economics was also at that time experiencing an unprecedented onslaught 
from the quarters of a new brand of economic theory known as new institutional 
economics. More will be said about new institutional economics later in this chapter, as 
it has a particular relevance in the environmental field, but its relevance needs first to be 
placed in the context of the new theoretical avenues being explored after the impasse, 
for which it is first necessary to expand on the nature of the impasse.  
Essentially the impasse in conflict theories of development had two key 
manifestations. First, the theories of Marxist stock could not provide much leverage 
over the new world order in which the boundaries between the first, second and third 
worlds became increasingly blurred8 . Second, a very important general critique of 
Marxist brands of structuralism was their inability to capture or explain diversity, and 
they were accused of being overly reductionist and deterministic. Radical structuralism, 
which analysed society in terms of the (conflictual) interrelations between its 
component parts, abstracted from concrete reality and posited the existence of 
underlying dynamic and contradictory relations between substructures that were the 
source of change and historical progress9. The main aim of such analyses was to explain 
the recurrent economic and political crises in society in terms of the underlying 
contradictions, on the basis of the idea that social and political processes are to some 
extent rooted in the material conditions of production. This mode of analysis tended to 
place little emphasis on the role of individuals in shaping history, laying its emphasis 
instead on understanding social outcomes in terms of the ‘inherent needs’ of the system 
being analysed. Thus in analysing dependency theory, for instance, which explained 
growing inequalities between developed and underdeveloped areas of the world in terms 
of the transfer of surplus from the underdeveloped to the developed areas of the world, 
Brewer10 states that “Capital, in the abstract, cannot ‘act’ at all; it is a process, a relation, 
which has its own impersonal laws of motion”. Thus, in terms of dependency theory, 
structural and impersonal features of the world economy act to cream off that which is 
                                                 
7  See Schuurman, F. (ed.) 1993: Beyond the impasse: new directions in development theory. London:  
Zed Press; Kiely, R. (1995): Sociology and Development. The impasse and beyond. London:  
University College London Press; 
8  Such as classical Marxism, Marxist theories of imperialism, dependency theory, world systems theory  
 and to a lesser extent theory devoted to explaining the ‘articulation’ of modes of production.  The  
 Asian tigers (Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Thailand) needed only a few  
 decades to achieve first world levels of per capita GDP. Similarly, the socialist republics united in the  
 Warsaw Pact returned to market-led economies.  
9  See amongst many others Burrel, G. and Morgan, G. (1979): Sociological Paradigms and  
 Organisational Analysis. London: Heinemann: 326-364;  
10  Brewer, A (1980): Marxist Theories of Imperialism. A Critical Survey. London: Routledge, pp. 158- 
 181.  
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locally produced but not locally consumed from ‘subject’ countries to ‘dominant’ 
countries. This is seen as an ‘objective’ process, i.e. it is conditioned by the needs of the 
economy rather than by the acts of individuals. However in removing human agency 
from the analysis, the discourse in these sorts of interpretations remains highly reified, 
and the level of abstraction at which most of their proponents sought to pitch their 
inputs rode roughshod over individual differences between institutions, economic 
sectors and even nations. In the example quoted above, even Brewer admits in his 
conclusion that “my main criticism […] is that there is little connection between their 
grandiose general statements and their […] discussion of particular historical cases. 
What is lacking is real theory”11. The main critique of structuralism is thus its tendency 
to homogenise across a variety of social actors, making actors passive recipients of an 
‘inexorable structural logic’. As a result, it is unable to explain the social diversity that 
exists despite the presumed operation of structural forces. Thus Long for instance states 
that “what is clearly missing in this is the attempt to analyse in depth the intricate and 
varied ways in which new and old forms of production, consumption, livelihoods and 
identity are intertwined and generate heterogeneous patterns of economic and cultural 
change”12.  
Furthermore, a consequence of removing agency from the analysis was that, in a 
rather functionalist vein, institutional political and economic changes were explained 
rather vaguely in terms of ‘system needs’. Thus to take the regulation school as an 
example, long cycles of economic growth (followed by crisis and recession) were 
explained in terms of the mutual adjustments that ‘had to’ take place between the social 
structure and the economic system in post-war Europe13. In essence the argument was 
that the role that the state had played in the pre-war economies was blocking growth and 
‘therefore’ a new accumulation regime was ‘required’ in the form of Fordism, or a 
linking of wage increases to economic growth. This kind of explanation not only denied 
much autonomy of the political system vis-à-vis the economic system, but it also 
stripped the explanations of economic or political developments of all outcomes that 
were the result of individual effort, and of all social disjunctures in which the polity was 
not acting directly in the best interests of the long terms growth of the economy. Overall, 
then, it was recognised that the theoretical challenges of the next few decades would lie 
precisely in being able to explain events in the global village, in being able to capture 
local diversity, and in explaining change in other ways than by referring rather vaguely 
to system needs.     
Some solid steps in this direction have been taken by authors such as Giddens, 
Jacobs, Long, Ostrom, and Sen. Common among them is the attempt to move away 
from the use of broad brush strokes by unpacking the mechanisms that produce change 
within and between organisations. In addition, the approaches tend in the main to avoid 
both excessive abstraction and concern with macro-structures or atomistic analyses that 
focus on the activities of individuals. Rather, their analyses are pitched at the meso level, 
                                                 
11  Ibid., p. 181; 
12  Long,N. (2001): Development Sociology. Actor Perspectives.London: Routledge , p.12. 
13  See Stichting Polekar (1985): Het Laboratorium van de Crisis. Debat over een nieuwe  
maatschappelijke ordening . Leuven, Belgium: Kritak;  
 29
looking at the very important sociological concept of institutions. Giddens offers a 
definition of institutions as practises which ‘stretch’ over long time-space distances in 
the reproduction of social systems14. Put another way, he states that social systems are 
composed of interactions, regularised as social practices, the most persisting of these 
being institutions. If, in other words, a social system is chronically reproduced, it 
becomes an institution. In a similar vein, Ostrom defines institutions as the people and 
the patterns of regular, repetitive interactions among them that transform inputs into 
outputs 15 . In this view, the basic building block of an institution is thus human 
interaction, and the characteristics of institutions are shaped by the patterns of 
interaction that take place within them. Institutions do not have an existence that can be 
separated from human action, i.e. there are no structural properties of the institution that 
are not the result of human intervention. This approach is very different from classical 
structuralist thinking, in that the existence of institutions is attributed to human agency 
rather than to the innate or ‘objective’ needs of society in general. However, in this 
approach, to emphasise the role of agency is not to deny the existence of structure: on 
the contrary, institutions are defined as regularised - and therefore structured - practices. 
Individuals contribute to structure by affirming particular social practices and 
reproducing particular forms of relations. In institutions, social practices have become 
so ingrained that they transcend the individual, in that social practices may be sustained 
despite the departure of individuals who at one time may have contributed to those 
social practices. In this sense there is a degree of impersonality to structured patterns of 
interaction, and yet these structured patterns of interaction cannot be sustained without 
their regular (re)affirmation by individuals. Thus it may be the case that the ownership 
of the means of production enables entrepreneurs to extract a surplus from individuals 
who have nothing to sell but their labour. It may also be the case that the act of using 
ownership of the means of production to extract a surplus from those who have little to 
sell but their own labour power is a particularly widespread phenomenon in society. 
However, this does not mean that in all cases, owners of the means of production will 
use the resources at their disposal to extract a surplus from workers. In fact, they may 
set fire to their factory to extract a surplus from their insurance company, or they may 
spontaneously offer free shares in their company to permanent employees. Essentially 
their room for manoeuvre may be constrained in some ways, but there is nothing about 
the logic of capital that can determine, within their room for manoeuvre, what they may 
at any time decide to do with the resources they have at their disposal. Therefore, there 
is nothing about control of the means of production that necessarily leads particular 
individuals to behave in certain ways, and there cannot be an objective march of history 
that is separate from the volition of individuals involved in production processes.  
Although the freedom of individuals operating within an organisation may be 
constrained in some ways, for instance by virtue of the fact that they have access to 
limited resources, an institution is sustained only through the repeated actions of 
                                                 
14  Giddens, A. (1995): A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism . London: Macmillan, pp.  
 28,41-42. 
15  Ostrom, E., Schroeder, L., Wynne, S. (1993): Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development.  
 Boulder: Westview Press, p. 6; 
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individuals, and should those individuals chose to develop new social practices, the 
institution will be transformed. However, by the same token, it is repeated social 
practices that constitute an institution, and an institution is not dependent on the actions 
of specific individuals for those practices to continue. Thus an institution can be 
separated from the actions of individuals in the sense that individuals may come and go, 
and regularised practices within an institution may remain the same despite such 
changes. An individual or group of individuals may interpret their surroundings and 
decide, on behalf of an institution, that it has certain needs which need to be acted upon. 
But these needs are determined actively by that individual or group, and the institution 
has no ‘objective’ needs that exist outside the subjective interpretations of those actors, 
other than the key structural properties of an institution itself such as the ‘need’ for 
human reproduction of its key characteristics (otherwise it could not be defined as an 
institution). This means that when institutions are being analysed in the particular 
context utilised in this work, i.e. in looking at organisational responses to scarcity, they 
cannot be analysed in isolation from the social practices that actors engage in within 
those organisations. It is necessary to look at the ways in which questions of access to 
resources become part and parcel of the organisations being analysed, through the 
medium of those actors who serve to ingrain the social practices that take place in those 
organisations. The analysis needs therefore to turn to concepts such as actors, resources, 
and power. However before doing so the concept of an institution needs to be applied to 
the specific context in which it is used in this work, i.e. to water management 
institutions.  
 
Water Management Institutions  
When one comes across the concept of a water management ‘institution’ in relation to 
the analysis of water resource management, the concept usually bears its second 
connotation as an ‘establishment’ or ‘organisation’. This double character of the word 
‘institution’ opens debates up for confusion of terms, and thus in the context of this 
work I will attempt to be consistent in using the term ‘institutions’ when I refer to a 
chronically repeated social practice and using the term ‘organisations’ when referring to  
an institution as an establishment.  
 If an institution is seen as a regularised social practice, or a pattern of repetitive 
interaction that transforms inputs into outputs, then water management institutions have 
existed for a very long time. Any ingrained water related practice such as a trip to a 
water source with a receptacle, and the transportation of that water to the place of need, 
is a water management institution so long as it stretches over a sufficiently long period 
and is so ingrained that it transcends the individual in the sense referred to above. Seen 
in these terms, a water management institution does not need to be a formally 
recognised organisation registered as a non-governmental organisation or private sector 
corporation16. Even such paper organisations can only be seen as fostering institutions if 
                                                 
16  A further condition is that it should involve human interaction, i.e. it is a regularised practice that  
 transcends the individual, providing meaning and involving the allocation of resources. A single trip  
to a water source with a receptacle arises from and gives rise to interaction and satisfies a group need.   
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they have a presence in the real world in that they form a core around which actors – 
defined below – shape their interactions and align their resources.  
 Therefore a water management institution is not a modern invention but it has been 
with mankind for time immemorial. As was stated in the introduction, even before the 
Neolithic revolution, hunters and gatherers migrated in the wake of the natural 
migrations of their prey, which in turn migrated from waterhole to waterhole in the 
rhythm of the seasons. To the extent that regularised social practices were organised 
around linking the point of water abstraction to the point at which it was used, they were 
water management institutions. This includes the issue of ensuring access to the 
resource, i.e. the process of obtaining water. In prehistory, water management 
‘institutions’ will probably not have been exclusively devoted to securing water, 
because migration and the selection of food sources may have been induced by many 
more factors than just the availability of water. For one thing, the quest for food will 
have been equally important. At one point or another, a significant break will have come 
into this tradition, in that for the first time, water will not have been used where it was 
naturally found but technology will have been applied to bring water to the place in 
which it was needed17. A simple receptacle will have been sufficient to give birth to the 
first institution devoted to water management in the modern sense of applying 
technology to link the point of abstraction to the point of human demand. However, if 
the mountain does not come to Moses, Moses must go to the mountain: any regularised 
social practice relating to the securing of water supplies is an institution, and thus 
migration towards a water source is also a water management institution. 
 As technology developed, so did the human capacity to transform the natural 
environment. Control over the availability of water was part of this transformation. As 
mentioned in the introduction, irrigation was developed some 7 500 years ago in 
Mesopotamia. It later emerged in other areas, such as in Egypt, Rome and the realm of 
the Inca (Peru), and the collective input of labour required for these early engineering 
projects set the stage for more dependable food production, for the storage of surpluses, 
and for the emergence of administrative systems and strong states18. In the long time 
span between the Mesopotamian civilisations and the present day, an enormous variety 
of water control systems have been developed, whereby natural water systems and the 
ecological zones which they served have been colonised and harnessed to mankind's 
needs. To an ever larger extent, water was used for economic purposes and it therefore 
obtained an ever larger (strategic) value in production processes. New interfaces 
developed between natural water systems and man-made water use systems. A water 
use system became a physical and institutional sub element of society, entailing in a 
physical sense: 
 
“The infrastructure, created for the purpose of water intake, conveyance, supply and distribution of 
water (raw and potable) and disposal of effluent on behalf of a user […] which utilizes water in both 
                                                 
17  Albeit in some cases perhaps integrated into a nomadic existence that emphasised migrating in pursuit  
 of water  
18  Pearce, F. (1992): op. Cit, pgs 9-20;  
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quantity and quality. Such a system provides water flow and use linkage between intake from a 
natural source and discharge into the same, or another natural source”19. 
 
These physical systems were man-made and often required considerable investment 
from society, as well as requiring operation, management, and expansion. To achieve 
this, a wide range of organisations were established that were charged with the design, 
construction and maintenance of water use systems and with the allocation of this very 
strategic resource amongst sectors, institutions and individuals in society.  
 These organisations were backed up by a variety of legal systems, principles and 
practises which evolved with at heart the daunting task of allocating a mobile and 
fugitive resource amongst competing users. Over time, as water use systems expanded, 
water became an increasingly managed resource, so that it was subject not only to 
natural forces but also to the outcomes of decisions within society and in particular to 
the decisions taking place within water management organisations. However for a long 
period of time, it will have been possible for water management organisations to devote 
their energies to the abovementioned ‘linkage between intake and discharge’, i.e. to the 
technical systems needed to ensure supply to the point of demand and drainage away 
from the point of use. That which lay outside the boundaries of the system could be seen 
as an ‘externality’, and was in most cases not of much relevance to the water 
management organisation. In other words, in the abundance of water, it was possible to 
have neighbouring water management organisations that operated in isolation from one 
another without the activities of the one having significant knock-on effects on the 
activities of the other. With the progressive colonisation of natural water courses, 
however, it could be expected that such knock-on effects would become ever more 
manifest, that the ‘frontiers’ beyond which lie virgin sources of water disappear, and 
that water management organisations would be forced into ever more intensive 
interaction with one another as natural water systems become replaced by water use 
systems.  
 The collapse of this ‘water frontier’ is a phenomenon that is currently spreading 
around the world, as water use systems expand and begin to encroach upon one 
another’s territory or begin to have significant impacts upon the quantity and quality of 
one another’s water20. Chapter two is devoted to a more expansive empirical overview 
of this global problem and its specific manifestations in South Africa. However, suffice 
it here to state that overexploitation of freshwater resources has joined the ranks of the 
major environmental issues facing mankind today. In recent history, there has been 
mounting pressure on the earth’s natural resources, and in particular, on the earth’s 
renewable resources. The tremendous growth in global economic production over the 
last one hundred and fifty years has placed a strain on the regenerative capacity of many 
of the earth’s renewable resources. This has given rise to a series of issues of concern 
open to research by academics and to intervention by environmental practitioners. Some 
of the most prominent areas of concern mentioned in the literature are declining 
                                                 
19  Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (1990): Crocodile River (Western Transvaal) Catchment  
Study. Urban Demands and Return Flows. Pretoria: DWAF, p. 15  
20  See for instance Ohlsson (1995): Hydropolitics. London:Zed Press pp. 20-24 
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biodiversity, topsoil destruction, deforestation, and the impacts of the industrialisation 
of agriculture, desertification, global warming, and pollution21. These aspects of damage 
to renewable resources are being monitored, and undoubtedly, as new forms of damage 
emerge, they too will be chartered. Until recently, the depletion of global stocks of fresh 
water was not recognized as a major feature of renewable resource depletion 22 . 
However, recently (in the last decade) a growing body of publications has begun to 
correct that trend and is beginning to eke out a research path for those keen to assist in 
the process of monitoring this particular problem 23 . Unfortunately, much of this 
research has focussed on the manifestations of the problem at the physical level rather 
than on the institutional consequences of scarcity, and these aspects still needs to be 
charted. However, before considering these points in more detail it is necessary to return 
to the topic of institutions, actors, resources and power.    
 
Institutions, actors, resources, and power 
To understand the operation of institutions, it is necessary to look at the 
interrelationships between the actors, their resources and the application of power. In 
essence, the day to day replication (or transformation) of social practices that 
characterises institutions is mediated by actors. These actors in turn utilise resources in 
the instantiation of these social practices. Finally, the interactions that constitute social 
practices utilise resources and replicate relations of property and authority among actors.  
The concept of an actor is closely related to (but not entirely synonymous with) the 
idea of an institution. An institution is a chronically reproduced form of social practice, 
which is only given meaning by specific actors24. The key qualification for an actor is 
the ability to interpret reality, take decisions, and monitor the outcomes of these 
decisions25. Thus a state agency is a social actor, by virtue of its ability to process 
reality and take decisions, while a language, although it is an institution by virtue of the 
continuous reaffirmation of its rules and practices, is not an actor. By contrast, actors 
are not institutions, although they may foster them: institutions are taken to be practices 
that ‘stretch over long time-space distances in the reproduction of social systems’. 
However, within institutions, the instantiation of social practices is carried out by actors, 
and hence institutions must be understood in terms of the variety of actors from whom it 
draws its social practices. In this sense no institution is a monolith – it is fragmented and 
diverse to the extent that it has different kinds of actors implementing different kinds of 
projects against the backdrop of the broader institution. On the other hand, it is unified 
to the extent that it is a vessel for structured patterns of interactions.  
                                                 
21  See Jacobs, Michael: The Green Economy. Environment, Development, and the Politics of the Future.  
London: Pluto Press, 1991; Middleton Nick (1995): The Global Casino. An introduction to 
environmental issues. London, Edward Arnold  
22  I.e. until around 1990. See for instance Rees, J. (1985): Natural Resources. Allocation, economics and  
 policy. London:  Methuen, p. 225; 
23  Examples of such publications are Clarke (1993), Davies & Day (1998), Donkers (1985), Gleick et al  
 (1993), Knoppers (1995), Lowi (1993), Ohlsson (1995), Pearce (1992), Postel (1992), Saeijs & van  
 Berkel (1995), Serageldin (1995), and UNEP (1995) 
24  See Long, N (2001), Op. Cit, p. 40 
25  Ibid., p. 16 
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Society, and the institutions within it, can be seen as being composed of a wide 
variety of actors. In interacting and in deploying resources, actors are the engines of 
change but also of reproduction in society. In their actions they may choose to depart 
from existing practices, or they may choose to reaffirm them. When such action is 
purposeful, each actor is striving to achieve goals in society26. In these cases, the actor is 
drawing on the resources it has at its disposal and entering into interactions with other 
actors in the pursuit of those goals. This perspective on action contextualises the 
utilisation of resources: a resource needs to be seen against the backdrop of human goals 
or desires. The Oxford dictionary defines a resource as “a means of supplying what is 
needed”. 
Both Giddens and Long emphasise the fundamental knowledgeability and capability 
of actors. This is not done to emphasise inter-subjectivity or the inability of those who 
pursue knowledge to transcend local contexts – rather, it serves to emphasise that 
certain representations of reality may come to dominate in interactions. In other words, 
it serves to sensitize the observer to the operation of power in interactive contexts where 
meaning is given to events. To properly analyse the flow of events (especially in 
development contexts), actors must not be stripped of their rationality on the basis of 
their evaluation from another normative context. Actors need to be seen as 
knowledgeable about their surroundings, they may or may not interpret reality in 
different ways according to different world views, forms of education, norms, values, 
etc. Where there are substantial disjunctures between the “social, evaluative and 
cognitive standpoints” of these actors, ongoing interactions between these actors can be 
seen as an ‘interface’, characterised by problems that take place in bridging or 
accommodating these differences in standpoints27. For Giddens, “All human action is 
carried out by knowledgeable agents who both construct the social world through their 
action, but yet whose action is also conditioned or constrained by the very world of their 
creation. In constituting and reconstituting the social world, human beings at the same 
time are involved in active interplay with nature, in which they both modify nature and 
themselves”28.  
In the exercise of power, Long stresses the importance of the fact that there is a 
multiplicity of actors in any one society, each drawing in different ways from a stock of 
cultural repertories and realities in their ordering of the world and the representation of 
meaning. What is of importance to Long’s analysis of the operation of power among 
actors is then the question whose interpretations or models prevail over those of others29. 
However in the development of his analytic scheme, Long and Giddens both tend to 
emphasise the role of knowledge as a resource in the clashes that take place between 
social actors: much of Long’s analysis for instance focuses on interfaces between state 
actors and recipients of development interventions as a divide across which there are 
many differences in the interpretation of development and of what needs to be done in 
order to overcome certain development problems. Giddens, for his part, states that in the 
                                                 
26  Although not all human action is strategic or geared towards the achievement of outcomes – there is  
also much reflexive, routine and unmotivated action 
27  Long, N. (2001), op. Cit, p. 65 
28  Giddens (1995), op. Cit., p.54  
29  Long, N., op. Cit, p. 19 
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generation of power, the storage of ‘allocative’ (physical) resources is less significant 
than the storage of ‘authoritative’ resources (cognitive and social resources generating 
command over people)30. While differences in knowledge stocks and perceptions is 
certainly important, actors have a wide range of resources upon which to draw which 
range from the symbolic to the physical, and it is not clear why knowledge should be 
given the primacy accorded to it by Long in his interpretations. Knowledge is important 
in that it provides a framework for the interpretation of events, for the processing of 
reality, and for the development of strategies for the future. It is also knowledge that 
enables inputs to be transformed into outputs, but the production of outputs also 
requires other resources such as labour, time, capital, and natural resources such as 
water.  
Human beings, through their actions, have the capacity to transform their 
environment, and in doing so they may replicate or transform the institutions of which 
they form a part. This is done by both exercising power and through the domination 
over resources: in their interactions with each other, individuals draw on resources of 
various kinds, and they are located in a field of relations of autonomy and dependence 
with regard to others. However, these relationships of autonomy and dependence are 
never absolute. Structures that exist in society are never all-encompassing, for instance 
in the sense that workers or citizens in Third World countries are doomed to walk a 
particular life-route by virtue of the underlying structures of the capitalist economy. 
Even when the distribution of resources between two groups or two individuals is 
highly asymmetrical, those who have few resources to draw upon still have some room 
for manoeuvre. Understanding power, then, is about understanding the degree to which 
groups of actors affect each others’ life chances. This room for manoeuvre is a multi-
dimensional phenomenon as actors can draw on many different kinds of resources in 
many different ways, with many different outcomes, each affecting the kinds of choices 
that can be made during a subsequent set of interactions. For Sen, the room for 
manoeuvre that actors have at their disposal is central to the analysis of development: he 
argues in favour of a broad perspective in development studies which defines 
‘development’ as ‘freedom’31. This view of freedom involves both the processes that 
allow freedom of actions (classical civil and political ‘rights’) and the opportunities 
(capabilities which their resource endowments provide them with) that people have 
given their personal and social circumstances.  
By virtue of this freedom that actors have, power cannot be seen as being absolute, 
and nor does it determine outcomes. Power is a dialectical process, in which every form 
of interaction serves to either reproduce or break down relations of autonomy and 
dependence between actors. In the long run, this leads to the maintenance or to the 
transformation of existing structures within institutions. Nor should power be seen as an 
entirely negative phenomenon, as is often the case in the literature32: the exercise of 
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 Routledge , p. 85: “Power is defined ass control over (or ability to determine) the allocation of 
 resources on which others are dependent; and therefore, ability to influence other people’s life  
chances”. 
 36
power is integral to the operation of institutions, as it represents both power to and 
power over: power represents the capacity to produce and deliver, while it also 
represents the capacity to subject and repress, i.e. the power over others. Power is thus 
an essential ingredient in the reproduction of institutional patterns, as is the use of 
resources to exercise control over others and to transform the environment.  
In any institution, there are asymmetries of access to resources that are utilised in the 
interactions that make up the institution (referred to by Giddens as ‘domination’). These 
resources can be of two basic types, i.e. allocative resources (material features of the 
environment, the means of production, and goods) and authoritative resources (the 
locales in which interaction may take place, the organisation of human beings in society, 
and the organisation of life chances). Why Giddens makes this particular distinction is 
not particularly clear, as he admits that it is a ‘conceptual’ distinction – and therefore it 
may not exist in practice. Water itself may be used both as an allocative resource (in the 
transformation or replication of access and use rights) and as an authoritative resource 
(when its access or denial is used by some in asserting authority or power over others33).  
When the asymmetries of resources are such that certain individuals have the control 
over the allocation of resources over which others are dependent, those individuals can 
be referred to as elites. State elites are those people who wield power by virtue of their 
position in the institutional structures of the state - senior politicians, and bureaucratic 
elites34.         
 
Institutions, transaction costs, and political change 
The application of an institutional approach to the understanding of resource utilisation 
provides some useful tools that have traditionally been overlooked by the field that is 
perhaps most associated with resource use, namely (neo)(classical)economics. Scarcity 
is a central concept in economics, so much so that economics is often defined in terms 
related to scarcity, i.e. as ‘the study of the relationships between endless wants and 
scarce means’35. In the traditional approach to economics, however, institutions were 
factored out of much of the analysis. In this older tradition, economics was seen as a 
value-free science in the sense that it did not seek to judge the expressed preferences of 
consumers but merely to understand the outcomes. The free market was seen as the 
most efficient means of allocating resources in society: if society is seen as being 
composed of individuals, each of whom consume goods and services with the intention 
of maximising their utility, the market will tend towards equilibrium in which the 
resources in society have been optimally allocated. In this view economists do not judge 
consumer preferences, they merely advise on policies that ensure optimality. This 
approach led to a form of economics that emphasised quantitative methods and 
underplayed the role of institutions and culture in the determination of economic 
outcomes. Quantitative approaches seemed logical in the face of a market that expressed 
the value of goods and services as a price, and hence a whole range of mathematical and 
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34  Etziony-Halevy, E. (1983): p. 85; 
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statistical methodologies was developed to aid researchers and economists to discover 
optimal outcomes in situations in which the market worked perfectly, i.e. in the absence 
of state regulation, monopoly enterprises, or difficulties in obtaining economic 
information. 
However for a number of reasons, this model upon which much of modern 
economics is based, is fundamentally flawed, and as a result, the ways in which 
resources are allocated in society need to be studies in new ways that overcome the 
conceptual errors of the founding fathers of the discipline of economics. In this sense, as 
was hinted above, neoclassical economics and methodological individualism are also 
emerging from what could be called an impasse. While the various strands of Marxism 
could be criticised for not being able to capture diversity, neoclassical economics was 
criticised for asserting a model of ‘perfect’ markets which did not exist in practice. The 
real world of resource allocation was one in which state regulation, monopoly control 
and a lack of information dominated economic decision making, therefore new theories 
needed to be developed that were more suited to analysing this real world.          
So what were the drawbacks of the ways in which classical economics looked at 
resource utilisation?  
Firstly, economic behaviour is deeply rooted in culture and value systems, and 
therefore economics has an institutional basis. This is the point of departure for the new 
institutional economics. For instance, Michael Jacobs writes:  
 
“Institutional economists reject the methodological individualism that underpins the neoclassical 
analysis. They argue that economic behaviour is culturally determined, and that institutions in society 
(such as governments, regulations and property rights) are not ‘market imperfections’ but the very 
structures that allow markets to operate”36.  
 
Sen, in turn, encapsulates the fundamentally cultural nature of economics when he 
points out that economic transaction is in essence about legitimation: 
 
“Consider a private ownership market economy. I own this loaf of bread. Why is this ownership 
accepted? Because I got it by exchange through paying some money I owned. Why is my ownership 
of that money accepted? Because I got it by selling a bamboo umbrella owned by me. Why is my 
ownership of that umbrella accepted? Because I made it with my own labour using some bamboo 
from my land. Why is my ownership of the land accepted? Because I inherited it from my father. Why 
is his ownership of that land accepted? And so on.”37    
 
These perspectives underscore the cultural basis of economics and lead back to Giddens 
in the sense that legitimation underlies interactions involving allocative resources in the 
marketplace. Acceptance of the legitimacy of transactions is a precondition for 
transactions to take place. Karl Marx38 and Adam Smith would probably have objected 
                                                 
36  Jacobs, M. : The Limits to Neoclassicism. In Redclift, M. and Benton,T (1994): Social Theory and  
 the Global Environment. London: Routledge, p.84; 
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to this perspective by stating that there are underlying ‘objective’ criteria that enable 
transactions, the most important being the relationship between price and labour time 
invested in a product or service. In this view trade takes place because the labour time 
and materials invested in the production of a product is comparable to the labour time 
and materials invested in another product. However, this assumes that actors in the 
marketplace have access to all the information regarding the labour and materials 
invested in a product and that they can take decisions based upon this information. As 
will be seen below, this argument does not withstand further scrutiny. Nor does it 
discount the fact that market transactions are based on legitimation, and that 
legitimation is ultimately determined by the property regimes that apply in a particular 
market context. And property regimes, of course, are managed by organisations which 
foster institutions. Therefore economic activity depends on institutions rather than being 
hindered by them. In Giddens’ terms, the market is a regularised and chronically 
reproduced social practice. As such, it is no more independent from interpretation, 
legitimation or the application of power than other institutions such as churches or the 
state. The market may indeed have structured properties resulting from the day to day 
actions of a great many individuals, but this certainly does not set it apart as a more 
objective and less culturally determined institution than other societal institutions.   
A second critique of classical economics approaches to understanding resource 
management is the restricted criteria upon which (neo)classical evaluations of resource 
utilisation are based. Classical economic theory is based on a rather doubtful model of 
humanity as being composed of strictly self interested individuals intent upon 
maximising their utility in every transaction which they enter into. A second assumption 
that (neo)classical economists make is that the greatest benefit to society will be 
achieved in those conditions whereby resources are allocated at maximum efficiency. In 
spite of classical economics’ claim to value neutrality, this is a utilitarian criterion that 
is normatively based, and it might equally be replaced with assumptions that the most 
benefit to society is achieved if resources are allocated at ‘maximum equity’, or 
‘maximum sustainability’39. Each assumption leads to a particular kind of evaluative 
approach with regard to resource utilisation, based on different (normative) conceptions 
of justice. Each evaluative approach in turn can be characterised by different kinds of 
included and excluded information: 
 
“Each evaluative approach can, to a great extent, be characterised by its informational basis: the 
information that is needed for making judgements using that approach and – no less important – the 
information that is “excluded” from a direct evaluative role in that approach”40.  
 
Seen from this perspective, there is therefore no ‘objective’ criterion for the evaluation 
of the most optimal allocation of resources in society. Classical and neoclassical 
economics are reductionist theories which assume that efficiency is the supreme 
criterion for resource allocation, and in this sense, they are deficient. What is needed, 
argues Sen, is a broader informational basis of justice. His argument, which leads back 
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to Long’s actor oriented approach, is that all evaluations of resource utilisation have at 
heart a concern with human well being. Human beings, in striving for well being, utilise 
the commodity bundles which they have at their disposal to actualise the goals that they 
have set themselves. However the actualisation of the potential of a particular 
commodity bundle depends on a variety of contingent circumstances that affect the 
room for manoeuvre or capability of a particular actor to choose a particular course of 
life. There are contingent circumstances which lie in the sphere of the market, there are 
contingent circumstances which lie in the sphere of the opportunity structures provided 
by the political arena, and there are contingencies that operate in the social sphere. What 
needs to be evaluated, therefore, is the full range of social practices that can be drawn 
upon to convert a particular resource bundle into the fulfilment of personal goals. These 
could lie in the social field, they could lie in the potential of the market, and they could 
lie in the rights offered by the state.    
An institutional approach to resource utilisation side steps the question of whether 
resources are best managed in the context of the market, in the context of state 
organisations or in the context of non-market institutions in civil society. There are a 
range of institutions in society, each of which has its own traditions and modes of 
ordering the world, and each of these offers means through which freedom may be 
actualised. However, given a particular resource context, such as that of water, it must 
also be recognised that none of these institutions is ubiquitous, and that not all locales 
boast a broad institutional marketplace from which a strategy for self actualisation can 
be drawn. In rural areas, contact with state officials may be rare or difficult to achieve, 
marketplaces may be distant, and hence self actualisation strategies may have to draw 
on those institutions that are locally available - traditional authorities, women’s groups, 
church groups, etc. Each actor strategy is a calculated gamble based on an assessment of 
the opportunities available in a particular setting, and each in turn draws on those 
institutions thought to be instrumental in increasing one’s ‘development as freedom’.  
A third problem with traditional economics approaches to the evaluation of resource 
utilisation is the assumption that when making decisions with regard to the investment 
of resources, individuals have a perfect overview of the kinds of choices available to 
them. The assumption, therefore, is that the information required to enable a decision 
with regard to a transaction is both omnipresent and comprehensive. This assumption is 
essential if the market is indeed to be deemed the most optimal mechanism through 
which to allocate resources: if and only if each individual in the market is making 
choices based on a perfect overview of options and that individual acts to maximise 
utility during every transaction, then the collective outcome of all similar decisions on 
the marketplace results in an optimal outcome for everybody. However, this assumption 
is a simplification of reality rather than an accurate reflection of it. Certainly in some 
situations when a major purchase is being considered – the purchase of a car for 
instance - there is a prominent tendency for individuals to invest in the collection of 
information on a wide variety of variables so as to choose the outcome that optimises 
the result for a given outlay of resources. However, not only is this often not the case in 
transactions in market economies in which information is abundant, but there are large 
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transaction costs involved in obtaining the right kinds of information for appropriate 
decision making in the rural areas of poorer countries.  
The difficulties of obtaining the appropriate information for decision making and the 
transaction costs involved in obtaining such information are central to the new 
institutional economics. In addition, as Ostrom has argued, this thinking is highly 
relevant to the understanding of institutional dynamics in what scholars from the first 
world call ‘development’ settings (it is highly relevant in development contexts in the 
first world too) 41 . More often than not decision making with regard to resource 
utilisation is highly complex, and decisions often need to be taken in contexts in which 
there are serious obstacles to the collection of relevant and accurate information. This 
leads Ostrom to challenge this key underlying assumption of classical economics:  
 
“Many of the situations of interest in understanding infrastructure development and maintenance are 
uncertain and complex and lack the selective pressure and information generating capabilities of a 
competitive market. Therefore, we substitute the assumption of bounded rationality – that persons are 
intendedly rational but only limitedly so – for the assumptions of perfect information and utility 
maximisation used in axiomatic choice theory”42.  
 
Most institutional contexts, including that of the market, are therefore characterised by 
difficulties that actors experience in obtaining the kind of information that would lead to 
optimal decision making. As a result, decision making is suboptimal, and resources are 
devoted to particular causes on the basis of intelligent guesses which may prove to be 
optimal but which may also prove to be mistaken. In the context of development, this is 
a two-way street. Long observes an ‘interface’ of life worlds between bureaucrats and 
the recipients of their development interventions, across which there are information 
disjunctures and ‘battlefields of knowledge’, while Ostrom points to differences 
between the scientific information generated in western research facilities and the ‘time 
and place’ information which is rich in detail on a particular environmental and social 
setting. From both sides of the divide, actors devote resources towards particular causes 
based on a particular interpretation of events.  
Taking a different slant to that of the ‘transaction costs’ theorists, Ulrich Beck argues 
that the exponential growth in technological development in the late industrial period of 
the last four decades is leading to the heaping of social risk, of which environmental 
risk is a particularly prominent aspect43. The unknown and potentially catastrophic 
effects of ongoing interventions in the natural world introduce high levels of risk into 
society, which public organisations are finding increasingly difficult to confront. The 
social institutions that functioned effectively in dealing with predictable risks in the 
early industrial period are increasingly being confronted by unpredictable 
environmental hazards in the current era. Translating this to the field of water resource 
                                                 
41  First world scholars rarely use examples from their own countries in discussing issues of poverty and  
 development. A welcome departure from this tradition is provided by Amartya Sen who for instance  
 uses examples drawn from the Harlem suburb of New York where mortality rates are higher than in  
 many ‘third world’ contexts to illustrate that ‘development’ is context specific;  
42  Ostrom, E., Schroeder, L. and Wynne, S. (1993): Institutional Incentives and Sustainable  
Development. Infrastructure Policies in Perspective. Boulder: Westview Press, p. 45;  
43  Mythen, G (2004): Ulrich Beck. A critical introduction to the risk society. London: Pluto 
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management, the dam building organisations that served to secure water supplies 
against the background of climatic variability now face the unpredictable effects of 
climate change and the cumulative effects of point source and non-point source 
pollution on the freshwater systems on which we depend. This perspective further 
underscores the importance of the fact that actors have an imperfect access to the 
information on the basis of which coherent strategies for action could be etched out, 
rather than a comprehensive overview as suggested by neoclassical theory. In fact, Beck 
argues, decisions that affect the natural environment are being taken against a 
background of increasing risk of catastrophic outcomes that are essentially unknown. 
This view further undermines the idea that utility maximising individuals have a perfect 
overview of the information needed to make resource related decisions.  
From the point of view of the development practitioner or bureaucrat insufficient or 
inaccurate information can lead to project instability or to gaps between policy and its 
implementation. There are transaction costs in obtaining this information that increase 
as the institutional complexity of a given planning context increases. As Hoebink has 
noted, government interventions can be reasonably coherent if restricted to one area of 
government intervention, but as the number of actors increase and possible conflicts of 
interest increase, it becomes very difficult to maintain an overview or influence 
outcomes44.  
A special case of government intervention is worth mention at this point, namely the 
popular attempt to rationalise and simplify government action by farming the provision 
of public services out to third parties. In theory, transaction costs in obtaining 
information are overcome by partnerships between the state and actors in civil society 
with regard to the provision of pubic services. “Co-production is one way that synergy 
between what a government does and what citizens do can occur”45. The phenomenon 
of co-production, which is often inaccurately referred to as ‘public-private partnerships, 
will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters of this work. Suffice it to state 
here in brief that since the 1980’s the world has witnessed a new phenomenon that I 
propose to refer to as the ‘globalisation of local government’46.  
On a world scale, private companies and civil society bodies have profiled 
themselves as partners in the provision of local government services, and this has led to 
the burgeoning of a local government service industry of massive proportions (of which 
the world water industry is a case in point). The conditions for this are always the 
rollback of the state in service provision and the farming out of the provision of public 
goods and services through public private partnerships (ppp’s) or co-production 
                                                 
44  Hoebink, P. (1999): De Strijd om de balans: mondialisering, ontwikkelingssamenwerking en  
coherentie van beleid. In: Hoebink, P., Haude, D. and Van de Velden, F. (1999): Doorlopers en  
Breuklijnen van Globalisering, Emancipatie en Verzet. Assen, the Netherlands: Van Gorkum, pp. 56- 
73;  
45  See Ostrom, E. (1996): Crossing the Great Divide: Coproduction, Synergy, and Development. In:  
 World Development Vol. 24 no. 6, 1996, p. 1079; 
46  See Ostrom, E. (1996): Op. Cit; Lorrain, Dominique and Stoker, Gerry (1997): The Privatisation of  
 Urban Services in Europe. London: Cassel; Mitchell-Weaver, Clyde and Manning, Brenda (1991):  
 Public Private Partnerships in Third World Development. In: Studies in Comparative International  
 Development, Vol. 26 no.4; Schmitz, T. (2002): Coproduction in South Africa: An intersectoral  
 exploration of partnership arrangements and outcomes. Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies;  
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arrangements. These arrangements are problematic for a number of reasons, many of 
which are related to the transaction costs of obtaining information from the contracted 
party about the state of infrastructure, the rollout of services, the true costs of service 
provision, etc. In South Africa – and undoubtedly in many other countries, ppp’s are not 
the only form of pervasive partnership which generates transaction costs. The 
information and work overloads of bureaucrats can also lead to a tendency towards 
government by consultancy, whereby much of the office work in departments is farmed 
out to consultants under contract. Again, this generates transaction costs in defining 
contracts, monitoring outputs, and integrating consultants’ outputs back into the 
government system. In the context of development interventions, ppp’s and government 
by consultancy generate extra challenges for government officials in ensuring that 
poverty alleviation targets are met, that the poor have been consulted by consultants, etc. 
Whether co-production and government by consultancy are on the balance more 
efficient than cases in which services are provided exclusively by state organisations is 
a highly controversial point, marked by triadic clashes between multinational companies, 
the local state, and anti-globalisation activists.  
Other forms of partnership relevant to the water sector are also affected by 
difficulties in obtaining relevant information for decision making. Foreign donors with 
their headquarters in the capital city of poor countries have difficulties in overcoming 
accurate time and place information about local dynamics in each of the projects that 
they roll out and projects can tend to be rolled out on the basis of general principles 
rather than in response to local needs. This particular transaction cost is not a new idea 
but goes back at least as far as 1960 when Chambers identified a series of factors that 
prevent rural poverty from being accurately perceived47. A solution that many donor 
agencies have resorted to is the use of peak civil society organisations as intermediaries 
between the donor and an affiliated NGO or civil society grouping in a local setting. 
And as will be seen in extensive detail in the chapter on catchment management, 
catchment management organisations are designed to overcome the problems of 
accessing detailed knowledge of the natural environment in a catchment through 
participatory processes, and yet achieving this is much easier said than done.   
From the point of view of actors in civil society, difficulties in achieving an overview 
of state subsidies and support mechanisms, institutional politics market realities, etc., 
also frustrate optimality in decision making. Far from being optimal, then, resource 
allocations are fraught with risk. Those who are ‘in the know’ about large scale 
movements of resources can act in ways that enhance their ability to tap into such 
processes, reducing the risks of inappropriate time and resource investments. On the 
other hand, for those who are out of the loop, resource bids resemble more those in a 
casino: they may on occasion result in positive outcomes but may equally result in a 
one-way poverty ratchet.                   
 
Planned Intervention / Policy Implementation 
Having linked institutions, actors, and resources in the context of an analytic framework 
that could be used to analyse the ways in which resources enter into institutional 
                                                 
47  Chambers, R. (1960): Putting the Last First. New York: Longman; 
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processes, it is now necessary to locate this thinking within the problematic of planned 
intervention during a political transition. The state is central to resource-related 
discourses in that in the classical libertarian sense it is the guarantor of the inviolability 
of a range of rights, of which property rights are of most direct importance in this 
context48. Also, in the context of widespread poverty, the state (when it is moderately 
benevolent and not overly kleptocratic) channels a portion of its resources into 
development and poverty alleviation. From both perspectives, the state is centrally 
involved in influencing “overall connections between property and authority in the 
long-term reproduction of societies”49. The state thus forms a central point of reference 
for the strategic manipulation of resources by actors in the reproduction / transformation 
of asymmetries in access to resources and relations of freedom/constraint. The state and 
its projects enter what Long would call the life world of various actors, influencing their 
life chances and thereby influencing their strategies for self actualisation. However, this 
influence is not always equally positive, and in some cases the aims of the state may run 
counter to the aims of certain actors, such that policy implementation is not free of 
conflict, nor is it necessarily a smooth and technically efficient process. Disjunctures 
exist both within the state and between the state and civil society that (for a number of 
reasons) prevent policy blueprints from being implemented in exactly the way in which 
they were conceived.  
First, such disjunctures exist within the state itself. Bureaucrats cannot be entirely 
apolitical and neutral in the policy game. In theory the functioning of a modern 
democracy requires the political elite to be supported by a bureaucracy that is up to the 
task of allocating very large amounts of resources. However, the idea of the political 
elite being supported by the bureaucracy is one that is fraught with contradictions: the 
reality is that the distinction between an elected and partisan political elite and a neutral, 
supportive bureaucracy does not exist in practice. The idea stems from a technocratic 
view of the state which accords ministers the power to make policy decisions and issues 
bureaucrats with the task of implementing these tasks50. It also draws on classical 
management thinking in which a hierarchical structure achieves efficiencies through the 
coordinated assignment of labour to particular categories of problems, procedures and 
assignments51. However a range of issues deeply complicate these ostensibly simple 
ideas.  
For example, bureaucrats hold power by virtue of their access to knowledge of 
processes and local information that senior politicians may not have. As a result they 
may be consulted in the determination of policy and hence cross the floor from 
neutrality into the partisan world of policy. After all, each political party has different 
ideas about how resources should be allocated in society, and once bureaucrats are 
                                                 
48  For more on libertarian theory see amongst others Sen (1999), op. Cit, 63-67;  
49  Giddens (1995), op. Cit., pg55; 
50  I.e. the Science of Administration school which drew on Taylorist principles of industrial management  
such as staff reporting to a single head, division of administration into restricted functional units,  
organisational homogeneity within functions, and staff-line coordination. See Van Schendelen &  
Ringeling (1984): Openbaar Bestuur. Alphen aan den Rijn: Tjeenk Willink, pp. 41-47.  
51  Charles Lindblom (1977): Politics and Markets. The World’s Political-Economic Systems.New York:  
Basic Books, p. 27  
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directly involved in contestations over policy formulation they are involved directly in 
politics52. Yet it is crucial to the functioning of a democracy that bureaucrats maintain 
their neutrality vis-à-vis the policy making process: the allocation of resources needs to 
proceed according to non-partisan criteria - i.e. on grounds that are impersonal and are 
judged on the basis of rules rather than on the basis of allegiance or personal favours. If 
this were not so, the democratic system would be replaced by some form of patronage 
system. Thus state resources are allocated according to criteria that result in an 
entitlement, i.e. as long as one fits particular criteria that apply to a particular state 
resource, one is entitled to certain benefits that cannot be withheld53. To counteract 
patronage and anchor entitlements, bureaucrats must apply the rules and refrain from 
partisan behaviour. However in practice they are drawn into the policy realm and their 
responsibility for the process of implementation carries significant weight in the design 
of policies that are realistic in the procedural sense. Those responsible for the design of 
policy need to find ways in which envisaged policy can negotiate the procedural hurdles 
of the administrative system without encountering blockages, and here the politics of 
implementation begins.     
Policies may not be implemented as conceived because of technical or procedural 
difficulties, some of which may be the result of purposeful action by bureaucrats who 
do not agree with the contents of policy, while others may simply result from an 
inability to oversee all the possible consequences of a particular line of action. While 
each institution has its politics, the latter point is more important than one may at first 
think. Bureaucracies suffer from problems related to coordination – when tasks have 
been subdivided among offices or posts, but they also suffer from communication 
failures, information overloads, and from the fact that informal relations cross cut 
formal relations 54 . Taken together, these issues serve to undermine the internal 
coherence and efficiency of large organisations. Therefore the state itself should not be 
seen as a monolith which blindly serves whatever is seen to constitute the public interest, 
nor does it exclusively mediate between the interests of fractions of capital (as in the 
Marxist reading). Rather, it should be seen as a loosely coherent but also rather 
fragmented institution.  
Second, such disjunctures between policy and implementation exist between the state 
and civil society. State policies assume that intervention is in the public interest, but all 
policies will face at least some degree of resistance from some sectors of civil society 
(or uncivil society), as the policies to some degree affect the autonomy of the actors 
concerned. As a result, the outcomes of policy implementation may differ significantly 
from those expected by those responsible for devising and/or executing those policies. 
The release of resources towards the realisation of a particular goal sets in motion a 
dialectical relationship between the political elite, the bureaucracy, and actors in civil 
society, of which the outcome will almost certainly depart to some extent from the 
original intentions. Long states: 
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53  Drawn from Etziony-Halevy (1983): op. Cit, p.86-90; 
54  See Charles Lindblom (1977): op. Cit, pgs 66-75;  
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“Intervention is an on-going transformational process that is constantly re-shaped by its own internal 
organisational and political dynamic and by the specific conditions it encounters or itself creates, 
including the responses and strategies of local and regional groups who may struggle to define and 
defend their own social spaces, cultural boundaries and positions within the wider power field”55.  
 
This perspective on intervention as a dynamic and ongoing process resonates with the 
idea of ‘deep democracy’ in civil society theory. This contrasts with shallow, delegative 
democracy in which civil society provides input into governance only once in every 
four to five years via a passive process involving selection from a menu of parties 
representing packages of policies with deep, ongoing, issue-based participatory 
governance based on interactions between civil society organisations and the state56.  
Democracy enables public debates about the allocation of various kinds of resources 
in society. It provides a partial antidote to systems of elite control in which economic, 
political and cultural resources are deployed in the service of a narrow set of interests. 
At one level, civil society organisations can claim against the state for the redistribution 
of resources in favour of the less privileged. Secondly, democracies are ideally 
characterised by voluntary (horizontal) forms of association among citizens, as opposed 
to clientelism, which is characterised by non-voluntary (vertical) forms of association 
which relegate the recipients to subjects. Thus democracy can counter power relations 
in society, which are based on unequal access to resources. In T.H. Marshall’s 
perspective57, there is an inherent tension between vertical democracy in the form of 
citizenship rights and the class system which generates inequality. Much of the subject 
matter of democracy involves the efforts of the less privileged to gain enhanced access 
to key resources. Thus, through democratic procedures, all forms of elite domination 
from cultural hegemony to economic exclusion can be the subject of claim-making and 
contest by groups in civil society. Lower economic strata engage with the state in 
relation to the provision of entitlements, and by so doing contribute to the deepening of 
democracy. It can further be expected that the entitlement claims of poorer strata of a 
population focus on key resources from which they are excluded. These are assets such 
as access to land and water, health and nutrition, education, buffers against adversity, 
and access to the centres of power and policy formulation. Such claims are made from a 
diverse base of world-views and understandings of entitlements, which on the one hand 
contribute to plurality but on the other hand may be fundamentally different and 
mutually exclusive. In other words, entitlements such as property rights or rights to free 
health care are the subject of contest. Thus while the state may attempt to lay down the 
basic parameters for action within a democratic framework, it cannot go uncontested. 
Entitlements are bound up with perceptions of legitimacy (of ownership, of cultural 
practises and of a political system), so that one’s world view fundamentally affects 
one’s perception of entitlements.  
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During a political transition such as the one that South Africa has experienced, there 
is a great extent of institutional fluidity and instability. The old political elite makes way 
for new political elite with a substantially different vision on policy. A great number of 
laws are repealed and new laws are formulated, including radical changes in property 
rights and entitlements. A great many policies are annulled and new policies are 
formulated. The institutional design of the entire state apparatus is subject to review. 
New institutional and political alliances are formed, while others are disbanded. Donor 
funding is rerouted from civil society to the state, placing many civil society 
organisations under stress 58 . All in all, the climate of transition is one of great 
uncertainty and change. Within this context, actors within the state and in civil society 
assess options within the context of bounded rationality as discussed above, whereby 
the transaction costs involved in obtaining relevant information are even higher than 
they would be under normal circumstances. Policy formulation takes place on the basis 
of assumptions that may within a short space of time prove to be misplaced. Actors 
gamble on particular outcomes, which may or may not materialise. As time passes new 
institutional structures and laws begin to materialise and the dust begins to settle. 
Claims for access to resources begin to focus around particular policy proposals and 
parliamentary bills. New institutional processes begin to take shape. Civil society 
‘decompression’ is followed by regrouping and campaigning around new issues. And 
within this context, the scarcity of a fundamental societal resource becomes the focal 
point for a series of institutional and actor strategies, around which a new dialectical 
process begins to unfold. The government proposes new water laws and water policies, 
water management organisations are subject to review, water experts regroup and form 
new institutions, water users find new channels for their claims, and new discourses on 
water are launched in the public arena. The trajectory of this institutional politics is 
drawn both by the need of a wide range of actors to secure access to the resource, and 
by the backdrop of political transition. To further explain how this can take place, it is 
necessary to unpack the idea of scarcity in more detail, and to factor an understanding of 
scarcity into the above framework of institutional change. It is to this task that the 
chapter now turns.  
 
 
Scarcity: an overview of the debate  
This next section is devoted to the analysis of a range of theoretical approaches to the 
problem of natural resource scarcity. Commencing with the word itself, the Oxford 
dictionary defines a resource that is scarce as ‘insufficient for the demand’, i.e. demand is 
taken as a given. However this definition is somewhat limited, as scarcity has more 
components than demand alone. A better definition is advanced by Homer Dixon, who 
provides a broad definition of environmental scarcity which incorporates three causes of 
scarcity into one analysis, namely supply-induced scarcity, demand-induced scarcity and 
structural scarcity. He illustrates these dimensions as follows: 
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“A simple pie metaphor illustrates these three kinds of scarcity. Supply-induced scarcity gets worse 
when the resource pie shrinks because it has been depleted in quantity or degraded in quality. Demand-
induced scarcity rises when, for example, a growing population divides a static resource pie into smaller 
pieces for each individual. Structural scarcity is aggravated when some groups get disproportionately 
large slices of the pie while other groups get slices that are too small”59.  
  
This definition is broader and more multi-faceted than the definition of scarcity as it is 
used in neoclassical economics, i.e. whereby economics is defined as a study of the 
relationship between endless wants and scarce means. Not only does the latter definition 
exclude demand from the analysis (demand is uncritically considered to be endless), but 
it is merely concerned with aggregates and not with localised scarcities such as those 
encapsulated by the idea of structural scarcity. By definition, it suggests that the study 
of scarcity should be concerned with factors that affect the supply of the resource, with 
factors that affect the demand for the resource, and with factors that affect the 
distribution of the resource. By virtue of its greater conceptual reach and its 
appropriateness to a range of different contexts, it is argued here, this definition is 
superior to that advanced by neoclassical economics. It is the definition used in this 
work.  
 The next question, then, is how to incorporate this broad definition of scarcity within 
the gamut of social theories of the environment. As a point of entry, I propose to make 
use of a typology presented by Ted Benton as a means to order the differing approaches to 
the subject of scarcity within the social sciences60. It must be noted at inception, though, 
that Benton’s typology refers to social theories of the environment in general and that I 
am applying it to the specific realm of resource scarcity. Benton distinguishes three 
classes of approach to the environmental debate (in the social sciences) in general: 
sociological reductionism, technological determinism, and naturalistic reductionism. 
 Sociological reductionism theories accentuate the importance of social processes and 
underplay the effect of nature on those social processes: theorists in this category either do 
not recognize the existence of, or downplay the importance of, an objective reality outside 
human thought and social discourse. Therefore, the environmental debate is primarily of 
interest for its usefulness in laying bare the sociological processes. Benton puts this as 
follows:  
 
“It is all the same, as far as the sociologist is concerned, whether we do in fact face ecological 
catastrophe, or whether environmentalists have conjured this threat out of their fevered imaginations. 
Under the guise of a methodological division of labour between the concerns of sociologists and natural 
scientists, this type of approach […] excludes environmental issues themselves from investigation”61.  
 
Next, Naturalistic reductionism asserts that rather than there being a fundamental 
dichotomy between humanity and nature, humanity stems from and is embedded in nature. 
Nature provides the model for human life and culture, and while we once lived in 
harmony with nature, this harmony is now lost, nature is being destroyed, and in order to 
survive mankind must return to a simpler, less environmentally destructive life. In the 
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environmental debate naturalist reductionists are generally speaking pessimistic with 
respect to mankind’s ability to sustainably expand production and consumption. We have 
at best a poor understanding of the workings of ecosystems, climate, etc. therefore our 
capacity to ‘manage’ these systems is severely limited. 
 Finally, technological determinism stems from the enlightenment and from positive 
evaluations of man’s capacity to ‘manage’ humanity’s interaction with nature. As Benton 
states,  
 
“The core assumptions shared by all …variants of the technologically determinist view are that there is a 
single-line cumulative growth of scientific knowledge in history [which] gives rise to progressive 
mastery of nature through its application in technology [resulting in] the ever-growing satisfaction of 
human desires” 62 
 
Technological determinists are generally speaking optimists in the environmental debate, 
asserting that although environmental problems may present themselves, science and 
technology may solve or significantly reduce the adverse impacts of environmental 
problems. For this reason it is also often called the ‘managerialist’ approach.  
 There is a good degree of correspondence between Benton’s scheme and the 
framework proposed by Buttel, albeit with the use of different labels for each category. 
For instance, Buttel refers to ‘social constructionism’ for that body of sociological theory 
which focuses on ‘cultural’ aspects of environmental sociology and elevates constructions 
of the environment to the symbolic level63. This comes close to the depiction of the realm 
of sociological reductionism as presented by Benton. Next, Buttel refers to ‘ecological 
modernisation’ theory as “a relatively optimistic view of the potentials for technological 
change to lead to solutions for environmental problems”. This comes very close to 
Benton’s idea of technological determinism. Finally, Buttel describes the ‘North 
American environmental sociology’ as a field of inquiry which hones in on empirical 
overviews of environmental destruction and distil from this intrinsic trends towards 
environmental degradation and crisis in a range of fields such as urban development, 
industrial production, market processes, and so on. This view is very similar to the 
naturalist reductionist approach which emphasise the ultimately naturally imposed limits 
to growth.  
 Similarly, Homer-Dixon identifies three ‘camps’ in the environmental debate, this time 
specifically geared to the issue of natural resource scarcity64. In his case, however, only 
two of the categories identified correspond with Benton’s typology. These are, 
respectively, ‘Neo-Malthusianism’ and ‘economic optimism’. Neo-Malthusianism could 
be compared to Benton’s category of naturalist reductionism in that they are both 
pessimistic about the ability to sustain economic growth within the limits placed by nature 
and that they both predict an imminent crisis of scarcity as the physical availability of 
resources clashes with the exponential growth in the demand for those resources. 
‘Economic optimism’, in turn, could be compared to Benton’s category of technological 
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determinism in that the former asserts that scarcity itself induces “standard economic 
responses that will maintain or increase the stream of utility provided by scarce 
resources”65. These standard responses include harder work, further labour specialisation, 
investment in higher productivity through capital goods, etc.     
 The two authors differ in their definition of the third group of scarcity theories: Homer 
Dixon’s third category is labelled distributionism and refers to Marxist and neo-Marxist 
theories that focus on the distribution of resources within society. These theories point out 
that institutions in society such as the market generate inequalities in access to resources, 
i.e. that society produces inequality and thus scarcity among certain social classes66.  
 I wish to argue that Benton’s category of ‘sociological reductionism’ is more 
appropriate, because Homer-Dixon’s third category is not in itself a theoretical category 
so much as one that stems from the definition of the concept of scarcity. In my own 
framework, I have chosen a definition of scarcity which includes the concept of dearth, in 
order precisely to capture situations in which scarcity exists amid plenty, i.e. as a result of 
forces affecting the distribution of resources in the way intended by Homer-Dixon. If 
scarcity includes dearth, there is no reason why its treatment cannot proceed within the 
context of either naturalistic reductionism or technological determinism, and therefore it 
cannot really be treated as a separate theoretical category.  
 Paradoxically, Homer-Dixon himself offers a highly appropriate definition of scarcity 
which includes dearth (which he calls ‘structural scarcity’). As a result his third ‘category’ 
is more the result of emphasising a particular connotation of the concept than it is the 
result of the existence of a separate approach to thinking on scarcity.  
 The three categories put forward by Benton should emphatically be seen as academic 
boxes which exist for the sake of ordering. In practise, most theorists use ideas from all 
three categories in their own unique mix, and the positions taken are only mutually 
exclusive in their extreme forms (i.e. all social activity is always constrained by nature or 
technology will always transcend natural limits). The classification of authors into a 
particular category is therefore a judgement call based on the emphasis in their narrative 
on the relative importance of society, nature or technology. Turning this argument on its 
head, it also means that there is agreement amongst most authors that scarcity is 
influenced by three factors, i.e. by the nature and strength of institutions, by the state of 
technology, and by processes in nature. The debate is (by and large) not an either-or 
debate but a more subtle difference of opinion on the weight that should be attributed to 
various causal factors. Figure one below shows scarcity unpacked into its component 
parts as contained in Homer-Dixon’s definition, and it shows the three causal factors 
referred to above. 
 
First, sociological reductionism as applied to natural resource scarcity is an approach 
characterised by concern about a perceived shift in norms and values vis-à-vis goods and 
services that has taken place in western society in the past three hundred years and which 
has subsequently spread to all corners of the globe. The spatial and temporal terrain 
covered in the arguments of this approach is generally large and the levels of abstraction 
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66  Ibid, pg 35.  
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are high. In essence the arguments presented are philosophical (i.e. devoted to knowledge 
of reality) and relate to cultural transitions (meaning in this case changes in the ways in 
which scarcity is perceived in society). 
 
Figure 2.1 
 
Causes and components of scarcity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The observations on scarcity reflect a concern over the environmental consequences of 
an exponential growth of the production of goods, services and waste on a finite planet, a 
concern with cultural transition from secure, tightly knit and predictable but socially and 
environmentally safe social units to rampant individualism and a passing of the environ-
mental buck. However the analyses are socio-centric in the sense that culture is the main 
object of analysis, rather than mankind’s inherent relationship with nature. In the opinion 
of the proponents of this variant, scarcity is (largely) a social construct, created by 
transformations in cultural systems and the resulting effects on production and 
consumption. Natural resources are not ‘naturally’ scarce but become so in relation to 
changing human desires. Essentially the argument defended is that the lifting of the social 
taboos on unlimited desire and the gradual merging of previously separate categories of 
needs and desires, along with technological and military successes that guaranteed 
continuously rising production and access to necessary resources, created scarcity as a 
social fact and as a social driving force. The arguments contained in this approach to 
scarcity contain a strong emphasis on understanding the origins of scarcity and not on 
developing ideas for its amelioration. Two thinkers in this tradition are Xenos67 and 
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Achterhuis68 . Xenos can be bracketed with Achterhuis as thinkers who believe that 
scarcity is an invention of modernity. Others, like Ophuls (a naturalist reductionist) 
dispute this view and argue that the ‘tradition’ of scarcity goes back much further.  
 Commencing with the views of Xenos, scarcity (in Western European society) is 
argued to have moved from being a term referring to a temporary lack of necessities to a 
permanent and general condition in the last four hundred years. Where scarcity used to 
refer to a limited period of interrupted supply of a culturally delimited package of goods 
and services, it gradually took on new meaning as a permanent phenomenon and as an 
engine of continuous, restless motion of society and production in search of the 
satisfaction of desire. The cultural step necessary for this transition was the gradual fading 
of the difference between needs and wants and a motion in society continuously defining 
wants as needs whilst constructing new wants to replace those already satisfied. In 
modern times, where positions in the social ranking are no longer determined by birth, 
wealth signifies status instead of status signifying wealth. The maintenance of social 
status becomes intimately connected with acquisition. 'Competitive emulation' within an 
unequal society creates demands for certain products established at the pinnacle, a 
demand which travels downwards through the social hierarchy, becoming more mass-
based and less desirable as it does so. Thus social scarcity is created, a category which is 
separate from scarcity of necessities. The institution of private property and the division 
of labour multiply the possibilities for the development of social scarcity69. 
 Achterhuis agrees with the 'invention of scarcity' postulate as long as it is clear that this 
does not mean an individual propagation of the concept but a structural and generalised 
change in culture. "Scarcity arising out of limitless desire is, in this general sense, an 
invention of modernity" 70 . Emulation as an engine of social scarcity is strongly 
represented in his work: he contends that the philosophical underpinnings of the concept 
of scarcity commence with Thomas Hobbes. The fear of scarcity leads to continuous 
comparisons and conflict between individuals and groups, and only the establishment of a 
central state can prevent degeneration of this situation into war. From Hobbes onwards, 
scarcity is seen as a natural fact and labour, technology and conquest must be deployed to 
put an end to scarcity. The history of mankind is rewritten to insert the myth of a long and 
hard struggle to overcome scarcity, whereby nature is blamed for its insufficiency and the 
overcoming of natural scarcity through labour and technology is one of the mighty end 
products of societal evolution. According to Achterhuis, the 'Leviathan' or authoritarian 
state required to avert 'the war of all against all' over scarce resources is "resurrected in 
global form" in the shape of the spaceship earth concept with its elite scientific steering 
committee. In this resurrected form, nature and resources are devalued to the level of their 
utility for human survival: nature's intrinsic value is replaced by a dry inventory of 
available resources71.  
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 For a number of reasons, sociological reductionism should be seen as a quest to 
accentuate the symbolic as a response to naturalist reductionist perspectives which were 
seen to be too concerned with the empirical inventory of environmental damage. The 
reason behind the call for attention to the symbolic, Buttel asserts, is emphatically not to 
cast away ‘realist’ perspectives but to call for more balance in the representation of the 
material and the symbolic: 
 
“A one-sided realist account of environmental science and knowledge – which environmental sociology 
often comes perilously close to embracing – is just that – one-sided, and inconsistent with any reasonable 
sociological perspective which must take account both ‘structure’ and ‘agency’, and the material and the 
symbolic. Even from a realist perspective, any concept such as global environmental change must be 
seen as an abstraction which, if it proves to be a good one, will help to illuminate the processes of the 
natural world but in doing so it will obscure others […] Interpretive sociologies are not intrinsically 
inconsistent with structural or materialist views […] without detracting from the fact that scientific 
knowledge tends to more or less mirror the realities of the natural world, the crucial role of science often 
lies in how it is ‘represented’ and how it is employed”72.   
 
 
The point of focusing on symbolic processes, therefore, is not to replace one reductionism 
with another but to add the symbolic to the materialist.  
 Second, from an institutional approach to social processes as developed earlier in this 
chapter above it is argued that resources – some of which are natural resources - are 
deployed in human interaction. Giddens states: “Resources, treated as structural elements 
of social systems, are drawn upon by actors in the instantiation of interaction” 73 . 
Therefore the deployment of these resources is essential to an understanding of socio - 
cultural life rather than being marginal to it. Furthermore, Giddens asserts that all human 
interaction involves the symbolic (communication of meaning), the operation of power 
(allocation of resources and authority) and modes of sanctioning (legitimation)74. In this 
view, again, the material and the symbolic are inseparable ingredients of social processes 
and thus little is gained from sociological reductionism other than the call to not forget the 
symbolic.  
 Next, naturalist reductionism, as mentioned above, assets that mankind is 
fundamentally embedded in nature and that while nature enables economic growth, it also 
imposes limits upon society. The most famous contribution to naturalistic reductionism is 
that of Thomas Malthus, and hence much naturalistic reductionism is also labelled as neo-
Malthusianism. Drawing very strongly on biology, Malthus argued that there was a 
contradiction between the propensity of human populations to grow exponentially and the 
growth of agricultural production, which proceeded linearly. He argued that therefore 
ultimately the average food output per capita would decline, leading to famine and/or 
war.75 However what it is that constitutes neo-Malthusianism is a point for further debate, 
as what began as a debate on population growth versus food production has now been 
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stretched to include debates on economic growth versus oil production. In this sense 
naturalist reductionism is much broader than Malthusianism, as it has both transcended 
the preoccupation with demographics and extended the debate to other resources than 
food.  
 A more recent and interesting representative of naturalistic reductionism this approach 
is William Ophuls, who could be described as a human ecologist76/77. Ophuls focuses on 
the question whether the way in which human communities are organised is compatible 
with the dynamics of their physical and biotic milieux, and emphasises the ultimate 
dependency of humanity on natural systems for survival. He departs significantly from 
the ideas of Achterhuis and Xenos in that he accepts scarcity as a natural given78. In fact, 
for Ophuls, rather than being a modern ‘invention’, it was precisely the existence of 
scarcity which necessitated the establishment of political institutions that could regulate 
the distribution of resources in publicly acceptable ways. Ideas about scarcity therefore 
fundamentally affect the ways in which political institutions function. Instead of being a 
period in which scarcity was invented, modernity is a period of 'abnormal abundance'. A 
number of simultaneously occurring contingencies served to implode the frontiers of 
scarcity and unleash the exponential growth of production and consumption which is 
characteristic of the modern age. The first and most important of these were the 
annexations of land in the New World which multiplied several fold the physical and 
biological resources which Europeans had under their command. This temporarily 
eliminated natural resource scarcity. A second reason for the rollback of scarcity was the 
strong advance of science and technology which opened a vast realm of possibilities in 
civil engineering, manufacturing, farming, etc. A third element in the reduction of scarcity 
was the abundant existence of ecological 'sinks' which could absorb the waste products 
generated by the strong increases in production. The new wealth provided the ground for 
the development of the institutions of our time such as democracy, individualism and 
freedom. On all the three fronts of victory over scarcity, however, the boom is over. There 
is no longer an expanding frontier, technology "can only manipulate what is already 
there", and the limits of the earth's 'sinks' to absorb waste have certainly been reached. In 
this sense Ophuls speaks of an imminent 'return to scarcity'79/80. 
 The idea that the frontier is gone or fast disappearing is repeated in the famous 
contribution to the scarcity debate by the Club of Rome in its publication 'The Limits to 
Growth'81. This contribution is a textbook case of naturalistic reductionism. The Club of 
Rome's publication 'The Limits to Growth' which served as a focus for environmental 
debate for many years, argues that the absolute limits to supply of various natural 
resources will at various stages begin to restrict the capacities of economies to sustain 
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growth. In the Limits to Growth logic, growth itself is identified as the fundamental 
problem, operating through resource scarcity, population growth, food production 
shortfalls, reductions in capital investments or excessive pollution, eventually leading to 
overall system collapse via a wide range of possible scenarios. The argumentation 
presented by the Club of Rome, while extremely influential, has been criticized on a 
number of fronts. One important source of critique was based on the fact that the 
argumentation was based on computer models of world development which constituted a 
highly simplified and technical model of reality (i.e. ignoring political and social 
processes). Two other criticisms, however, are more important to discussions of the issue 
of scarcity, namely the role of technological development and the existence of market 
adjustments to scarcity. I will deal with each of these in turn. Technological development, 
firstly, may act in several ways to counteract the negative effects of a vanished frontier. 
The first of these is greater efficiency of use: rising scarcity will provide an incentive for 
the development of technologies which are more resource efficient. The second is 
substitution: growing scarcity will stimulate a search for other means towards the same 
end, such as the drive for hydroelectric and nuclear power after the 1973 oil crisis. The 
third is recycling: more time and energy are devoted to obtaining the resource from the 
waste products of production and consumption. The other factor acting to mitigate the 
effects of rising scarcity is the market mechanism: according to this view, a rise in 
scarcity will produce a rise in prices which will lead to an automatic reduction in demand 
for the resource in question82. 
 Thus the main thrust of the Club of Rome's argument, i.e. that there is a basic 
contradiction between a fixed pool of resources and an exponentially expanding economy, 
was weakened because technological improvement and market responses to scarcity were 
not incorporated into the model. And on another front, the argumentation was severely 
weakened by the fact that for many of the non-renewable resources (which were the 
subject of the Club of Rome's report), the improvements in technology and/or rises in 
price have extended the amounts of resource available: "for most minerals, the rate at 
which new discoveries and new technological and economic changes have added to 
proven reserves has exceeded, or at least kept pace with, increases in consumptionand it 
applies equally to oil and natural gas"83. The argumentation would perhaps have held 
more water if its subject had been the renewable class of resources: renewable resources 
are being exploited above their natural rate of regeneration and in this sense they are 
being depleted. Their depletion is likely to constrict to an ever growing extent the capacity 
for economic growth in those areas in which these resources are being used. The global 
fishing industry has grown to the extent that fish stocks of various fish species have been 
exhausted, requiring restraint on fishing to allow stock regeneration. World topsoil loss 
through erosion, overproduction and poisoning is eroding the very basis of agricutural 
production. Deforestation is threatening supplies of fuel wood, timber and an inestimable 
quantity of genetic and other resources which the forests are home to84. Finally, with 
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some 100 000 dams on earth of which some 36 000 have a dam wall of more than 15 
metres in height, and with the rapid growth of groundwater extraction, the limits on the 
supply of fresh water are within reach and have already been reached in many places. 
Fresh water must be ever more judiciously distributed over competing economic sectors, 
while the costs of expanding supply or purifying existing supplies rise. 
 A fifth contributor to the causes of scarcity debate is Michael Jacobs, who might be 
labelled as an ‘enlightened’ naturalist reductionist. Jacobs is an environmental economist 
and thus he places emphasis on the role of the economy rather than ‘culture’ in the 
production of scarcity85. For Jacobs, the environmental crisis in general is caused by 
economic activity, and economic activity is undermined by the environmental crisis - i.e. 
the economy is embedded in and dependent upon nature. Economic activity entails “the 
transformation of materials and energy from one state into another….what economic 
activity does is turn resources into wastes” whereby the ‘useful product’ produced (the 
period in which resources, transformed into products and services, perform services or 
satisfy wants) is but a passing middle phase in this transformation86. Furthermore, “the 
more resources are used, the more wastes need to be assimilated. Resource depletion 
(scarcity) and pollution are essentially the same problem, as they are two sides of one 
coin”87 . In his opinion, for various reasons such as the emergence of technological 
innovations that reduce the demand for non-renewable resources or replace this demand 
with demand for other resources, the rising scarcity of renewable resources is a more 
important issue than the scarcity of non-renewable resources88. However, he emphasises 
the limited role of technology in the scarcity debate. Firstly, he states, environmental 
degradation is not a regrettable by-product of economic development to be solved through 
technological improvement, but one of its main products (all products become wastes)89. 
Secondly, control of forest or fishery (and by implication: water) depletion requires 
political or economic change rather than technological change. Thirdly, technological 
change has already been very impressive in the past decades but it has been directed 
primarily at increasing production rather than at reducing environmental damage: 
technology is “chosen and financed, and these decisions, made primarily by private 
businesses, are…based mainly on economic calculation”90. The dual problem of scarcity 
and pollution (quantity and quality) is the result of the aggregation of individual consumer 
and producer decisions on the market. Economic activity consciously or unconsciously 
creates environmental damage, and decisions are influenced more by market signals than 
by environmental constraints. 
 Let us now focus our attention on the last group of thinkers, i.e. the technological 
determinists. As mentioned above the core assumption of technological determinism is 
that limits imposed by nature upon economic progress are temporary and are generally 
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solved by new waves of technological progress. Judith Rees could be classified as a 
cautious technological optimist. Reacting to publications such as the limits to growth by 
Meadows et al. Rees asserts that, in the case of most minerals,  
 
“The rate at which new discoveries and technological and economic changes have added to proven 
reserves has exceeded, or at least kept pace with, increases in consumption […] An ultimate resource 
base five times greater than the current level of proven reserves may appear to be generous but in just 
twenty years, from 1950 to 1970, increases of or above that magnitude were experienced for iron, 
chromite, bauxite, oil, potash, phosphates and many other of our most widely used minerals[…] All 
physically deterministic models fail to take account of the fact that resources are culturally determined, a 
product of social choice, technology and the workings of the economic system. Man is not a blind 
automaton programmed to push stock resource consumption to catastrophic limits”91. 
 
Clearly, for Rees, technology provides a significant escape option for the rising resource 
demands of growing economies, but she places considerable emphasis on the importance 
of disaggregating natural resources into stock (non-renewable) and flow (renewable & 
inexhaustible) resources. While she is a clear technological optimist in the case of stock 
resources, she observes an inability on the part of technology to avert rising pressures on 
renewable resources. As examples to support her case she cites the higher pressure on 
recreation facilities caused by rising consumer incomes in the North, the adverse impact 
of high external input industrial agriculture on biodiversity, the inability of the 
technology-based green revolution to avert food shortages in the South, and the negative 
effects on soil salinity and on water tables by the unchecked expansion of irrigation. 
Working on the conscious assumption that market forces could serve to avert stock 
resource scarcity (e.g. through rising scarcity resulting in higher prices and a resultant 
drop in demand or a search for cheaper substitutes), she goes so far as to say that 
 
“It is just possible that the technological changes and other forms of adaptation generated by the market 
to avert stock resource scarcity will prove compatible with the maintenance of the critical bio-
geochemical cycles [i.e. renewing renewable resources, T.S.], but it would be an act of supreme faith (or 
extreme folly) to rely on such a happy coincidence of interests.” 92 
 
Rees’ point on the disaggregating of natural resources is crucial to a proper understanding 
of scarcity specifically, but also to the understanding of resource dynamics in general. A 
prime failing of the natural resources management debate is the level of aggregation at 
which debates are pitched. Naturalist reductionists such as Ophuls, Meadows and 
Meadows or Jacobs pitch their narratives at the level of entire cultures, the world 
economy, or ‘the’ nature of economic production. Furthermore, both technological 
determinists and naturalist reductionists suffer from what could be called ‘the great 
sunshine and elephants debate’, or a tendency to force the enormous diversity of the 
natural world under one heading and then hope for a debate that somehow adds value to 
our understanding of natural resource management processes. However, the set of 
structured social practices that characterises relationships between social institutions and 
the sun are very different from the set of structured social practices that characterises 
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relationships between social institutions and elephants. There is little hope for progress in 
the analysis of environmental issues unless the levels of analysis are brought down to 
researchable levels, and unless ‘natural resources’ are differentiated to a greater extent. 
Again, there is need for a meso-level approach to research in which diversity can be 
captured.    
 
Towards an institutional approach to scarcity 
It was mentioned above that there is agreement amongst most authors that scarcity is 
influenced by the nature and strength of institutions, by the state of technology, and by 
processes in nature. It was further argued that sociological reductionism, naturalistic 
reductionism and technological determinism have drawbacks including a tendency 
towards reductionism and high levels of abstraction in analysis. I argue here that many of 
these drawbacks can be overcome through an institutional approach to scarcity. In such an 
approach, the level of analysis is brought down to the meso-level of the institution. After 
all, there are fundamental methodological problems involved in researching global issues 
qualitatively. For example, globalisation can only be studied locally93.  
 An institutional approach to scarcity would entail a study of the structured social 
practices that define relationships of control over/access to natural resources, with specific 
reference to scarcity. Within the broader framework of institutional change, an 
institutional approach to scarcity is an approach that analyses scarcity by analysing those 
organisations in society which manage control over and access to resources. Furthermore, 
by virtue of the definition of scarcity provided above as supply-induced, demand-induced, 
and structural, such an analysis would have to be up to the task of capturing all three 
dimensions of the concept. 
 This brings us to another argument. There are two important and interlinked schools of 
thought which ‘entail a study of structured social practices that define relationships of 
control over/access to natural resources’. One of these is the ‘entitlements’ approach in 
development studies, which was developed to further understandings of the 
maldistribution of resources in society. As argued above, this cannot be seen as a separate 
school of scarcity thought, because it only covers one aspect of scarcity and is not up to 
the task of explaining macro-changes in supply and demand. However, there is another 
school of thought which has been developed with this task in mind, i.e. what could be 
referred to as the property and access rights school. This school emphasises that different 
forms of resource use and allocation (including resource degradation, inefficiencies in 
allocation, and scarcity) are the result of different kinds of property rights. This school 
does explain macro-changes in resource utilisation by referring to the functioning of 
property rights institutions. Therefore, in order to analyse scarcity in the broad meaning of 
the word, the entitlements approach needs to be wedded to the property rights approach 
such that what emerges is an approach that explains supply, demand, and distribution. 
However, in doing so, it must be borne in mind that the emergent approach is an 
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institutional approach. What this means is that, in the sense referred to by Giddens, it 
refers to the set of chronically reproduced social practices that constitute entitlements and 
property rights. In other words, neither entitlements nor property rights should be taken as 
a given but as an institution. This means that they only exist in so far as they are the 
subject of repetitive interactions, and they are subject to change and contestation. Property 
rights which are declared by law but never enforced are not institutions, and neither are 
entitlements that cannot be translated into capabilities.      
 The entitlement approach stresses that each society has its own mode of regulation of 
access to natural resources, and if problems of access (i.e. scarcity) emerge, the mode of 
regulation of access to resources should be scrutinised. Although essentially a 
cultural/economic/legal approach, this approach is not sociologically reductionist, as 
nature and society both feature in the equation, and very real natural resource scarcities 
are examined. Nor is it technologically reductionist: the question raised in this approach is 
not how natural resources can best be accessed or productively engaged, but to whom 
they belong or under whose control they fall. Lastly, although there may be quite some 
overlap with naturalist reductionists in the common attention for ‘collapse of the frontier’ 
approaches such as in modern studies of progressive subdivisions of agricultural lands in 
Africa, ownership questions in encroachment of tropical forests and nature reserves, the 
entitlement approach does not inherently bring the pressure on natural systems to the fore 
(being the context rather than the subject matter). The founding father of the entitlement 
approach is Amartya Sen, who produced a long series of articles and volumes on the 
relationships between entitlements and their flipside, deprivation. In essence, the approach 
asserts that poverty may be manifested through a lack of access to basic human needs 
such as food and water, but that the cause of poverty lies at a deeper level. For example, 
there may be enough food available to the poor but this does not mean that the poor can 
access this food through purchase, barter, credit or other means. The determinant of 
access to basic human needs (and luxuries) is the command over resources. For example 
entitlements to land, water and seeds may be engaged in production through the input of 
labour in order to produce food for consumption or for sale. Each culture and economy 
(slave, feudal, socialist, capitalist) has its own system of entitlement relations specifying 
which ownership and control patterns are considered legitimate. In each superimposition 
of culture and economy ownership or control over natural resources is regulated through 
mechanisms such as trade, inheritance, and lease. Assuming the willingness and capacity 
of individuals to engage in production and exchange, access over resources translates into 
access to basic human needs. Scarcity in this approach is attributable essentially to a 
failure of entitlements. Given the unequal distribution of resources within society, the 
entitlement approach provides a powerful tool for the analysis of scarcity as created 
through power relations in society, and for the inclusion of distributive scarcity as an 
element of the overall concept of scarcity94. 
 Sen’s entitlement approach referred to such entitlements as employment, assets, labour 
power, resources and social security. It is possible to expand this set from a fairly 
economistic set to include other forms of resource that can equally be accessed in times of 
need. 
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 A broader approach to entitlements is contained in the approach taken by Robert 
Chambers, a development theorist. Also focussing on deprivation as an aspect of scarcity, 
Chambers identifies five interlocking clusters of disadvantage which function as modes of 
exclusion from access to goods and services. The first of these is a lack of assets, and 
relates directly to Sen’s concept of entitlements. A lack of assets means diminished 
control over the means of production and diminished trade based entitlements: one has 
little to trade with. The second disadvantage is physical weakness, referring to the ratio of 
dependents to able bodied adults in a household. Production and energy expenditure are 
thus continuously dissipated, resulting in little capacity to produce surpluses. The third 
disadvantage is isolation, referring to the relationship between access to information and 
access to resources such as employment, scientific production methods. Isolation creates 
dearth amongst other things through ignorance. The fourth disadvantage is vulnerability. 
This refers to the buffers against contingencies that a household has at its disposal. If one 
has few resources these may be destroyed or incapacitated through one incident or few 
incidents. In this sense scarcity breeds scarcity and abundance breeds abundance. Finally, 
the fifth disadvantage is powerlessness. This refers to the position in the hierarchy on the 
factory floor, the position in relation to rural or urban elites, the position in relation to the 
law, and so on. Powerlessness translates into diminished command over resources95. 
 The Sen/Chambers model is somewhat static in that entitlements are somehow seen to 
‘automatically’ translate into access to basic needs, leaving out the entire gamut of social 
forces that may prevent an agent translating an entitlement into a productive investment, 
trade, or barter. Chambers does cover this by recognising the existence of ‘contingencies’ 
against which the poor have few buffers, but again it seems as though the precise 
mechanics of these contingencies are swept aside despite their importance in explaining 
the translation of entitlements into realised opportunities. One way towards a model with 
more nuance is to append the word ‘claims’ to entitlements as put forward by Dietz: 
 
“Claims can be based on a variety of legal systems, sometimes operating at the same time in the same 
area. In many societies different sets of entitlement rules compete: state laws (often a body of laws that is 
in itself full of contradictions), religious laws or laws governed by deeply entrenched moral codes, and 
indigenous laws” 96 
 
Entitlements may thus have some permanence but they are subject to contestation. For 
instance, in the Marxian view, history itself is the story of contestation of ownership 
and/or control over the means of production. In this view the recognition or contestation 
of claims to access to natural resources constitutes the social arena within which 
translation of entitlements into opportunities is either made possible or obstructed. 
 Within the entitlement approach as a whole Sen and Chambers could possibly be 
labelled as ‘livelihood’ thinkers, the focus being on distributional aspects of scarcity and 
on human welfare with the environment featuring on the backdrop. Other entitlement 
thinkers specifically focus on the effects on natural resource management of different 
entitlement systems, and this group could be labelled as ‘property rights’ thinkers. The 
                                                 
95  Chambers, Robert (1983): Rural Development. Putting the Last First. New York: Longman 
96  Ibid. 
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general approach taken to explaining scarcity, overexploitation and degradation within 
this category is that inappropriate property rights systems generate scarcity (and 
overexploitation and degradation).  
 This approach could be said to have its roots in Garrett Hardin’s 1968 essay ‘The 
Tragedy of the Commons’ which pointed to a central contradiction between what is 
rational behaviour for the individual and what is rational behaviour for a community with 
respect to natural resources under common ownership. Individuals face incentives to 
utilise commonly owned resources so as to maximise their returns from the commonly 
owned resource, but the aggregate of these individual decisions results in the utilisation of 
resources (water, fish, forests, grazing land) above their regenerative capacity.  
David Pearce is a well-known exponent of the property rights approach, defining natural 
resources in terms of ownership patterns. Pearce (and many others) distinguish between 
‘open access’ resources (those with no owner), ‘common property’ resources (those 
owned at some level of collective decision making) and ‘private property’ (privately 
owned) resources. Pearce states: 
 
“One of the features of many environmental problems is that they occur in contexts where there are no 
owners or where there are owners who only have limited ‘security of tenure”97. 
 
 The central argument in this approach with respect to natural resource management is 
that ownership patterns contain inherent behavioural incentive patterns. If the incentive 
pattern is ‘set right’, natural resource management will be less destructive. The central 
argument with respect to natural resource scarcity is that the idea of ‘excessive use’ of 
natural resources is a normative or improperly defined idea. Scarcity is here 
(economistically) seen as a function of human demand, and Pearce asks for explanation of 
in relation to what it is that scarcity should be seen: in relation to human demand 
(resources and sinks may run out), in relation to future well being (resources and sinks 
will run out in the future), or in relation to the kind of resource in question (divided into 
materials and energy on the one hand and ‘sinks’ on the other). 
 Again, neither the entitlements approach nor the property rights approach should be 
static, in the sense that social activity is interpreted against a background of entitlements 
and property rights. Both entitlements and property rights are institutions, and they are 
subject to affirmation or change. An institutional study of scarcity is a study of 
organisations that regulate access to and control over natural resources, taking into 
account the resource availability in the natural environment and the technologies available 
in these organisations to manage the resource. Finally, it takes into account issues of 
supply, issues of demand, and issues of distribution by embracing both personal 
entitlements and aggregate property rights.     
 
                                                 
97  Pearce, David (1995): Blueprint 4. Capturing global environmental value. London: Earthscan. 
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Conclusions 
This chapter departed from the observation that the last century has witnessed a 
concerted effort to ‘replumb the planet’. This process has featured the construction of 
water resources management infrastructure at an unprecedented and exponentially 
increasing pace. This expansion of water management organisations and infrastructure 
is a response to (as well as the cause of) increasing water scarcity. The increase of water 
scarcity and its organisational responses need to be analysed, embedded as they are, 
within the broader framework of society and the transformation of its institutions.    
 To do this, it was argued, three steps are required. First of all, it is necessary to 
unpack in some detail the meaning attached to the concepts of institution and scarcity 
and place these concepts within a framework which serves to explain how organisations, 
faced with scarcity, may respond to the contingencies that arise during a political 
transition. This includes the challenge of understanding the ways in which resources are 
utilised in organisations. Second, it was argued that it is necessary to locate this 
understanding within a framework that can be used to understand organisational 
responses to the contingencies faced during a transition. Finally, was argued, it is 
necessary to unpack the concept of scarcity and to look at the ways in which the scarcity 
debate has been approached. Through the application of institutional analysis thus 
developed to the scarcity debate, it was hoped that fresh leverage would be gained over  
what is by now a very old debate.  
In section one, a framework was developed for the understanding of institutions 
generally, which was then elaborated to include the use of resources in resources in 
organisations. It was argued that this approach offered ways out of the development 
studies impasse of the early 1990’s, as well as offering solutions for the limitations of 
resource allocation thinking that stemmed from neoclassical economics. Out of this 
emerged a picture of actors, operating in organisations, deploying resources towards 
their own particular projects, on the basis of bounded rationality and faced by 
transaction costs in obtaining relevant information for decision making. In section two, 
this thinking was located within the broader context of planned intervention during a 
political transition, arguing that the state is a central point of orientation for actors in 
resource-related discourses. A model of the state was advanced in which the state is not 
seen as a monolith but as a complex, fragmented and not always coherent whole, 
operating in a dialectic relationship with institutions in civil society rather than 
efficiently implementing a preconceived blueprint. In section three, an overview was 
presented of the scarcity debate, consisting of three main schools of thought, i.e. 
sociological reductionism, naturalistic reductionism, and technological determinism. 
These schools were argued to differ mainly on the degree to which they emphasised the 
role of institutions, technology, and nature in influencing scarcity. They were also 
critiqued for their reductionism, a drawback which could be countered through the use 
of an institutional approach to research on scarcity. Therefore, it was argued, a model of 
water scarcity should be advanced that straddles this triad. Section three advanced a 
broad definition of scarcity to include both the relationships between supply and 
demand and issues of resource distribution within society. Finally, it was proposed that 
an institutional approach to scarcity would entail a study of the structured social practices 
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that define relationships of control over/access to natural resources, with specific 
reference to scarcity. To capture a broad definition of scarcity, these structured social 
practices would have to encompass both entitlement thinking and property rights thinking. 
3 
Scarcity, allocation and institutional change 
South African water resource management in the global 
context  
Introduction  
This chapter places the problem of South African water scarcity in its global context. 
The rising scarcity of (fresh) water in quantity and quality is, as stated in the theoretical 
chapter, a relatively new terrain of research. The precise domain of research in this field 
has yet to be established, more so than in research arenas which have accumulated 
momentum (i.e. in content and direction) and have established focal points of debate. The 
empirical context of this research therefore needs to be set out in some detail; it is 
necessary to describe the practical issues that are generating a set of social problems with 
which government policy and popular movements have to deal. What is the rise of water 
scarcity, how does it manifest itself in practise, and what set of issues does this generate? 
How, if at all, does South Africa differ from the global (developmental) picture and can 
anything be said about the relationships between the specifics of the South African 
situation and the general, global picture - is every situation entirely unique? This chapter 
attempts to depict the nature of the problem, placing the specifically South African 
narrative in a global context.  
The problem of scarcity per se lends itself to a quantitative approach, because 
scarcity is an issue that relates to supply, to demand and to distribution. Essentially this 
chapter therefore focuses on quantitative material, describing both globally and in South 
Africa an exponential growth over time of a tendency to replace natural water systems 
by man-made water use systemsi. As mentioned in chapter one, however, scarcity feeds 
in to an institutional context, and it is important to capture within an empirical narrative 
the nature of the institutional changes that are emerging.  
 64
This chapter looks first at the global context of water resources development, 
describing the rise of global water scarcity and the emergence of new institutional 
responses in the first five sections. Thereafter, the chapter zooms in on the development 
of South African water scarcity and its organisational responses to this situation in the 
other sections. Finally, conclusions are drawn on directions taken in SA policy, as 
placed against the backdrop of international experience and emerging issues, in the last 
section.  
 
The global boom in water demand   
Humanity first began to assert control over water when natural or manufactured objects 
such as calabashes, bladders and clay pots began to be used to hold and store it. In this 
early period the range of uses to which water was put was still highly limited, being 
restricted to domestic purposes and perhaps small scale production such as pottery and 
the washing of utensils. In addition, of course, the quantities of water utilised were 
limited both by the number of uses to which the resource could be put (restricted 
demand) and by the technology available to supply it to the site at which it was needed 
(restricted supply).  
In historical sequence, domestic water use, which is essential to survival, probably 
preceded the emergence of irrigation, which involved a much larger scale of water 
control. However, the assertion of this sequence depends on the definition of irrigation, 
which may be associated with considerable technological input, or it may not. If 
irrigation is understood to mean stream diversion or lift irrigation, it first developed in 
ancient Mesopotamia under the Sumerians, some 7 500 years ago, commencing as a 
system of river diversion using gravity flow and later evolving into more complex 
systems. Since this time, (hi-tech) irrigation has spread all over the world, and has 
formed the cornerstone of many civilisations. If however less technology-intensive 
methods such as flood recession agriculture are included under the definition of 
irrigation, then irrigation goes back considerably further than 7500 years. Furthermore, 
if flood recession agriculture is included in the definition of irrigation, the continent of 
Africa, which is often factored out of much of the history of irrigation, can be 
considered to have had highly developed irrigation systems. Flood irrigation techniques 
also developed along African river floodplains; whereby the emphasis lay more on 
climatological and agricultural expertise surrounding the planting and harvesting of 
appropriate mixes of plants in accordance with the natural rise and fall of water levels. 
These systems had less mechanisms of control over water than in situations where 
furrows were dug and maintained or mechanical means of water transfer were 
developed, although the construction of earthen or stone bunds to maximise soil water 
retention was common, such as in Senegal1.  
However irrigation is defined, though, for many centuries it remained highly labour-
intensive, and this perhaps contributed to its slow growth. By 1800, only some 8 million 
                                                 
1  See Pearce, F. (1992): The Dammed. Rivers, Dams and the Coming World Water Crisis. London: The  
Bodley Head 1992; Adams, W.M. (1992): Wasting the Rain. Rivers, People and planning in Africa.  
London: Earthscan; 
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hectares of the world’s agricultural lands were under irrigation, compared to some 253 
million hectares today2.  
 The past century has seen an enormous expansion of human interventions in natural 
water courses. In this period, the absolute quantity of water used has grown 
exponentially, while the diversity of uses to which water has been put has also grown 
very rapidly. The growth in demand for the resource has been driven by a number of 
factors, of which the most important have probably been the rapid expansion of the 
world population, the rapid expansion of irrigated agriculture, the expansion of 
domestic demand, the industrial revolution and its spread to countries outside Western 
Europe, and the increasing urbanisation or the world’s population (which served to 
concentrate demand in small areas).  
First, the world’s population grew from some 1608 million people in 1900 in 5,771 
in 1993, placing a growing strain on the world’s water resources 3 . However, this 
statement should be treated with some care, as treating population growth as an 
indicator of stress on resources is a relatively clumsy tool4 . Second, while in 1800 the 
global area under irrigation was some 8 million hectares, this rose to 40 million in 1900, 
100 million hectares in 1950 and 253 million hectares in 19865. This boom is associated 
with the increasing availability of fuel and pumping technology on the world market 
over time, and it has had the most powerful impact on increasing water demand of all 
other factors, as will be seen further on. Currently, one third of world harvests come 
from land under irrigation, of which 70% lies in the Third World6. Thus irrigation has 
become a cornerstone of world food security. However, there are many problems 
associated with irrigated agriculture. In terms of water supply, civil engineers and 
government planners are now increasingly meeting the simple constraint that most of 
the sites for potential damming and irrigation have already been developed. The 
remaining sites are badly situated, present daunting engineering obstacles, face 
enormous development costs, or have other problems such as rivers with high silt 
                                                 
2  Postel, S (1992): Water and Agriculture. In Gleick, P. (1993): Water in Crisis. A Guide to the World's  
 Fresh Water Resources. New York / Oxford: Oxford University Press; 
3  McNeill, J. (2000): Something new under the Sun. An Environmental History of the Twentieth  
Century. London: Penguin, p. 273;  
4  To start with, above a certain minimum required for consumption, a given population could have various  
 levels of demand for water, depending on the culture of water use. Therefore, water consumption is  
 culturally determined and population growth taken on its own is not a very convincing cause of growth  
in water demand. Next, and connected to this, population growth is only a convincing cause of growth in  
water demand in respect of the basic minimum of water required for survival. Above this demand level,  
cultural factors (including the economic culture) are more important. On the other hand, population  
growth does become a relevant factor at a given cutoff point, where there is so little water available per  
capita that further growth will place undue strain upon the rest of the population. The hydrologist Malin  
Falkenmark developed a scale of water scarcity based solely upon population growth, in which, for  
instance, countries are considered to encounter chronic problems when there is between 500 and 1000  
cubic metres of water per capita, and are considered to encounter absolute scarcity when there is less  
than 500 cubic metres per capita per annum. At these low cutoff points, population becomes relevant  
again. Lastly, population-related indicators do not take into account scarcities induced by maldistribution  
of the resource within the population, i.e. scarcity as dearth.  
5  Van de Laar, A. (1994): Irrigation Development, Food Production and the State in Historical  
 Perspective. The Hague, The Netherlands: Institute of Social Studies w. paper series no. 168, p. 11; 
6  Postel in Gleick (1993): op. Cit, p. 57; 
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content. Thus the limits to the boom in irrigation development are now becoming 
evident: while the average rate of growth of irrigated area was 2-4% in the 1960's and 
1970's, the rate of growth has slowed to an average of 1% for the post-1979 period7. 
Powerful forces were at work in driving the expansion of irrigation. For instance, 
agricultural industries were expanding and were searching for markets for their farm 
inputs, engineering firms were lobbying for government support to secure building 
contracts, many aid and government officials upheld an ideological perspective which 
considered western agricultural practices to be superior to local traditional ways of 
farming, and Third World governments were dependent upon the foreign exchange 
rendered by agricultural exports and saw in irrigation a means to create a dependable 
water supply for the farms far superior to gambling on the vagaries of rain-fed 
agriculture. All over the world, the nature of farming itself was subject to great changes. 
The enormous post-war expansion of the land area under irrigation is strongly related to 
what is often called the industrialisation of agriculture: at farm level, this indicates the 
tendency for production all over the world to be steadily more mechanized and to be 
making steadily more use of irrigation, fertilizer application, pesticide application, and 
the use of seeds developed in the laboratory. Other aspects of the industrialisation of 
agriculture are the hollowing out of the autonomy of the farmer by state institutions 
and/or actors in the private sector: the replacement of locally generated 'inputs' to 
farming by the provision of inputs by large corporations and the increasing external 
control over marketing, etc. The model for plant growth is not produced in the field in 
harmony with the potentialities inherent in a particular environment but is developed in 
the laboratory. Effort is then put into emulating these ideal laboratory growth conditions 
in the field by the use of high-yield seed varieties, the application of fertilizer, the 
application of pesticides and of course the application of irrigation. Together, these four 
elements constitute a package which has been rapidly introduced (by Third World 
governments, western aid agencies and the private sector) into the social and economic 
lives of farming communities in rural areas, especially in the post-war period. This 
process has strongly affected social relations in rural areas, often disrupting existing 
economic and cultural patterns by reducing the degree of local self-sufficiency and 
autonomy in food production and food distribution and by increasing the dependence of 
farmers on cash crops as a means to gain income. Furthermore, all four of these 
interventions are unnatural and have adverse environmental consequences: the use of 
laboratory seed is not beneficial to the diversity of the genetic stock of the plants in 
question; the natural fertility of the soil is not being developed and a dependence on 
petrochemical origin and synthetic fertilizers is being created; the application of 
pesticides leads to a gradual poisoning of runoff water as well as accumulation of 
poisons in the tissue of organisms as one moves up the food chain, and finally the 
application of irrigation leads, amongst other things, to water-logging, the rise in salt 
concentrations in the soil and to the withdrawal of water from its natural courses. I will 
explain this last factor in more detail here. Where drainage is poor, irrigation water 
cannot escape, and it may cut the plant roots off from a vital supply of oxygen, causing 
them to rot. In the case of salinisation, salts dissolved in the water are transferred from 
                                                 
7  Postel 1993: op. Cit, p. 49, Van de Laar 1994: op. Cit, p. 11; 
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the water to the land through evaporation, and even the purest water sources contain 
sufficient salts to severely damage productive land. The closer the water level is to the 
earth's surface, the faster evaporation - and therefore salinisation - proceeds. This means 
that improper drainage of irrigated fields can have two adverse effects on plants, namely 
water-logging and salinisation. The damage to production from these two sources can 
be considerable: it is estimated that 60.2 million hectares of the world's 253.3 million 
hectares of irrigated land are damaged by salinisation, amounting to 23.8% of the total 
irrigated area. Furthermore, the global area of irrigated land per capita has declined to 
1960 levels after a brief peak in the late 1970’s 8. And since 1980, World Bank lending 
for irrigation and drainage schemes has been in steady decline9. Overall, then, the 
dramatic expansion of irrigation in this century has proceeded to the point whereby 
most of the existing water resources have been tapped, and further expansion of supply 
is now proving difficult 10 . Also, this development has been part and parcel of 
ecologically damaging agricultural practices, while irrigation itself brings a host of 
environmental difficulties with it. The next frontier from the point of view of 
agricultural water technology is not the expansion of supply but the reduction of 
demand, i.e. the switch to water efficient irrigation technology11.  
 A third factor influencing the growth in demand for water has been the boom in 
delivery of water supply and sanitation systems to individual households. Although 
domestic water use is so limited that reasonably limited domestic demands can easily be 
met by any country in the world, it is a significant contributor to the overall demand 
placed on natural water systems, usually representing between 5% and 16% of total 
water demand in any one country. Linked to this fact is the fact that increased 
availability of water also leads to increases in individual demand. Furthermore, scarcity 
has a strong distributional element: certain groups in society are excluded from access 
to basic water services or are provided with such services in an unsustainable way. For 
many groups in society the lack of access to drinking water is a critical factor lowering 
the overall quality of life. Therefore, looking at the success or failure of delivery efforts 
says a lot about the capacity of a given society to diminish distributional scarcity. 
At the United Nations Water Conference at Mar Del Plata in 1977, a plan of action 
was designed arising from the desire of many Third World states to expand water 
supply and sanitation services to populations as yet not served by tapped or pumped 
water or provided with sanitary facilities. Out of this initiative came the International 
Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade, lasting from 1981 to 1990. By the end 
of the decade, a total of US $ 73 891 million had been spent on expanding water supply. 
During the decade, the number of urban residents across the world who had access to at 
least basic water services increased by 80%, while the number of rural people with 
access to basic water services increased by some 175% 12 . During the decade, an 
                                                 
8  Postel 1993: op. Cit, p. 51,56; van de Laar 1994: op. Cit, p. 13; 
9  United Nations (2006): World Water Development Report, p.194; 
10  This does not mean that irrigation efficiency cannot be increased: there is enormous potential yet in  
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technological developments in the realm of demand reduction.   
11  United Nations (2006): Op. Cit, p. 208; 
12  Briscoe, J (1993): When the Cup is Half Full. Improving Water and Sanitation Services in the  
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estimated 1.3 billion people worldwide received water services, while some 750 million 
people received access to sanitation services13. Given an un-served global community of 
some 1,8 billion people at the start of the decade, these figures quietly point to an 
enormous effort and achievement . On the sanitation front, developments were also 
impressive, although less so than in the case of water services. In view of the fact that 
the lack of both safe drinking water and appropriate sanitation was estimated to account 
for some 80% of all the world’s diseases, the impact of service delivery on world health 
has also been nothing short of a landslide. In fact, from the point of view of donor 
communities, it was the positive impact that service delivery had on health that 
provided the main rationale for the programme in the first place14. Offsetting this 
achievement, however, was a number of factors. Firstly, there was the fact that the 
world population grew from 4.5 billion to 5.7 billion between 1980 and 1995, i.e. the 
numbers of un-served people in both categories of service delivery as a proportion of 
world population remained relatively unchanged despite the huge increase in the 
numbers of people who did receive services15. By 2000, there were still some 1.1 billion 
people without access to protected sources of water 16 . Population growth thus 
undermined the goal that was stated at the Mar Del Plata conference to achieve 
worldwide coverage of water services by the year 2000.  
 The positive aspects of the IWSSD on human welfare had however did have a 
negative impact on overall water availability and overall water demand. In general, 
connection to a public or private tap or pump will facilitate uses of all kinds and 
therefore increase usage of water. For Sub Saharan Africa, the per capita daily water use 
is 15-30 litres when the distance to the water source is long, and rises to 50 litres a day 
when the availability rises17. This is further quantified by Knapp, who presents an 
overview of the relationship between availability and consumption in domestic water 
supply and sanitation. Table 1 below shows that a small increase in water availability 
can cause a large increase in household water consumption18.  
As a result, it can be expected that overall global demand for domestic water is set to 
rise as a result of the success of the IWSSD. In this regard, it is relevant to mention that 
for drinking water supply and sanitation, between 1980 and 1990, the number of 
countries reporting very severely inadequate water resources rose from 5 to 10, the 
number reporting severely inadequate water resources remained constant at 11, and the 
number of countries reporting moderate inadequacy of water resources remained 
constant at 4019. 
                                                                                                                                               
Developing World. In: Environment, Vol. 35, No. 4, p. 8;  
13  Nash in Gleick (1993): op. Cit, p. 33; 
14  Black, M (1998): Learning What Works. A 20 Year Retrospective View on International Water and  
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18  Knapp, B. (1989): Challenge of the Natural Environment. Longman, 1989, p. 181; 
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Table 3.1 
Household water consumption and water availability20 
 
Household water use in litres per capita per day 
 Rural household  5 – 40 
 Household using stand-pipe  20 – 80 
 Household using single tap  20 - 140  
 Household using urban multiple tap  40 – 300 
 
 For drinking water in particular, it is not just the supply of a basic quantity of water 
that is important, but also the provision of water of sufficiently high quality. Water used 
for domestic purposes is generally required to have the highest quality in relation to 
other uses for water, followed in order of importance by recreational use, industrial use, 
and irrigation. However, human interventions of all kinds in natural water courses, such 
as industrial warming, industrial and agricultural pollution of water or the spread of 
water borne diseases caused by damming have led to an increasing scarcity of naturally 
available fresh water which is sufficiently clean to warrant direct human consumption 
without undue health risks. Water scarcity is thus increasing in quality terms. One 
important problem is the spread of waterborne diseases. Water-related diseases are a 
major health concern in many Third World countries. Untreated water can contain an 
enormous multitude of micro-organisms, of which quite a number can endanger human 
health and/or stock health. Because of the expansion of damming for irrigation and 
other purposes, conditions have been created which are favourable for the spread of 
diseases such as malaria and schistomiasis. Between 1980 and 1990, there was an 
increase in the proportion of countries reporting more than 1% of the population 
suffering from waterborne diseases from 33% in 1980 to 48% in 199021.  
A fourth factor influencing the growth in demand for water is the increasing 
geographical concentration of demand which is the correlate of both the rapid urbaniza-
tion of the world’s population and of the industrialisation of many of the world’s 
economies. Overall, the world’s population growth has taken place in the context of a 
worldwide shift away from rural livelihoods and towards urban-based livelihoods, i.e. 
the world’s population growth must be set against the background of a worldwide 
migration from rural to urban areas. During the second half of the twentieth century, the 
world’s population grew by 150%, while the world’s urban population grew by 300%22. 
In 1950, 29.2% of the world’s population lived in towns and cities (only 15, 7% for the 
African continent) while in 2000, 46.6% of the world’s population was living in towns 
and cities (39.0% for the African continent). In 2000, the world featured 388 cities with 
                                                 
20  Ibid, p. 181; 
21  WHO (1982), (1992), op. Cit; 
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more than one million inhabitants23. In the same year, some 900 million urban dwellers 
across the world lived in slums with inadequate and unreliable water supplies24.  
 Fifth, the growth of industry has led to a concomitant growth in the demand for water. 
Water is redirected to urban centres, or urban industrial areas are situated along natural 
water systems, so that the water can be used for industrial purposes. In the Third World, 
urban centres are growing rapidly, and although many south Asian and most African 
countries have not been very successful in promoting the growth of industry, 
industrialisation has been moderately to highly successful in many Latin American and 
Southeast Asian countries. In many cases companies of western origin have relocated 
production to poor countries, attracted by low labour costs and relatively permissive 
environmental legislation or limited resources to effectuate abidance. Nash lists the 
production of hazardous chemicals, paper, steel production and food processing as 
examples of particularly pollutant industrial sectors which have expanded production in 
the Third World in recent years25.  
In most poor countries of the world, both economic growth and population growth 
was concentrated in a small number of cities, the so-called primate cities that endure no 
competition26 . South African cities are no exception to this rule: for instance, the 
Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging or PWV complex is South Africa's industrial 
heartland and national economic motor, accounting for about half of the nation’s GDP 
and being the home of 206 of the country's largest 300 companies. The PWV area 
currently consumes about twice the amount of naturally available water in the Crocodile 
river catchment in which it is located, and water is being drawn from ever further to 
satisfy its needs. Cities are highly concentrated points of demand for resources such as 
water, and thus they place considerable pressure on the hinterland for access to these 
resources. In Spain, for instance, cities have taken to buying out farmers’ rights to water 
in order to sustain their growth. Tony Turton speaks of ‘resource capture’ to describe 
this preferential allocation of water for one section of society at the expense of other 
sections. While industrial pollution can be highly destructive as far as water quality is 
concerned, there is a high economic premium upon water utilization for industrial 
purposes: there are indications that the value added which can be gained from 
production in industry is some fifty to sixty times higher than that from agriculture. 
Often the higher value added per litre that water enables in urban areas is used to 
legitimise the rerouting of water away from rural areas and towards, although this is a 
rather economist argument that sees water as an economic rather than as a social good.  
A correlate of highly concentrated consumption and production is the fact that cities 
concentrate the release of wastes into the environment, placing considerable pressure on 
natural resources where those wastes are released. In poorer countries, where 
infrastructure is often inadequate in relation to the numbers of city dwellers, untreated 
sewerage can form a major source of pollution. For instance, the World Health 
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Organisation has declared that there should be less than 100 coli form organisms in each 
100 millilitres of water in order for it to be safe for human consumption. When the 
Yamuna River flows out of New Delhi in India, it holds an incredible 24 million coli 
form organisms for each 100 ml of water27. As a result of declining water quality in 
urban areas, the conclusion is often drawn that although many more people have 
received access to drinking water and to sanitation, and especially so in urban areas, the 
expected positive overall health gains as a result of these services are not being 
manifested because of the overloading of the infrastructure in the word’s burgeoning 
cities.  
 In or around urban areas, water is more expensive and more difficult to purify, partly 
because of contamination by pollutants resulting from economic activity (and also by 
biological contamination through inadequate sanitation). Most industrial activity is 
located in urban centres and as a result, point-source pollution is highly concentrated in 
cities. Traditionally, cities are located close to rivers and have for many years had 
surface water as their main source of supply. Also, the river has historically been used 
as a conduit for waste, which was not a problem for so long as the pollution loads did 
not exceed the absorptive capacity of the rivers. However with the exponential increase 
in the production of both biological and chemical wastes in cities over the last century, 
the absorptive capacity of many rivers was exceeded, and urban discharge has become 
subject to increasing regulation by the state under pressure from environmental 
movements. The result of this is often that the man-made water use system has at its 
final point a purification plant which ensures that water being discharged back into the 
river is of a particular quality. Purification, though, adds to the overall costs of water 
management, and water quality downstream of a city has therefore become a function of 
the capacity of municipalities to foot the bill for water purification. Since the 1920s 
onwards, the United States and most European countries began to install sewerage 
treatment plants in their cities, and this development has spread relatively unevenly 
across the globe since then28. However many cities remain without water treatment 
facilities, and many more have outdated water treatment facilities that cannot wholly 
cope with the demands of a growing city. In both rural and urban areas in the poor 
countries, although water-related diseases are the main health concern, chemical 
pollution is rapidly adding to the existing problems of providing households with clean 
water. Synthetic chemicals and heavy metals are difficult to remove from drinking 
water with standard purification facilities, and as surface water near urban areas 
becomes steadily more polluted and more expensive to purify, public water authorities 
and other water users have increasingly turned to groundwater as a reliable source of 
clean and safe water. However, in many places, groundwater, too, is becoming polluted 
and clean groundwater is also becoming increasingly scarce29. 
                                                 
27  Clarke, R (1991): Water. The International Crisis. London: Earthscan, pp. 25-6; 
28  McNeill, J.R.(2000): An environmental history of the twentieth century. London: Penguin, pp. 127- 
 128;  
29  World Bank: World Development Report 1992. Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1992; 
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 Industry now accounts for a fourth of global water use30. However, this global figure 
masks huge regional variations, as shown in table 3 below. Industrial water use can be 
grouped into at least three categories, which are listed below: 
 
(a). As a raw material used directly in production processes, such as in the production of 
beverages; 
(b). as a facilitator of production, such as for cooling or for power delivery (hydraulics); 
(c). as a transport vehicle for waste.  
 
The last two applications dominate heavily in terms of their effect on water demand. 
Thermal electricity stations need enormous quantities of water for cooling, and the same 
is true both of chemical industries which use water to remove the heat caused by various 
chemical reactions, and of various heavy industries such as steel production. Although 
one might argue that since this water is not used up but returns to rivers, lakes and 
groundwater, this is not entirely true. As Robin Clarke argues31, the water is needed at a 
specific site and it cannot be diverted or tapped upstream because it is needed downstre-
am for cooling purposes. Also, the rise in temperature reduces the amount of oxygen 
available in the water. This is important because micro-organisms live on organic matter 
suspended in the water and use oxygen in the process. These micro-organisms form the 
basis of the food chain in water, so if the temperature rises too much the entire food 
chain in water may be threatened. Thus the water used for cooling serves important 
biological functions, and cooling 'diverts' this water away from such functions. 
 While point (b) above is important, so is point (c). Water is increasingly being used 
to transport industrial and mining pollutants away from the site of production of those 
pollutants. Sometimes the pollutants are released directly into rivers and streams; 
sometimes water is used for 'cleaning' purposes, which really means that the 'unclean' 
element is transferred from the object being cleansed to the water doing the cleansing. 
In both cases, toxic chemicals and heavy metals pollute surface water and groundwater. 
Where the usage and disposal of such substances is uncontrolled or not carefully 
monitored, they may seep into groundwater. In Latin America, the quantity of such 
substances reaching groundwater from waste dumps appears to be doubling every 15 
years (World Bank 1992:47). Globally, the decline in water quality through industrial 
and mining pollution is increasing at an alarming rate. Clarke (1991:24) states that 
every year some 450 cubic kilometres of waste water are allowed to flow into rivers and 
streams, and that the entire stable global river flow will be needed for pollutant transport 
by the year 2000.  
 The overall result of population growth, the growth of irrigation, the increasing 
availability of water for domestic purposes, the growth of cities and the development of 
industry has been a tremendous increase in water demand over the last century. From 
some 580 cubic kilometres per year in 1900, world water consumption crossed the 2000 
cubic kilometre barrier in the 1960’s, crossed the 4000 cubic kilometre barrier in the 
                                                 
30  Postel (1992): op. Cit, p. 20; 
31  Clarke (1991): op. Cit, p. 22; 
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1980’s, and is currently estimated at just over 5000 cubic kilometres per annum32. Table 
three below illustrates this development. Table 2 illustrates clearly the exponential 
growth in global water demand over time. 
However, it also shows clearly how water consumption is increasing over time as 
availability increases. This could be used to support an argument in favour of purely 
population-based approaches to water scarcity that  focuses exclusively on the average 
amount of water available per capita per annum. However, scarcity also has a strong 
distributional element, in that certain groups in society may experience scarcity of water 
irrespective of that society’s population size.  
 
Table 3.2 
Global freshwater consumption, 1900-2000 / km³/annum33 
Year Aggregate Consumption Per Capita Consumption   
1900 580 0.36 
1950 1,360 0.54 
1970 2,590 0.70 
1990 4,130 0.78 
2000 5,190 0.87 
 
 Distributional scarcity has a number of dimensions. The first of these is simply the 
result of climate and topography: Asia has 32% of the world’s available stream flow, 
Europe has 7%, North America has 18%, Africa has 10%, South America has 26% and 
Australia and Oceania have 5%34. Within each of these continents there are again strong 
differences between regions and catchment areas in terms of their water endowments. 
Clearly, water scarcity can be highly localised. The second dimension of distributional 
scarcity is the actual deployment of technology to construct water use systems: not all 
available water is used everywhere, and there are differences between regions in terms 
of the percentages of a national water bulk that is actually utilised in the economy. Thus 
Asia utilises 60% of the worlds freshwater despite having only 32% of the world’s 
available stream flow, while Africa utilises only 6% of the world’s available stream 
flow despite having access to 10% of it 35 . Such differences would be magnified 
tremendously if virtual water were to enter the equation: virtual water consumption is 
the water that a nation consumes by virtue of the importation of water-intensive goods 
and services from other countries. For instance, to grow an adequate diet for an adult for 
one year requires about 300 tonnes of water, 100 litres of water are needed to produce 
one kilogram of paper, 4500 litres are required to make one tonne of cement, and 4.3 
tonnes of water are required to make one tonne of steel36. Many water specialists, 
including myself, are of the opinion that much of the solution to global water scarcity 
would theoretically lie in the optimisation of virtual water trading, i.e. in making good 
use of the comparative advantage of water-rich countries. However this rather idealistic 
                                                 
32  Postel (1992): op. Cit, pg 42; 
33  Source: Mc Neill (2000): op. Cit, p. 121 
34  Ibid, p. 122; 
35  Ibid 
36  Clarke, R (1991): Water. The International Crisis. London:Earthscan, p. 3; 
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view would be to completely deny the reality of the overwhelming dominance of world 
trade (and world virtual water consumption) by the United States of America, Japan, 
Europe and South East Asia. Distributional water scarcity is fundamentally affected by 
patterns of world trade. Lastly, distributional water scarcity is affected by resource 
capture, whereby the allocation of water in society is determined by elite groups who 
have what is called the ‘hydro political privilege’. South Africa is a text-book case of 
resource capture by elite groups, and the generation of scarcities of land, water and fuel-
wood in the apartheid-era homelands to which 50% of the population was forcibly 
confined.   
The global boom in water supply  
In response to the growth in human demand described above, water has been dammed, 
channelled, rerouted, pumped and piped away from its natural location to sites at which 
it is required for human production and consumption. Large and small water reservoirs 
have been created all over the earth's surface to store water where it is needed for urban 
households, for industry, or for irrigation. Natural river courses have been interrupted 
and often redirected. Technological advances have enabled the construction of dams 
that have become political symbols of nationhood, or monuments of economic advance. 
'Modern' usages of water such as its consumption in a modern multiple-tap household or 
its use for pollutant transport in urban industrial areas have expanded rapidly, extending 
now into many areas in the former Third World. In many ways, increasing the 
availability of water has been the correlate of economic growth, and where economies 
have grown water has been harnessed to meet productive and consumptive demands. In 
this recent boom of water resources development, there has for many decades been a 
strong supply-sided logic to developments: water has been supplied to satisfy a growing 
demand, rather than querying the level of demand itself. While pressures to achieve 
efficiency gains in water usage have existed for a long time, this has been in the context 
of an overall rise in demand for fresh water over time, i.e. the rise in demand has been 
faster than the efficiency gains.  
Physical control over water increased throughout the centuries as new control 
systems were developed and adopted. For many centuries, large scale irrigation works 
were a key manifestation of water control, and the subject of state intervention in the 
economy. So too were the destruction of virgin forest (much of Europe was historically 
covered by oak forest) and the draining of wetlands (pioneered by the Dutch and 
subsequently exported to England)37. 
In modern times, and focussing on storage rather than drainage, there is an intimate 
link between the evolution of state-directed development interventions informed by 
Keynesian economics and the rapid expansion of dams throughout the world. The 
model often followed was that of the American Tennessee Valley Authority, whereby 
dam building was followed by rapid irrigation development as an anti-poverty measure 
in the years of the Great Depression. In this model, state intervention was coupled to a 
rather top-down form of river-basin planning in which infrastructure was laid out to 
                                                 
37  See Pearce (1992): The Dammed. Rivers, Dams and the Coming World Water Crisis. London: the  
Bodley head, pp. 28-40;  
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make what state planners considered to be optimal use of the resource endowments in a 
particular valley.  
As economies grew and diversified, so water demand for municipal and industrial 
purposes grew, and this was superimposed on existing demand for irrigation. As shown 
in table 3 below, in industrialised nations, industrial water use can account for 41%-
56% of demand, and there are thus considerable regional deviations from the global 
average whereby irrigation use accounts for some 71% and industrial use for some 21% 
of global demand. As economies grow and diversify, there is a growth in the 
dependence on reliable water supplies for food production, energy production (cooling 
and steam), waste transport, domestic applications, and so on. Water use becomes 
ingrained into the social fabric and the building and upkeep of man-made water systems 
become routine. This has institutional consequences. Both in the case of irrigation and 
of urban areas, man-made water control infrastructure is constructed to divert water 
from its natural setting into channels that would satisfy the various categories of human 
demand. 
 
Table 3.3 
Water use by region and by sector / percentages of total demand38 
Region Agriculture Industry Domestic 
North and Central 
America 
 
   49.7 
 
   41.0 
 
   9.3 
Europe    32.2    56.0   11.6 
Africa    89.4     5.0    5.6 
Asia    87.5     6.9    5.6 
South America    63.4    20.9   15.9 
  
This infrastructure requires construction and management, therefore as control over 
water grew, so institutions developed that were equipped with the skills to build water 
control schemes and to control and apportion the resource amongst various players in 
society.  
Water management became a profession, with various branches devoted to civil 
engineering, hydrology, financial management, and the like. A strong supply orientation 
prevailed in this period, rooted in the control and subjugation orientation towards nature 
that came with the (European) Renaissance, and coupled to a strong presence of 
technical rather than social disciplines in water resources planning39. The high capital 
costs of dams and other water control schemes required their justification within 
                                                 
38  Source: Dohogne, J.J., (1994): Het water van de Aarde: zegen, zwaard en zorg. in: Noord-Zuid  
Cahier nr. 19, p.16. Antwerpen: Rombouts 
39  Thus Knoppers (1995): pp. 13-30 for instance describes in some detail how much technical  
knowledge goes into the construction of a dam. It requires the analysis of hydrological records and  
distillation of  local rainfall to runoff conversion patterns, it often involves the assessment of a range of  
possible sites  and dam models, it requires the geological analysis of the substrate and the formations  
onto which the dam wall will be fixed, it requires calculation of the strength of the dam wall to  
withstand the enormous weight of the water, it requires the construction of access roads and a  
complex logistical operation to transport construction materials to the site, etc. It is not surprising; 
 therefore, that early water resource management was essentially a technical profession.  
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political programmes, and they thus became ideological tools, presented to the public as 
symbols of progress. But, since they were long-term investments in infrastructure, with 
time horizons of thirty years or more, the assessments of economic gains and social and 
environmental costs were of necessity experimental and could be strongly corrected by 
contingencies on implementation.  
This supply orientation was enthusiastically exported to Africa in and immediately 
after the colonial era. This resulted in a strong expansion of irrigation in poor countries: 
Pearce estimates that by the mid-1980s, public irrigation schemes in the third world had 
absorbed some US $250bn in aid transfers, resulting in 75% of the world’s irrigated 
farmland being located in poorer countries40.  
This had three main negative consequences. Firstly, local knowledge of the 
environment was rarely consulted in any depth by colonial developers and, later, aid 
officials, often being considered unscientific. Unfortunately for the development experts, 
much of this knowledge had developed over the years in response to first hand 
experiences of rainfall patterns and soil conditions. As a result, many projects 
floundered because of inaccurate assumptions about local conditions during project 
planning, and a general inaccuracy with respect to local community aspirations for 
livelihoods in the local natural environment. Secondly, the river basin planning projects 
introduced to Africa were direct transplants of models in rich countries and assumed a 
strong state able to provide inputs, extension workers and subsidies for an emerging 
agricultural export sector or one devoted to enhancing local food security. Water supply 
was only one input among a complex of interventions associated with the green 
revolution that included the use of high yield variety seeds, pesticides and fertilisers, 
and general the introduction of industrial thinking to agricultural practises. All this 
happily assumed a complete revolution in rural productive thinking, and as a result 
many projects were overly optimistic and fell short of their targets. Thirdly, a theme 
taken up by the global environmental movement, dam building creates clearly 
identifiable sets of losers41. People residing downstream of a new dam may suffer 
setbacks as a result of reduced water availability and the removal of natural ebb and 
flood cycles. Pearce concurs, stating:  
 
“The common image of irrigation making barren land fertile is wrong. Most land taken over for 
irrigation projects was cultivated before the engineers arrived. Frequently, too, as in northern Nigeria, 
water diversions for large state irrigation schemes dry up productive land downstream”42. 
 
He even questions the net productiveness of irrigation relative to the system it replaces. 
He cites the influence of the Maga dam on the Logone river in Chad on the water tables 
of the Logone floodplain, the retreating shores of lake Chad, and the large Yaeres 
wetland some 250 km downstream of the dam, coining the term ‘hydrological drought’ 
to describe the dam’s effects. It has destroyed habitat downstream which provided 
resources for local residents, has dried up significant areas of pasture land, and has 
                                                 
40  Pearce, (1992): op. Cit; 
41  See Cannon, 1994 
42  Pearce (1992): op. Cit, p. 183; 
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replaced recession agriculture with irrigation which has a phenomenal per ha capital 
cost43. In this view, therefore, dams alter the division of power within a region or a 
country because they alter the balance of access to basic productive resources. On a 
more positive note, colonial and postcolonial investments in poor countries did provide 
infrastructure that created a base for investment and provided the state and/or parastatal 
organisations with a reliable source of revenue from the sale of water and/or 
hydroelectricity. Often the construction of access roads was part and parcel of the 
construction of dams, and they improved farmers’ and artisans’ access to urban markets, 
stimulating surplus production.  
In summary, this century has seen a rapid increase in global water infrastructure 
development that built on a more gradual growth in previous centuries. This was 
spurred on by industrialisation and the ready availability of fuel on the world market, 
which created new centres of water demand and provided both the technical means and 
the energy requirements for rerouting water - or what Fred Pearce terms ‘replumbing 
the planet’44 . What did the replumbing of the planet entail?  
Replumbing the planet 
Water demand together with the investment of state and private capital led to a veritable 
boom in dam building in the last century. Between 1945 and 1971, 8140 large dams 
were completed globally, thereby bringing the global total at that time to some 12 000 
large dams45.46. By 1995, this figure had trebled to 36 00047. If smaller dams are 
included, there are more than 100 000 on earth today. Given the fact that there is a fixed 
total supply of fresh water on earth, and given also the fact that many countries are 
moving towards the upper limits of their national supply capacity, the continuation of 
both population growth and economic growth indicate an increasing pressure on water 
resources. If options for supply augmentation are dwindling while demand is growing, 
clearly scarcity Every day, a further two large dams with a wall higher than 15m are 
being completed, and by the end of the twentieth century, some two thirds of the 
world’s total stream flow are said to be controlled by dams48. 
As the most logical sites for dam construction progressively become occupied by 
dams, so the remaining possible sites become less favourable in social, environmental 
and economic terms. There is a gradual process of elimination, through cost-benefit 
analyses, whereby suitable sites are selected and therefore less suitable ones remain. In 
consequence, the supply orientation is entering a phase in which the negative effects of 
dam building are rising and are calling the benefits into question. 
                                                 
43  Ibid, pp.167-175 
44  Ibid 
45  A large dam in this case is a dam with a wall higher than 15 metres. There are alternative and  
probably better definitions of large dams, such as the amount of water held back or the surface area of  
the water. Unfortunately however I do not as yet have access to dam building statistics which are  
based on these definitions;  
46  See Van de Laar (1993): Water Development for Power and Irrigation, the Environment and Sustainable  
 Development. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies Working Paper series no. 141, pp. 5,6; 
47  See Knoppers et . al. (1995): De Keerzijde van de Dam (The Other Side of Dams, T.S.). Utrecht, The  
 Netherlands: Van Arkel, p. 22; 
48  See Van de Laar 1993:7 
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  The social upheaval and organised opposition associated with the Narmada project in 
India and the Three Gorges Dam in China are examples of the rise in controversy over 
new mega-dam projects. This does not mean that water infrastructure development is 
grinding to a halt – it is still continuing vigorously - but rather that there is a gradual 
reduction in the remaining options for supply augmentation. This only measures 
availability in relation to population growth and not economic growth. Tables two point 
four above to two point six below show the different story told by statistics based on 
either population growth or on economic growth.  
 
Table 3.4 
Global percentage decline in per capita water availability per region49 
Region Percentage decline in water availability 1955-90 
Latin America                  55.1  
Western Europe                   17.1 
Eastern Europe                  25.2 
Africa                  59.3 
Middle East                   78.5 
South Asia                   54.8 
Southeast Asia                   54.4 
 
Box 3.1 
 Global groundwater stocks50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
49  Figures calculated from the United Nations population and environmental programme's 1995 update on 
water availability. The 2006 Human Development Report of the United Nations presents more dramatic 
figures which therefore differ from the above statistics: the ‘developed countries’ are said to have 
suffered a 40% loss in water availability since 1950, whereas the ‘developing countries’ have suffered an 
85% reduction in water availability. UN (2006): HDR 2006: 136 
 
50  See Tushaar Shah, David Molden, R. Sakthivaldivel and Davis Seckler (2000): The global  
groundwater situation. Colombo: IWMI; Postel, Sandra (1992): The Last oasis. Facing water scarcity.  
London: Earthscan; and Shiklomanov, Igor (1993): World fresh water resources in Gleick et al (1993):  
Water in Crisis. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
World groundwater stocks amount to some 23, 400 km³of the world’s total water stock of 1,385,984 
million km³, or 1.7% of the total. Of this, only 10,530 km³ is fresh water, and this in turn amounts to 
30.1% of the world’s total fresh water stock of 35,029 km³. The lion’s share of this groundwater is located 
so deep under the ground that it is inaccessible or uneconomic to use. It is difficult to estimate with 
precision how much groundwater can be sustainably accessed - not everything is known about 
groundwater flows or the recharge rates of underground sources such as aquifers. Because of the 
increasing demand for water, groundwater sources are being overused in many areas, leading to declining 
water tables. Where groundwater underlies wetlands, the depletion of groundwater can lead to ecosystem 
decline or collapse and the decline of livelihoods associated with the wetlands. The most extreme 
examples of groundwater overabstraction are the mining of ‘fossil’ aquifers in Yemen, Libya and Saudi 
Arabia, but serious drops in water tables have been reported in amongst others China, India, Mexico, 
Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, the former Soviet Union, Thailand, and the United States. In 
South Africa, more than 400 towns are (co)-dependent on groundwater and many coastal towns (as is the 
case in coastal Gujurat, India) run the risk of salt intrusion into groundwater. In some areas compensation 
is offered by the increased infiltration into groundwater that is the result of the construction of dams, but 
of course this is a complex and varied issue. In total, some 2 billion people worldwide are dependent on 
groundwater supplies and together they account for some 20% of global water use (600km³/annum to 700 
km³/annum).    
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Table 3.5 underscores the importance of economic rather than demographic indicators 
of scarcity: not only do per capita figures of withdrawal vary strongly between rich and 
poor countries, but the differences between rich and poor countries in water 
consumption are dominated by economic rather than domestic demand across the world. 
 
Table 3.5 
Annual global per capita water withdrawals per region / m³/cap/ a51  
Withdrawal for domestic purposes Withdrawal for productive purposes 
Low Income 
Countries  
 
  24 
Low Income 
Countries  
 
  315 
Middle Income 
Countries  
 
  58 
Middle Income 
Countries 
 
  578  (302) 
Upper Middle 
Income Countries  
 
  76 
Upper Middle 
Income Countries  
 
  480 
South Africa    47 South Africa   348 
High Income 
Countries 
  
 141 
High Income 
Countries 
 
  520 
 
Again, this illustrates the fundamental weakness of a water scarcity indicator that is 
based upon population growth: water scarcity should in fact be measured predominantly 
but not exclusively on economic growth52. In retrospect, then the figures in table 3.4 
above should be corrected: in particular the declines of western and Eastern Europe are 
completely off the mark (in actual fact Eastern Europe has the greatest per capita 
consumption of water in the world, but this is not reflected in population based 
measures of scarcity).  
 
Table 3.6 
 Global percentage decline in water availability per region53  
Region Annual GDP growth  
1995-2004 
Decline in water availability 
1960-1982 
Latin America / 
Carribean 
2.1                  94.1  
Western Europe  3.6                  90.0 
Sub Saharan Africa 1.3                  92.8 
Middle East / North 
Africa 
3.9                  98.2 
South Asia  5.3                  81.6 
Southeast Asia  -                  96.6 
 
                                                 
51  Figures calculated from World Bank (1997): World Development Report. The figures are averages. 
52  World Bank: World Development Indicators 2006 
53  Expressed in terms of water availability per million dollars of GDP, 1960 – 1982. Figures calculated  
 from World Bank (1989): World Development Report 
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A further illustration of the distortion caused by population based measures of 
scarcity can be gleaned from table six below, which shows that if water availability is 
calculated as a function of national economic product, the decline in water availability is 
much more dramatic than in demographic terms. Rather than declining by some 50%, 
world water availability is shown to be almost halved in the period from 1955-1989.  
As can be seen from the moderate decline in water availability in Western Europe 
compared to the global average, table 3.4 wrongly suggests that Europe is not facing 
problems of increasing water scarcity.   
This suggestion is the result of the fact that population growth in Europe has been 
slow in the period from 1955 to 1990.  This image can be partly corrected by looking at 
the absolute withdrawals per capita rather than at total water availability, because it 
more directly reflects consumptive behaviour. Table five below illustrates the fact that 
the size of an economy directly affects the volumes of water withdrawn, both for 
domestic and for productive purposes. Both categories of consumption rise as the 
economy becomes wealthier. An aberrance shows up under the withdrawals by Middle 
Income Countries for productive purposes, but this is corrected when the countries of 
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are removed from the calculation (figures 
between brackets).  
Definitions aside, however, all three tables indicate a strong decline in water 
availability for most regions in the post-war era. When taken together with the rising 
pollution and costs of pollution of many rivers, there is evidence of a mounting crisis in 
supply for human consumption, for production, and for the maintenance of our natural 
environment. This has led to a critical re-examination of the ideas upon which water 
resource management was built in the years of the supply orientation. This process of 
review has produced a number of management responses in which the problems 
inherent in the supply orientation are dealt with in some measure. Three related clusters 
of response are presented in the next subsection of this paper, water demand 
management, integrated catchment management, and water harvesting.  
Organisational responses to scarcity: water demand management  
The most direct and obvious way to counter emerging scarcity is to cut back on demand. 
The attempt to do this has led to the emergence of a new field of water demand 
management which, in the last few decades, and fuelled by scarcity, has begun to enter 
into the jargon of writings on water resource management. For instance, chapter 18 of 
Agenda 21, endorsed by participants of the UN Conference on the Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in 1992, recognised demand management as a central aspect of 
responding to growing world water scarcity and set out a series of demand management 
responses to be achieved by 2000. However, there is no fixed model of what water 
demand management actually entails: the concept exists but its precise content in policy 
terms is still unclear. For instance, according to Falkenmark and Lindh, water demand 
management in water scarce developing countries is crisis driven, and no satisfactory 
models for socio-economic growth under conditions of scarcity exist54.  
                                                 
54  See Falkenmark and Lindh in Gleick (1993): op. Cit, p. 89; 
 81
Water demand management seems to have commenced with management of quality: 
Postel reports dramatic water efficiency gains in industry in Japan, the US and the 
former West Germany in the wake of strict pollution control regulations in the 1970s55. 
Japan managed to triple its industrial output per cubic metre of water input between 
1965 and 1990, Sweden achieved a fourfold increase in water productivity between the 
early 1960s and the late 1970s56.  
 Demand management from a quantity point of view seems to have arisen a little later. 
Israel reached the upper limit of its supply capacity in 1991, igniting a debate between 
water demand management protagonists and proponents of the supply orientation who 
see value in recycling more wastewater57. Also, Ghezawi reports the emergence of 
water demand management in Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia in recent years 58 . The 
discipline, if it can be called that, is new phenomenon, which is set to grow rapidly as 
supply options become less practicable. A review of the literature seems to indicate that 
there are three interrelated reasons for the emergence of water demand management in 
any given area, and five main instruments through which it is implemented59.  
The first cause is water scarcity itself, which limits further supply options in a given 
area (such as a town), and therefore induces some thought on measures to reduce 
demand. The second cause (related to scarcity) is the rising cost of supply options. This 
can mean either the cost of the next supply augmentation scheme, or of upgrading water 
purification works (less water used means less purification needed before release into 
natural systems, and downstream users, environmental groups or government 
regulations may be pressing upstream users to maintain quality). The third cause is 
environmental decline: a supply area may be induced to reduce its demand to maintain 
basic ecological functions of a given habitat by restoring or not further reducing its 
water bulk. Pressure on decision makers from environmental groups may assist in 
allowing a decision in favour of water demand management rather than pursuing further 
supply options, if these still exist.  
There are five types of policy instrument which can assist a given area in 
implementing demand management: pricing, education, technology, environmental 
management and regulation.   
Pricing is a much debated demand management tool. In economic terms, the 
intention is to raise the price and thus reduce demand. The reason provided (by 
Geoffrey Stiles) for pricing as a demand management tool is that water is ‘generally 
                                                 
55  See Postel (1992): op. Cit, pp. 136-145; 
56  Ibid, pp. 138-9; 
57  See Falkenmark and Lindh in Gleick (1993): op. Cit, p. 82; 
58  See Ghezawi (1997): Water demand management networking in the Middle East and North Afric. In:  
Brooks, D.B., Rached, .E, and Saade, M. (1997): Management of Water Demand in Africa and the  
Middle East. Ottawa/Johannesburg: International Development Research Centre (IDRC): pp. 15-17; 
59  Forde (1997): Water Demand Management and Conservation. Water Supply and Sanitation  
Collaborative  Council of the World Water Forum, http://www.wsscc.org/wg (accessed in May 2007); 
Postel (1992): op. Cit; Rached et al. (1998), op. Cit; DWAF (1999): Water Conservation and Demand  
Management National Strategy Framework. Pretoria: DWAF; World Bank (1992): Country Experiences  
with Water Resources Management. Economic, Institutional, Technological and Environmental Issues.  
Washington: IBRD; 
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under priced relative to its intrinsic and economic values’60. Beyond this, it is often 
provided at low bulk prices, which puts a premium on high consumption*. Water 
pricing for demand management should make consumers pay in proportion to volumes 
used - Easter notes that ‘without adequate water charges to cover operation and 
maintenance costs plus the costs of the original investment, the rest of the society is 
subsidizing those receiving the water’61.62. But subsidising water supplies to a sector in 
society is common and is implemented in line with government targets for economic 
development or equity. Subsidising supply to an area must be separated from the rising 
scarcity of water which necessitates gradual introduction of pricing mechanisms in areas 
where it was free or cheap. In the latter case pricing may be applied for demand 
management while in the former it need not be: subsidised delivery to some can coexist 
with scarcity if that coincides with the society’s perception of optimality. Water pricing 
is also contentious, as it can be regarded culturally as a common or social good which is 
not for sale. Maclean and Voss declare that ‘many arid and semi-arid countries remain 
reluctant to endorse it (i.e. pricing) because water is so essential for life itself that it is 
not treated as a commodity’63. Thus the very scarcity of water, in this view, contributes 
to resistance to its commoditisation through pricing.  
Education is an important tool in demand management: raising public awareness of 
water scarcity is a precondition to encouraging change. Therefore many water demand 
management strategies include public awareness campaigns, which focus on 
technologies and tips for demand reduction, at the household level but also on irrigated 
farmland. According to Forde, investments in public education yield very high returns 
in water demand reduction64.  
Technology offers a partial return to the engineering discipline in water resources 
management which dominated during the supply orientation, but cannot be 
implemented in isolation from other aspects of demand management if it is to succeed: 
the perceived need for water efficient technology is linked to public awareness of water 
scarcity. In the urban demand centres, demand is often reduced by encouraging (or 
enforcing) the retrofitting of household and office appliances65. Examples are toilets 
with small flush cisterns and low-flow showerheads. In irrigation, land levelling can 
produce spectacular results in raising water use efficiency, but farmer education is a 
prerequisite. Other methods are surge irrigation, low energy precision application and 
drip irrigation, which can be further enhanced when used with soil moisture 
monitoring66. In industry, wastewater recycling technologies provide ways to reduce 
throughput.  
Environmental management is a curious but valid method. The underlying 
philosophy is that changes in land use practises will lead to changes in water supplies in 
                                                 
60  Stiles, G. in Rached et al. (1997): op. Cit, p. 3, see also Postel (1992): op. Cit. 165-182; 
61  From Forde (1997): op. Cit, p. 1; 
62  Ester in World Bank (1992): op. cit, p. 11; 
63  In Rached et al. 1996:43 
64  See Forde (1997): Op. Cit, p.3 
65  Retrofitting means the replacement in existing buildings of the original technology by modern, more  
 efficient, technology. 
66  See Postel in Gleick (1993): pp.61-62 
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a given catchment. An example can be taken from SA, where environmental 
management is fast becoming part and parcel of water demand management: the 
Working for Water Campaign of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
generates employment through the removal of non-indigenous vegetation in catchments. 
This reduction in ‘non-indigenous demand’ releases runoff into channels downstream. 
And limitations placed on forestation in various catchments around the country are in 
place because of the (detrimental) effects of forests on runoff.  
Regulation assumes the ability of a government to intervene in water uses. If a public 
authority is unable to control water abstractions in excess of collectively agreed 
quantities, and cannot implement appropriate disincentives such as fines for 
infringements, water demand management cannot be properly implemented. A water 
right, according to Hoogendam, is an ‘authorized claim to a benefit stream of a water 
resource’; it expresses a social relation embedded in relations of power and authority. 
Different groups may make claims to the same water resource using different normative 
frameworks67. If the technology does not exist, there is no labour to operate it, there are 
no concrete rules for distribution, and there is no labour to distribute water or implement 
the rules, then water rights cannot operate68. Therefore reducing demand is difficult 
without efforts to ensure its legitimacy, the technology it requires, concrete rules about 
who must reduce consumption by how much, and above all in government’s case 
without the staff to implement change.  
Part of the regulation of water use is the question of the efficiency of a particular 
allocation of water in society. Different allocations across economic sectors lead to 
different outcomes as the economic return per unit utilised varies between sectors. But 
changing water allocations has an associated social cost, quite apart from the fact that 
economic sectors cannot simply be done away with because their value added per unit 
of water is less than another sector’s.         
Linked to allocations is the concept of ‘virtual water’, the water transfers involved in 
trans-boundary movements of goods and services. Local demand can be reduced by 
importing water-intensive goods and services from other countries: to grow an adequate 
diet for a human being for a year requires some 300 tonnes of water69. There are 
therefore large water gains to be had from the importation of food from water-rich 
countries.  
 
Organisational responses to scarcity: integrated water resources management  
The evolution and spread of catchment-based approaches to water resources 
management is intimately related to the development of global water scarcity. The 
supply orientation generally did not involve long term planning of water resource 
utilisation at the level of the catchment as a whole, and water resource developments 
were discrete and localised interventions. But as water became scarce and more polluted, 
it became progressively more important to know where developments were situated 
                                                 
67  In Boelens, R. en Hoogendam, P. (2002): Water rights and Empowerment. Assen: van Gorcum 
68  Ibid..  
69  Clarke (1993): Op. Cit, p. 3 
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relative to each other, as one could strongly affect the performance of another. 
Integrated planning of water resources at the catchment level therefore became more 
and more necessary.   
The concept was placed on the international agenda at the International Conference 
on Water and the Environment in Dublin in 1992. At this conference, the stakeholders 
agreed on the principle that “water development and management should be based on a 
participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy makers at all levels”70. This 
idea was carried forward at the UN Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro later than year. The protection of both the quality and the 
supply of freshwater resources were discussed at UNCED, out of which emerged  
chapter 18 of the Conference’s final statement, Agenda 21. UNCED declared that “the 
holistic management of freshwater … and the integration of sectoral water plans and 
programmes within the framework of national economic and social policy are of 
paramount importance for the 1990’s and beyond” 71 . Of the seven programmes 
proposed for the water sector, the first is integrated water resources management. 
Section 18.3 of agenda 21 states that:  
 
“The widespread scarcity, gradual destruction and aggravated pollution of freshwater resources in many 
world regions, along with the progressive encroachment of incompatible activities, demand integrated 
water resources planning and management. Such integration must cover all types of interrelated 
freshwater bodies, including both surface water and groundwater, and duly consider water quantity and 
quality aspects. The multi-sectoral nature of water resources development in the context of socio-
economic development must be recognized, as well as the multi-interest utilization of water resources for 
water supply and sanitation, agriculture, industry, urban development, hydropower generation, inland 
fisheries, transportation… and other activities”72. 
 
The widespread endorsement of this perspective is a testimony to the growth of 
integrated water resources management as a philosophy. Commitment to IWRM was 
later reaffirmed at the three World Water Forums in Marrakech (1997), the Hague (2000) 
and Kyoto (2003), and the UNCED principles were reaffirmed at ‘Rio + 10’ or the ten-
year follow up to UNCED in Johannesburg in 2002.  
The concept of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) could be 
summarised as the attempt to integrate all aspects of interventions in water resources 
into a management framework at the level of the catchment. This replaces existing 
(politically determined) water resource management areas by (naturally determined) 
catchment areas. The provincial and district-based water resource management systems 
of the past are thus replaced by institutions representing sub -catchments within the 
framework of an umbrella catchment management agency. IWRM necessitates planning 
at the level of catchment areas that is integrated at several levels, i.e. scientifically 
interdisciplinary, full public participation, and temporal flexibility. These components 
of IWRM are explained below.  
Firstly, IWRM stems from the idea that water resources can only be managed 
sensibly and effectively at the level of the hydrological cycle as a whole. It is at the 
                                                 
70  UN (2003): Water For People, Water For Life / 1st World Water Report  
71  Ibid  
72  UNCED (1992): Agenda 21 - chapter 18:1 
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level of the river basin that atmospheric water, surface water, groundwater, estuaries 
and coastlines are connected. Water falls onto the land in a catchment as precipitation, 
and collects and flows over and under the land towards a single point of convergence, 
which can be the confluence with a larger river basin, or with the sea. The water flowing 
through a catchment can flow through and across land that has many uses. Therefore, 
any impact of land on water in one location can be transmitted to another: pollution 
picked up in an urban environment can be transmitted to a lower-lying wetland, and 
abstraction of water for farming can reduce flow downstream. Water resource planning 
at a level below that of the catchment may be impacted on by developments upstream, 
and will in turn impact on human and environmental users downstream. Where water is 
abundant, abstractions upstream will not significantly affect users downstream, and 
pollution upstream will be diluted so that the impact on users downstream is lessened. 
But where water becomes scarce, abstraction by users upstream will adversely affect the 
production capacity of human and biological users downstream, and pollution upstream 
will similarly negatively affect downstream. Therefore, the catchment is a natural unit 
for water resources planning under conditions of scarcity as it integrates all localised 
impacts on water resources in a catchment into a catchment management plan. In 
practise, some catchments have been artificially connected through interbasin transfer 
schemes such as the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, and in these cases catchments 
are no longer the natural unit for planning. Policy actors then need to devote attention to 
water trade between catchments, and to take stock of the environmental consequences 
of inter-basin transfers.  
Secondly, IWRM attempts to take account of all aspects of the complex physical and 
ecological system within a catchment, including human effects, in planning. Catchments 
have varied habitats, each of which has its own localised ecosystem. Also, catchments 
harbour different kinds of human activity, from farming to mining and urban 
development. The attempt to integrate all these systems into a plan at catchment level 
requires many kinds of knowledge: biology, geography, chemistry, town planning, etc. 
Therefore, ideally, IWRM planning must be interdisciplinary so that decisions relevant 
to the environment are based on considerations that are as comprehensive as possible.  
Thirdly, planning should be participatory and planning teams should be accountable 
so that detailed information about the environment and grassroots activities or impacts 
are accounted for in plans at higher levels. Typically, catchment management 
authorities function as a small core of specialists interacting with stakeholder forums 
which allow input from a wide variety of sources. Leadership is vested in the 
administration of the authority, but should be supportive and consultative rather than 
regulative and top-down. This encourages users to utilise resources in a sustainable 
manner. Catchment management plans are established on the basis of consensus among 
stakeholders and within government. 
Lastly, catchment management plans need to be flexible and adaptive to take account 
of the continuous changes in the human and natural environments. Economies change, 
settlement patterns change, and as a result, water use patterns change. IWRM systems 
need to take account of these changing dynamics and evolve in step with changes in 
society. Also, peak environmental events may take place, deforestation and urbanisation 
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may lead to higher instability of water courses, pollution may increase, and again, the 
institution in charge needs to adapt to each set of challenges it faces.73 . 
 
Problems in Integrated Water Resources Management  
While the principles underlying IWRM are relatively straightforward, several clear 
problems need to be overcome for its effective implementation. Mitchell mentions that 
progress in implementing IWRM has been hesitant and unsystematic, and that as a 
result many practitioners in the field have adopted an incremental approach74. What are 
the main obstacles? 
Firstly, there are serious political obstacles to managing water resources on a 
catchment basis because catchments cross-cut international, provincial and local 
authority borders. Shifting the boundaries of political jurisdiction from established 
patterns and towards a new one generally meets resistance from bureaucrats and 
politicians. Therefore, in practise, IWRM involves some form of compromise between 
spatial management structures. In trans-boundary water resource management (i.e. 
across national borders), river basin management institutions are often hollow, having 
highly technical tasks and very little political clout. In South African catchment 
management, representatives of the various regions through which a river flows sit 
together on catchment management forums: an inclusive strategy is used to create 
institutional collusion.  
Secondly, the goal of interdisciplinary integration is scientifically sound, but choices 
must still be made that restrict the potentially huge amount of data that could be 
considered relevant to catchment management. As with the integrated rural 
development programmes initiated throughout Africa in the 1970s, an attempt is made 
to relate everything to everything in a management plan, and this carries the real danger 
that complexity will impede implementation. Both Ashton and Mitchell testify to this 
complexity, and Mitchell emphasises the need for scoping and focusing in IWRM75.  
Thirdly, IWRM is a compromised form of integrated catchment management (ICM), 
the attempt to manage all environmental resources in the geographical unit of the 
catchment, based on the idea that habitats and ecosystems in it are interlinked and 
should therefore be managed as one whole76. In other words, the way in which land, 
forests, rural areas and urban areas are managed affects biodiversity and the 
sustainability of human interventions in the environment. Integrated Catchment 
Management advocates integrating all interventions in the environment (not only in 
water) into an overall management framework. 
                                                 
73  This section draws on Mitchell (1990): Integrated Water Management: International Experiences and  
 Perspectives. New York: Belhaven Press, pp. 1-22, Ashton (1997): The Philosophy and Practise of  
Integrated Catchment Management. Pretoria: WRC, pp. 1-6; Schmitz & Ashton (1998): Ensuring  
Equity and Access for Poorer Communities in the Establishment of Catchment Management Agencies.  
Pretoria: DWAF, pgs 10-12; 
74  See Mitchell (1990): op. Cit, p. 3; 
75  See Ashton (1996): op. Cit, Mitchell (1990): op. Cit..; 
76  See Fuggle, R.F. and Rabie, M.A. (1992): Environmental Management in South Africa. Cape Town:  
 Juta, p. 315; 
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However, integrated catchment management is an ideal that is difficult to realise in 
practise. Firstly, the functioning of ecosystems is still not well understood, so that their 
proper ‘management’ cannot but be based on speculation77. Secondly, management of 
natural resources is often functionally divided between land, water, forestry, wetlands 
and the like. De facto integration of all these institutions is a daunting and politically 
sensitive task given the political obstacles to IWRM mentioned above78. Often therefore, 
a lead agency is identified to manage the integration effort or, as in SA, an incremental 
strategy is followed whereby IWRM is commenced with the intention to later broaden 
out into ICM. 
IWRM, therefore, faces several obstacles. But the attractive logic of integrated 
planning at catchment level has led to many attempts to introduce it despite the apparent 
obstacles: IWRM systems are in operation in Australia, Canada, England, Japan, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Poland, the United States and Zimbabwe79.   
Organisational responses to scarcity: rainwater harvesting 
Both water demand management and integrated catchment management are responses 
to scarcity generally associated with national policies, although they can be 
implemented at the level of individual catchments or, in the case of demand 
management, at the micro level. Water harvesting, on the other hand, is strongly 
associated with grassroots control over water and, although it is known to have had state 
support in the past, it can be implemented very well just on the strength of resources 
available in the local household, farm or village.  
 
Table 3.7 
Global freshwater flows over/through landmass / x10³ km³ / annum80  
Source of freshwater  Volume  Percentage of total 
Precipitation 119  100 
Evaporation 72 60 
Runoff 45 38 
Groundwater 2  2 
 
Fundamentally, both integrated catchment management and water demand management 
focus on the use of surface water and groundwater. They focus on water that nature has 
collected into sites that can be developed, such as underground aquifers or existing river 
channels. In this perspective, all water that evaporates or becomes soil moisture is thus 
‘wasted’81. Rainwater harvesting, by contrast, focuses on capturing rainwater itself, i.e. 
                                                 
77  Ecosystems in fact manage themselves, but nowadays often human intervention is necessary to retain  
them because of excessive encroachment, fragmentation, pollution, etc.  
78  See Schmitz (1999) in Synopsis vol. 3 no. 3, Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies; 
79  See Ashton (1996), op. Cit; Mitchell (1990), op. Cit; 
80  Adapted from Middleton, N. (1995): The Global Casino. An introduction to environmental issues.  
 London: Edward Arnold, p. 7l  
81  See Agarwal, A. (1998): Introductory Speech to the (Indian) National Conference on the Potential of  
 Rainwater Harvesting. Traditions,Technologies, Policies and Social Mobilisation. Sourced from  
 http://www.oneworld.org/cse/html/extra/twhs_anil.htm; accessed October 2006. 
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intervening in water at the moment of precipitation rather than after precipitation. Table 
7 above below shows the potential of water harvesting techniques compared to 
catchment and demand management.  
From table 7 it can be inferred that mainstream water resource development focuses 
only on capturing surface runoff and/or on pumping up groundwater, which together 
amount to a mere 40% of all available freshwater. Rainwater harvesting, by contrast, 
seeks to avert the losses through evaporation that are assumed to be inevitable by 
classical ‘modern’ approaches to water resources management, and strives to access all 
available precipitation. By shifting the emphasis from water available on or in the land 
to water available in the atmosphere, the potential amount of water that could be 
harvested is increased to 100%. However, the approach has been given little attention in 
classical civil engineering, a neglect which is entirely unfounded in view of the 
enormous potential of the technique. 
An example of a successful rainwater harvesting tradition is given by Agarwal82. He 
mentions an ancient Indian military fort, built on a hill, which existed in a desert 
environment with no sources of groundwater or surface water nearby. Yet this town had 
enough water to sustain a population of 50000 people, based on ancient Indian 
traditions known as ‘kundi’. Kundis are artificial catchments whereby a local micro-
catchment is built or a natural micro-catchment developed by lining it with concrete, 
creating a bowl with a channel in the centre, leading to a well covered by a dome to 
prevent pollution and evaporation.  
These traditions existed all over India for centuries but fell into disrepair under 
colonialism. They are currently being vigorously re-established. Other initiatives are 
known to exist in Germany, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Nepal, Sri Lanka, the United States, 
and Zimbabwe83 . Despite the current groundswell towards water harvesting, however, 
the movement is still in its infancy. Water harvesting is a powerful tool for water 
resource management in the interest of sustainability and equity, which can exist even 
without state support. It can raise drinking water and productive water availability all 
over the world at low cost, and in the light of the current global water crisis it merits 
considerable attention, which it is unfortunately not receiving.     
Water Scarcity in South Africa 
The above sections described recent developments in organisational responses to 
scarcity across the world, noting the quantitative development of scarcity and the 
institutional responses of water demand management, integrated water resources 
management and rainwater harvesting. In sections 3.7 to 3.13 below, a similar format is 
applied to the situation in South Africa. Therefore, sections 3.7 to 3.10 below will 
commence with a quantitative analysis of South Africa’s water management issues, and 
thereafter the attention will turn to the emergence of scarcity and the initiation of new 
institutional responses to it.  
                                                 
82  Ibid. 
83  See session 6 of the Centre for Science and the Environment’s conference on the Potential of  
Rainwater Harvesting / New Delhi 3-5/10/1998. 
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 South Africa is currently being confronted with a growing water scarcity problem. 
This scarcity is both a natural fact and a product of policies and competition between 
social actors. From a global point of view, South Africa is interesting amongst other 
things because in the period under review, it crossed a water availability threshold of 
less than 1000 cubic metres per capita per annum84. This threshold concept, although 
problematic in various ways, can be used as a point of entry into the debate. The 
Swedish scientist Malin Falkenmark developed a scale for water scarcity in which she 
states that nations enter the ‘critical’ phase, or level four on a five-point scale, when 
water availability is less than 1000 cubic metres per person per year85. South Africa 
probably crossed that threshold around 1995: the number of cubic metres per person per 
annum in South Africa dropped 3,250 in 1955 to 1,349 in 1990, and large regions 
within South Africa already have chronic water scarcity86. In 2002, water availability 
was approximately 780m³/a87.  
 How should one 'unpack' this scarcity into its component parts? Water scarcity has 
several root causes. As a first category of causes one could point to the supply 
parameters – determined both by the country's topography and climate, by the 
technology available to supply this water, and by the institutions which regulate 
allocation. A second category is human demand driven scarcity, including both scarcity 
as a result of rising demand and scarcity as a result of the inequality of water 
distribution in society. A third is scarcity defined as declining quality. I will treat these 
in turn below.  
South Africa’s natural water supply parameters 
Firstly, water scarcity is a product of South Africa's climate. Factors involved here are 
the quantity of water entering the country through rainfall (no rivers flow into the 
country from neighbouring states), the ratio of rainfall to runoff, the evaporation rate, 
and the way in which the country’s topography lends itself to storage of water. 
 The average annual rainfall in South Africa is 497 mm, considerably lower than the 
world average, which is 860mm88. However, calculating an annual average for South 
                                                 
84  South Africa is also interesting from a series of other reasons, as mentioned in the introduction and  
 methodological note. One of these is the powerful presence of resource capture as a cause of scarcity:  
i.e. the presence of scarcity as a result of misdistribution of the resource in society.   
85  Level one means having more than 10 000 cubic metres per person per annum, and is depicted as a  
 situation in which there are relatively few water problems. Level two means between 1670 cubic  
metres per person per annum and is characterised by ‘incidental’ problems. Level three means  
between 1000 and 1670 cubic metres per person per annum and is characterised by ‘regular’ problems.  
Level four means between 500 and 1000 cubic metres per person per annum and is characterised by 
‘chronic’ water problems. Level five means less than 500 cubic metres per person per annum and is 
characterized by ‘absolute’ water scarcity. As mentioned earlier in the text, scarcity needs to be 
defined more in economic terms than this, as well as being analysed in terms of distributions within a 
population.  
86  Government Communication and Information Service (1995): South Africa Yearbook. Pretoria: GCIS,  
 p. 88; 
87  See DWAF (2002): National Water Resources Strategy. Pretoria: DWAF, p. 31. There are different  
 calculations of the maximum annual water yield, of which the most optimistic is 33 million m³/a,  
which amounts to 780m³/a against a population of 42 million  
88  This figure is from DWAF (1986): Managing the Water Resources of the Republic of South Africa.  
 Pretoria: DWAF. It contrasts slightly with Davies and Day (1998): Vanishing Waters. Cape Town:  
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African rainfall is a rather misleading thing to do, as the average figure masks a very 
uneven distribution of rainfall throughout the country. Average annual rainfall ranges 
from 200mm per annum in the western areas of the Western Cape and Northern Cape, 
to 1000mm per annum on a narrow strip along the eastern shore board from East 
London to the border with Mozambique. The country becomes progressively drier as 
one moves from east to west, and the same is true to a less pronounced extent as one 
moves from north to south. 65% of the country receives less than 500mm of rain 
annually and 21% of the country, located in the south and west, receives less than 
200mm per annum. As a result, the water resources of the country are highly 
concentrated in the eastern areas: more than 60% of the country’s river flow is derived 
from only 20% of the land area. 89. 
 In addition to this unevenness in rainfall, evaporation is high and rainfall is 
unpredictable over time. The mean annual surface temperature is higher than 17, 5 
degrees Celsius for the Crocodile river catchment, the climate in most of the country 
and certainly in the research area is hot and dry, and 
 
 "There are only a few isolated areas in South Africa where the average annual potential evaporation90 
is less than the average annual rainfall"91.  
 
The result of this situation is that on average, about 27% of the water stored in dams is 
lost through evaporation and 33% of Mean Annual Runoff (MAR) is lost through 
evaporation in dams and channels as well as flood spillage over reservoirs92.93. O’Keefe, 
Uys & Bruton state that: 
 
 “Because of high evaporation rates, the runoff to rainfall ratio is amongst the lowest for any 
populated region of the world”94. 
 
Indeed, the conversion of rainfall to runoff is very low: only 10% of South Africa’s 
rainfall is converted to runoff, compared to 25% for Spain, approximately 30% for the 
United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden, and approximately 50% for Italy and Austria95. 
As a result, water is retained in the upper regions of a catchment for as long as possible 
because these areas are cool and less prone to evaporation. In addition, some 
experiments have been carried out with the introduction of layers of oil on dams as a 
means to prevent evaporation, but these have not met with much success. 
                                                                                                                                               
Cape Town University Press, p. 30. The latter put it at 452 mm/a. 
89  See DWAF (1997): op. Cit, pp.8,9; Fuggle and Rabie (1992) op. Cit, p. 647; 
90  The 'average annual potential evaporation' is a term referring to the potential evaporation which a  
 combination of sunshine, air temperature and air humidity could produce . 
91  DWAF (1986): op. Cit, p. 1.6; 
92  Ibid., p. 1.19 
93  DWAF (1997): Overview of Water Resources availability and utilisation in South Africa. Pretoria:  
 DWAF, p. 51; 
94  Fuggle and Rabie (1992): op. Cit, p. 277; 
95  Ibid, p. 281; 
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 Rainfall periodicity is very weak; while the natural variability in river flow 
overwhelms any predictability annual rainfall might have96. The lower rainfall is the 
more unpredictable it is97. In the Karoo desert, stretching up to the Namibian border, 
inter-annual rainfall variability is between 36% and 50%. In the central areas, including 
the lower reaches of the Crocodile River catchment, inter-annual rainfall variability is 
21%-25%. On the eastern shore board and stretching inland to the upper Crocodile 
River catchment, inter-annual rainfall variability is 15%-20%. However, it is 
worthwhile to note that these are standard deviations: in any one year, rainfall can 
deviate up to 150% in excess of the average or down to 65% of the average. For 
particular forms of water use such as farming, it is actual rainfall rather than average 
rainfall that is important, and in this sense rain fed agriculture is prone to substantial 
risks. Originally, i.e. before dams were constructed, most rivers in South Africa had a 
very low but dependable base flow, which could suddenly swell after rains to 
considerable volumes of ‘surplus flow’. Until dams were built, however, little use could 
be made of this surplus flow. For this reason, the exploitation of groundwater played a 
pivotal role in the European settlement of the country, although it plays a much 
diminished role nowadays. In the Crocodile River catchment, Pretoria is an important 
example of this point, as is the irrigation in the Zeerust -Groot Marico area.   
 Water impoundment in dams is intended precisely to flatten out the inter-annual 
variability (the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry plans water resource 
management at dam level on a five-year basis), although a higher evaporation is on the 
debit side of this equation. A broad inter-annual rainfall cycle of 18 to 20 years has been 
demonstrated for most of the country (excluding the south-western coastal strip up to 
Namibia) 98 . The last major drought the region experienced (excluding the current 
2001/2002 drought) was in 1991/1992 and 1993/1994, whereas the summers of 1996 
and 1997 were very wet: this latest development would also seem to confirm the 
continuation of this cycle beyond 1992. 
 Furthermore, surface water constitutes the main source of water supply in the country 
(some 87% of total supply in 1980, and 13% from groundwater sources). The result of 
these factors is that only 62% of mean annual runoff can be exploited economically, 
while water storage capacity must be high (and thus costly) to offset fluctuations in 
natural supply 99 . There are virtually no natural freshwater lakes in South Africa, 
meaning that surface water exploitation must proceed through damming and pumping 
from natural water channels (as well as inter-basin transfer schemes to correct local 
imbalances). As is the case elsewhere in the world, knowledge of the groundwater 
reserves and aquifer recharge rates is limited, resulting in uncertainties in estimating the 
total exploitable volume of groundwater in the country: Fuggle and Rabie estimate that 
5 400 million cubic metres per annum could be exploited, representing 16,4% of the 
total exploitable runoff in river channels100. The groundwater is mostly concentrated in 
secondary aquifers which deliver water at a low rate, making exploitation on a large 
                                                 
96  DWAF (1986): op. Cit, p. 6.11; 
97  Ibid, p. 1.13; 
98  Fuggle and Rabie (1992):op. Cit, p. 281; 
99  Figures from DWA 1986: 1.3-1.8 
100  Ibid., p. 279 
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scale difficult. There are, however, isolated dolomitic aquifers such as under the city of 
Pretoria and the town of Mafikeng, which enable exploitation for urban and agricultural 
purposes. While, as mentioned earlier, groundwater was historically very important 
during the establishment phase of (white) farms and urban centres throughout the 
country, the unification of South Africa in 1910 enabled state-directed and financed 
infrastructure expansion on a scale impossible to achieve through collective efforts of 
farmers or municipal officials. Therefore surface water exploitation has been on the 
increase through time in South Africa and in particular since 1910. 
 In summary, South African average rainfall is a mere 58% of the world average, 
rainfall is highly variable, evaporation is high, there are no natural freshwater lakes, 
groundwater supplies are on the whole suitable for small scale uses only, so that storage 
must proceed predominantly through dams.  
A regional picture  
South Africa has a total of eight climatic zones ranging from desert to sub-humid, and 
as indicated in the section above factors such as rainfall, periodicity in rainfall and 
evaporation combine to create substantial differences in water endowment between the 
regions. On the one hand, as mentioned, 60% of the water in the country’s rivers arises 
from only 20% of the land area. On the other hand, the driest 70% of the country’s 
surface area has only 11% of the country’s usable water supply101. As Adams mentions, 
rainfall in Africa in general falls in the form of short convective storms, meaning that 
rainfall is unpredictable from day to day as well as from site to site (it can be highly 
concentrated geographically, inundating one farm while leaving a neighbouring farm 
dry102.  
 While the original flora and fauna of the country was adapted to natural availability, 
water demand arising from man’s influence (including a new pattern of flora and fauna 
needs) bears little relation to natural availability. There are many possible reasons for 
the historical establishment of a town or rural settlement, and water availability was 
only one factor in this equation. Thus there are many anthropogenic centres of water 
demand which have insufficient local supply sources. Both the town of Kimberley and 
the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging areas are major urban developments that were 
the result of the exploitation of mineral deposits but which are located far from major 
river courses. Similarly, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East London grew because of 
the existence of harbour sites, but current demand far outstrips the natural supply of 
water in the area. Furthermore, irrigation development was promoted in the semi arid 
and arid interior in a period when water was not as scarce as it is today. As a result, the 
country is characterised by substantial mismatches between supply and demand. Water 
resource development has responded to this situation: there are now 24 inter-basin 
transfer schemes in operation, which predominantly transfer water westwards, with the 
notable exception of the eastward inter-basin transfer schemes which augment the 
                                                 
101  DWAF undated: p. 6 
102  Adams, W.M. (1992): Wasting the rain: rivers, people and planning in Africa. London: Earthscan, p.  
 42. 
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supplies of the coastal cities of Pietermaritzburg, East London, Port Elizabeth and Cape 
Town.     
 
The South African boom in water demand  
While natural parameters influence the availability of water, scarcity is a function of 
human demand. Economic forces, political forces, social forces and cultural forces all 
combine to generate a given level of water demand in an area, and if an appropriate 
institutional and financial apparatus is in place, a man-made water use system can be 
implanted within the natural water system to match natural supply to anthropogenic 
demand. This water use system is not fixed but is constantly changing as farming 
practises change, mines open or close, industries develop, shut down, or change their 
use practises, villages are provided with piped water, etc. Over time, the role of 
agriculture and mining in the South African economy has decreased while the role of 
industry has increased. Thus the contribution of agriculture to GDP declined steadily 
from 21% in 1911 to 7% in 1980, while the contribution of mining declined from 28% 
of GDP to 10% of GDP between 1911 and 1970. Currently the contribution of 
agriculture and forestry is less than 5% of GDP, while the contribution of mining is 
some 8.7%. By contrast, the contribution of manufacturing and construction, which 
stood at 5% of GDP in 1911, increased steadily, especially after the Second World War, 
to its current level at 26.7% of GDP103. The South African population grew from some 
9,5 million in 1936 to 28 million in 1981 and 42 million in 1994. In response, the 
demand for water grew at an average compound annual growth rate of 3.8% a year. 
Thus national water consumption in 1910 was a mere 30% of water consumption in 
1970, and 130% of the 1970 consumption level by 1980. In response, expenditures of 
the state on water resource development grew at an average rate of 8% per annum 
throughout the period between the Second World War and 1986, although cutbacks on 
state spending after the 1973 oil crisis meant a much lower expenditure on dam building 
in the late 1970’s. 
 Of course with the initiation of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project in 1986, 
expenditure on dam building increased substantially again after that. A report released 
in 1970 announced an expected increase in annual expenditure on water infrastructure 
from R 100 million in the 1970’s to R 200 million in the 1980’s and R410 million by 
the end of the centur104. This was based on the rather neat exponential curve which state 
expenditure on dam building had demonstrated between 1930 and 1970105.   
 Table 8 combines the actual sectoral breakdown in water demand in 1980 and 1996 
with a 1986 projection of sectoral water demand for 1990. The table illustrates a number 
of issues at once. First, it is a clear indicator of the effects of the continuous growth of 
both the economy and the population on the demands placed on the water bulk. The 
most rapid growth in overall water demand is in the urban/domestic sphere, but all 
categories of demand have increased substantially since 1980. The maximum 
                                                 
103  Drawn from the Central Statistical Service (1982) and GCIS (1995): op. Cit, p. 217; 
104  DWAF (1986): op. Cit, p. 1.30 
105  Ibid, 9.8-9.10; 
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exploitable annual quantity of surface water is estimated at 33600 million m³/a, i.e. 
South Africa can expect to reach the upper limits of its supply capacity around 2030.  
 Second, the table strongly underscores the distributional element in South Africa’s 
water scarcity: the amounts of water allocated to the homeland areas, home to 50% of 
South Africa’s population before the abolition of influx control, are a mere fraction of 
that available to the 87% of South Africa allocate to whites and blacks with permanent 
residence rights in white areas. In concrete terms, for instance, during apartheid, a white 
household could look forward to an average of 168 cubic metres of water per annum, a 
coloured household could look forwards to 37 cubic metres per annum, and a black 
household could look forward to a mere 20 cubic metres106.  
  
Table 3.8 
Sectoral breakdown of water demand in South Africa / million m³/a107 
 1980 1990 1996 2030108 
Sector white 
areas 
back 
areas  
white 
areas 
black 
areas 
white 
areas 
black 
areas 
projection
Industry, 
power 
generation 
and 
mining 
 
 
 
1736 
 
 
 
162 
 
 
 
2631 
  
 
 
1598 
 
 
 
192 
 
 
 
162 
Irrigation 8132 693 9317  12344 851 693 
Stock 
watering 
 
240 
 
54 
 
263 
  
- 
 
61 
 
54 
Forestry 1170 126 1307  - 134 126 
Domestic 1207 167 1831  2171 255 167 
Ecosystem 178 2 182  3932 2 2 
Total 13867 17026 20045 30415 
 
The South African boom in water supply  
From 1912 to the late 1970’s, South Africa experienced a boom in the rollout of water 
supply infrastructure. Before this time, such development had expanded very slowly109. 
Firstly, it is difficult to state precisely how access to water was regulated in pre-colonial 
times: very little is known about such traditions in water resource management in SA. 
                                                 
106  DWAF (1986): op. Cit, 9.10; 
107  The figures in each date column represent demand in ‘white’ areas as against demand in the former  
 black homelands. Source: calculated from DWAF 1986, 1997. Although more recent statistics are  
 available in the National Water Resources Strategy it is difficult to reconcile them with the above  
 because of different assumptions and methods of calculation. The figures should therefore be  
 interpreted as illustrative of a trend rather than as absolute values. 
108 DEAT (1999): National State of the Environment Report projection, based on Basson (1997). Pretoria:  
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism;  
109  This is the period between the promulgation of the 1912 Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act  
which initiated rollout, and the period after the 1973 oil crisis which saw a sharp dip in state  
expenditure on infrastructure expansion;  
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However, this does not mean that these traditions did not exist - it merely means that 
there is very little research on the topic. Research by Jacobs and Khorrombi  shows the 
existence of traditions of water resource management that predate colonialism, but 
colonialism rode roughshod over them and imposed forms of natural resource 
management that were developed in and were appropriate to the European rather than 
South African context110.111.  
Because of the highly capital intensive nature of water resources development, state 
controlled infrastructure development has dominated throughout SA history, although 
private development certainly did occur. Shortages of water have manifested themselves 
from the earliest colonial developments onwards, and water resource development has 
therefore responded to recurrent crises in supply. The variability and relative aridity of 
the country’s climate imposed continuous restrictions on local development 
opportunities unless the means could be found to augment water supplies which 
provided an important precondition for economic development.  
The first civil engineering contract for water resource development was in 1670 for 
the construction of an aqueduct from Van Riebeeck’s reservoir to the Jetty at Table 
Bay112. Initial developments were financed by the Dutch East India Company and later 
taken over by the Departments of Irrigation of Transvaal and Cape Administrations in 
1904. Until the late 19th century, however, the Cape Administration neither had the 
interest nor the resources to develop infrastructure in the interior. It was only with the 
declaration of Union in 1910 and the sudden rise in investment in the interior that came 
with the discovery of gold and diamonds, that state directed infrastructure development 
began in earnest. The Department of Irrigation came into being in 1912 with the 
Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act, and one of its main goals was the 
construction of impoundments for the development of irrigation. This was hampered by 
the First World War but accelerated after 1918, such that by 1945 there were 53 
government dams across the country113. This development was a double-edged sword. It 
was social in character for destitute whites such as soldiers returning from the war that 
were settled on irrigation plots or put to work on the construction of labour intensive 
irrigation schemes. It was highly destructive for black farmers settled in areas served by 
dams, who were evicted in the wake of the 1913 Land Act and resettled on dryer, less 
fertile, land. Riparian law, introduced into SA through British interpretations of Roman-
Dutch law, related control over water to ownership of land adjacent to water sources. 
This set in motion a key element of monopoly capitalism in SA whereby the intensive 
concentration of land ownership in the hands of a small group of white commercial 
farmers was matched by their effective control over much of the national water bulk 
(Forster puts it at about 65%) backed by a national department whose key brief was to 
support irrigation rather than other economic developments114. Apartheid, as Turton 
                                                 
110  See Jacobs, 1999 
111  From conversations with K. Khorrombi, Assistant Director Catchment Management, DWAF 
112  See DWAF (1987): DWA 75 years: An anniversary worth the marking. Pretoria: house journal of the  
Department of Water Affairs, p. 2; 
113  See DWAF (1986): op. Cit; 
114  See Forster (1994): Critical Water Issues Affecting Rural Development in South Africa. Johannesburg:  
Land and Agricultural Policy Centre;  
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states, was about state directed resource capture and, in terms of water, institutionalising 
a particular hydropolitical privilege 115 . The aridity and unproductiveness of the 
‘homelands’, with the forced removal of black South Africans to these resource poor 
areas, was a key feature of apartheid. In essence, the supply orientation, in the specific 
manifestation of its rooting in SA soil, was internally generated rather than externally 
imposed. This makes it an exception on the African continent.  
The SA economy was destined rapidly to grow in a direction not envisaged by the 
institutional arrangements of the Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act. The rapid 
growth of mining and the concomitant growth of concentrated urban demand in the 
semi-arid interior created a new logic of water resource development that soon required 
a new water law. For instance, new water demand centres were not necessarily adjacent 
to watercourses, and yet riparian law disadvantaged non-riparians in their access to 
water, the water courts only allocating to non-riparians if all riparian needs had been 
satisfied. Thus for instance the continuous crisis in water supply on the Witwatersrand - 
gold was discovered far from significant water sources - could only be solved by 
pumping water up from the Vaal River 48 km away, but the appeals by Rand Water 
officials to the Department of Irrigation to obtain rights to this water fell on deaf ears as 
downstream riparian farmers were given preferential treatment116. A need grew for a 
law in which the water demand of municipalities, mining and industry were no longer 
subservient to the needs of agriculture. Also, private control over water had led to the 
development of excessive groundwater abstractions or impoundments in some areas, 
and more state control over the resource was needed. Lastly, water quality began to 
become an issue, and thus water quality legislation needed to be introduced.       
In 1956 a new Water Act was promulgated, and the name of the Department of 
Irrigation was changed to the more neutral Water Affairs, serving a by now 
industrialised and diversified economy as a whole rather than agriculture alone. The 
access rights to water of non-riparians, and in particular those of local authorities, were 
significantly improved 117 . Any use of water for industrial purposes contained the 
requirement that purification was an integral part of its usage and that water should be 
returned to natural watercourses in a condition conforming to quality standards set by 
the minister118. Unfortunately, however, this potentially helpful article was severely 
hobbled by a lack of clear statements in the law on retributions for non-compliance, and 
for many years water quality managers had to rely principally on moral pressure on 
producers to somewhat contain pollution levels. SA’s ‘hydraulic mission’ tolerated 
pollution to create the necessary space for the expansion of the mining industry and the 
emergence of a go-it-alone, coal-based, energy strategy. 
In terms of quantity, government water control areas could be declared in areas 
considered in danger of over-abstraction, and limits were placed on the size of dams on 
private property, to allow more water to flow to downstream recipients119. Although 
adapted many times to changing conditions, the 1956 Water Act remained in place 
                                                 
115  Private correspondence, 1999 
116  Taken from Rand Water Board Annual Reports 1913, 1914. 
117  See Articles 12 and 13(1) of the 1956 Act. 
118  See Article 21(1)(a) of the 1956 Act. 
119  See Articles 16(1)(a) and (b) and 28(1)) of the 1956 Act. 
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during the entire apartheid era and was only overhauled with the emergence of 
democracy.  
As the economy and population grew, demand grew exponentially, and the 
development of infrastructure grew exponentially with it. Table 9 below summarises 
this. The table shows a ‘messy’ approximation of an exponential growth in dam 
construction in SA between 1889 and 1986. By 1997 the Department of Water Affairs 
and Forestry could claim its disposal over a storage capacity of 27 000 million m³, 
holding more than 50% of the mean annual runoff of 50 150 million m³120. Currently the 
country has a storage capacity of 32412 million m³, but the increase since 1997 is 
predominantly from storage development outside the country through international 
agreements121. Officials at the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry estimate that 
ultimately a further 13 250 million m³ could be developed inside the country before the 
maximum yield is reached, and that the rest would be lost to evaporation and spillage 
during floods. However the table shows that these projections are likely to be fairly 
optimistic: table 3.9 shows that the growth in storage capacity has been tapering off 
since 1979, and in the twenty years from 1986 to 2006, only 4714 million m³ has been 
added to total capacity. In fact, since 1986, South Africa has increasingly been turning 
to foreign sources of water through agreements with Lesotho on the multi-dam Lesotho 
Highlands Water Project and with Swaziland on the Maguga dam.  
 
Table 3.9 
Construction of dams in South Africa, 1889 - present122 
Period Number of dams 
constructed per decade 
Total storage capacity added  
in million m³ 
1889 – 1899    2     6.46 
1900 – 1909    8    16.28 
1910 – 1919   12    76.95 
1920 – 1929   19    39.24 
1930 – 1939   21    31.02 
1940 – 1949   20    59.90 
1950 – 1959   71   491.81 
1960 – 1969   89   362.60 
1970 – 1979  104 14480.79 
1980 – 1986  109 12132.99 
1986 – present  (45)123  4714.00 
 
The Lesotho Highlands Water Project could provide a further 6 500 million m³ of 
storage, of which 1 950 million m³ is already being used, and the Maguga dam has a 
                                                 
120  See DWAF (1997): Op. Cit, p. 9; 
121  DWAF (2002): Op. Cit, pg 23.  
122  Source: calculated from DWAF (1986): annex, and DWAF (2002): National Water Resources  
Strategy. Pretoria: DWAF. 
123  This of course covers two decades;  
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storage capacity of 332 million m³124.  Furthermore, dam construction naturally takes 
place in areas well endowed with water and which have suitable geographical sites for 
development. In South Africa, there is a geographical mismatch between supply and 
demand which has led to the construction of inter-basin transfer schemes for the 
importation of water into catchments with high demand. Figure 3.1 provides and 
overview of supply and demand for South Africa’s 19 water management areas. It 
illustrates a number of things. Firstly, in twelve of the nineteen water management areas, 
water demand exceeds the amount of water naturally available. The deficits are the 
largest in the Crocodile West, the lower Vaal and the lower Orange. The Orange River 
is an extreme case, whereby the lower reaches of the river have little or no natural water 
available and all water utilised is imported from upstream (the upper reaches of the 
Orange River are located in Lesotho which still holds much of the potential for further 
regional water resources development). 
 The Vaal River as a whole cannot satisfy its water demand without substantial water 
imports, which are to a large extent related to the water needs of the Crocodile River 
catchment. A portion of the water of the upper Vaal is transferred to the Eastern 
Highveld where it is used to cool coal fired electricity plants, while the Southern 
portions of the Witwatersrand fall within the catchment area of the middle Vaal and 
therefore fall within the supply region of South Africa’s industrial heartland.  
 
Box 3.2: Groundwater utilisation in South Africa125  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
124  See Joint Permanent Technical Commission, JPTC, 1991. The Maguga dam is to be shared with  
Swaziland, therefore only 60% of the water of this dam is available for South Africa  
125  Compiled from DWAF (2000): The National Water Resource Strategy. Pretoria: DWAF;  
DWAF(2000): Groundwater Quality Management in South Africa. Pretoria: DWAF; DWAF (1997):  
Overview of water resources availability and utilization in South Africa. The figures on total surface  
and groundwater utilization exclude ‘return flow’ or re-use which significantly increases surface water  
utilization capacity relative to groundwater.  
Current South African surface water storage capacity is 32,412 million m³, which amounts to 66% of 
the total average mean annual runoff of 49,000 million m³ (including runoff from Lesotho and 
Swaziland). Surface water comprises the lion’s share of water utilisation in South Africa: it accounts 
for 90.4% of the total, and groundwater accounts for the remaining 9.6% of utilisation. It is estimated 
that a total of 6,000 million m³ could in theory be abstracted sustainably, i.e. at or below the rate of 
recharge. However, competition for access to the resource hampers sustainable use. Groundwater 
abstraction has increased from an estimated 1,783 million m³/a in 1980 to 1,969 million m³/a in 1990 
and 2,159 million m³/a in 2000, leading to local problems with groundwater tables. During the 
drought of 1992, groundwater tables dropped in excess of 10m in some areas in the former Transvaal, 
cutting many community hand pumps off from their water sources whereas mechanised abstraction 
on white farms at greater depths continued.  
Although groundwater does not account for a large proportion of aggregate water supply, it 
nevertheless has an importance out of proportion to its quantity. Surface water is unevenly distributed 
in South Africa, with 60% of the river flow arising from only 20% of the land area. Groundwater, by 
contrast, is better distributed throughout the country and therefore it is an essential fallback resource. 
In fact, it is estimated that almost two thirds of South Africa’s population depends on groundwater 
for their domestic water needs. Furthermore, some 400 South African towns are at least partly 
dependent on groundwater for their supplies. 
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And the Crocodile River, as will be set out in more detail in later chapters, receives 
transfers from the Middle Vaal to satisfy its local demand. None of these areas can be 
developed further unless more water is imported.   
The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry still sees the potential for the 
development of a further 5410 million m³ countrywide by 2025 that will predominantly 
consist of dam construction in the moist eastern regions of the country as well as 
ancillary international dam building126. However, even if this is realised, it would be a 
further confirmation of the slowdown in the expansion of water resources infrastructure 
that has set in since 1986. And in this scenario, a number of pertinent questions remain 
unanswered:  
Firstly, like other countries, SA has enthusiastically embraced the supply orientation 
for most of its water management history. In keeping with world trends, as the most 
logical sites for dam construction in SA have progressively become occupied by dams, 
so the remaining possible sites have become less favourable in social, environmental 
and economic terms. Thus not only are there fewer and fewer options for further water 
resources development, but the infrastructure that is currently being built is facing more 
and more public criticism. To take the example of the largest recent development in 
infrastructure expansion, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, both social and 
environmental issues associated with it have been taken up as concerns by local and 
international lobby groups 127 . The social costs of the dams have included loss of 
livelihoods with tardy or inadequate compensation for some 20 000 dispossessed 
villagers in the Maluti Mountains. The environmental consequences have included 
increased soil erosion in the Ash River as a result of the decanting of impounded water 
into this tributary of the Vaal, using it as a conduit of water to the Vaal dam. Another 
example comes from the South African water boards which are paying the present day 
cost of national water schemes that is built into the tariff for bulk water. The continued 
and uncritical expansion of supply infrastructure has met criticism from the water 
boards, which point to large losses through leakages in municipal areas and question the 
utility of large infrastructural works when proper management could substantially bring 
down consumption and negate or postpone the need for new infrastructure128. A third 
example is in the realm of public awareness of the consequences of water infrastructure 
development, which is currently on the rise. South Africa’s pre-1994 state machinery 
was technocratic and hostile to notions of public consultation such as on infrastructural 
works, so that the negative social consequences of dams were not subjected to scrutiny, 
as they would under normal circumstances be in a democratic culture. The typical 
discursive elites during the supply orientation phase were white Afrikaner male 
engineers, producing a mindset on water delivery that was biased in terms of race, 
ethnicity, gender and even scientific orientation. 
However, after the emergence of democracy in 1994 the public debate opened on all 
manner of fronts, including issues of public infrastructure. In 1999, civil society 
                                                 
126  DWAF (2002); NWRS, Op. Cit, p. 36. 
127  These include the International Rivers Network, the Transformation Resources Centre, and the 
  Highlands Church Solidarity and Action Centre. 
128  From an interview with George Constantinidis, Rand Water Board, Rand Water Community Based  
Projects Division, 18/04/1997 
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groupings organised the Southern African Hearings for Communities Affected by Large 
Dams129. These pointed to the loss of livelihoods, homes, places of cultural value, etc. 
that was associated with the construction of a range of large dams in Southern Africa 
and provided one of the first opportunities in South Africa for a broad public debate on 
dams. At the time, the first South African minister of Water Affairs and Forestry, Kader 
Asmal, was the chairman of the World Commission on Dams, and he attended the 
hearings together with the Secretary General of the World Commission on Dams. In 
fact, as will be seen in more detail below and in other chapters, emerging departmental 
policies are strongly oriented towards the broadening of consultations on water resource 
management, which will sharpen public scrutiny of major infrastructural works.   
 
Figure 3.1 
National distribution of water availability and demand 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, within the ministry of Water Affairs and Forestry itself, fault lines are 
beginning to appear which challenge the hegemony of the supply orientation. The 
current DWAF was built on a ministry in which the construction of new infrastructure 
was the order of the day, and the careers of many civil servants were and still are 
associated with the supply orientation. It cannot therefore be expected that this 
orientation will disappear tomorrow, however, it is interesting to note that as new 
                                                 
129  These hearings were hosted by the twin environmental organizations in South Africa, the Group for  
Environmental Monitoring and the Environmental Monitoring Group, as well as the International  
Rivers Network;  
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management options and structures (such as the directorates of demand management 
and catchment management) enter the department, so new debates are beginning to 
emerge within the ministry on alternative approaches to the water scarcity issue.  
Secondly, current projections of water availability or the potential for further 
development do not take into account either the provisions in the National Water Act 
for the Ecological Reserve, or adjustments that may have to be made in future as a result 
of the SADC protocol on shared water resources. Under the Ecological Reserve 
provision, the Department is required to set aside a proportion of the river flow in each 
catchment area for the satisfaction of basic human needs (i.e. 25 litres per capita per day) 
as well as that amount of water that is deemed to be necessary to maintain the riverine 
ecosystem. Thus for the Crocodile-Marico water management area, for example, it is 
estimated that of the Mean Annual Runoff of 855 million m³/annum, 164 million 
m³/annum will have to be set aside for the Ecological Reserve. This considerably 
reduces the total amount of water which can be dependably relied upon for other 
purposes. In addition, many of South Africa’s rivers are shared with neighbouring 
countries, and there are obligations for the equitable share of the resource amongst the 
SADC member states. For example, Gaborone, the capital of Botswana, receives an 
annual transfer of 7million m³/annum from the Crocodile-Marico water management 
area. Despite this, the Gaborone dam dropped to 23% of its full capacity in 2005, 
sparking fears of an imminent water crisis in Botswana and raising questions about 
Gaborone’s future sources of water 130 . Depending on the way in which regional 
conflicts over water are resolved, it may be that more water will have to be set aside in 
future to satisfy regional rather than just national water needs.    
Thirdly, access to water is highly unequal in South Africa. In 1994, Forster estimated 
that 6% of the population controlled 65% of the country’s water as a result of the 
riparian system131 .132. In addition, at that time some 12 million South Africans had no 
access to protected water supplies for domestic purposes, let alone for production. 
Currently the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry estimates that 16.18 million 
people have either received access to basic water services or have had these services 
upgraded to a higher level since 1994. It also estimates that the number of people with 
no infrastructure at all has been reduced to 3.38 million in that period133. These figures 
indicate that while substantial progress has been made in rolling out infrastructure to the 
poor, aggregate statistics on national water demand mask distributional scarcity. The 
bulk of South Africa’s water still remains locked into the service of a minority. Efforts 
at redistribution such as through the licensing system under the authority of catchment 
management agencies can be expected to address the very large demand for water 
amongst the poor majority of the population. This in turn can be expected to have a 
                                                 
130  See Helmuth, M. and Sanderson (2001): Southern Africa: Water Stressed by 2021? In: The Courier  
 ACP-Eu, Nov/Dec 2001 
131  Forster, S. (1994): Critical Water Issues Facing Rural Development in South Africa. Johannesburg:  
Land and Agricultural Policy Centre, October 1994 
132  The riparian system was abolished as a result of the promulgation of the National Water Act in 1998.  
 Nevertheless, progress in redressing inequalities in access to water for production has been slow. 
133  Department of Water Affairs and Forestry: Water Services National Information System as of  
 December 2006; 
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major impact upon overall water demand, an issue not catered for in analyses that focus 
on water demand in the context of the existing distribution of the resource. Generally 
speaking, a small increase in living standards can be expected to have a substantial 
effect upon overall water demand. Between 1955 and 1990, South Africa’s decline in 
per capita water availability was 62.2%, while its decline in water availability per unit 
of economic product was 92.8% 134 . This indicates the extent to which economic 
changes such as increases in per capita income can affect overall water demand.     
For the above reasons, it is clear that even with the inclusion of feasible international 
water projects, South Africa is rapidly approaching the upper limits of its national water 
supply capacity. While there has been an exponential increase in water storage capacity 
in SA in the 20th century, the remaining room for expansion is fairly limited. Also, in 
terms of ecosystem needs, population growth and economic growth, the same water 
bulk has to be spread over an increasing number of demand categories, individuals and 
economic actors. Taken together, therefore, SA can be seen to be crossing a threshold 
from an era of supply orientation into a period in which this approach is critically re-
examined.  
Looking at the field of water policy, one can it is possible to observe the emergence 
of new ideas and practises on water resource management. The country is in the unique 
position that this emerging scarcity takes place as all laws and public management 
systems are under review in the attempt to shake off the legacy of apartheid. The 
process of reformulating water law is fundamentally informed by scarcity, and most of 
the 28 principles on which the new water law relate in some way to the need to address 
rising scarcity of water in quantity or quality135. Therefore, the country’s emerging 
water policies and the institutions they call for are rooted in the need to address scarcity. 
The post-apartheid political context involved a fundamental review of state institutions 
and policies. Because of this, in 1994, South Africa was in a unique position to 
introduce responses to scarcity on a large scale within a short period of time. In broad 
terms, the key responses to scarcity have been water demand management, integrated 
catchment management and rainwater harvesting. These responses took place against 
the background of a complex series of changes within the Department of Water Affairs 
and Forestry as well as its location within the broader framework of institutional change 
at the national level. These developments are the subject matter of chapter three. For the 
sake of comparison with global policy developments, the key policy changes in South 
Africa with regard to water demand management, integrated water resource 
management and rainwater harvesting are examined here.     
The political transition and water resource management   
In a nutshell, in 1994, South African water resources were locked into the service of an 
advantaged minority while a huge proportion of the population remained un-served 
even for its domestic water needs. The national Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry, historically without the forestry portfolio, was an organisation steeped in the 
                                                 
134  Compiled from Central Statistical Service (1997), United Nations population and environmental  
programme's 1995 update on water availability, IBRD World Development Report 1997 
135  More detail on this issue will be provided in chapter three.  
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traditions of civil engineering and supply augmentation, to which water quality 
management had fairly recently been added. In the 1980’s there were some influential 
officials within the department who championed the development of stakeholder driven 
river forums, an end to the uncritical subsidisation of water use in agriculture, or 
experimentation with greater conversion of rainfall to runoff. However, their ideas and 
initiatives did not find expression in policy until the major transformations of the 1990’s 
provided the opportunity for the rewriting of water policy.  
The new Department of Water Affairs and Forestry came into existence by 
Presidential proclamation on the 1st of July 1994136. The scale of the transformation it 
faced was huge. It integrated the eleven water affairs and forestry related administrative 
units that were the result of apartheid’s separate development policy; its budget was 
thus trebled while the personnel count rose from 7000 to some 35 000 people137.  
DWAF departed in a fundamental manner from its previous policies. The first and 
most radical of its policy shifts was the introduction of policy on third tier water 
management (responsibility for retail water and sanitation service delivery to 
households). The systematic lack of access to reliable sources of water for an estimated 
12 million people was given top priority, and the department was given disposal over a 
considerably larger budget than it had commanded in the apartheid period, from 1.28% 
to 2, 24% of the national budget138.139. The department had a large staff contingent with 
expertise in first tier water management but little capacity in the new field of third tier 
water management. This placed pressure on its capacity to deliver water services on the 
kind of scale required to address the existing backlog, and forced partnerships with a 
broad range of organisations to ensure service delivery140.  
The second policy shift was in water resource management. Existing expertise was 
focussed on the supply orientation, and therefore new competencies had to be created to 
address demand and catchment management, in which engineering was merely a role 
player in more holistic management approaches that addressed a broad range of issues 
including the socio-economic and environmental arenas. To all intents and purposes, 
these new functions were add-ons to the existing structure and introduced new policy 
direction in the department without necessarily getting rid of the old directions, for 
instance through commencing a scaling down of infrastructure supply.  
A key cultural element in the department was a commitment to move at speed with 
the policy and delivery process while not necessarily having all the available data, 
personnel, or a clear view of the divisions of tasks. Thus amid all the confusion of 
transformation, policy vacuums and uncertainties on redeployments of staff and changes 
in functional divisions, there was an overriding commitment to ensure that staff rise 
above this and create increasing momentum in a new direction. This was referred to as 
                                                 
136  See DWAF 1994: White Paper on Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, page 2. 
137 See Clement, K. and Schmitz, T. (1997): Input paper on Water Supply and Sanitation for the National  
Poverty and Inequality Study. Pretoria: Ministry in the Office of the Deputy President 1997:17. 
138  This figure was later changed from 12m to 18m, indicating the kinds of data uncertainties with which  
the new government had to cope.  
139 See Schmitz, T (2000): Rethinking Delivery? A review of the efforts of the Department of Water  
Affairs, 1994-9. Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies, policy brief # 16; 
140  Ibid. 
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the ‘80 over 20’ policy, that margins of 20% error would be accepted as long as 
processes could move at speed. This intangible ‘vibe’ was the key to current perceptions 
of the success of the department under Kader Asmal between 1994 and 1999141.  
Three White Papers have emanated from the department since 1994142. In the first 
cabinet period considerable emphasis was given to water services delivery, while in the 
second the profile of catchment management, for instance, was raised to second position: 
the department developed policy on water resource management after that on water 
services delivery had been developed, and they now co-exist as the dual pillars of 
DWAF policy. The three White Papers are the Water Supply and Sanitation White 
Paper (1994); the National Sanitation Policy White Paper (1996) and the White Paper 
on a National Water Policy for SA (1997). 
The third White Paper set the policy for water resource management in the new SA. 
It deals with national management of the resource: it is concerned with resource 
management and conservation, catchment management, water allocations, demand 
management, and the organisational environment required in order to implement the 
new policy. It places strong emphasis both on redressing the imbalances created by 
apartheid in access to water (an equity focus), and on placing demands on management 
relating to sustainable resource use (a sustainability focus). An example is the concept 
of the 'Reserve': this translates into the attempt to quantify an amount of minimum flow 
in rivers and impoundments that can be reserved for maintaining basic ecological 
functions (such as habitat for fish and plants) and to ensure that the population is 
guaranteed a minimum of 25 litres per capita per day for domestic purposes. 
The 1997 White Paper advocates water tenure reform: it replaces riparian law with a 
system in which the state will issue water use licenses that have restricted validity. A 
prime motivation for this is scarcity of water and the consequent need to ensure optimal 
use and allocation of water over the economic sectors at all times. But it also motivated 
by equity considerations. The White Paper mentions three components of equity: in 
access to water services (connection to the tap and sanitation services are basic rights), 
in access to water resources (equitable access to productive uses of water), and in 
access to benefits from the use of water resources (water should be used in a way 
beneficial to the whole of society). Only the first was operationalised and quantified in 
law; the meaning given to equity in water provision therefore shrunk somewhat between 
the writing of the White Paper in 1997 and the promulgation of the new Water Act in 
1998143. 
The White Paper on a National Water Policy for SA was a crucial stage in the ‘Water 
Law Review Process’ - a process of public consultation that eventually led to 
promulgation of the Water Act. In 1995 the department published a document entitled 
‘you and your water rights’, calling for public input into the reform of the 1956 Water 
Act. A review panel synthesised the resulting comments and ideas into 27 key 
principles on which the new water law was to be based. These principles were in turn 
                                                 
141  This impression of a department making haste with delivery without sufficient information to support  
 implementation was gleaned from a series of interviews with DWAF officials carried out in 1996 and  
1997.  
142  Excluding the 1996 White Paper on Sustainable Forest Development in South Africa.  
143  Ibid. 
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published and distributed for public consultation, resulting finally in a water law review 
conference in October 1996. This process resulted in 28 principles which were approved 
by Cabinet, and which formed the pillars on which drafting panels were to write the 
1997 White Paper and the subsequent Water Act, finally promulgated in August 1998. 
Parallel to this, the Water Services Act, that regulated third tier water management, was 
also drafted and promulgated.  
Both the Water Act and the preceding White Paper indicated a new emphasis on 
water conservation and demand management on the one hand, catchment-based 
management on the other. As 20 of the 28 underlying principles of the Water Act 
related in some way to scarcity in quantity or quality or both, these developments can be 
seen as a policy response to scarcity. 
Water demand management, integrated catchment management, and water 
harvesting are now treated in turn. Only the first two are within the ambit of 
government; water harvesting is a more civil society-based development and is placed 
here alongside the other two for purposes of contrast.   
Organisational responses to scarcity: water demand management  
Under apartheid, water was already regarded as an increasingly scarce national resource 
by the then Department of Water Affairs144. In policy terms, this had led to increasing 
centralisation of the control of water, in ‘the public interest’. A key policy principle was 
that of ‘best joint utilisation’ which sought to achieve optimum benefit and minimum 
negative impact from any configuration of water demand, supply, and allocation 
combinations that an evolving economy demanded. This mission was formulated thus:  
 
‘To ensure the ongoing, equitable provision of adequate quantities and qualities of water to all 
competing users at acceptable degrees of risk and cost under changing conditions’ 145 
 
Of course in typical apartheid era doublespeak, the ‘all competing users’ referred 
primarily to competing fractions of white capital rather than to the population as whole. 
Considerable restriction of demand was in fact (perhaps not always consciously) 
achieved by ignoring the demands of the majority for proper access to the resource. 
In the new SA, various aspects of water demand management were launched several 
years before permanent institutional structures were created at national level to ensure 
the furtherance of the demand orientation. In 1995, at the initiative of then minister 
Asmal, the National Water Conservation Campaign was launched. It was run by a group 
of part-time external consultants, none of whom were full-time government 
employees146. 
A major thrust of the conservation campaign was the Working for Water programme, 
which focuses on the national consumption of water by non-indigenous plant species 
which have ‘invaded’ SA’s natural habitat. In fact, this ‘invasion’ was induced by 
human action and many of these species are being exploited commercially.  
                                                 
144  See DWAF (1986): op. Cit, p. 10.3. 
145  DWAF (1986): op. Cit, p. xvii. 
146  Drawn from an interview with Desighen Naidoo, DWAF Water demand management, 14/10/1999. 
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Invasive plants now occupy some 10 million hectares of land in South Africa, an area 
equivalent to that of Kwazulu-Natal (i.e. some 8% of the nation’s land area). It is 
estimated that this vegetation consumes some 7% of the country’s water resources, and 
the programme aims to clear this vegetation to free a significant amount of the national 
water bulk and enhance water security. What is not mentioned is that, if left to itself, 
this added water would sustain indigenous vegetation (although indigenous vegetation 
is often water efficient), and need not necessarily be released for human production. 
How much water will be reserved for local ecosystem maintenance is still under 
discussion147. 
Designed as a public works programme, Working for Water has been very successful 
in achieving efficiency, equity and sustainability. Unemployed adults are trained to 
recognise and remove alien vegetation, providing jobs, while water resources can be 
used more efficiently than in feeding alien plants, and the natural environment is 
protected from competition with other species. The programme is quite rightly heralded 
as one of the best launched by the government in the RDP era.  
But it is not without its faults. Tony Turton mentions the impossibility of actually 
eradicating alien invaders, whose seeds lead to a continuous resurgence of the 
prevalence of the plants148. The Working for Water Campaign is therefore not a once-
off event but a continuing battle against alien plants. It can be asked how long 
government funding will be available for this campaign.   
The National Water Conservation Campaign created an argument for a competency 
in DWAF that could begin to tackle the demand side of the water supply problem. In 
August 1998 the Directorate of Water Conservation was established, consisting of 5 
core and four support staff members; it has a budget of R 14m. Compared to the some R 
250m of the infrastructure development chief directorate, water conservation obviously 
has an inferior status within the department, although its work is linked to and supported 
by the catchment management and water quality directorates. There is no doubt, 
however, that the chief directorate of water utilisation under which demand 
management falls is enjoying rising prominence in the department, and water scarcity 
has now achieved status of priority 2 in the department, after community water 
services149.   
The directorate embraces the five pillars of demand management described above as 
tools to reduce consumption. Its policies cannot be judged on their implementation 
because the national strategy framework on water conservation and demand 
management was only released in May 1999. However, that the measures proposed by 
the strategy to effectuate demand management (chapter 6) emphasise efficiency 
measures rather than equity, the enormous concentration of demand in the hands of a 
small group of producers and domestic consumers (poor people use less water) does not 
feature as prominently as it perhaps could have. The block tariff system seems to be the 
only measure available to flatten out the relationship between income and demand.   
                                                 
147  From the DWAF Working for Water Annual Report 1998/9. 
148  Personal correspondence, 1999. 
149  Conversation, Haroon Karodia, former Director of Catchment Management in the DWAF. 
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Responses to scarcity: integrated water resources management  
No mention is made in SA catchment management documents of the call for integrated 
water resources management made at the UNCED conference in Rio in 1992. 
Nevertheless, various DWAF officials attest to the fact that South African delegates did 
attend UNCED and that the changes in water quality management from point source 
control to receiving water quality objectives, the groundswell towards catchment 
management, and the absorption of eight key UNCED principles into the 28-point 
framework of the 1998 Water Act, are strongly related to the UNCED process150. 
In South Africa, the catchment management process started in earnest in 1996 with 
the commissioning of preparatory studies on catchment management through traditional 
beneficiaries of research funding such as the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR) and the consultancy firm Ninham Shand. The studies show a 
chronological evolution from the abstract and general to the specific and practical. Two 
documents, ‘The Philosophy and Practise of Integrated Catchment Management. 
Implications for Integrated Water Resource Management in SA’ (1996) and ‘Research 
into Alternative Institutional Models for Integrated Water Resource Management in SA’ 
(1997), acted as key background documents to the drafting of the new Water Act, 
promulgated in August 1998. These were later followed up by more concrete, practical, 
documents such as ‘Guidelines For Catchment Management to Achieve Integrated 
Water Resources Management in SA’ (1997), and ‘A Strategic Plan for the Department 
of Water Affairs and Forestry for the Implementation of Catchment Management in SA 
(1998)’.  
The directorate: catchment management was established in mid-1998; this 
development ran parallel to the refinement and promulgation of the Water Act. The 
director of catchment management started the job alone, but was soon joined by four 
core and one support staff. The directorate, like that of water demand management, falls 
under the chief director of water utilisation. There are no similar structures in the 
regional offices of DWAF, so catchment related work consists of involving other 
functions in catchment management. In the future it can be expected that catchment 
management agencies will be staffed with experts, but indications are that this team will 
not consist of more than ten people per agency. Given the complexities of catchment 
management, it can be asked how policy developed at head office is to be effectively 
implemented by such a small team. History has taught that water quality management, 
for instance, was crisis driven and that it was difficult for water quality managers to 
monitor the activities of the many stakeholders that catchments can contain. In the 
present situation it is difficult to see how this will be improved upon unless civil society 
itself becomes actively involved in mutual social control to prevent excessive pollution 
or illegal water abstraction.      
In analysing the implementation of Integrated Catchment Management, the following 
trends are be important in assessing the direction of catchment management in SA, and 
                                                 
150  Conversation, Eustacia Boufilatos, Current Director: Catchment Management 7/1/2000, and Eiman  
 Karar, former Director , June 2002.   
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will be treated in more detail in chapter four. Firstly, there was a gradual change from 
the use of the concept of integrated catchment management to the use of the concept of 
integrated water resources management.The concept of catchment management 
involves the integrated management of all natural resources in the natural area of a 
catchment. It attempts to capture all activities and foreseen impacts of human activity 
and natural events within a management plan. But this would transcend existing 
boundaries between line departments such as Land and Agriculture, Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism, and DWAF. Catchment based natural resource management thus 
requires either its complete integration under one ministry, or efficient cooperative 
governance between line departments involved in managing one or more prominent 
natural resource. Over time the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry dropped the 
mention of integrated catchment management and began to replace it with ‘integrated 
water resource management’, remaining within its competency and opting for an 
incremental route whereby the assistance of other departments will be requested as 
catchment management gets off the ground and inevitably expands into land use 
planning, mining regulations, and the like. Unfortunately, current trends in SA show a 
fragmentation of environmental governance along departmental lines; each department 
has set up its own institutions for integrated environmental management and is inviting 
others to participate in its structures151. Of course, this falls short of integration. The 
institutional structures for integrated natural resource management, by definition, need 
to be structured around catchments but they would need to move towards, for instance, 
a panel constituted by members of the various natural resource-centred line departments. 
This issue will return to the fore in chapter three. Secondly, there was a gradual shift 
with regard to the idea of community involvement in catchment management. 
According to the 1998 Water Act, water use licensing is to be delegated to Catchment 
Management Agencies (CMAs) which in turn answer to participatory catchment 
management forums (CMFs). Water resource management is thus to become 
community-based, with direct involvement of stakeholders in the deliberations over 
catchment management and water allocation. If one departs from the premise that 
apartheid centres around resource capture, then all initiatives that open avenues to 
democratic debate on access to resources fundamentally deepen democracy. There is 
therefore a powerful opportunity through the catchment management process to deepen 
democracy, especially in rural areas where oppression still manifests itself strongly.  
But South African water delivery infrastructure is locked into the service of 
previously advantaged communities, and the new law has not guaranteed or quantified 
water rights for the productive needs of the poor. This means that the guaranteeing of 
rights for the poor in respect of access to water is left to second order institutions in the 
form of Catchment Management Agencies. Unless the individual catchment 
management strategies (that each CMA must submit to the Minister for approval) 
specifically devote attention to development needs and strategies, there is a danger that 
the poor will be left to fend for themselves in stakeholder forums in which businesses 
can be expected to play a dominant and well-informed role. As will be argued in more 
detail in chapters four and five, the Department is experiencing considerable frustration 
                                                 
151  See Schmitz (1999): Synopsis vol. 3 no.3, Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies.  
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in its efforts to involve historically disadvantaged groups in current catchment 
management processes. A syndrome of ‘ participation fatigue’ is setting in as previously 
disadvantaged communities grow tired of waiting for the benefits of catchment 
management and in the meantime, the allocation of water resources remains much as it 
always was. Thirdly, there is the issue of data poverty. Research on water management 
has a long history in SA, and the plethora of local publications on water-related topics 
could and does fill entire libraries. These publications are generated through institutions 
such as the CSIR, Water Research Commission, DWAF itself and university research 
centres. An interesting sub-group within these publications are those produced by 
consultants who were traditionally used by the government to study particular issues 
and thus built up an impressive stock of knowledge - the very usefulness of their 
knowledge and the reliability of their information services is hampering the stimulation 
of emerging consultants because DWAF often relies on the reliable rather than 
venturing into the arena of new consultants.   
In general, information gathered on water resource management in the apartheid era 
was very technical. But as DWAF moves from an era of technology push to one of user 
pull, information needs are changing, and there is a dearth of data on water related 
socio-economic issues required for catchment management. The water availability and 
needs of the majority were ignored for many years and planning would at least require 
catchment studies of communities, their water use and needs. For instance, if requests 
are to be submitted to CMAs for water allocations for development, some indication is 
needed of the consumption and quality requirements of various kinds of activity.    
 
Organisational Responses to Scarcity: Water Harvesting  
In contrast to India, rainwater harvesting (RWH) does not have a long history in 
Southern Africa. There is therefore no cultural stock to draw on other than traditional 
knowledge on natural resource conservation. But the technique has considerable 
potential because of its low cost and the fact that it lends itself to a large degree of 
community control and independence from donors or the state. There is considerable 
momentum in the expansion of RWH on the subcontinent, supported primarily by 
NGOs although in Zambia, for example, it is also supported by the state. This expansion 
is taking place from a small base and there are ‘pockets’ of RWH development in each 
country. The tradition seems to be particularly strong in Zimbabwe, where it primarily 
has agricultural applications. It seems that very positive gains in access to water can be 
reaped through RWH projects but in the absence of the centralised water quality control 
that comes with bulk supply projects, water quality must be managed at the local and 
even household level, which requires training and appropriate technology152.  
In South Africa, there is no overall government policy on rainwater harvesting, 
although research into its effectiveness has been carried out by both the Water Research 
Council and the Agricultural Research Council, both of which have strong ties to the 
                                                 
152  See IDRC (1996): Water Management in Africa and the Middle East. Ottawa: IDRC; IUCN (2000):  
Water Demand Management: Towards developing effective strategies for Southern Africa. Pretoria:  
IUCN  
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policy arena. Rainwater harvesting finds its support predominantly among NGOs rather 
than government. It has its roots in the environmental movement, having been 
experimented with in various forms, for instance, on permaculture farms. RWH projects, 
for augmenting domestic water supply, providing access to irrigation water or both, are 
currently initiated through environmentally and rurally oriented NGOs. Despite its 
enormous potential, RWH in SA is restricted to a relatively isolated group of projects.    
Conclusions  
This chapter has attempted to place South African water scarcity in the global context. It 
was argued that the field of water scarcity as a research domain is relatively new and 
that therefore it is necessary to describe the practical issues that are generating a set of 
social problems with which government policy and popular movements have to deal. 
What is the rise of water scarcity, how does it manifest itself in practise, and what set of 
issues does this generate? It was asked how South Africa differs from the global context 
and whether anything be said about the relationships between the specifics of the South 
African situation and the general, global picture. As a backdrop to more organisational 
issues analysed further on in this work, the problem of scarcity is described in 
quantitative terms, relating it to questions of supply, demand and distribution. 
Both at the global level and iun the South African case, the past century has 
witnessed an enormous expansion of human interventions in natural water courses. In 
this period, the absolute quantity of water used has grown exponentially, while the 
diversity of uses to which water has been put has also grown very rapidly. Demand has 
been pushed upwards by population growth, by the expansion of the land area under 
irrigation, by changing patterns of use at the household level, by the increasing 
geographical concentration of demand through urbanisation, and by industrialisation.  
In conclusion, broadly speaking, South Africa has in fact mirrored global water 
resource management developments in trhe sense that what I have called the ‘supply 
orientation’ has enjoyed ascendancy until very recently (in the last twenty or so years). 
Both in South Africa and globally, the limits to continuing expansion became more and 
more evident and a range of new water resource management disciplines emerged in 
response to the evolving crisis. These included water demand management, integrated 
catchment management and rainwater harvesting. In South Africa, water harvesting did 
not achieve the kind of state recognition that either water demand management or 
integrated catchment management have enjoyed. Overall, however, there are, strong 
similarities between South African and global developments.  
But there are also several characteristics of the South African case that do not match 
other countries’ experiences. Firstly, the supply orientation was driven by the state 
rather than international donors, and in this sense South Africa stands out from the rest 
of the continent. Water resource development in SA is in this sense (but as the second 
point will illustrate not in another sense) closer to developments in industrialised 
countries than events in the rest of Africa. Secondly, in SA, most of the population was 
intentionally locked out of access to water as a productive resource. Rather than being 
used for development as it has across the Third World (whatever opinion one might 
have of these interventions), water has been used predominantly to satisfy the needs of 
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the elite. Overcoming the legacy of consciously created inequality is a key element of 
the current era of water resource management.  
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4 
Organisational responses to scarcity at the 
national level 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the organisational responses to scarcity in South Africa that have 
taken place at the national level. Operationally, this includes both responses in the field 
of the legislature and responses at the level of the executive, i.e. it includes the evolution 
of water law and the transformation of government departments at the national level.  
With regard to the former, it is argued that much can be learned from an analysis of 
the evolution of the South African regulatory environment with respect to water over 
time. Such evidence as there exists in history would tend to suggest that there has 
always been a scarcity of water relative to demand in the country, but that the nature of 
demand for and supply of the resource have changed dramatically over time. This has 
necessitated a continual revision and adaptation of the regulatory mechanisms 
developed to suit a particular configuration of supply and demand. Concrete economic 
and demographic developments placed demands not only on the physical infrastructure 
developed to deliver water, but also on the set of rules according to which the 
distribution of water operated. These economic conditions, demographic conditions, 
physical infrastructure and the regulatory system that influence water supply and 
demand are all subject to change. Because in the case of water, the low volume and 
quality available presented problems in matching demand and supply, changes in the 
regulatory environment represent a particular kind of institutional response to changing 
conditions of scarcity. Examining the nature of these changes can contribute to a better 
understanding of societal responses to scarcity and, it will be argued in this chapter, 
historical analysis can reveal important general trends in the development of regulatory 
regimes over time.  
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With regard to the transformation of state institutions, this chapter argues that, after 
1994, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry was enmeshed within a broader 
effort to effectuate a thorough transformation of the apartheid state towards a responsive 
and effective delivery apparatus. As a result, such organisational responses to scarcity as 
are encapsulated within the framework of the various policies that emerged from the 
Department in the ‘new’ South Africa must also be seen against the background of the 
politics and praxis of the transition period. The abolition of the riparian doctrine, the 
nationalization of water, the launching of catchment management, water demand 
management and the drive for the extension of community water supply and sanitation 
systems all took place in the context of a broader institutional flux in which the 
department muddled through as best it could in partial cognizance of events taking place 
at other levels of the state apparatus and within society as a whole.   
This chapter is subdivided into two sections. The first section looks at the evolution 
of South African water law over time, with a specific focus on water scarcity. The 
second section looks at, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry in the contest of 
the national transition, picking out a range of specific issues with which it needed to 
grapple. From these two sources, an attempt is made to distil a set of general trends with 
regard to organisational responses to scarcity at the national level.     
Water law could in one view be seen as constituting an attempt to control a 
fundamental natural resource for the improvement of human wellbeing. Stauth and 
Baskind adhere to this view when they state that “true economic development is the 
process of using resources to improve human well-being for this and succeeding 
generations through a careful balance of development and conservation“153.This view 
embodies a positive economic interpretation of resources as benefiting society in 
general. A more negative view such as that put forward by Bader & van Benschop is 
that resources are used for the production and reproduction of social inequality. Water 
law in this view is repressive, regulating and restricting society’s access to a 
fundamental resource on behalf of an elite group154. In the abundance of water, these 
two views are not mutually exclusive: controlling water for the benefit of mankind in 
general can (and does) coexist with inequalities in access to water. It would be too 
simple to reduce all purposeful action in the field of water law to attempts to restrict 
access to the bulk of a country’s resources by a minority group. Similarly it would be 
too simple to maintain that all purposeful action in the field of water law is benevolently 
intended for the furtherance of the well being of mankind in general. As Cannon has 
described with respect to the process of dam construction, there will always be 
identifiable groups of winners and losers155. However, as the resource base dwindles, so 
competition for a resource may rise and choices of water allocation for the benefit of 
mankind in general become more difficult to make. Water then loses some of its 
                                                 
153  In Fuggle and Rabie (1992): Environmental Management in South Africa. Johannesburg: Juta, pg 27. 
154  Bader, V.M., and Benschop, A. (1988): Ongelijkheden. Sociale ongelijkheden en collectief handelen  
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 Noordhof. 
155  Cannon, T (1994) Who controls water? Systems of power and the abuse of nature and people. In:  
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character as a public good, whereby its use by one citizen does not affect its use by 
another citizen. As a result, issues of resource capture for the benefit of a particular 
group in society and to the detriment of the rest of society become more prominent.  
The evolution of water law in South Africa  
This section traces the evolution of South African water law over time, paying special 
attention to the provisions of the various acts that attempted to regulate scarcity in both 
quantity and quality. The section begins by tracing the origins of South African water 
law. Next, it describes how this body of water law, which was essentially foreign in its 
origin, was adapted to the water-scarce conditions inside South Africa between 1652 
and the declaration of the Union of South Africa in 1910. It then explores South 
Africa’s first national water act, i.e. the Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act of 
1912, before describing the major revision to this act in 1956. Finally, it depicts the 
broader context of the 1998 Water Act as the most recent stage in a gradual evolution of 
regulatory regimes.  
The origins of South African water law 
As a result of the country’s peculiar history, South African water law as it existed until 
1998 was a local mix and interpretation of Roman law, Roman-Dutch law, British law 
and American law. As everywhere, water law had its roots in old legal traditions: in 
South Africa, because of European colonization, Roman law provided the framework on 
which local law was built, rather than Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist or Soviet frameworks156. 
African customary law did exist in the various areas of South Africa, regulating 
pollution, catchment management, etc. However, although customary law probably 
coexisted alongside colonial law for a considerable period of time in South Africa’s 
history, there is very little reference to it or to its influence on South African water law 
in the literature157. No scholarly opinions on South African water law mention any 
influence of local customary law on legislation in the colony.  
From 1652 onwards the Dutch colonists introduced Roman-Dutch law in South 
Africa, an adaptation of Roman law as applied to the freshwater environment of the 
Netherlands that commenced between the 14th and 16th Centuries A.D.158. Under old 
Roman law, water was considered to be res omnium communes, i.e. it belonged to 
everyone, but subsequent competitive use of rivers for fishing and navigation prompted 
state intervention through interdicts, creating the impression among some authors that 
water was state-owned159. In fact state control over what were previously res communes 
expanded gradually, making way for a combination of state control and private rights. 
                                                 
156  Van der Zaag, Pieter (1998): Water Law. lecture notes for WREM 506, Department of Civil  
Engineering, University of Zimbabwe. Harare, p. 17 and Pieter van der Zaag, personal  
Correspondence. 
157  Konanani Khorommbi, DWAF, 1999: personal contact, Nancy Jacobs, 1999: personal correspondence  
 Khorrombi has written a master’s thesis on Venda traditions w.r.t. catchment management and Jacobs  
(an African historian) has written a dissertation on changing agricultural practices in the Kuruman  
area. Both sources asserted that references on this topic were very thin on the ground. 
158  DWAF (1986): Management of the Water Resources of South Africa. Pretoria: DWAF, p. 8.6 
159  Van der Zaag (1998): Op Cit., pp. 19-21 
 116
Thus in the absence of interdicts to the contrary, early Roman law made water 
accessible to everyone for any purpose ranging from drinking to irrigation. As time 
went on and competition over the resource increased, so the communal character of 
rivers was eroded and certain classes and stretches of river were placed in different 
classes. Thus, for instance, Vos states that “if the stream was navigable or rendered 
another stream navigable, the State had absolute rights in it”160. These rivers were 
public rivers and belonged to res publicae (destined for the use and enjoyment of the 
general public but belonging to the state in ownership)161. The Roman state created a 
distinction between private streams and public streams for the purpose of applying 
interdicts in public streams162. This distinction continued into Roman-Dutch law163. If a 
river was predominantly perennial, it was considered to be a public stream (flumen 
publicum). Private streams derived their private character by default, i.e. that which was 
not a public stream was a private stream and could be treated as any other private 
property 164 . Control over the water of small non-perennial streams was not often 
disputed and therefore not often subject to state control, whereas larger streams were 
subject to more competition and dispute and thus required more state control 165 . 
However, in all cases, the state could control and regulate the use of even private 
streams as it administered water use in the public interest. Thus, in general, under 
Roman law there was a gradual transition from the treatment of water as a common 
resource whose utilisation by anyone was a right, to increasing state control over the 
resource in response to competition. An offshoot of this process was the attempt to 
divide water courses into public and private portions for administrative purposes.  
Roman water law was adopted and adapted in the Netherlands before being exported 
to South Africa. A number of essential differences between Roman water law and 
Roman-dutch law are mentioned in the literature. Firstly, although perenniality 
remained the main criterion for a river’s public status, the Dutch, having a surplus of 
water, understandably placed more emphasis on a river’s navigability: a navigable 
stream was also a public stream in Roman-Dutch law166. Secondly, whereas under 
Roman law water was available to all life forms i.e. no plant or animal could be denied 
the right to water, under Roman Dutch law access was restricted to all men. Thirdly, 
water was changed from res communes to res publicae, i.e. water belonged to the 
human population of the Netherlands167. Other than these three fairly major shifts in 
emphasis, Roman-Dutch water law remained much the same as Roman water law. 
As mentioned above, Roman-Dutch water law was introduced into the Cape Colony 
right from its earliest existence in 1652. Thus a body of water law adapted to conditions 
in water-rich Europe was imported to the water-scarce region of South Africa. Conflicts 
                                                 
160  Vos, W.J. (1978): Principles of South African Water Law. Cape Town, Johannesburg: Juta & Co, p. 
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163  Rabie (1989): Op Cit., p. 21 
164  Vos (1978): Op Cit., pg 1 
165  Van der Zaag (1998): Op Cit., pg 20 
166  See Rabie (1989): Op Cit., pg 21; Vos (1978): Op Cit., p. 1 
167  Van der Zaag (1998): Op Cit., pg 21 
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emerged over access to the streams in Table Valley from the very beginning of settler 
occupation in the Cape, between farmers who realised the need for irrigation in the 
colony’s climate on the one hand and the burgeoning town at the seashore on the 
other168. In the strict geographical area of the Cape colony the Cape Supreme Court 
presided over legal conflicts in respect of access rights, and in outlying areas water 
rights were regulated through local government structures by official colony magistrates 
(landdrosten) or by civilian councils (heemraden)169. However it seems that particularly 
in the early years, the capacity of the Cape administration to regulate and control events 
on the colonial frontier was limited. Davenport mentions that poor soils and scarce 
water at the Cape encouraged farmers to scatter, indicating the existence of much less 
formal methods of water allocation than those on offer through the application of 
Roman Dutch law170. It is likely that as roads were built and settlements became more 
formalised, the control of government over its citizens was enhanced. 
Navigability ceased to be an important criterion for the public nature of a stream in 
the South African versions of Roman-Dutch law (very few South African rivers are 
navigable, and if they are navigable, this is not so along the whole stretch of the river). 
However, apart from mentioning navigability, there is little reference in the literature to 
the evolution of the law during the Dutch occupation of the Cape. The Dutch occupation 
only explains the existence of strong elements of Roman-Dutch water law in South 
African law up to 1998. Major changes to the regulative system came with the British 
takeover at the Cape, when principles from British law began to be imported into the 
existing Roman-Dutch framework. Before going on to describe these changes, at this 
stage it seems valuable to have a brief look at the various legal systems on offer with 
respect to water regulation and their implications in regard to scarcity. 
Frederick mentions three ideal-types of water rights whereas Van der Zaag mentions 
two of these171 .172 . First, there are riparian rights. Here, the right to use water is 
associated with the ownership of land adjacent to a water source, while in times of 
scarcity, in theory at least, the scarcity is shared by all owners along the bank of the 
water source (in practice and in the absence of proper control measures, upstream 
landowners can appropriate more water. Second, there are prior appropriation rights. In 
this system, the rights to use water declines in reverse order to chronological sequence 
of human settlement along a water course, i.e. first come, first serve. This is conditional 
upon water being used beneficially by the user (the ‘use it or lose it’ principle). This 
system had its origins on the colonial frontiers. Third, there is the permit system. In this 
system, water cannot be privately controlled and all water belongs to or is controlled by 
the state in the public interest. Prospective users must apply for water use permits. 
Permit systems and riparian systems were capable of rudimentary administration 
even in the absence of a strong state. In general, riparian systems and prior 
appropriation systems are replaced by permit systems as scarcity and the need for 
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regulation increases and “some form of a permit now governs the use of at least some of 
the water in virtually every country”173. In the South African case, initial state control 
over water as res publicae made way for the British system of riparian rights: in this 
case law originating in a country (the Netherlands) in which water was abundant and 
under state control for purposes very different to the problem of scarcity, was replaced 
by a system which at least allowed for the sharing of scarcity along a water course. 
However, the riparian system was not much better suited to South African conditions 
than Roman-Dutch water law, because of the enormous fluctuations in river flow 
conditions in the country. In South Africa dependable river flow (that amount of flow 
which can be depended upon throughout the seasons and from year to year) is an 
exceptionally small fraction of mean annual runoff. Thus the greater proportion of river 
flow in South Africa comes in brief bursts following thunderstorms, and this river swell 
is not easily apportioned between riparian landowners174.  
In 1814/1815 the British took formal possession of the Cape colony175. From this 
point onwards, British and American law began to creep into the Roman-Dutch system. 
Davenport mentions that the British were cautious not to alienate more people against 
them than necessary and that they therefore trod carefully in the Cape. In an effort to 
appease Dutch residents, for instance, property rights in land were secured and the 
Roman-Dutch legal system was left intact. However the traditional Dutch courts of 
landrost & heemraden were abolished and replaced by British magistrates and civil 
commissioners: “the law and its enforcement were the concern of higher, generally alien 
authorities, who legislated in English, but gazetted the law in Dutch as well”176. This 
explains how essentially Roman-Dutch law remained intact in South Africa but 
suddenly received a barrage of distinctly British-American interpretations. A 
tremendously influential court case was held in 1850 (Retief v. Louw) in which the 
judge (who had the distinctly British surname of ‘J. Bell’) pronounced that water was 
common to all riparian owners and, following the American example, should be shared 
proportionally amongst the landowners along the stream. This decision introduced 
riparian law into South Africa177. It seems that the introduction of riparian law into 
South Africa was preceded by changes in land tenure also related to the British takeover 
at the Cape: the Dutch East India Company was highly hierarchical and authoritarian, 
and not only was land issued by the company as a temporary lease only, but irrigation 
was prohibited until 1761 as it interfered with the water supply to, amongst other things, 
the company’s mill. After the arrival of the British, land tenure was improved to (taxed) 
ownership and the British principle that natural rights related to land belong to the 
landowner was introduced, leading gradually to the introduction of riparian rights178. 
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The evolution of water law inside South Africa 
From this point onwards it was up to the courts to make the rules as the South African 
climate and topography presented their unique problems and created conflicts amongst 
users. Being mobile and moving in a cycle, the subdivision and allocation of water 
created an endless series of problems which needed resolution through regulation.  
One such issue related to the question of what constituted private water and what 
constituted public water. As water scarcity developed and increased, private control 
over water was gradually reduced. 
At first, water which flowed over private land was considered to be private water, i.e. 
it was for the exclusive use of the landowner. This was later restricted to mean water 
that originated on private land (otherwise public water which happened to flow over 
somebody’s land would cease to be public at that place)179. Here an element of prior 
appropriation was brought in: a landowner on whose land water rose was entitled to use 
this water unless this water had previously been beneficially used. Vos quotes the 
original provision:  
 
“If it can be proved that a right to water, which has flowed across certain areas by ancient custom and 
usage, is useful for the irrigation of certain lands, our representative will ensure nothing to the 
contrary to the ancient custom and usage will be introduced”180. 
 
Various later interpretations led to the conclusion that water rising on private land could 
only be exclusively used by the landowner if that water did not contribute to a public 
stream, thus further eroding the concept of private water. 
Another such issue was the relative inapplicability to the South African context of 
the Roman requirement that a river should be perennial in order to be classified as 
public. Many South African rivers run dry during winter but were nevertheless needed 
by more than one individual. Hall reports that the perenniality rule was discarded in the 
Transvaal in 1894, and indicates that a change was introduced to British/American 
colonial law in that upper landowners had preferent rights to a reasonable share of a 
stream’s water for irrigation181. Van der Zaag mentions that originally in the British-
American system “no riparian owner was allowed to use water to the detriment of other 
owners with similar rights” 182. It is likely that the water scarcity in the Transvaal 
induced the emergence of preferent rights, as my archival research shows that in some 
areas the available water was insufficient for the irrigation of all farms along a 
watercourse and some system had to be developed to select beneficiaries from amongst 
the group of claimants183. This evolution shows multiple adaptations to the law induced 
by local scarcity of water.  
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A third issue in this regard was the need to classify water according to usage and to 
create a hierarchy of preferences in use. In 1876 a subdivision was made between 
primary use (for the support of human and animal life) and secondary use (for irrigation, 
power, cleaning, etc.). An upper riparian was allowed to use water in a public stream for 
primary purposes but was not allowed to do so for secondary purposes if in so doing he 
would deprive lower riparians of access to water for primary purposes184. Again, this set 
of rules is a response to insufficiency, prioritising certain forms of access above others 
when supplies did not allow all needs to be satisfied.  
These legal developments took place in the following historical setting. Settlers 
moved gradually northward and eastward from the Cape. Reading the history of the 
country, one gets the impression that agriculture was only practiced (by white colonists: 
African kingdoms definitely had settled agriculture in this period) where it was safe to 
do so, such as in the area around Table Bay, and that on the colonial frontier stock 
keeping was a response to this lack of secure access to land and water. In the 1830’s the 
Boers moved out of the British colony en masse in response to various issues such as 
general ‘burgher’ opposition against the dictates of the Colony, especially after the 
British takeover, a feeling of insecurity with respect to the colony’s will and ability to 
maintain and defend existing frontiers, and to the abolition of slavery and other aspects 
of Enlightenment thinking being imposed on their way of life.  
This means that pastoralism was practiced on the colonial frontier and that the need 
for irrigation water could only appear, as it did, where settlement had taken on a more 
permanent character, i.e. around the emerging Cape Town, and in the later half of the 
nineteenth century, in the Boer Republics to the north. In view of the fairly extreme 
South African situation in which mean annual runoff is less than 10% of mean annual 
precipitation, the actual annual rainfall deviates erratically from the interannual average, 
swinging between 70% and 150% of the average in any one year, and strong variations 
in rainfall from place to place and month to month, impoundment was to be the only 
long-term means to provide water to an expanding economy185. Early applications to the 
Transvaal Water Court (TWC) in the first decades of the twentieth century often 
requested apportionment of existing river flow amongst riparians or applied for 
servitudes of weirs, canals and furrows built by farmers themselves across the streams 
at various points186. In the absence of expensive impoundment structures from which all 
riparians could benefit, farmers had to rely on their own means to access the water 
available and could not capture much of the surplus flow which was generated by 
storms and, much to their frustration; this had to be allowed to flow to the sea. It was 
only after the Anglo-Boer War and the declaration of the Union of South Africa in 1910 
that the resources could be mustered at the level of the state to develop the water 
resources of the country through supply augmentation schemes. Early South African 
water law provided the means for distribution of river flow in before augmentation 
schemes got underway, and the main purpose of the 1912 Irrigation and Conservation of 
Waters Act was to provide for impoundments and to regulate their water supplies. 
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The 1912 Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act  
Under Act no. 8 of 1912, the Department of Irrigation of the Union of South Africa 
came into being187. The stated purpose of the Act was to: 
 
“Consolidate and amend the Laws in Force in the Union Relating to the Use of Water of Public 
Streams for Domestic Irrigation and Industrial Purposes and to Provide Facilities for the Irrigation of 
Land and Use of Water”188 
 
This would indicate a broad definition of tasks across various water use sectors. 
However, the five functions of the Department of Irrigation mentioned in the Act did 
not directly relate to industrial use of water, chiefly granting it powers in the field of the 
study, evaluation, financing, construction and control of irrigation works as well as in 
data collection (The South African economy at that time was largely rural and 
agricultural, and as a result not much attention was paid to tertiary water usage and the 
Department was not defined in those terms189. Regarding the other main function of the 
department of the time, i.e. data collection, this was also a dire need. There is ample 
evidence in the early court cases that although laws may have been in place which 
intended to regulate access to water and prescribe allocation procedures, very little was 
known about the flow conditions of most rivers, average rainfall, crop needs, and other 
such information crucial to informed allocation of the resource amongst riparians190. It 
is for this reason that data gathering was given special status within the Ministry, rather 
mirroring the situation that evolved in 1994 when it was ‘discovered’ that very little was 
known about the poor in South Africa and their specific needs or resource use 
conditions. 
A number of provisions of the 1912 Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act with 
respect to water scarcity should be mentioned here. The first was the troublesome 
distinction between the ‘normal’ flow of a river and its ‘surplus’ flow. This distinction 
was to become a key feature of South African law, as it provided a criterion on the basis 
of which water could be allocated. The underlying idea of this distinction was that in a 
given perennial river there was a reasonably dependable base flow not directly 
respondent to rainfall, as well as a much less dependable and fluctuating surplus flow 
which existed in response to precipitation. In the 1912 Act most efforts with respect to 
allocations related to the normal flow. The Act stated the following: 
 
“Whenever the expression “normal flow” is used in this or in any other Chapter of this Act in relation 
to a public stream, it shall mean the quantity of water actually and visibly flowing which, under a 
system of direct irrigation from that stream whether by furrows or otherwise, but without the aid of 
storage, can be beneficially used for the irrigation of land riparian to the stream, but the expression 
“storage”, as used in this section shall not be deemed to exclude the impounding of the impounding of 
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such share of the normal flow of the public stream as a riparian owner is or may become entitled to by 
means of a lawful distribution of that normal flow”191 
 
In the first decades immediately after the promulgation of the Act the allocation of 
surplus water was not subject to extensive allocation criteria and the law focused on the 
allocation of the normal flow of the river. In the absence of adequate storage facilities, it 
was in fact only the dependable flow of a river which could be beneficially utilised and 
divided amongst users. I would like to submit that it is only with the emergence of dams 
capable of storing surplus flow that the allocation of surplus water could become an 
issue - such farmers (and other users) as were capable of diverting or storing a portion 
of a river’s surplus flow could use it beneficially, but the rest simply flowed to the sea 
unused with the exception of natural usage for ecosystem maintenance.  
Vos relates an additional important point about the distinction between normal and 
surplus flow192. In Roman Dutch law no distinction was made between normal flow and 
surplus flow. Certainly in the Netherlands, the differences in volume between normal 
and surplus flow are much smaller than is the case in South Africa, and the law needed 
adaptation to the new climate. Thus the original position in riparian law was that both 
normal flow and surplus flow were to be apportioned between riparians. This made no 
sense in the South African situation because it was a disincentive to dam-building. Vos 
states that: 
 
“Each riparian owner, possessing merely a ‘reasonable share’ in the flood-flow, was practically 
debarred from conserving the flood by constructing storage works”193. 
 
And therefore 
 
“The object of the Act in dividing the flow into two portions is in order to introduce provisions in the 
case of surplus water which will replace the hampering principles of common law [..] a single 
enterprising owner is entitled in suitable cases to acquire control of the entire surplus water of a public 
stream”194. 
 
However, this still avoids the question of what it is that constitutes either normal flow or 
surplus flow. In practice it is not possible to determine from observation of a river what 
proportion of flow is a result of rainfall recently received, and what portion is caused by 
the gradual supply to a river from sources into which water has infiltrated after rainfall. 
The 1912 Act attempted to create this subdivision: 
 
“No public stream shall be deemed to have a normal flow unless a portion of the actual flow be 
derived from springs, seepage, melting snow, the steady drainage from swamps, vleis, natural or 
indigenous forests, or other like sources of supply”195 
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And  
 
“”Surplus water” shall mean the water in a public stream other than the normal flow, if any”196 
 
However it was impossible in practice for farmers and the water courts to establish this 
difference without long and careful observation of the stream in question. In almost all 
cases, the streams had not been observed for long enough to provide reliable evidence 
of flow conditions with and without rainfall.  
Confusing the matter further, the 1912 Act contained a double definition of normal 
flow: flow was normal if it was actually and visibly flowing and capable of beneficial 
use for irrigation without storage, and if the stream was supplied from sources other 
than direct rainfall. Vos points out the contradiction contained in this: if a stream has 
sources other than rainfall, and it rains, and the water is capable of beneficial use for 
irrigation without storage, the surplus flow created by rainfall had suddenly been 
converted to normal flow197. As can be seen from this example, if the law were to be 
applied literally, it would defy the technical capacity of most farmers and even 
engineers to accurately determine the volumetric apportionment between normal flow 
and surplus flow at each farm off take under changing climatic conditions, land use 
patterns, etc. 198. This means that the law had to be interpreted in such a way as to yield 
a practical alternative to the technical route, i.e. a series of rules of thumb applicable in 
the technical conditions of South Africa’s farming environment of the 1920’s and 
1930’s. Hall states that: 
 
“It is nowhere laid down what quantity or what proportion of the whole flow must be derived from 
these constant sources of supply, [..] it was laid down [..] that the volume and duration of the seepage 
flow should be such that, without any accretions from floodwater, it should itself be capable of 
beneficial riparian use for irrigation by two or more riparian owners on separately granted properties. 
It was further laid down that it is not necessary that a seepage flow of that volume should be present 
throughout the year. It would appear to be sufficient if the seepage flow is continuously present during 
the irrigating season for a period which will enable it to be beneficially employed in producing a 
useful crop”199. 
  
Thus normal flow became quite simply the flow in a river during the dry season if it was 
capable of being utilised productively in irrigation by one or more riparian farmers.  
A second provision of the 1912 Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act with 
respect to water scarcity was the establishment of a hierarchy of preferent usages of 
water, which was more difficult to maintain in later years. It may be remembered from 
the above that in 1876 a law was introduced to Cape legislation whereby an upper 
riparian was allowed to use water in a public stream for primary purposes (support of 
human and animal life) but was not allowed to do so for secondary purposes (irrigation) 
if in so doing he would deprive lower riparians of access to water for primary purposes. 
By 1912 there were non-irrigation uses of water which constituted a significant volume 
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of demand, such as mining or municipal water, and the law needed to take account of 
this even if the Irrigation Department was primarily concerned with the needs of 
farmers. Thus a category of ‘tertiary usage’ was appended to the list of priorities: 
 
“The water of a public stream shall be subject to primary, secondary and tertiary uses”200 
 
And 
 
“The tertiary use of such water shall be for mechanical or industrial purposes” 201 
 
And 
 
“The tertiary use of water of a public stream by an upper riparian owner shall be subject to reasonable 
secondary use of such water by all lower riparian owners, who are entitled to such secondary use of 
any of the water of a public stream” 202 
 
Thus a hierarchy of use was established which conformed to the economic structure of 
the period. But it seems as though the use of water by a town or village was not properly 
considered in this formulation. In the absence of clear legislation on the matter, the right 
of municipalities to use water under this Act must be assumed to be related to land 
ownership, i.e. if the municipality owned riparian land, it was entitled to a ‘reasonable 
share’ of the water in a public stream just as other landowners were. It was also entitled 
to such water as was necessary for domestic purposes, but only by virtue of being a 
riparian. If the municipality was not riparian, Article 23(1) provided a means by which 
water could be accessed. This article is rather long for quotation here. It provided that 
non-riparians could use water if and only if the primary, secondary and tertiary needs 
riparians had been satisfied.  
The 1912 Act was geared to an agricultural economy, which was at that point in time 
(i.e. in 1912) in the process of diversifying rapidly into mining. Diamonds were 
discovered in Kimberley and other centres in the 1860’s and diamond mining in 1910 
accounted for more than 98% of world production. The main gold reef in present-day 
Johannesburg was discovered in 1886203. Urbanisation was rapid, and this changed the 
water demand structure of South Africa, adding municipal and mining demand to 
existing agricultural demand. However, the age of dam-building was enabled through 
the 1912 Act, and for a considerable period of time (more than eight decades), 
impoundment provided the solution to scarcity.  
It is important to mention here that from 1912 onward water resource management 
differed substantially from the previous era in that henceforth there were more and more 
dams in existence. Dams and other impoundments such as weirs and barrages are a 
technical response to scarcity, creating new interfaces between natural water systems 
and man-made water use systems. Natural water systems respond to seasonal changes in 
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climate, having a cyclical character in terms of changes in volume of flow throughout 
the year, as well as responding to immediate climatic contingencies, i.e. climatic 
departures from the statistical average pattern. Variability is thus part of the system: 
some years have exceptionally high rainfall, while other years can be exceptionally dry, 
and some seasons are (normally) dry while others are (normally) wet. For mankind, 
however, water usage is so ingrained into social and economic systems that a basic 
assurance of water supply is required in order to maintain crucial pillars of society like 
irrigation or power generation. Variability must be turned into dependability, and this is 
what impoundments do. Impoundments store water in rainy seasons (or unseasonal 
rainy periods) and release water in dry seasons (or unseasonal dry periods). Water flow 
in a river bed becomes relatively constant through impoundment, affecting ecosystems 
of natural floodplains, introducing artificial lakes into a region, etc.  
The new Department of Irrigation embarked on a period of dam-building, hampered 
somewhat by the First World War. By the commencement of the second world war, 
some 53 government dams were in existence countrywide (there are now more than 500) 
and several of these were major dams, such as Hartbeespoort (with a dam wall of 59m 
in height ), Kama-Nassie (41m), and Lake Mentz (34m)204. In addition, there was a 
sprinkling of municipal and private dams by 1940. In devoting state resources towards 
the construction of dams, water scarcity was alleviated in crucial areas, and the 1912 
Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act thus partially liberated the country from 
scarcity, while regulating it in others. It provided the basis for water allocations until 
1956, when a new Act was promulgated. 
 
The 1956 Water Act 
By the time the next Water Act was promulgated in 1956, the old Irrigation and 
Conservation of Waters Act had become completely outdated. Firstly, excessive private 
abstractions and impoundments of water in certain areas required at least a partial 
departure from private control over water. Secondly, the development of non-riparian 
demand such as for municipal purposes needed to be addressed properly; industry and 
mining needed to be placed on a footing that was no longer subservient to agriculture. 
Thirdly, in the wake of substantial mining, industrial and urban development, at least 
embryonic water quality legislation was required. And lastly, the re-use of water had to 
be considered in order to enable the utilisation of the same water by more than one party. 
These changes are treated in turn below. 
 Firstly, as mentioned, excessive abstractions of water in certain areas required at 
least a partial departure from private control over water. In the 1912 Act riparians had 
been enabled to apply for permission from a water court to construct waterworks that 
would enable the storage of surplus flow from a river205. Although in promulgating the 
1956 Act many portions of the 1912 Act were thereby repealed, riparian works for the 
storage of surplus water were ‘protected’ from repeal, i.e. the storage works could 
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remain in place. These areas were said to be ‘protected areas’, i.e. the storage works and 
the impounded water were protected. This does not carry quite the same meaning as the 
current understanding of a ‘protected area’, which carries more environmental 
connotations, but there was a degree to which the state was intervening to protect and 
maintain the water resources in a public stream from possible changes in land 
ownership, new claims to water, etc. Furthermore, from 1956 onwards, land owners 
were restricted in the size of the dams they were permitted to construct: Art. 16(1)(a) 
determined that the total storage capacity of private dams could not exceed 25 million 
gallons, while Art 16(1)(b). regulated diversion works in that an owner’s works could 
not carry more than 10 cubic feet per second of surplus flow for his own use206. Thus 
whereas previously surplus water was ‘free’ in order to encourage the construction of 
private impoundments, in 1956 state control was imposed for the first time on the 
volume of surplus water that any individual could use. 
Other areas were protected too: under section 98 of the 1912 Act land could be 
expropriated by the state with appropriate compensation for the purpose of constructing 
waterworks. This land would then be state-owned and would similarly be a ‘water 
control area’. Again, this illustrates a growth in state control over resource allocations. 
Finally, section 28 of the 1956 Act allowed the governor-general to proclaim 
subterranean water control areas, amongst other things if: 
 
“The abstraction of water naturally existing underground in such area may result in undue depletion 
of its underground water resources”207. 
 
By contrast, the 1912 Act had stated that  
 
“The owner of every farm shall be entitled to abstract any subterranean water thereunder for his own 
use, for any purpose”208. 
 
It is clear that some caution had crept into the original statement and that provision had 
to be made to prevent excessive abstraction. 
Secondly, the development of non-riparian demand such as for municipal purposes 
needed to be addressed in order to secure water supplies to areas not adjacent to water 
sources. Riparian rights had, before 1956, been relatively unchecked by qualifications 
and conditions. However, the emergence of towns created demand centres that overrode 
the prerogatives of the individual, and section 13 of the 1956 Act stated: 
 
“If an owner of land which is situated within the area of jurisdiction of a local authority is entitled to 
the use of the water of a public stream to which such land is riparian for the irrigation of that land, the 
said local authority may, if it requires such water or any portion thereof for urban purposes, with the 
consent of the Administrator of the province in which such local authority has been established and of 
the Minister, take such water or any portion thereof as it may so require”209. 
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Thus inside the area of a local authority, the primacy of the riparian doctrine was 
revoked and by extension, all water in a local authority area was under the control of the 
state if it so wished. Note that it was entirely possible for the local authority to be non-
riparian, owning no land by a public stream, and yet control any water in its area of 
jurisdiction. This particular article and its underlying reason is well illustrated in the 
Rustenburg case cited by myself elsewhere210. 
 Thirdly, the emergence of a mining economy in South Africa and the rapid 
expansion of urban areas meant that the water needs of industry and mining needed to 
be placed on a footing that was no longer subservient to agriculture. The use of water 
for industry or mining is related to the location of such an enterprise inside or outside a 
municipality. Neither mining nor industry is necessarily located inside an urban 
environment. However, in most cases, industry is located within a municipal boundary, 
while mining activity may be located far out of town, but is often also located inside a 
town. It is difficult in practice to separate domestic water use in an urban environment 
from industrial use. The water use of mining often has independent systems of 
purification (slimes dams) and release into the natural water system. 
 
In the 1912 Act, Art. 12 stated that 
 
“Every riparian owner shall […] be entitled to the reasonable use of the normal flow of a public 
stream with reference to which his land is riparian”211. 
 
This was then subject to the hierarchy of usage mentioned above whereby industrial 
needs could only be satisfied when the needs of humans, animals and agriculture had 
been satisfied.  
 
In the 1956 Act this was fundamentally changed: 
 
“Every riparian owner is entitled to the reasonable use of such share as may have been lawfully 
acquired by him from any other person and of his share […] of the normal flow of a public stream to 
which his land is riparian for use for agricultural and urban purposes”212. 
 
Thus urban industrial needs were catered for under this article through municipal 
ownership of land. What then about industrial and mining needs outside town? 
The 1912 Act had already provided (section 23) that the use of water on non-riparian 
land was possible in principle and that claimants should put in an application to the 
water courts for permission to use water for primary, secondary and tertiary purposes. 
However, this permission was subject to strict conditions: it was not to deprive riparians 
of either present or future irrigation needs. In the 1956 Act persons wishing to use water 
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for industrial purposes that would consume more than sixty thousand gallons (270 000 
litres) per day, was obliged to apply for permission from the Minister to do so (seen 
1956 Act: Art.12). The minister was then obliged to consider each case with regard to 
the local availability of water, possible reduction in supply to other users in the system 
by the new development, the location of the industry in regard to national industrial 
decentralisation objectives, and the results to be expected in terms of waste water 
impact in the area. Thus the minister of water affairs had discretion over spatial 
developments in relation to water consumption.  
 Fourthly, the increasing pollution of water sources in the wake of substantial mining, 
industrial and urban development led to a need for at least embryonic water quality 
legislation. As South Africa became more industrialised, a lack of water of sufficient 
quality began to be superimposed on a lack of water of sufficient quantity. This also 
required regulation in the public interest. From 1956 onward, riparians were obliged to 
return used and unused water to the public stream, and Article 21 of the 1956 Act stated 
that: 
 
“The purification of waste water or any effluent or waste produced by or resulting from the use of 
water for industrial purposes shall form an integral part of the process of such use and [] any person 
using water for industrial purposes shall purify such water, effluent or waste so as to conform to such 
requirements as the Minister may from time to time after consultation with the South African Bureau 
of Standards, prescribe by notice in the Gazette”213.  
 
To the frustration of many water quality experts in the Department, the 1956 Act did not 
specify what could be done against offenders: Article 23 merely stated that polluters 
were guilty of an offence, and that the minister could enter onto private land to install or 
upgrade purification systems and recover the costs involved from the operator of the 
plant in question214. Other than this drastic action, water quality officers could only 
exert moral pressure on polluters. Water quality has remained a problem area.  
 Fifth, the increasing scarcity of water meant that multiple successive uses of water had 
to be enabled, i.e. the re-use of water had to be considered. In principle there is no 
objection to water being used many times over, and the hydrological cycle ensures that it 
is - it is a renewable resource. Appropriate water quality is the fundamental proviso for 
water re-use in a catchment. As mentioned above, article 9 dealt in part with re-use: 
 
“A riparian owner who uses any portion of such normal flow for agricultural purposes shall on his 
own land, if practicable, or otherwise at the nearest convenient point elsewhere, return such water to 
the public stream from which it was abstracted with no other loss than that which has been occasioned 
by such use, unless he is legally obliged to pass the water on to other land”215. 
 
Similarly, Article 21(2) declared that industrial water should also be returned to a public 
stream after use, and Article 21(7) added that: 
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“A local authority which uses water for the purification or disposal of sewage or any effluent or waste 
[…] shall be deemed to use such water for industrial purposes” 
 
Thus both industrial users and municipalities were under obligation to return water to a 
public stream and to purify it before doing so. Purification works at the tail end of a man-
made water use system became a key feature of water use in South Africa. In the present 
era much debate surrounds their filtering capacity, and many systems are in need of 
replacement by more powerful and expensive plants. Despite these systems, water quality 
declines everywhere as one goes downstream as systems are not 100% efficient and also 
do not and cannot cover the entire gamut of industrial and biological compounds in their 
purification systems. 
The 1956 Act remained in place, albeit undergoing substantial amendments, until 1998, 
when the new Water Act was promulgated. Until then, the legal system described above, 
coupled with extensive expansion of water supply infrastructure, constituted the state’s 
response to water scarcity. The 1998 Act will be treated in considerable detail in other 
chapters, and section three below provides the context for this by placing the 1998 Act in 
the context of the South African transition. The attention is thus turned from legal issues 
to questions of governance, or the factors affecting the implementation of the 1998 Act.  
 
Water management and the South African transition 
In the turmoil of South Africa’s political transition, many new institutions were created, 
not all of which survive. In the same period, many apartheid-era institutions underwent 
change, not all of which was far-reaching. The transformation of South Africa’s 
institutions of water resource management cannot be divorced from the broader context 
of political transition, as they existed in a dynamic interrelationship with them. Water 
management institutions exist alongside a plethora of other new and old natural resource 
management related institutions designed to assist land reform, promote small scale 
farmers, further integrated environmental management, develop community based public 
works, and so on.  
The policies of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry are related in 
complicated and not always symbiotic ways to the policies of other line departments, 
while the internal culture of each department also affects that of other departments in a 
range of different ways. Furthermore, with the advent of democracy and the ‘opening’ of 
the state to lobbying from a much wider spectrum of actors in civil society, a new 
institutional politics has emerged out of an interplay between a range of civil society 
institutions from the effective to the ineffective and a range of government departments, 
each with a specific interpretation of its mandate that may or may not conflict with that of 
another department. In addition, governance is affected across the board by certain 
aspects of the negotiated transition - such as the sunset clause which forbade the 
retrenchment of white civil servants during the first five years into the transition, or the 
pressure to deliver on election promises before the next general election. The policies of 
the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry must also be situated within the context of 
the politics of macro policy frameworks such as the Reconstruction and Development 
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Programme (RDP) and the subsequent Growth Employment and Redistribution 
Programme (GEAR). The policies of all line departments are deemed to be in some way 
an operationalisation of these macro-policy frameworks. Thus all in all, the new 
regularised practices in water management institutions are informed by the broader 
environment in which they find themselves. Section two of this chapter summarises the 
nature of these practices, with the focus on the effect at the national level institutions of 
water resource management.    
 
South Africa’s national transition  
It has been argued that the resolution of the crisis of the apartheid state rested on two 
pillars, namely the achievement of a political settlement and the construction of a new 
development path216. Both projects can be interpreted in shallow or deep ways. The 
achievement of a political settlement can be seen in narrow sense as an elite compact 
designed by the leaders of various political/cultural movements. It can also be seen in the 
broadest sense as the project of national reconciliation at the level of society as a whole, 
as referred to by Mbeki in his ‘two nations‘ address, which is a much broader and longer 
process.  
Similarly, the construction of a new development path may be seen as a paper exercise 
in which a range of stakeholders beat out a plan of action, or it may be seen as the 
realistic wisdom that comes with the years as government negotiates all the hurdles of 
policy implementation and begins to make some inroads into poverty alleviation. Marais, 
who presented this argument, was probably referring to the shallow interpretation, i.e. the 
South African transition was made possible by a political settlement between elites and 
by the drafting of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). However, the 
title of his book, ‘limits to change’, indicates that these pillars of change needed to be 
pervasive enough to guarantee a lasting basis for both reconciliation and the reversal of 
apartheid’s damage throughout society.  
Otherwise the argument cannot withstand much scrutiny and it confers a rather docile 
status upon the government bureaucracy and society itself, which are then assumed to fall 
in line to both the outcomes of the political settlement and the outcomes of the process of 
designing a development strategy. For clarity, ‘the transition’, as referred to in this 
chapter, means the whole period from 1985 to 2002, and not just the ‘enabling’ period 
from 1990 to 1994. 
The transition, thus defined, could be subdivided analytically into four distinct phases 
(even if these academic ‘boxes’ are somewhat difficult to separate out in practice). These 
are the period of covert talks (1985-1990), the period of overt negotiations (1990-1994), 
the government of national unity (1994-1996), and the period of majority rule (1996-
2002).  
The period of covert negotiations was certainly a period on which the outlines of a 
compact were drawn up. In this period key individuals in the African National Congress 
and the National Party clandestinely tested each other’s willingness to negotiate while 
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consulting regularly with their colleagues. While a full scale civil war was raging 
throughout South Africa and the social cohesion from the family level to the national 
level was breaking down rapidly, the minister of justice, police and prisons began to meet 
with Nelson Mandela. Mandela was moved to mainland South Africa with three 
colleagues, and eventually provided with an office in prison in which he could meet with 
various officials both local and international. ‘Verligtes’ within the National Party were 
apprehensive of the consequences of the death in prison of Mandela and those imprisoned 
with in the era of the Rivonia trial, and were looking for a way forward which allowed for 
power sharing on terms dictated by the National Party. Their caution stemmed from the 
need to work with the ‘verkramptes’ in their party, the most important representative of 
whom was the then state president, P.W. Botha. It also stemmed from a deep suspicion of 
the liberation movement, in particular with regard to its socialist elements and the call for 
nationalization of key sectors of the economy and radical land reform.  
Mandela for his part had launched the armed struggle because of the unwillingness of 
the state to negotiate but was willing to test the depth of the Afrikaner commitment to a 
real negotiated settlement. He was hampered by the inability to communicate properly 
with colleagues in prison, in exile, or in the country at large, although he had contact with 
the ANC in Lusaka through his lawyer, George Bizos. The covert meetings that took 
place over the years had the effect of breaking the ice and exploring some of the avenues 
available. On the other hand not much could be achieved until the two parties could meet 
openly at a negotiating table. This condition could not be met as long as P.W. Botha was 
in power, and Mandela rejected all overtures to him in person that excluded the full 
participation of the ANC at the negotiating table. With the ascendance of the ‘verligte’ 
F.W. de Klerk after the white elections in 1989, the tables turned dramatically, and the 
‘Pretoriastroika’ period could commence.       
Overt negotiations commenced in 1990. On the 2nd of February 1990 F.W. de Klerk 
announced the unbanning of the African National Congress, the Pan African Congress, 
and a range of other resistance organizations, and Mandela was released on the 11th of 
February. Key members of the ANC in exile returned to South Africa for the negotiations 
that commenced in May 1990. Much suspicion existed on both sides of the fence: on the 
one hand the liberation movements had been un-banned but their members were still 
subject to existing security laws. On the other hand the security police were in the strange 
position of escorting those they had pursued for so long. After it’s unbanning, the ANC 
needed to consolidate its constituency, which was essentially divided into those who had 
been in exile, those who had been in prison, and the ‘legal’ internal movements such as 
the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU). It has been argued that the ANC could not negotiate a new constitution until 
after June 1991, 16 months after Mandela’s release, when it held its first national 
conference inside the country and the leadership obtained a formal mandate to 
negotiate217.  
While they were certainly talking to each other, the parties could not even agree on the 
process that would lead to negotiations, let alone agree on what a new constitution should 
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contain. De Klerk insisted that he would not surrender to majority rule while majority 
rule was precisely what the liberation movement was striving for. In 1990, the National 
Party announced a desire to protect group cultural and political rights (i.e. a new 
apartheid) in a constitution that gave powers of veto to a racially structured upper house. 
It called for power sharing rather than majority rule. The ANC on the other hand opposed 
the pre-selection of negotiating parties and called for a general election leading to a 
representative constituent assembly that could legitimately negotiate the contours of a 
constitution. This phase lasted almost two years, and focused on the conditions that were 
needed to achieve negotiations rather than on the content of negotiation218.  
With characteristic vision, Mandela broke this deadlock by calling for an all party 
congress that could negotiate an interim constitution and could lay down certain basic 
principles governing the final constitution (a concession to the National Party). Then 
there would be a general election and a constituent assembly which would determine the 
final constitution (meeting the ANC’s wishes). Importantly, all parties gaining more that 
5% of the vote would share executive power in a government of national unity, in which 
consensus building rather than majority rule would be the formula for transition. The 
elections would follow 18 months after the all party conference and would take place 
under the Government of National Unity.  
The all party conference was to be known as the Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa, or CODESA, and was to commence its work before the end of 1991 (it first met 
in December 1991). Its task was to negotiate the contours of an interim constitution and 
to lay down key principles for the drafting of the final constitution, especially the 
threshold percentage requirements for various kinds of decisions in parliament. It was 
agreed that 18 months after the conclusion of CODESA, a general election was to be held. 
CODESA commenced in December 1991, but reached a deadlock in May 1992, over the 
degree to which the basic principles of the final constitution should be agreed upon by a 
group of parties whose political support had not yet been tested in an election. The parties 
became ever more distant as police violence made it difficult for the ANC to maintain its 
friendliness. On September 14th, Mandela again reached out to the NP by reducing a 
fourteen point list of demands to a mere three, to which de Klerk responded positively, 
and the negotiations continued after a summit meeting on September 26th.  
In contrast to the period that had gone before, this new round of negotiations proved to 
be a fruitful period in which many of the key ingredients of the new dispensation were 
hammered out, all in line with Mandela’s broad and overarching vision of CODESA 
followed by the Government of National Unity. The content of the debate shifted ‘from 
talks about talks to talks’. Mandela and De Klerk remained on the background with a 
hotline to their chief negotiators, Cyril Ramaphosa for the ANC and Roelf Meyer for the 
National Party. Ramaphosa was an energetic realist who had negotiated deal after deal as 
head of COSATU, while Roelf Meyer was a new and young member of the National 
Party who had to find a future for the party in a new dispensation rather than hold on to 
the apartheid dreams of his colleagues. On the sidelines of this negotiating axis (from left 
to right) were the leaders of the Pan African Congress who held on to the ‘United States 
of Africa’ ideals of Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, conformist leaders of the discredited 
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homelands such as Chief Mangosotho Buthelezi of Kwazulu, and the members of the 
Konserwatiewe Partij to the right of the National Party. To the right of this again were the 
secessionist Afrikaner Weerstands Beweging who had visions of an independent white 
homeland. All these groups had difficulty in adjusting to the negotiations, and often the 
hotline between the National Party and the African National Congress had to be 
interrupted to accommodate the demands of these third parties.  
In the meantime, Roelf Meyer and Cyril Ramaphosa worked day and night against the 
background of the summit meeting, until on November 18th 1993 the final draft of the 
new constitution was accepted. It rested on six main pillars. The first was the creation of 
a government of national unity. The second was the creation of a federal state allowing 
some degree of concurrent competence between provincial and national government 
(‘giving’ the Western Cape to the National Party and Kwazulu-Natal to the Inkatha 
Freedom Party). The third was the so-called ‘sunset clause’, which meant that there were 
guarantees with respect to the protection of the jobs and pensions of white soldiers, police 
and civil servants. The fourth was the creation of a constitutional court to provide space 
for the evolution of the new constitution. The fifth was the acceptance of a new flag and 
anthem, and the sixth was the transitional construct involving one President and two 
deputy Presidents, one from each of the largest parties at the general election. 
 On 27 and 28 April 1994 South Africa experienced its first ever elections as a 
democratic state. Political settlement had been achieved. What remained was the 
development of a progamme of action for national reconciliation and poverty alleviation. 
This came in the form of the Reconstruction and Development Programme or RDP, 
which was later superceded by the Growth Employment and Redistribution Strategy or 
GEAR. 
 
A Vision for the Future  
The RDP, or Reconstruction and Development Programme, provided the overall policy 
framework guiding the new government in the broad and integrated attempt to rid the 
country of the legacies of apartheid. The first RDP document, otherwise known as the 
‘base document’, was also the philosophical document informing the ANC election 
campaign that culminated in the elections in April 1994. This first RDP policy document 
became known as the ‘base document’, and it was based on a public consultation process 
that essentially repeated a process the ANC had initiated in 1956, resulting then in the 
ANC Freedom Charter. The RDP consultations were somewhat less deep and extensive 
in terms of public consultation than the Freedom Charter, leading an insider at the time to 
refer to them as ‘football stadium consultations’. There was, however, sufficient basis for 
the document to be a legitimate representation of the wishes of a broad spectrum of 
people, specialists and interests groups located vaguely to the left of the political 
middle219. 
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It must be realized however that the fact that the RDP base document gained much 
support and could be ‘carried’ by the extremely broad church that was the government of 
national unity, from its early origins its contents were not free from contestation. It is 
highly significant that the ‘base document’ originated within the ranks of the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), which organisation, according to Gotz, hoped to 
draw some tactical advantage out of having produced a political programme before its 
umbrella organization, the ANC, had done so 220 . Later versions of the document 
incorporated the views of other parties and civil society organisations. It was thus 
eventually co-authored by the South African Communist Party, the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions, the South African National Civics Organisation, The National 
Education Coordinating Committee and the African National Congress before being work 
shopped with NGO’s, think tanks and intellectuals221. It was based, amongst other things, 
on the philosophy that negotiated consensus creates the carrying capacity for policy 
implementation222. The base document states: “development is not about the delivery of 
goods to a passive citizenry. It is about active involvement and growing 
empowerment”223. With the benefit of hindsight, the very inclusiveness of the process 
was one of the base document’s weaknesses: it is an eclectic inventory, often labeled as a 
‘wish list’224.   
 During its genesis, the document first reflected the policy view of the left wing within 
the ANC, i.e. COSATU and the South African Communist Party or SACP, with passages 
for instance advocating the nationalisation of key industries. Later a wide range of non-
government organizations (NGOs) and research organizations also assisted in the process 
of drafting it, and this broadened its base furtherii. Broadening its scope still further, the 
document was later endorsed by the other parties in the five year government of national 
unity, i.e. the National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party. With each draft the RDP base 
document lost some of its original leftist edge, and eventually became a compromise of 
words that had little true meaning. The key to this was the fact that it listed what needed to 
be done without indicating how it should be done, i.e. whether a particular delivery strategy 
should be state or market-led. ‘The’ original RDP policy document can therefore be seen as 
a very broad statement of goals in which parties with advocating very different 
implementation paths nevertheless all saw themselves reflected. It is important to 
emphasize that actors from both from the socialist camp and from the market camp 
endorsed the document, in order to understand that this policy could swing in various 
directions during its life, depending on the choice of agents to be empowered with its 
implementation. While its genesis lay in the leftist camp, its implementation was soon 
taken over by private sector advocates. As it happened, the alarming rollovers of the RDP 
fund (see below) later led to the secondment of private sector experts to the RDP office to 
                                                 
220 Gotz (1999): Adler, G. and Webster, E.; Trade Unions and Democratization in South Africa, 1985-1997,  
US, St. Martin’s Press, p179 
221  Gotz (2000): Op. Cit, South Africa Yearbook 1995:54; 
222  See for instance Schreiner, B. (1995): a popular guide to Environment Reconstruction & Development  
in the new South Africa. Johannesburg/Ottawa: International Development Research Centre; 
223  RDP Base document, p. 5 
224  Interview with T. Abrahamse, then Deputy Director General for Environmental Affairs and Tourism  
8/9/1999; 
 135
lend a hand to the unrolling of the programme 225 . In this way the programme was 
implemented with a strong private sector flavour despite having been designed by trade 
unionists. The RDP was from the start composed of shifting sands, meaning many different 
things to many different people. 
 As the winds of change blew through the state, so the RDP took on new meanings. To 
take environmental management as an example, the built-in contradictions of its 
environmental policy were such that it could be bent in various directions: it called for 
stronger and more consistent regulation of environmental offences and the introduction of 
compulsory environmental impact assessments, thus strengthening the hand of the state in 
controlling environmental resources 226 . This was compounded by the call for more 
equitable access of the South African citizenry to natural resources227. On the other hand 
the state was asked to stand back and allow the citizenry to participate more actively in 
decision making through a participatory and decentralised decision making process that 
was to empower communities to manage their natural environment. Clearly the state could 
not at once intervene in existing rights of access to natural resources while allowing local 
communities a free hand to manage these resources as they saw fit. This fault line in the 
policy itself persists to the present day.     
 The process of consultation and buy-in out of which it was born was a demonstration of 
democratic prudence. Experiences in other countries show that a coalition is more likely to 
have firm control in the implementation of its policies than a single party policy. Contrary 
to Brazil in the period before 1985, where labour was always dependent on the state for 
favours and salary increases, labour in South Africa had an active voice in the formulation 
of the RDP. While in many other countries governments initiate and then sell their 
economic programmes to powerful actors in the economy and civil society, the contrary 
happened in South Africa. The country’s major trade union umbrella organisation drafted a 
programme, which was adopted as government policy by the ANC. The RDP thus 
originated in the unions who wanted the programme to enable workers to gain control over 
their lives in the future dispensation. The ANC adopted the document not because it 
accepted its content but because of the exigency of the constitutional negotiations at 
Kempton Park. It was used for strategic gain at a time of deadlock in the negotiations over 
South Africa’s future constitution228.  
 It has been argued that the adoption by the ANC of a policy document which was not 
their own led to an arms-length treatment of the document in practise by the ANC despite 
its formal endorsement by the party229. Thus the process of its genesis weakened the 
political will to implement it, and its subsequent dilution weakened relations between the 
trade union movement that had drafted it and the ANC which adopted and adapted it. This 
argument does not hold much water because the RDP was endorsed formally by parties to 
the right and to the left, and could be interpreted in ways that could suit the programme of 
many parties. Rather, as we shall see, a change in political direction lead to a 
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reinterpretation of the RDP in a market centred way and to a growing gulf between the 
liberals in the ANC and its trade unionist constituency.   
 Furthermore, it must also be argued that the dilution process was essential to the creation 
of sufficient carrying capacity to push the programme through, so that COSATU could not 
have expected wholesale adoption of the programme in its original form. While the ANC 
may indeed have begrudgingly endorsed it, the inclusiveness of its evolution process 
ensured a broad acceptance of the programme in civil society and by political parties other 
than the ANC. In summary, the RDP should be seen as a symbolic document, as a 
statement of confidence in a peaceful resolution of South Africa’s ills by means of a jointly 
endorsed programme. This programme, although it was rather eclectic and did not commit 
itself to difficult policy choices within the wish list of development priorities, carried much 
of the nation-building and unifying rhetoric that was part of the vocabulary of the first 
cabinet.  
  
The Green and White papers  
The RDP Base Document (which was essentially an election (manifesto) was followed 
chronologically by the Green and White Papers, the latter of course sanctioned by South 
Africa’s new parliament. These papers made the crucial jump from a ‘wish-list’ to a set 
of concrete policies. Perhaps inevitably, the issue of how these wishes were to be 
achieved was subject to considerably more debate than the RDP wish-list itself. Various 
operational definitions of the RDP can be conceived of, ranging for instance from 
market-driven delivery to strong state intervention. The RDP base document never made 
clear choices in this regard, but when the Green paper came out, it evoked a strong public 
reaction by emphasizing fiscal discipline as a cornerstone of RDP policy. The theme of 
fiscal discipline, of reducing the state budget deficit and cutting back on borrowing and 
spending, was to become a central aspect of new South African policy in later years and 
it made its first strong public appearance in the RDP Green Paper. It set the frame of 
reference for much Water Affairs policy that was to come, expressed perhaps most 
powerfully in a desire that services should be self-financing at the local and regional level 
and that water resources should be provided at the cost of at least the operation and 
maintenance of infrastructural works230.  
Much of DWAF’s ‘developmental’ spending was sunk into a series of large and costly 
irrigation projects and the provision of free drinking water to villages in the former 
homelands, and the Department was keen to rid itself of this particular legacy. In addition, 
the policy of providing subsidized water to white commercial farmers on state financed 
irrigation schemes was proving costly to maintain, while water was required elsewhere 
for purposes such as urban and industrial use, that were becoming more and more 
important . DWAF policy on financial stringency and the cutback of subsidies thus linked 
in to an overarching RDP policy of rolling out development projects on the condition of 
payment for services.  
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The Green Paper on the RDP was released on the 14th of August 1994 and was 
produced by a technical team in the RDP office before being published for public 
comment. Amongst other things, the Green Paper set targets for the reduction of state 
expenditure as well as indicating that, rather than government having the lead role in 
development; it should play a facilitatory role in encouraging investment231. The process 
of Reconstruction, it was argued, would call for Development oriented contracts to 
business enterprises, which in turn would stimulate economic growth. In this sense, the 
RDP Green Paper was therefore a more market-oriented document than the base 
document had been, and this evoked criticism from the SACP and COSATU about a 
perceived swing towards conservative economics232.  
But all this was predicated on the idea that the RDP ideology would trickle down into 
society and the South Africans rich and poor would wholeheartedly embrace its ideals. 
This is not what happened: the document was produced in government and NGO circles 
but at the level of practical policy implementation little remained of its original intentions. 
The transformation of the state apparatus that was required to actually implement the 
RDP in practice was a daunting task, requiring the radical transformation of an 
authoritarian and bureaucratic system that had been designed for repression, not inclusion. 
In addition, merely getting the systems in place to carry out the RDP was a daunting task 
in itself. Bernie Fanaroff, a key member of the RDP office, recalls: 
 
“There was a lot of policy and not a lot of how we were going to deliver it. I think quite a lot of RDP 
principles were paid lip service to in White Papers. But there is a big difference between saying we 
are going to do this in compliance with RDP or Batho Pele and actually translating this to the level of 
strategic planning, budgeting and delivery […] the RDP principles and priorities were not included in 
the next level which is to say: as a department or a ministry, what are our strategic priorities, so what 
you found is that the strategic priorities of the existing departments were carried forward with only 
incremental changes so you had a policy up there, you had a strategic plan down there, and they in 
fact bore very little relation to each other, Irrespective of the RDP. I mean the Ministers made policy 
and the DG’s carried on with their strategies as they were. What dictated the budgets was even not 
related to the strategies because the budgets at that time were largely incremental budgets so what 
would happen was that the Department of State expenditure would say to you: tell us what you would 
cut if you got one and a half percent more and what you would cut if you got one and a half a percent 
less. So they would take the existing budget and they would give it to someone at the level of a deputy 
director who would say we would do this or we would do that. There was no link between the 
strategic planning which was done by the DG, and the budgets which were done by the deputy 
director, and the minister who wrote the policy.”233 
 
Ultimately, though, policy and strategy were expressed in budgetary terms, and thus the 
budget became the ‘bottom line’. When the White Paper on the RDP came out, in 
response to the public input to the Green paper, it announced a commitment for instance 
to trade liberalisation in line with GATT agreements, and to cutbacks on state debt, but it 
retained much of the eclectic, something-for-all character of the base document. Thus it 
avoided commitment to substantial choices within the wish list by prioritizing public 
health or public works and, rather than making difficult political choices for some kinds 
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of development at the cost of other kinds of development, it emphasized overall financial 
stringency.  
 
Leveraging state transformation 
The RDP Office was housed in the Office of the Deputy President as a Ministry without a 
portfolio, but with powers to steer the transformation of state spending towards 
developmental goals. It was interpreted correctly or incorrectly by many directors general 
as a politburo or super ministry by virtue of its power to place conditions on the further 
release of funds to a given line ministry. The funding of the RDP Office was envisaged to 
be to the detriment of departmental allocations, and the Office was given the mandate to 
leverage line ministry spending towards RDP priorities234. The intention behind this 
power to act as a ‘super ministry’ was to effect the transformation of the line ministries 
such as the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, and to ensure a shift in spending in 
line with overall RDP goals. An unforeseen consequence of these arrangements was to pit 
the RDP Office against the line ministries both in terms of budget allocations and in 
terms of the independence of mandates. Indeed, the office was often seen as both 
centralist and an unnecessary hurdle for the line ministries in the implementation of their 
tasks235. A source in the President’s Office mentioned to me that because of its influence 
on line ministry spending patterns, the RDP Office was encroaching on the planning and 
budgeting functions of the ministry of Finance236.  
Thus the institutional design of the RDP implementation framework seems to have 
had some built-in tensions, despite whatever cohesive forces may have operated within 
the Government of National Unity. According to another (pro-RDP office) source, the 
slicing of the line ministry budgets was non-negotiable and the sources of conflict lay in 
the attempts by the line ministries to reclaim the lost portion of their budgets. Success in 
reclaiming this money was a function of the degree to which the activities of the ministry 
in question fitted into overall RDP objectives, of the ability of staff in that ministry to put 
out RDP project proposals (which was usually stunted by lack of ‘developmental’ 
capacity), and the energy, charisma and personal influence of key individuals in the 
ministry such as the directors general.  
The White Paper on the RDP was published in the Government Gazette on the 23rd of 
November 1994. It set out the principal mechanisms for the implementation of the RDP. 
In essence, the intention was to maintain fiscal discipline and to redirect government 
spending rather than to increase it as a proportion of GDP. This intention was first 
mentioned in the Base Document and reiterated in the White Paper237.238. This was to be 
achieved by a progressive increase in the reductions of the budgets of the line ministries, 
and their reallocation towards key ministries that were seen to be essential to the RDP 
delivery process, such as Education, Welfare Services, Health, Land Affairs and Water 
Affairs and Forestry. This reprioritization and redirection was in the first instance to be 
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effectuated through the RDP Fund and its administration in the RDP Office. This created 
leverage over intradepartmental transformation by the RDP Fund. The White paper stated 
that: 
 
“In effect therefore the RDP Fund consists of funds which have been removed from departmental 
allocations and can be reassigned to them subject to compliance with the new priorities” 239 
 
Thus R 2.5 billion was taken out of the 1994/1995 budget of R 148 billion to create the 
RDP fund, and this was to increase to R 5 billion in 1995/6 and R 10 billion in 1996/7240. 
Line ministries were to negotiate with the RDP Office for funding of projects and 
programmes, tied to assessments of the capacity of staff to run these programmes. As the 
funds available from the budget for the RDP Office increased, therefore, so the power of 
this office over the line ministries increased. The ministries could receive the portions of 
their budgets they had lost by submitting project proposals to the RDP office that were 
compliant with RDP principles. In the meantime, the line ministries were to be 
transformed, and it was envisaged -or rather hoped - at the time that within five years of 
the elections, the whole government budget would be based on RDP principles241. The 
RDP office thus had a lot of power over the other line ministries, but this power did not 
necessarily result in transformation, as it also created irritation towards the RDP office 
from the line ministries. Similarly the transformation of line ministries itself met with 
obstacles along the way.  
A key factor hampering transformation was the fact that budgets of the line ministries 
were locked into certain forms of expenditure from which it was not easy to find quick 
exit options. Table 4.1 below presents a broad overview of the general squeeze 
experienced by government on ‘development’ spending. This rather broad category is 
created simply by subtracting what Landman calls the ‘terrible twins’ of expenditure on 
personnel and interest on debts from the national budget242. The remaining figure can in 
theory be allocated for RDP development purposes in the broadest sense. The table shows 
that in fact from 1994 to 1999 the net share of ´development´ spending in the state budget 
declined from 34.6% to 27.5% while the costs of personnel rose from 46.6% to 51.1%. 
As can be seen in the table, ‘development’ spending was somewhat squeezed out by both 
personnel and debt costs. This leads to the interpretation from the budget that the capacity 
of the RDP programme to deliver, in terms of spending capacity, has declined 
significantly over time. However this observation should be tempered by the comment 
that personnel expenditure on education, for instance, does contribute to development. 
Finance Minister Trevor Manuel emphasized this point in an article in Business Day, 
stating that:  
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“Education expenditure of about R35bn annually represents investment in people of nearly three times 
public sector spending on physical capital formation” 243 
 
Table 4.1  
State expenditure on development, personnel, and debt244: 
 1994/5 1995/6 1996/7 1997/8 1998/9 
Total 148 000  158 068  177 555  190 222  204 300 
personnel  (47.2%)est.  46.6%  47.3%   49.4%  51.1%  
interest on debt   (17%)  18.8%   19.6%     20.4%  21.4% 
‘development’  (35.8%)   34.6%   33.1%  30.2%  27.5% 
 
This does not mean that development spending has not been squeezed; it simply means 
that not all spending on personnel is spending which could otherwise have been spent on 
development. Overall, therefore, the RDP Office was given a nominal degree of power 
over the line ministries, but the actual translation of that power into transformation was 
hampered both by institutional conflict between the RDP Office and the line ministries on 
the one hand, and by the ´development squeeze´ of personnel spending on the other hand.    
 
The RDP and GEAR 
As time went on the new government began to formulate detailed policy, submit draft 
legislation and implement the first RDP-oriented programmes and projects. In this 
process, pragmatism began to replace idealism, and in the wake of this process, the RDP 
base document, which had been the cornerstone of policy from 1994 to 1996, received a 
‘handmaiden’ to lead South Africa out of the ‘economic desert‘, i.e. the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) document245. GEAR is often presented as being 
a response to the disappointing growth rates of around 3% per annum that the South 
African economy demonstrated since 1993: the GEAR document announced a 
commitment to raise this to 6% per annum. According to many analysts, the publication 
of GEAR in June 1996 after the abrupt and unexpected closure of the RDP Office in 
April 1996 was an indication of the decline of the role of the RDP and of the emergence 
of a new economic realism in policy formulation.  
Certainly, it is true that when the RDP office was closed, the RDP had lost the 
institution that was most proactive in promoting adherence to its principles. And it is also 
true that GEAR strongly advocated fairly neo liberal interventions such as change 
towards a competitive outward-oriented economy and cutbacks in state consumptive 
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spending, whereas the RDP was more state-interventionist in its stance. But it was 
emphasized amongst others by the then Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, that the 
RDP and GEAR are strongly related, and that the GEAR document was a necessary 
addition to the RDP, even if it’s content and emphasis were somewhat different246. At the 
same time though, the South African state effectively had two ministries of finance, of 
which one was the Ministry of Finance and the other was the RDP Office which 
redirected development spending. There were clear conflicts of interest between these 
two institutions, and the subsequent absorption of much of the RDP Office staff into the 
Ministry of Finance underscored the shift that took place. Thus there are some elements 
of continuity and some of change: GEAR is not a radical and total departure from RDP, 
nor are they very similar. In my opinion it is clear however that the synchronicity of the 
cabinet reshuffle and the emergence of GEAR can be seen as a shift in the internal 
balance of power of the ANC in favour of pro-market, slim state approaches to the 
country’s problems.  
The ‘post-apartheid policy process’ changed its emphasis over time and the change 
was ushered in on the 1st of April 1996 with a cabinet reshuffle. But the RDP continued 
to inform policies: the emphasis on employment generation and the emphasis on 
redistribution in GEAR, for instance, are both strong ‘social’ aspects of GEAR policy 
that hark back to the RDP. GEAR is the macro-economic framework that emerged as a 
result of the implementation of the RDP, remoulded and recast by the practical 
contingencies of the first years of government of and reemphasizing and open economy, 
financial discipline, etc. More strongly than before, the post-1996 period became one 
characterized by an emphasis on cost recovery, economic growth, and an emphasis on the 
provision of basic needs rather than a fundamental redistribution of natural resources. 
Land reform was locked into a willing seller, willing buyer model that predicated land 
transfer on the availability of capital to purchase land, while the nationalisation of the 
water bulk and the redistribution of water resources was deferred to catchment 
management agencies that were at that time not yet conceived. Water services for 
domestic consumption became the key priority within the Department of Water Affairs, 
and water resources management remained on the back burner for some time to come. 
Village water supplies were developed at an increasing speed, as a basic human need to 
which rights were entrenched in the Constitution. However the access to productive 
resources on the basis of which these services could be accessed sustainably became an 
issue to be sorted out at a later date. Thus the basic needs model, which delivered services 
without asking questions about how services could be paid for, became entrenched, and 
this model linked into the overall GEAR vision of a slim state.   
 
Institutional transformation within DWAF 
On 1 July 1994 the new Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) came into 
existence by Presidential proclamation247. This move was an ambitious exercise in itself 
that required considerable effort, as it integrated the eleven separate and parallel water 
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and forestry-related administrations that apartheid had earlier created: ten ‘homeland’ 
administrative structures and one ‘RSA’ (Republic of South Africa) structure containing 
most of the white population and the country’s major productive areas248. Institutional 
fragmentation was such that one pipeline in the same town could fall within the 
responsibility of two different institutions, complicating delivery arrangements. At a 
higher level of management, the same was true of bulk water supply (multiple, 
interconnected water boards) and catchment management (integrating homeland resource 
management with ‘R.S.A.’ water resource management). Homeland administrations had 
their own water boards, which integrated bulk supply with (free) retail delivery to 
villages249. The homelands had high population pressures on the marginal lands allocated 
to them and often inadequate sanitation, resulting in soil erosion and biological 
contamination of water sources which had knock-on effects to downstream ‘white’ areas. 
The water boards in their supply areas were generally financially stressed and received 
subsidies from Pretoria on their current accounts that were to be phased out over time in 
response to the redefinition of their supply area boundaries. Catchment management now 
needed to absorb information from the homeland areas into their planning structures, as 
the homeland boundaries crossed in and out of drainage areas to be unified under the new 
institutional arrangements. In the Crocodile River Catchment, the Gauteng Regional 
Office managed the upper reaches of the river, while the Mmabatho Regional Office 
managed the lower reaches of the river, thus the catchment was cut in two by a provincial 
boundary. At the same time, the sources of many western and eastern tributaries were 
located in the more elevated and more arid section of the valley, allocated to the former 
homeland of Bophutatswana. The Crocodile river essentially runs between two pieces of 
the old Bophutatswana, so that a strip of commercial irrigated valley floor rises up to the 
homeland, where forest, woodland and thicket has been severely degraded and the area 
delivery eroded silt into the river. 
 Large areas were due to receive street level community water supply, defined in 1994 
policy as 25 litres per capita per day at a maximum of 200 m from the homestead. The 
first ‘push’ of this endeavour took place under the auspices of the RDP programme in 
densely settled peri-urban communities located close to centres of work. In 1990 the 
squatter settlement of Winterveld near Pretoria (in the Crocodile River Catchment) had 
no public water supply despite its population of 100 000 people250. Although water was 
tankered into these settlements, there was a high dependence on naturally available water, 
and the population pressure on these resources was such that biological contamination 
often led to the outbreak of cholera during the summer months in areas where there were 
still no public water supplies or adequate sanitation facilities. In densely populated areas, 
such as in Alexandra Township, Johannesburg, diarrhoea is a perennial problem where 
public streams are used for washing, cooking, hygiene and waste transport. ‘White’ areas, 
often located in the river valleys and facing north, were well watered and had many 
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impoundments along the main tributaries supplying irrigation boards and feeding into 
water boards which in turn supplied municipalities and other bulk users. These areas 
could often been seen directly from aerial photographs as an island of green within a 
more arid surrounding. White controlled irrigation boards, located on the valley floors, 
often received the knock-on effects of interventions in higher reaches of the catchments, 
such as chlorinated water from cities which raised the chlorine levels in the plants that 
farmers were growing. The rivers often had afforested upper catchment areas managed by 
parks boards and timber companies which reduced erosion but slowed the flow of surface 
water into the lower reaches of a catchment. Water boards, which received bulk 
allocations from the Departments dams to satisfy urban requirements, provided bulk 
transport and purification services for the cities. The cities rode on the income from bulk 
users where possible, and retail water supply to black townships within white areas was 
left to destitute and discredited black local authorities.  
 As a result of all this fragmentation, integration of decision making at a range of levels 
was an urgent necessity in order to increase the effectiveness of planning. From 1994 to 
1998, integration was horizontal rather than vertical, i.e. the catchment areas were unified, 
the water boards were rationalised, and the new municipal boundaries swallowed the 
spatial headache that apartheid had created by bringing rich white areas and poor black 
areas under the umbrella of one Municipal Council. This still left open the question of 
how catchment areas, water boards and municipalities were to relate to one another in the 
same catchment (i.e. vertical integration).   
 The new integrated department's budget was the sum of its former parts and trebled in 
comparison with that of the previous 'Republic of South Africa' (from about R 700 
million for the old ‘RSA’ portion to about R 2 500 million for the integrated ministry) 
while the personnel count rose from 7000 to an estimated 35 000251. At its head stood 
Professor Kader Asmal, a Professor of law, one of the key members of the Mandela 
Cabinet and an individual who developed a considerable reputation for himself as, with a 
wink to the Pizza world, ‘Mr. Delivery’. He stood before the daunting task of 
transforming an engineering-led Ministry whose history had been entirely technocratic in 
that the business of water management had been left to ‘experts’ in an institution isolated 
from society as a whole. Because of the considerable importance of ensuring rapid access 
to drinking water for the between 12 and 18 million South Africans whom the Ministry 
had ignored (it was an important electoral issue and high priority for most poor 
households), the Department embarked on a process of ‘driving at one hundred and 
twenty while still building the car‘252. No sooner had the RDP base document been 
published and the elections held, than Asmal produced a well work shopped albeit 
slightly contradictory White Paper on Water Supply and Sanitation Policy in November 
1994. In this effort he was assisted by the Standing Committee on Water Supply and 
Sanitation (SCOWSAS), a gathering of consultants who had earned their stripes in 
amongst other places the village water supplies of Lesotho and Mozambique. A 
prominent role was played in its formulation by the Development Bank of Southern 
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Africa (DBSA), an institution which had rapidly gained experience in delivering water to 
the homelands and which had positioned itself as the new benevolent face of South 
Africa in its last apartheid years. The DBSA was well connected in government circles, 
but took some time to shake off the identity and association with an endorsement of 
‘separate development’ that it had been linked to. From the ranks of the DBSA came the 
Department’s first Deputy Director General: Community Water Supply and Sanitation, a 
Sussex rural development graduate who later took over as Director General of the 
Ministry, a post he still holds.   
 The role of consultants grew as the Ministry reoriented itself towards its new set of 
priorities Because of the ‘sunset clause’, civil servants could not be retrenched except 
through an expensive golden handshake process, and such new winds as blew through the 
Ministry had to be accepted as ‘add-on’ functions to the existing range of competencies. 
Often stressed for lack of time, work was farmed out to consultants in a system of what 
could be called government by consultancy. Ironically, many ex-departmental officials 
who had accepted golden handshakes returned to the ministry at many times their original 
cost because their expertise proved very difficult to live without. The new guard of 
incoming officials, from the political appointments above Chief Directorate level to the 
technical specialists below this, often had to define their own job descriptions as they 
went along. They were almost irresistibly drawn into the protocol and culture of the 
institutions surrounding them, and many efforts at rapid transformation were frustrated by 
procedural difficulties and clashes of culture between the ideals of those who had fought 
in the struggle and those who had always worked at the system from within. New 
Directorates mushroomed, and new members of staff were appointed with much attention 
for affirmative action, gender balancing and new topics such as institution building and 
poverty alleviation in what had long been a bastion for white Afrikaner male engineers. 
The lingua franca changed from Afrikaans to English, and ceilings on social mobility 
were cut through, replacing old traditions of rewards for loyal service by a new room for 
manoeuvre for the young Turks in charge of poverty alleviation.      
 A strategic management team (a transformation management committee) was 
established to advise the Minister on the restructuring of the new enlarged Ministry and 
its transformation towards a new ethos and vision. The transformation programme was 
driven by a group of consultants external to the Ministry (it was felt to be prudent that a 
‘neutral’ outsider should be the focal point of these changes) - a consortium of Ernest 
Young and RGA consultants, who drove the process to align the entire department behind 
a new value system. This process was extensive and highly complex, involving a large 
degree of stakeholder participation in various ways. 
 There were three directions in which information flowed: top-down, bottom-up, and 
outside-in. The top-down process was given initial prominence: Some 185 managers 
from within the department met in 10 sub-groups (head office and regional offices), 
assessing their competencies, issues of personal transformation, and aligning their visions 
and strategies to ensure a coordinated whole253. Secondly, in each directorate within the 
Ministry, ‘change agents’ were identified, who held the trust of both of management but 
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also of the personn254. There were some 150 change agents supporting the transformation 
efforts of the Steering Group and Management team, amongst others through consultation 
of between 15 000 and 18 000 civil servants in the various structures of the Ministry. 
This was the ‘bottom-up’ consultation. Finally, there were ten external stakeholder 
consultations at which a total of 1 200 stakeholders were consulted with regard to the 
creation of an overall vision for the Department, all of which was within the overall 
framework of the Reconstruction and Development Programme. This process lasted 
almost one year. In summary, the move was one from institutional fragmentation to 
integration; top-down management to participative, cooperative alignment; Euro centrism 
to Afrocentrism; responsiveness to society rather than to internal dynamics; and 
inflexible to flexible255. 
Delivery of basic water services to the poorer sections of the South African population 
had been identified as a major priority before the elections, ranking second in the 
hierarchy of priorities of the country’s poor, after jobs. It was therefore a clear imperative 
for the GNU to drive the delivery of water supply and sanitation services at speed from 
the onset, rather than transforming the department first and then proceeding to implement 
new policy. The Chief Directorate of Community Water Supply and Sanitation (CWSS) 
was established in September 1994. Its initial staff complement was a mere 22 staff 
members, seconded from other directorates in the Department. By 1997 it had grown to 
include 5 directorates and 97 more posts, which was still insignificant in view of the fact 
that by then the CWSS commanded 66% of the Ministry’s financial resources256. Because 
of the pressure on basic services delivery and the need to commence projects without 
being hampered by problems associated with the reorganisation within the ministry, a 
temporary structure was created which could go ahead and spend money on projects. 
Thus in the first instance community water supply and sanitation delivery was routed 
through the RDP Presidential Lead Project approach in which R 282 million was 
allocated to 12 projects serving a potential 1 700 000 people257. 
Thus whereas the old department had emphasized water resources management in its 
policies, the transformed department placed a much stronger emphasis on basic services 
delivery on the one hand, and greater emphasis on participatory, sustainable and equitable 
resource utilisation in the water resource management field on the other hand. From an 
organisation which had focussed on first tier water management (catchment management, 
infrastructure provision) for the entire period of its existence, this was a major 
transformation in terms of budget, personnel, policy content, etc. From 1994 onwards the 
department had a dual function: that of basic services delivery on the one hand, and that 
of water resource management on the other hand. After internal restructuring, the new 
Department had a single Director General, and under him, three deputy director generals 
                                                 
254  Interview with Mr. Braune, Chief Director: Regions , 10/6/1997 
255  I have collapsed a number of the original categories into one, namely hierarchical to sharing,  
paternalistic to partnership, and constrictive to enlisting, all of which indicate declining top-down 
management and more participation. See DWAF (1996): National Vision and Strategy Document. 
Pretoria: DWAF. 
256  See DWAF 1997: Transformation Planning and Implementation Progress Report. 
257  DWAF 1994/1995 annual report: p. 18. 
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(DDG’s) 258. These were in turn, the Deputy Director General utilization, responsible for 
what could be termed the resource management side of the equation. The utilization 
branch had four chief directors with functionally distinct programmes, being ‘scientific 
and information services’, ‘water utilization’, ‘forestry’, and ‘corporate services’. The CD 
water utilization had four directorates, namely ‘water quality management’, ‘catchment 
management’, ‘water allocation’, and ‘water conservation’. Next, there was the Deputy 
Director General national water infrastructure; responsible for the construction and in 
some cases management of water schemes in South Africa as well as internationally. The 
infrastructure branch has four chief directorates, being ‘planning’ (future projects), 
‘international projects’ (Lesotho Highlands Water Project and others), ‘development’ 
(engineering, construction), and ‘operations’ (management of existing schemes). Lastly, 
there was, and still is, Deputy Director General regions, a hold over from the past kept in 
place until its functions could be taken over by catchment management agencies. It 
functions through the Department’s regional offices according to the old subdivision of 
the provinces, and the territorial mandates of the regional offices cross-cut a range of 
catchment areas. At present the new Catchment Management Agencies are to take over 
the functions of the regional offices, thus the function of a regional Deputy Director is in 
theory to become obsolete. As will be seen in chapter four, however, this has been a 
sensitive sticking point within the department, and the regional offices have a rather 
unclear role in the future of catchment management. The DDG: regions was also 
responsible for implementation of national policy in the nine provinces, and thus also for 
community water supply and sanitation. This branch has five chief directorates, namely 
‘community water supply and sanitation’, ‘regional management‘(Gauteng, Mpumalanga, 
Free State, North West, Northern Cape and Western Cape: the ‘rich’ provinces), and then 
the poorer provinces ‘Northern Province’, Eastern Cape Province’, and ‘Kwazulu-Natal’.  
 The Chief Directorate of water utilization was considerably upgraded relative to the 
past, when it was merely a directorate. Now it is a chief directorate with four functionally 
distinct directorates under it. This new structure is in direct response to the rising scarcity 
of water in the country. Two directorates deal directly with reduction in water use in 
quality and quantity (‘water quality’ and ‘conservation’), while the other two (‘catchment 
management’ and ‘allocation’) also have a lot to do with water use optimization259. From 
a distributional scarcity perspective, the CD community water supply and sanitation 
(whose director has been upgraded to the status of DDG while the DDG: regions has 
been changed to that of CD) was the only structure explicitly set up to redress apartheid 
imbalances: other forms of addressing inequality were subsumed under catchment 
management, allocation, etc. This means that institutionally there were personnel and a 
budget behind basic water service provision, but not explicitly behind the provision of 
productive water for the poor. The empowerment was, rather, an indirect one: through 
                                                 
258  That is, there were to be three DDG’s in the field of water management. There are also DDG’s for  
‘Corporate Services’ and for ‘Finance’. The structure has in the meantime changed again, and all  
policy issues, including forestry, are now grouped under ‘policy and regulation’. The ‘regions’ branch  
has remained intact, and there still is a DDG devoted to national water resource infrastructure. The  
fact that the regions branch has not yet disappeared, as it was intended to do, is a comment on the  
slow pace of change with regard to catchment management.   
259  Interview with C. Triebel, Deputy Director General, 30/5/1997 
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enhancement of the accessibility and responsiveness of the Department of Water Affairs 
and the involvement of beneficiaries in policy making, planning and implementation, 
equity issues could be integrated to the extent that they are put forward by the poor or 
their advocates. 
Integration of the eleven water management institutions into a cohesive whole was one 
challenge the Department faced. However, at a super-ministerial level Water Affairs was 
but one department managing a portion of the nation’s natural resources. A key challenge 
during the transition was the need to find ways for the various ministries with natural 
resource portfolios to work together in an integrated fashion. In the next section it is 
argued that this got off to a rather difficult start, as each ministry attempted to elicit the 
cooperation of the other in its own vision of integration.  
 
Issues in integration I: the fragmentation of environmental governance  
Integration, or cooperative governance, as it is referred to in some government circles, is 
a key problem in natural resource management at the national level. Integration is a 
relatively new concept in environmental management, and it is a response to an existing 
gap between the functioning of society and the functioning of nature. Essentially, the use 
of environmental resources by mankind casts the workings of the natural world into the 
realm of the human world, and management systems must be developed that 
appropriately interface between the human and the natural.  This is difficult to achieve for 
two main reasons. The first is that although mankind cannot exist without the natural 
environment, culture has evolved away from nature over time, and the two worlds 
currently operate according to very different sets of principles, raising the question of 
how they can be brought back together again. The second reason is that nature has until 
recently been destroyed, fragmented and subjugated by human processes with little 
regard for the viability of this approach in the long term. The act of turning this culture 
around and introducing sound environmental management practices is of necessity 
experimental and somewhat uncertain.  
One of the first institutions in South Africa to use the rhetoric of integration in a policy 
setting was the department of Agriculture: its 1995 White Paper contained a chapter on 
sustainable natural resource usage, which however carefully avoided assigning tasks in 
environmental governance to specific departments, preferring to refer to ‘government’ in 
general as the responsible agent260.261. In practice, however, integration in an agricultural 
setting is restricted to on-farm integration262. In this way, the planning of the farmer is not 
integrated with his neighbours unless they voluntarily decide to do so. Where many 
neighbouring farmers are involved, conservation planning at farm level can be aggregated 
and linked up to the level of a sub-catchment. Water, of course, does not stop at the farm 
                                                 
260  There are others: the Development Facilitation Act, Act no. 67 of 1995, also calls for the “integration  
of the social, economic, institutional and physical aspects of land development “(3(c) (i)). And note  
that integration was one of the six key principles underlying the RDP policy framework.  
261  For instance: “The government will encourage integrated land-use planning and community  
participation to ensure optimum management and utilisation of the natural resources (White paper on  
Agriculture, 4.2).  
262  In the Western Cape, for instance, soil and water conservation are integrated on the farm through  
subsidies for land rehabilitation exercises. 
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gate but moves from farm to farm. Traditionally DWAF’ role has been restricted to water 
resource management, or the maintenance of infrastructure up to the farm gate. From 
here, farmers and extension officers would take over the retail delivery of the water from 
its bulk source. Essentially the demarcation between the agriculture and water 
departments lies in the fact that in agricultural planning, water and soil conservation do 
not involve looking at water sources: for instance, farmers may not plough within 10m of 
a water source. Once water flows over a farm, however, it does become the subject of 
agricultural conservation efforts.  
In 1996 it was the turn of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) to 
launch its version of integrated natural resource management. Studies commissioned by 
the DWAF promoted the concept of integrated catchment management, emphasizing that 
hydrological catchments were natural units for both natural resource management and 
socioeconomic planning263. Although the concept was scientifically sound, it also brought 
major political obstacles with it. For one thing, the concept of catchment management 
contained the threat of usurping the authority of those concerned with land management 
or water management. For another, catchment management could be construed as an 
attempt to redraw the political map and replace local, provincial and even national units 
by river basin management units. As a result of these risks, the department opted for an 
incremental approach, launching the more limited concept of ‘integrated water resource 
management’ in later documents on catchment management, as a first stage in the 
movement towards integrated catchment management, and one which fell entirely within 
its competency. However, this more careful approach is flawed scientifically if land use 
practices, which strongly affect water flow and quality, cannot be influenced.  
The Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) has been in a 
particularly difficult position: its central mission of protecting the natural environment is 
difficult to achieve when certain key classes of resources such as water, land and forests, 
fall within the competencies of other line departments. The DEAT could only effectively 
deal with natural resource management issues not already covered by other departments, 
such as atmospheric pollution and the maintenance of biodiversity. In other 
environmental spheres it had to hope for some effect through regulation. Currently an 
ambitious form of regulation initiated by the DEAT is emerging in the form of the 
National Environmental Management Act (NEMA), promulgated in January 1999. One 
of the main aims of the NEMA was to launch integrated environmental management in 
South Africa through the development of National Environmental Strategy and Action 
Plans. The White Paper on Environmental Management emphasized the lead role of the 
DEAT in driving integrated environmental management in the country, through a body 
known as the Committee for Environmental Coordination (CEC), chaired by the Director 
General of DEAT and comprising amongst others of the Directors General of nine 
environmentally- related departments. According to this framework, all national 
departments considered to engage in activities which may affect the environment must 
submit an environmental management plan to the CEC within a year of promulgation of 
the Act. Also, all national departments exercising functions relating to environmental 
                                                 
263  Because it is within the catchment that all effects and knock-on effects of changing land use practices,  
water abstraction and pollution, mining and other activities are united. 
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management must submit environmental management plans for approval by the CEC 
within a year of the promulgation of the Act. According to a source, this Act evoked 
some resistance from DWAF, particularly in relation to the idea that the NEMA would be 
superior in status to the Water Act. There seems, therefore to be a tension between DEAT 
being the lead agency (i.e. facilitator and integrator) in environmental management and 
its assertion of control over the environmental management activities of other ministries.    
Acting independently from the other ministries, the Department of Agriculture has 
embarked upon the drafting of the ‘Sustainable Utilisation of Agricultural Resources Bill’. 
It has not been released yet, nor has it yet been sent to other departments for input. 
Essentially it continues the 1983 Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act’s 
recognition of the deterioration of South Africa’s agricultural resources and focuses on 
enhancing sustainability of natural resource management on the farm. One critical issue 
here is biodiversity: amongst other things, the 1983 Act dealt with (ministerial control 
over) the ploughing of virgin land but did not provide sufficient ‘teeth’ to deal with 
encroachment of farming on the habitat of endangered species. The intention of the new 
bill is to provide more protection for endangered species on existing and potential 
farmland. However, biodiversity is central to the policies of the DEAT, and here again 
the question is raised where the competency of one line department ends and that of the 
other commences. Ultimately it will probably be fleshed out in consultations between the 
DoA and the DEAT on this bill.  
On balance the current tendency in environmental policy and planning appears to be 
that, rather than creating structures for the integrated planning of natural resource 
management in South Africa, each department has used the rhetoric of integration 
independently from other departments in the establishment of structures suited to the 
furtherance of their own internal goals. The reality of natural resource management is that 
these resources cannot be managed independently of one another, but on the other hand 
the reality of governance is that functional divisions between ministries are both 
necessary for effective management and are defended by the ministries in question. This 
does not imply an inherent antagonism between line functions, it merely emphasises a 
tendency to parcel the environment off into discrete and recognisable units for 
management purposes that contradicts the logic of integration. 
 
Issues in integration II: The Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme  
Integration, then, has been difficult to achieve in that the appropriate institutional vehicle 
to drive integration has not yet been found. The management of natural resources falls 
within the mandate of a range of different departments, and it is not yet clear how an 
overarching strategy is to be devised by the various ministries involved to integrate the 
efforts of each department into a holistic framework. With the inauguration of Thabo 
Mbeki amid joking threats by Mandela to make a political comeback in five years’ time 
and counters by Mbeki that he does not like Mandela’s taste for shoes, let alone want to 
step into them, a new tendency towards centralization of power set in. His office staff 
expanded rapidly, with some emphasis on a unit for policy coordination whose task was 
to identify ways in which ministries could begin to coordinate the wide range of policies 
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and laws that parliament had approved and promulgated in the five years from 1994 to 
1999. Mbeki put it as follows:   
 
“The integration we seek must, for instance, ensure that when a clinic is built, there must be a road to 
access it. It must be electrified and supplied with water. It must have the requisite personnel, qualified 
to meet the health needs of the particular community. The safety and security of the personnel and 
material resources which are part of the clinic must be guaranteed. We must also establish the 
conditions which give the possibility to this clinic to radiate outwards as a point of reference with 
regard to the larger project of our self-definition as a people at work, building a life for ourselves”264.  
 
A key to integrated development was seen to be the targeting of rural areas. While 
integrated urban development had been taking place for some time already under the 
banner of the Municipal Infrastructure Programme (MIP), a rural counterpart to this 
strategy had not taken off yet, which was problematic in that 70% of South Africa’s poor 
are located in the rural areas265. Thus a strategy for targeting the poor had to begin to go 
rural. The MIP had reached out to (urban) local government through the Department of 
Constitutional Development, later known as the Department for Provincial and Local 
Government (DPLG). It was caught in a web of institutional problems; the main issue 
being that transfers of resources to recipient municipalities was difficult because of the 
lack of human resources and spending capacity in underdeveloped areas, so that project 
identification had to go hand in hand with capacity building to handle projects.  
On the other hand, the DPLG became a ministry of everything in that it delivered an 
eclectic mix of infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and water under the umbrella of one 
ministry. The argument was that each municipality could prioritise its own mix of needs 
and draw down from DPLG’s grants to roll out the infrastructure it had selected from the 
menu. For the ministry of Finance, this had considerable advantages, not least of which 
was DPLG’s ability to efficiently spend its budgetary allocations. However, as mentioned 
above, the Municipal Infrastructure Programme had an urban history, and for various 
reasons, a rural counterpart had not yet got off the ground. A degree of infrastructural 
schizophrenia emerged, in which domestic water supply for instance was delivered 
through two parallel programmes, one by the DWAF, which concentrated its efforts on 
rural areas, and one by DPLG, which delivered water infrastructure to urban 
municipalities. Ultimately, it was the DPLG formula of presenting local government with 
a development menu that was to persevere, as it was laid down in the Constitution that 
local government had the final responsibility for the delivery of basic services in its 
jurisdictional area. This meant a reduction in the role of central government in service 
delivery. Once municipal boundaries had been redrawn and local government elections 
had been held, legitimate local government was in place and national government had to 
retreat from direct service delivery. DWAF, which had delivered community water 
supply and sanitation directly to rural villages, now, had to concentrate its efforts on 
enabling local government to make choices for itself.  
                                                 
264  President Thabo Mbeki, address at the opening of parliament, national assembly, 25/6/1999; 
265  The MIP continued under new headings and subsequently became known as the Extended Municipal  
Infrastructure Programme, and later the Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme (CONMIP). 
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In the context of these recent developments and a shift in priorities away from national 
government to local government, the theme of rural development has been brought back 
out of the closet and is now being sold as a key pillar of the new era in delivery.  
After some six years of ill-fated initiatives to develop and launch an integrated 
strategy for government investment in rural upliftment, a new development is taking 
place – known as the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy, or ISRDS. It 
was approved by parliament in October 2000, and its implementation phase launched by 
the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) on 7 July 2001266. DPLG, 
which, as mentioned above, has an urban history, is now going rural, and all ministries 
devoted to the delivery of rural services and infrastructure need to work out new ways of 
approaching what is now regarded as relatively autonomous local government. To some 
extent, DPLG is the gatekeeper of relationships between national and local government, 
and the ISRDS is a new road map for such relationships.  
Why, though, has rural development, which began to take shape in draft form as the 
Rural Infrastructure Investment Programme in 1996 and 1997, taken so long to achieve 
the status accorded to it now? Furthermore, how could it come to pass that an ostensibly 
high-profile and interdepartmental policy programme could exist in government circles 
for a full five years before finally being implemented? Turning these questions on their 
heads, precisely the fact that there have been several unsuccessful efforts to launch an 
interdepartmental rural development strategy begs the question why the ISRDS has until 
now succeeded where its predecessors have failed.  
I would argue that two main reasons can be advanced for this. The first is that the lack 
of implementation of the programme was to a large extent attributable to the fact that for 
many years, there was no clearly identifiable institutional home for it. Secondly, I would 
argue that the ideas behind the ISRDS blend in a new form various strands of policy 
thinking that already existed in government circles, borrowing on their strengths and 
accepted ness within state institutions to provide the ISRDS with the identity it needed to 
pass the litmus test of new government thinking on delivery. Thus for instance it appears 
not only to provide solutions for integrated rural development, but also offers a very 
concrete operationalisation of ideas that accord primacy to the role of local government 
in service delivery and economic development.  
 
The ISRDS in a nutshell 
The strength of the ISRDS in comparison to its predecessors is the centrality of the notion 
that rather than producing more policy, it seeks to co-ordinate existing rural development 
initiatives of a range of line departments into a coherent strategy267. Although perhaps not 
stated as such in official policy document, the central goal is the co-ordination of existing 
initiatives rather than the reinvention of the wheel268. This differs somewhat from the 
central goal stated in the ISRDS policy document: 
                                                 
266  Source: DPLG, telephone conversation 4/10/2001. 
267  Ministry in the Office of the Deputy President (2001): the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development  
Strategy. Pretoria: Ministry in the Office of the Deputy President, page 1 
268  Presentation on the ISRDS by the IDT. Workshop in Blydepoort on 23 and 24 August 2001.  
Commentators on the ISRDS tend to agree that its goal is integration of rural development initiatives,  
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 “To attain socially cohesive and stable communities with viable institutions, sustainable economies 
and universal access to social amenities, able to attract skilled and knowledgeable people, equipped to 
contribute to their own and the nation’s growth and development”269.   
 
This goal is rather complex and multifaceted, and it reveals the fact that the ISRDS is 
intended to be a long-term strategy: for the moment it is based on a ten-year time horizon, 
ending in 2010270. It is to be piloted through 13 district municipalities, predominantly in 
the Eastern Cape (4), Kwazulu-Natal (4), and Northern Province/Mpumalanga (2)271. 
With the exception of Gauteng, the provinces have one pilot district municipality each272. 
The districts chosen rank as the 13 poorest in the country273. Significantly, however, the 
ISRDS is targeting Districts primarily because it is assumed that local government 
capacity is concentrated at the District level. However, there may be a range of smaller 
municipalities within any one District, and thus rather than targeting the third tier of 
government, the ISRDS is elevating the status of a fourth level.  
A key element of the programme is that it borrows on an idea which is becoming ever 
more prevalent within government circles, namely the idea that given sufficient support, 
local government is now in a position to play a key role in participatory development, 
inter-departmental integration, and delivery. In terms of existing legislation, each 
municipality is expected to produce an Integrated Development Plan (IDP) setting out the 
broad developmental needs of the area, and produced after broad consultations with civil 
society. The ISRDS links into this with a range of new concepts which strengthen the 
notion of an independent local government drawing down services from other spheres of 
government. Thus service delivery priorities indicated in the IDPs are to be submitted to 
those overseeing a ‘basket of services’ which will be targeted at a local ‘development 
node’. A ‘basket of services’ is a series of potential investments by line departments 
directed at social goals or kick starting local economic development. The services exist 
already within each department’s budget, but through the ‘basket’ and local IDPs, the 
investments are to be brought together in an integrated fashion. In this way, local 
government integration through the ISRDS is becoming the new panacea of integrated 
development. It is argued that it is at the local level that services are integrated into a 
‘way of life’ or living standard, and thus integration is assumed to take pace naturally at 
the local level while higher level organs of government may be divided into a range of 
departments.    
What this means practically is that the ISRDS itself does not have a budget, but draws 
on those of its constituent ministries through the district level ‘basket’. The District level 
is known as a ‘development node’, and it is a spatial unit consisting of settlements bound 
together by economic linkages. While these linkages are not easy to separate from the 
                                                                                                                                               
while its lofty official goal is more complex  
269  Ministry in the Office of the Deputy President / Independent Development Trust (November 2000):  
The Integrated Sustainable Development Strategy (ISRDS), pg vi. 
270  Ibid, p.VI. 
271  See http://www.local.gov.za/DCD/news/summary.html, sourced on 11/08/2007 
272  The Northern Cape and the North West Province share one pilot district municipality in the form of  
Kgalagadi. 
273 See http://www.local.gov.za/DCD/news/summary.html sourced on 11/08/2007 
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wider geography of the country, it is understood that the new demarcation of local 
government boundaries that has taken place was based on the attempt to create internally 
coherent units. However in practice the distribution of facilities within any one local 
government area is such that an exchange of services with neighboring municipalities is 
inevitable. Apartheid consciously created spatial diseconomies which defy rapid 
reintegration into a local government model based on international standards. Thus some 
municipalities may have several hospitals while others have none, and some areas will 
have a strong economic base while others have little to offer. The District is a messy way 
to unify some of these services into one jurisdictional area, but for now has become the 
new ‘one-stop shop’ for rural upliftment. In essence, the ISRDS term a ‘node’ refers to a 
District, which is assumed to be an ‘institutionally defined geographic area’274. All this 
argumentation strengthens the idea that nodes are a logical and appropriate unit for 
intervention in rural poverty.  
Thus the ISRDS envisages a large role for District Municipalities in driving rural 
development in future. This dovetails with a current debate within the African National 
Congress on the future of provinces: both factions within the party agree on a reduction 
of the role played by them in service delivery and on a concomitant increase in the role of 
municipalities275. The factions differ only on the degree to which the role of provinces 
should be reduced. The ISRDS, therefore, can be seen as an application of this mode of 
thinking to service delivery in rural areas. Crucial to its implementation is therefore local 
government capacity to absorb the demands of the new approach. It is not yet clear why 
local government (albeit at the District level) will fare any better than higher tiers of 
government in integrating the work of a range of government departments. Critics 
already complain that the ISRDS is a vehicle for fiscal dumping, in which financial 
rollovers from higher levels of government will cascade down into District coffers and 
remain unspent there. This ‘Starship Enterprise’ approach to rural development means the 
facilitation of local ‘docking sites’ at District level into which national departments can 
paste their own chapter of an Integrated Development Plan.   
Thankfully, the ISRDS envisages a process whereby municipalities and the 
stakeholders to whom they are accountable merely drive a process that leads to the 
prioritisation and selection of interventions: they will not be responsible for direct 
implementation in the short to medium term. Over the longer term, as capacity is built in 
municipalities, responsibility for direct implementation can be devolved to them. In the 
meantime, the DPLG is developing systems that will act in support of a capacitating 
process through the provision of training and back-up to districts276.  
This raises several questions. The ISRDS document does not say how public 
consultation will be effected. Rural areas, by definition, have scattered and often 
relatively isolated settlements, and logistics militate against effective participation277. At 
one level, poverty, which is concentrated in rural areas, presents obstacles to community 
                                                 
274  ISRDS 2001, page 30 
275  See Kihato, C. and Rapoo, T (2001): A future for the provinces? Rethink needed on the role of  
provinces. Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies policy brief # 23 
276  See ISRDS (2000: 33) 
277  See National Land Committee (2000): Rural Development Planning. Context and current status.  
Johannesburg: NLC 
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leaders wishing to take part in municipal planning deliberations. At another, rural 
municipalities are crippled by the lack of income from service provision as a result of 
local poverty and the higher costs of service provision in rural areas. As a result, public 
participation processes may be less representative of the rural poor than if the ISRDS 
were linked to an appropriate and well-funded communication strategy. Secondly, the 
ISRDS faces a conundrum in that it intends to boost local economic development by 
using local institutions weakened precisely as a result of lack of resources. It seems 
unlikely that the equitable share of local government coupled to staff training exercises 
will provide sufficient ballast to offset the new load of previously national and provincial 
responsibilities that now needs to be taken on at local level278. Back-up from provincial 
government, where task-specific expertise is still held, is likely to remain crucial in the 
short to medium term.       
 
The ISRDS and the Community Based Public Works Programme  
In addition to the fact that the ISRDS linked into existing thoughts on policy 
implementation through local government, it has linked into a swing away from basic 
needs thinking in government and towards recognition of the importance of stimulating 
local production. In basic needs thinking, poverty is equated with a lack of access to 
services, and thus government delivery is focused on unrolling service delivery. The idea 
of stimulating local economic development, on the other hand, involves a more sober 
recognition that services will not be paid for if unemployment is high and incomes are 
low. It also involves recognition that poverty is determined by lack of access to 
productive and other strategic resources rather than by a lack of access to services.  
Much of the thinking on poverty that is prevalent in the ISRDS can be traced back to 
ideas in the Independent Development Trust, an NGO which was central to the 
formulation of the ISRDS and now has a large part of the responsibility for its 
implementation. Specifically, the ISRDS has very close conceptual links to the 
Community Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP) of the Department of Public 
Works. The IDT gained much of its experience with rural development through its 
partnership with the Department of Public Works in implementing the CBPWP - it 
played a prominent role in this programme, accounting for some 25% of the budget. 
The CBPWP started life as a collection of discrete projects in rural areas which used 
labour-intensive methods to build ‘community assets’ such as roads, clinics, schools and 
water supply systems while generating temporary employment. But an evaluation by the 
Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) in 1996 led to a rethink. The CBPWP 
projects were seen as unsustainable because of the morass of poverty into which they 
were injected. If projects could be clustered so that they had a mutually reinforcing 
impact, it was reasoned, each would become more sustainable because it was part of a 
broader upliftment strategy by a larger number of actors. And if the projects could be 
geared towards the delivery of assets which were productive and generated an income 
(such as irrigation schemes), sustainability would be further enhanced. This led to the 
                                                 
278  An equitable share is a direct transfer of state resources to local government to compensate for a lack  
of local income.  
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idea of the stimulation of ‘Community Production Centres’ (CPC’s) under the auspices of 
the Department of Public Works. 
The ISRDS bears many similarities to the CBPWP, hinting at a close relationship 
between the IDT and government in policy formulation in both cases. At one level, the 
idea of ‘kick starting’ local economic development by clustering the interventions of a 
range of line departments is very similar to the approach in CBPWP projects. Also, the 
idea that interventions will be more sustainable if a range of projects link into each other 
is common to both the public works projects and the ideas of integrated rural 
development. Thirdly, the implementing agent in both cases is the IDT. Thus the ISRDS 
appears to have borrowed some ideas on local economic development which have gained 
currency within government, and again, this could help to explain why it is being 
implemented where other rural development programmes failed to reach the 
implementation stage.  
  
A short history of South African Rural Development Frameworks  
The first attempt to launch a coordinated programme of investment in rural areas was in 
1995, emanating from the Development Planning unit of the RDP office. The Office 
produced a discussion document, Rural Development Strategy of the Government of 
National Unity. At the time it was not clear which ministry was to be given the 
responsibility for its implementation and the initiative was held back by the closure of the 
RDP office in 1996. At the time, the Department of Land Affairs agreed to further the 
process of completion of the policy document, leading to the formulation of a Rural 
Development Framework along the same lines as the Municipal Infrastructure 
Framework. The Rural Development Strategy was completed in 1997, but again, it had 
no clear champion, and the initiative faltered279.  
By 1997, therefore, despite attempts at policy formulation, a comprehensive strategy 
for the alleviation of poverty in the areas in which it was most concentrated, the rural 
areas, was not yet being implemented. The main reason appeared to be lack of a natural 
institutional home. This was in stark contrast to the urban areas, where the Municipal 
Infrastructure Investment process was well underway and was being driven by the then 
Department of Constitutional Development. In response, a broad and consultative civil 
society initiative emerged to create a new Rural Development Framework, because it was 
seen as rather abstract and had not dealt with questions of implementation in sufficient 
detail. This Rural Development Initiative was intended to place rural issues on the 
national agenda again. A national process of rural consultation was initiated by a group of 
NGO’s such as the Trust for Community Outreach and Education and the Environmental 
Monitoring Group. After a series of regional and sub-regional workshops, a Rural Charter 
was adopted on 25 April 1999280. 
In June of the same year, in a speech at the opening of parliament, the President 
announced that the government was ready to implement ‘a rural development programme 
                                                 
279  From conversations with Steven Greenberg, Environment and Development Agency, 5/10/2001 
280  Drawn from Greenberg, S. (2000): Building a People-Driven Rural Development Strategy.  
Lessons from the RDI. Paper presented at the Land and Agrarian Conference, July 1999.  
Johannesburg: Environment and Development Agency.  
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for the integrated development of the rural areas’. This announcement appeared unrelated 
to the civil society initiative, but it sparked a flurry of activity within government that 
was to lead to the formulation of the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy. 
An interdepartmental task team consisting of senior government officials was constituted 
in April 2000, and it approached the IDT to draft the policy document, but again the 
initiative floundered because of the lack of a clear driver. This time, however, a home 
was found, as the policy formulation process was located in the Office of the Deputy 
President from October 2000.     
In the meantime, two important processes had made it possible for an institutional 
home for the programme to be found, the finalisation of the demarcation process and the 
promulgation of the Municipal Systems Act. Both cleared the way for the new and 
prominent role of local government in driving delivery. The format for integration of the 
programmes of various line departments was to be through the Integrated Development 
Plans (IDPs) of local authorities. By linking the concept of Integrated Rural Development 
to the IDPs, the ISRDS found a natural home in the DPLG. Simultaneously, by linking it 
to the enhanced role of local government, the ISRDS was riding a new wave of thought 
that already existed across government, enhancing its chances of success. A drafting team 
from the University of Pretoria, IDT and World Bank submitted a first draft of the ISRDS 
to Cabinet at the end of December 2000 and had completed its final draft by February 
2001. This document was discussed and approved at an inter-departmental legotla and 
then transferred to the DPLG under the Deputy Director General for Development and 
Governance. Thus, after many years of meandering, a national rural development strategy 
had found a home.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter was devoted to the analysis of organisational responses to scarcity at the 
national level. In essence, this was broken down into a two part process. In part one, this 
chapter reviewed the history of South African water law against the background of the 
country’s broader political and economic history. This included responses to scarcity in 
the field of the legislature and institutional dynamics at the level of the executive, i.e. it 
included the evolution of water law and the transformation of government departments at 
the national level. The purpose of this analysis was to shed some light on the evolution of 
responses to scarcity through time. Given this background and given the legacy of water 
resource management in the country, the ground was cleared for an analysis of the 
transformation of water resource management organisations and their regulative 
frameworks with the advent of democracy.  The latter included the dynamic 
interrelationships between the political transition and the narrower transformation that 
occurred within water law and national water resource management institutions.  
In section one it was argued that with the passage of time water law, which originated 
outside South Africa, has been adapted more and more to local conditions and local needs. 
In the beginning this consisted of adaptations to foreign law, and subsequently three 
generations of local water law were drafted that each time represented an overhauled 
view of the role of water in the economy and in service provision. In turn, these three 
phases represented the primacy of agricultural, industrial, and democratic ideas about 
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water management. The 1912 and 1956 Acts operated within a technocratic, exclusivist 
mode which reduced their flexibility and responsiveness to changing local circumstances. 
As time passed, they therefore became more and more out of step with changes that were 
taking place in water management practices, and they eventually required replacement by 
a new Act. The 1998 Act (which will be treated in more detail in subsequent chapters) is 
more enabling character and has considerably more flexibility built into it than its 
predecessors, but this does not make it free from assumptions about for instance the 
nature of poverty and development, assumptions which may require revision after some 
time. As time has passed, so private control over water has been replaced by state control 
over water in response to increasing scarcity of the resource and a corresponding need for 
the state to regulate access to the resource for the benefit of all. Municipalities gained 
control over water within their boundaries, the state gained control over water in areas 
where the resource was becoming depleted, riparians lost their exclusive rights and non-
riparians obtained enhanced access to the resource, and a privileged minority lost its 
exclusive rights so that equity concerns could be addressed. Therefore the definition of 
that which lies in the public interest begins with the premise that ultimate control over 
water lies with the state. Previously partisan legislation which favoured agriculture or 
white commercial needs has been replaced by a more open-ended system which does not 
set clear criteria for the allocation of water other than that certain parties should not be 
excluded from access. In a way this makes the system more difficult to implement than in 
South Africa’s past, because the legitimacy of each allocative choice will have to be 
defended whilst water scarcity continues to rise.  
In section two it was argued that the transformation of South Africa’s institutions of 
water resource management cannot be divorced from the broader context of political 
transition, as they existed in a dynamic interrelationship with it. Water Management 
institutions were overhauled as part and parcel of a highly complicate shift of attention of 
the South African state away from repression and towards nation building. This transition 
included a series of structural compromises between the parties negotiating South 
Africa’s future, such as the sunset clause prohibiting the retrenchment of civil servants 
and the imposition of a transitional Government of National Unity. It also included the 
drafting of a development strategy (the RDP) which was broadly supported by a wide 
range of political movements. However the RDP failed to make clear choices from its list 
of wishes for the future, and soon became predicated on a strict regime of fiscal discipline 
and the cutback of state debt. An attempt was made to transform the line ministries from 
outside (through the RDP Office) and from within (through consultants), resulting in a 
ministry with a new add-on mandates including the pressure to roll out water and 
sanitation services across the country. The management of water resources obtained 
second grade status in this process, and it was only in 1998 with the promulgation of the 
Water Act that attention began to shift towards integrated water resources management. 
However in carrying out its mandate the Department did not stand alone but was faced 
with parallel efforts of many other departments, all of which had mandates which 
overlapped partially with its own. ‘Integration’ and the challenge of overcoming 
problems of cooperative governance became a keyword in the Mbeki period, as the 
 158
policies the Department had set out in the period up to 1999 had to be linked creatively 
into broader processes of governance taking place across the country.  
5 
Responses to scarcity at the catchment level  
Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the organisational responses to scarcity that have taken place at 
the catchment level, using the Crocodile River catchment as a case study. It describes 
the various phases of water scarcity that the catchment has experienced. The first of 
these is the direct usage of water at its natural source. The second is the development of 
local water resources. The third is the development of high potential dams within the 
catchment and the transportation of this water to places of need. The fourth phase is the 
optimisation of all water resources of the catchment by linking water resources to each 
other in a catchment-wide water use system. The fifth phase is the importation of water 
from other catchments. Institutionally the management of scarcity has also moved from 
the local– through water user associations and municipal interventions – to the 
catchment level. Building on existing water user associations such as irrigation boards 
and other large scale users such as mines and municipalities, local river forums emerged 
on tributaries of the Crocodile (the Jukskei, the Hennops, the Apies, the Pienaar, the 
Molopo, etc.) in response to local crises such as pollution, environmental degradation 
and over usage. Currently these still relatively localised institutions are linking to each 
other through a catchment-wide public participation process geared towards the 
submission of a proposal for the creation of a catchment management agency. The new 
institutions however reflect new forms of exclusion from access to water, as a result of 
both the administrative mechanisms of transformation (i.e. the implementation 
strategies of catchment management) and of the politics associated with the new rules of 
the game. One important example has been the chronological separation between 
institution building and the provision of entitlements to water, as a result of which those 
already in possession of entitlements to water have an active stake in the new 
institutions while those who have historically been dispossessed of land and water have 
 160
no entitlement on the basis of which to participate actively. An important institutional 
side theme is the resistance of the old regional office under which the Crocodile River 
catchment fell to its disbandment and replacement by a catchment management agency.  
 
The Crocodile River catchment in its physical context 
The figure below shows the location of the Crocodile River catchment. Although by 
definition the catchment is physically separate from other catchments, human agency 
has served to link it to the catchments to its North, South East and West in a range of 
different ways.  
 
 
Figure 5.0 
Overview of Crocodile and Marico Catchments1  
 
 
To the west lies the Marico River catchment, which together with the Crocodile 
system forms one of the nineteen ‘Water Management Areas’ that are the basis of South 
Africa’s new catchment management system. The Crocodile and Marico catchments are 
physically separate from each other but will in future fall under the same management 
                                                 
1  Source: Adapted from DWAF (1990): Crocodile River (Western Transvaal) Catchment Study  
Pretoria/Tshwane: DWAF 
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unit once the proposal for the creation of a Catchment Management Agency for the 
Crocodile-Marico system has been approved by the Minister. To the east of the 
Crocodile River basin lies the Olifants river basin, which also contributes to the 
Limpopo, but which drains eastwards and only joins the Limpopo inside Mozambique. 
The Olifants River is used very intensively, and it is linked to the Crocodile River 
catchment in that its water is used to cool the coal-fired power plants that supply the 
highly industrialised Crocodile area with its electricity.In this way, the Olifants 
performs a water-intensive service for its western neighbour And takes some of the 
pressure off the Crocodile itself. On the other hand, water is pumped into the Olifants 
basin from the Vaal river system to support the power stations on the eastern Highveld. 
Thus the Vaal River, apart from supplying water to points of need within its own 
catchment, boosts the supplies in the Crocodile and Olifants systems to its North West.  
The Vaal river catchment plays the key role in South Africa’s water resource 
management system – its water is referred to as the life blood of a nation - in that it 
links the well-watered catchments along the eastern shore board to the centres of high 
demand in the west. Inter-basin transfer schemes enable water to be transferred from 
dams situated in the upper reaches of a range of eastern catchments westwards into 
tributaries of the Vaal, from which it flows into the Vaal’s main channel and is exported 
westwards again into the Crocodile and the Olifants river systems. Because of these 
inter-basin transfer schemes, also, catchments are no longer self-standing entities but are 
linked into a national ‘water grid’. To the north of the Crocodile lies the Limpopo 
catchment, of which the Crocodile is a tributary: in total a series of eight rivers flow 
northwards out of South Africa and contribute to the Limpopo River. The Limpopo 
defines much of South Africa’s north western border with Botswana and its entire 
northern border with Zimbabwe. The Crocodile is therefore part of an international river 
basin, an issue which became topical in the summer of 2000, when Mozambique was 
inundated by floods and questions were raised in relation to South Africa’s ability to 
hold back the flood waters. 
In many respects, therefore, the Crocodile cannot be separated from the water 
systems around it. The emergence of catchment management in South Africa has taken 
place precisely at a time when the boundaries between catchments are becoming less 
sharply defined and when each catchment plays a specific role within an overall 
national water resource management strategy involving transfers of water between 
catchments. In accordance with the national Water Act of 1998, each catchment must 
develop a catchment management strategy, but this may not be in conflict with the 
national water resource management strategy. In the case of the Crocodile, the 
boundaries between a national water resource strategy and a catchment management 
strategy are more blurred than in any other region in the country, as a result of the 
national importance of the economic activity that takes place in the area. As the next 
section will show, water has been imported into the Crocodile in order to sustain a high 
level of economic growth in the catchment and to support an exponential growth in the 
demand for water in the area.  
 
 162
Key features of the catchment 
The act of describing a catchment area such as the Crocodile could be approached in a 
range of different ways. The area is very large, covering a total of 29 307 km² and 
containing an enormous range of features which all have an individual impact upon the 
overall availability and quality of the water resources in the catchment. The few existing 
studies and reports on the catchment that have been carried out by consultants on 
commission from the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry could be described as 
eclectic inventories of minutiae, all without doubt part and parcel of an overall picture 
of the catchment but failing to provide a mental map or analytic leverage over the key 
issues that concern the area2.    
 At the risk of oversimplification, in broad brush strokes, I argue that the catchment 
could be subdivided conceptually into three key zones that each has a specific 
associated form of water resource management and an impact on each of the other zones 
that is related to the sequence in which they are manifested in the area. The first of these 
zones is the area of urban development, especially along the Southern ridge of the 
catchment but also including Pretoria, Brits and Rustenburg. The second zone is the 
area of (white commercial) irrigation development along the main river channels, 
especially the Crocodile but also its tributaries such as the Elands and the Pienaars, also 
on occasion including (white commercial) mining development in areas that are not 
overly urbanised and also do not fall within the former homeland. The third zone 
consists of arid, poor and overpopulated areas, especially the sections of the former 
homeland of Bophutatswana that fall within the catchment, but also including informal 
settlements. These three zones are not exclusive to the Crocodile River catchment: they 
are manifested throughout South Africa in various configurations. The Crocodile is 
unique in several respects, perhaps the most important of which are the urbanisation of 
the watershed and the level of economic activity in the catchment in relation to that in 
the rest of the country. However to further understand the catchment, as I argued, it is 
necessary to focus consecutively on its constituent zones.    
 
Urban development  
The first constituent zone is the urban zone, of which the string of towns and cities 
along the Witwatersrand ridge (the Southern rim of the catchment) is by far the most 
dominant. However, the catchment also contains the important towns of Pretoria, 
Midrand and Rustenburg. The urban areas in the catchment account for a very large 
proportion of its overall water demand and similarly account for a very large proportion 
of its water quality problems. On the other hand, the return flow from these urban areas 
are also a resource for rural areas located downstream, albeit a resource of poor quality 
and a resource that is highly concentrated in the main river channels, where it can only 
be accessed by a small group of beneficiaries.    
                                                 
2  DWAF (1990): Crocodile River (Western Transvaal) Catchment Study. Urban demands and return  
flows; DWAF (1991): Krokodilrivier (Wes-Transvaal) Opvanggebiedstudie. Besproeieingsgebruike  
en terugvloeie; DWAF (2000): Crocodile Marico WMA Situation Assessment.  
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 Historically, I argue that water utilisation in each of these towns has evolved through 
a number of phases, each of which is a specific institutional response to ongoing water 
scarcity. Typically, the pattern is that the original settlement is based on a groundwater 
source, although in some cases such as Pretoria the town is located on a river. When this 
local source becomes insufficient for the growing town, nearby rivers are dammed 
and/or additional groundwater sources are tapped to augment supplies. When, in turn, 
these additional sources run out, typically the local dam wall would be raised to increase 
its yield, or yet more groundwater sources would be tapped. In the next phase, more 
distant sources in the sub-catchment are exploited and a water company or water board 
takes charge of the bulk transport and purification of the water, drawing from a range of 
different sources. The establishment of a water board in itself is an indication that there 
is a need to optimise and regulate bulk supply for municipal and mining/industrial 
usages at a regional level. Institutional arrangements at the local level no longer suffice 
and a new tier of water institutions is required that can regulate water supply at a much 
larger scale of operation. But while a water board may be established on the basis for 
instance of a fixed assurance of supply from a powerful local source such as a large dam, 
urban development in the region may be such that this allocation soon becomes fully 
accounted for. In the next phase of development, the major dams in the catchment as a 
whole are linked to each other in order to optimise supply within the catchment and to 
ensure the supply to remote areas with high demand and little water. When the supply 
of the catchment as a whole runs out, importation of water from neighbouring 
catchments needs to be considered. When these run out, a national water supply grid 
must be developed to transfer water from catchment to catchment across the country. 
Finally, water demand management must be introduced to further optimise water 
utilisation.  
 Evidence from the Crocodile River catchment tends to support the picture thus 
painted of a phased development of water resource management. However it also shows 
that there is no iron law of phasing at work in the sense that there is always a clean 
progression from one phase to the next. The case of Johannesburg and the establishment 
of Rand Water Board show that the city leaped from the phase of local resource 
development to the inter-basin transfer phase, bypassing the optimisation of supply in 
the catchment in which it is situated. However, the rest of the catchment has more 
closely followed the phases described above, as areas outside Johannesburg have 
historically been more dependent on the water resources of the catchment itself than on 
imported water. For the purpose of illustration of this trend, some of the history of 
Johannesburg, Pretoria and Rustenburg is set out below. However, I would like to point 
out that a more exhaustive treatment of this overall tendency can be gleaned from 
chapter six, where the case of Johannesburg will be treated in some detail.  
 A parallel process to the evolution of water resources development in the catchment 
is the ‘solidification’ of processes of resource capture by those with the ‘hydro political 
privilege’ to do so. Turton refers to situations in which structural inequalities in access 
to and control over water exist over time, whereby those inequalities are contested and 
positions of hydro political privilege are entrenched and protected by ‘discursive elites‘, 
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in the form of hydraulic engineers3. In the Crocodile River catchment, the current 
demarcations (and contradictions) between urban areas, white farming areas and tribal 
lands that provide the catchment with its key attributes have their roots in the period of 
conquest and white settlement in the area. Of course much has changed since then, and 
much nuance needs to be added to this rather stark portrayal, but it is argued that the 
basic triad still remains intact today4. 
 Because control over water was linked to land ownership through the riparian 
doctrine in the water law of the Boer Republics and later in the 1912 Irrigation and 
Conservation of Waters Act and the 1956 Water Act, the initial zoning of land for 
settlement, for white agriculture, and for black resettlement, also had a long term impact 
upon water demand and utilisation in the area. The catchment as a whole was the scene 
of colonial conquest and conflict for a period of sixty years in the nineteenth century, 
during which the Transvaal was annexed and incorporated into the Boer Republic 
known as the South African Republic. Davenport states that: 
 
“White citizens were allowed two farms, supposedly of up to 3,000 morgen, as of right. Blacks, by 
contrast, were precluded by Volksraad resolution from owning land at all, though in some instances 
missionary societies took out land on their behalf. By the end of the century a mere 860,000 morgen 
had been set aside as treaty areas for occupation by black chiefdoms or as government locations, out 
of total area of 71, 000,000 for the Republic as a whole […] A man merely found unoccupied land and 
registered his claim at the landrost office, describing its locality in terms of natural landmarks”5.   
 
Voortrekker towns generally developed as a result of key natural resource endowments - 
Wilson and Thompson mention that places such as Rustenburg, Potchefstroom, 
Klerksdorp, Heidelberg and Zeerust, were selected for the availability of key natural 
resources including water, soil and pasture6. Thus the availability of water was an 
important feature enabling the initial settlement of a relatively large number of people 
on a relatively small plot of land without requiring prohibitive investments in water 
supply development. By the same token, colonial relations were embedded into the first 
water supply development initiatives, as African juveniles captured in colonial raids 
became part of white households and were often used to dig irrigation canals.  
 The origins of Pretoria confirm this general trend, as the new Republic needed a 
location for the meetings of its Volksraad, and in 1855 two farms were purchased on the 
Apies River for the purpose of the meetings7. This was the birth of South Africa’s 
administrative capital. Pretoria remained rather small for some time, as the 
                                                 
3  Turton and Hussein (2000): Water Wars. Enduring Myth or Impending Reality. Pretoria: University of  
Pretoria, p.35-6.  
4  One key nuance is that the bifurcation between whites and blacks in overall access to resources was  
generated by the colonial and later apartheid system as a whole and not just by water engineers. A  
second is that since the abolition of influx control and the repeal of apartheid legislation blacks may  
purchase white irrigation farms while whites may live in shacks with no running water:  
democratisation has begun to erode the sharper contours of the society’s past. Other nuances will  
follow in the text.   
5  Davenport (1977): South Africa. A Modern History. London: Macmillan, p.76. 
6  Wilson, Monica and Thompson, Leonard (eds.)(1982): A History of South Africa to 1870. Cape Town:  
 David Philip, p. 413, also internet search: Rustenburg. 
7  Ibid, p.77. 
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administrative centre for a rural agricultural community, but the discovery of gold on 
the Witwatersrand in 1866 set in motion a rapid influx of people into the catchment, and 
Pretoria’s size and importance increased concomitantly. Originally, Pretoria’s water was 
supplied from springs and from the Apies River. In 1977 its supply was boosted by the 
Rietlvei dam on the Hennops River, but the increase in its water demand over time has 
been such that some 80% of the city’s water is currently supplied by Rand Water Board, 
i.e. it is from imported sources.   
 Similarly, in Rustenburg’s case, a powerful spring was found, supplying the Dorps 
river tributary of the Hex River, enabling settlement in an arid area. This spring had to 
suffice for the town until the Bospoort dam was built on the Hex River in 1969, but it 
still contributes to the towns overall water supply in the present day8.9. While the town 
was originally an agricultural settlement, rich mineral deposits have since been 
discovered in the area, especially of platinum. The town is currently an important 
mining town which is growing rapidly. Like Pretoria, it wet through the primary phases 
of drawing from a local source and later augmenting its supplies through the 
construction of a local dam before having to import water from more distant areas. 
Rustenburg now augments its supplies by buying bulk water from both from both Rand 
Water Board and Magalies Water Board. It is located on the Western limits of the Rand 
Water supply area. 
 Johannesburg, by contrast, is a very important exception to the general rule, in that 
the city did not develop close to a water source but rather straddled a watershed. 
Incoming settlers had staked their claims to farms on the Witwatersrand, and proceeded 
to engage in subsistence agriculture, often boosted by springs located on each farm10. 
Individual finds of small quantities of gold in the area contributed to a growing 
conviction that the ridge contained gold, and after much persuasion, a number of farms 
were declared public diggings in 1886. From this moment on Johannesburg grew in a 
wild and haphazard way11.   
 Urban development in the catchment mirrored that in the rest of the country, albeit 
with higher population densities, higher economic turnover, and more concentrated 
impacts on water resources than elsewhere. The spatial set-up of the apartheid city itself 
led to a combination of different impacts arising from the areas of production and white 
settlement, from the townships, and from informal settlements. White residential areas, 
known as the ‘leafy suburbs‘, are leafy because of a high per capita consumption of 
water that is used in watering ample gardens, filling swimming pools, washing cars, and 
in satisfying more direct household needs. These suburbs are expanding rapidly – in 
Johannesburg’s case in a Northerly direction - and contributing to a continued increase 
in the demand for purified and chlorinated water. While the quantities of water utilised 
for domestic purposes (9.3%of the total) are not very large when compared to 
mining/industrial (17.5% of the total) or agricultural/forestry use (57.9% of the total), 
expansion is such that by 2030 domestic use is expected to reach 19.5% of the total 
                                                 
8  Pretoria State Archives, Transvaal Water Court case no 40, 30/5/1917.   
9  See DWAF (1986): Management of the Water Resources of South Africa, p. 5.29’, also A.6. 
10  Although a limited number of springs were available 
11  Van Rensburg (1986): Johannesburg: One Hundred Years. Johannesburg: Chris van Rensburg, pp.  
1/28.  
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water consumption in the area12. This would represent a demand increase of more than 
100%. In the realm of quality, urban domestic water supply has a powerful impact 
downstream in that the domestic water required in the upper catchment needs to be of 
the highest standards in order to meet public health requirements for its consumption. 
Rand Water Board purifies and treats its raw water allocation from the Vaal Dam before 
it is pumped up to Johannesburg and Pretoria, a process involving the addition of 
chlorine to the water to kill any bacteria that the water may contain. However only a 
very small amount of chlorinated water supplied to suburban homes is actually 
consumed: by far the largest amount is used for bathing, washing, cleaning and 
sprinkling – categories of consumption whereby chlorination is not required. When 
disposed of, the water eventually returns to the main river channels containing high 
levels of chlorine which accumulates in cash crops grown downstream13. Tobacco 
grown in the Crocodile River catchment can no longer be exported to the European 
Union as a result of its high chlorine levels.      
 At the same time, the storm water runoff from these expanses of concrete is an 
increasing problem, as the water rushes down in sharp peaks after rains rather than 
infiltrating the soil or being held back by vegetation as it did before urbanisation. In 
addition, this water is highly polluted with both physical waste and dissolved waste 
from the urban areas14. Thus in the upper catchment heavy rains are at once a blessing 
and a curse, as they fill the dams with much needed water but at the same time fill them 
with pollutant from urban tarmac.        
 On the industrial and mining front, much of the water consumed is consumed within 
the context of municipal water supply, especially in the South-Eastern areas of the 
catchment. In downstream rural and peri-urban areas, individual bulk supply to mines or 
industries from water boards is more prevalent. In the context of the 1956 Water Act, 
mines and industries are required to return used water to its source 15 . For most 
industries this simply means decanting the water into drains which transport it to the 
nearest treatment works. For those industries releasing water directly into streams, 
adherence to effluent standards is monitored by the Department in a rather difficult cat 
and mouse game which reportedly boils down to maintaining good relations with a 
range of companies who are open about their water quality management problems, and 
catching out those who are less open about their pollution loads 16 . Neither the 
technology nor the manpower exits to monitor every industry and its point sources, and 
                                                 
12  DWAF (1997): Overview of Water Resources Availability and Utilisation in South Africa. Pretoria:  
DWAF, p. 14. the statistics apply to all tributaries of the Limpopo. 
13  Chlorine levels in the water of the catchment vary from some 10mg/l to some 100mg/l. On a scale  
from 1 to 4 whereby a high figure indicated low water quality, most irrigation water in the catchment  
is at a level between 2 and 3, meaning that the crops used require a reasonable level of salt tolerance  
and the soils need to be moderately to well drained. The Elands river system does not receive much  
urban return flow and is the cleanest river in the catchment. see DWAF (1991): Krokodilrivier (Wes- 
Transvaal) Opvanggebiedstudie, Op Cit., section 8-3-8-10.  
14  Interview with Petrus Venter, Brits District, DWAF directorate water quality, 6/4/2002.  
15  The 1956 Water Act has been repealed. However, in many ways it is still effective in the transition  
period while new organisational structures such as catchment management agencies take root and take  
charge of water quality management.  
16  From a number of conversations I have held with Marcel Hanekom, (ex)deputy director water quality  
in the Gauteng Regional Office.  
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thus communication with favourably inclined stakeholders in the area is a key source of 
information. Of course ultimately this kind of thinking lies at the basis of catchment 
management.  
 Mining, by contrast, inherently takes place in nature rather than in a factory, and 
mining activity results very directly in the pollution of surface water and groundwater. 
Mines account for a total of 70% of South Africa’s solid waste, and a wide range of 
minerals that are brought to the surface through the mining process dissolve in water 
during rains or in the crushing and cleansing process, thus contributing to water 
pollution 17 . Typically prevention measures include rainwater diversion away from 
mining areas, and holding runoff water in slimes dams which hold heavy metals, arsenic 
and cyanides in a localised area. However during heavy rains these dams may overtop 
or even collapse and the pollutants from the mining site may reach watercourses in other 
ways, resulting in very heavy pollution loads reaching the main river channels18. An 
additional problem is that on the Witwatersrand, mining penetrates water-holding 
dolomite formations, thus polluting underground water that is often used as a high 
quality source for domestic purposes19.   
 Apart from white suburbs, industrial areas and mines, the apartheid city zoned off 
black residential areas or ‘townships ‘, often located out of physical view of white 
residential areas and located far from places of work and service provision. Townships 
were intended for those blacks who had permanent employment in urban areas, and 
township residents had so-called ‘section 10c rights’, or rights to stay in urban areas, 
while those without such rights were only allowed to stay in town for as long as they 
had temporary employment. Township residents, in other words, were a cut above the 
rural black population in that they lived in urban areas and had access to permanent 
employment. Townships generally had reticulated water within the house or in the yard, 
and sometimes but certainly not always piped sewerage. Real water consumption in 
these areas is low, but the poor state of maintenance of many areas leads to large scale 
losses of water through leaky or broken pipes and illegal connections. Currently it is 
estimated that up to 51% of Soweto Township’s water is lost through leakage20. This 
figure merely measures unaccounted for water, and until thorough research has been 
carried out on the issue, it will remain unclear whether all this water is in fact water that 
has leaked into the ground. The Director: Water Conservation and Demand 
Management at the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry estimates that half of all 
losses in urban areas are ‘non-revenue ‘, i.e. simply lost, and the other half is due to 
consumption in un-metered areas21. Despite impressive improvements since 1994, water 
scarcity is still high in the townships, in that supplies are minimal and of poor quality, 
being degraded and dysfunctional in many areas. In general, historically, those 
residential areas which were recognised by the apartheid state as having a legal right to 
exist were provided with basic water supplies, although currently the maintenance of 
                                                 
17  Fuggle and Rabie (1992): Environmental Management in South Africa. Johannesburg: Juta, p. 357. 
18  Conversations with Marcel Hanekom (see note 15), 1997,1998. 
19  Davies and Day (1998): Vanishing Waters. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, p. 358-9. 
20  Interview, M. Lautre, Johannesburg Water, 11/5/02. 
21  Interview, Desighen Naidoo, 14/10/2000. 
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these systems is a recurring problem. However outside these areas, i.e. in homeland 
areas or in informal settlements, the situation was much worse.  
 Many areas have no water supplies at all, or did not have water supplies until very 
recently. In many of the very dense peri-urban settlements and satellite towns of 
Pretoria, located in the former homeland of Bophutatswana, water supplies were 
inadequate or even non-existent. Very large settlements such as Moretele, Mabopane, 
ODI, Garankuwa and Atteridgeville suffered from inadequate supplies, leaking 
sewerage, and a generally overcrowded, degraded and unhealthy environment. It was 
these areas that were first targeted for water supply delivery under the Presidential Lead 
Programme in the first year into the transition – thus by April 1995, one year after the 
elections, 150000 people had been connected to the public tap in Moretele 122.23.  
 The worst situation of all prevailed in the informal settlements, such as Winterveldt 
close to Pretoria, or Alexandra Township in North-eastern Johannesburg. These areas 
had neither the support of the apartheid government nor the meagre support of the 
Bophutatswana administration, and generally had no facilities whatsoever. For example, 
in 1991 it was reported that Winterveld squatter camp had neither water supply nor 
sanitation, despite harbouring a population of more than 200 000 people24. Similarly, 
Alexandra, a 2km² square strip of land in North-eastern Johannesburg, had a population 
of more than 175000 because it was one of the only areas in the City providing legal 
residence to black people at a reasonable distance from places of work. Its water and 
sanitation facilities were hopelessly inadequate, having been provided to those few 
houses that stand in the area in the 1970’s. These houses were served by bucket 
lavatories that were collected irregularly for emptying by the municipality, but the 
majority of the township’s residents have no sanitation facilities whatsoever. The 
combination of high population density and the lack of sanitation facilities made the 
township a permanent health hazard. Thus while World Health Organisation standards 
for safe drinking water include a count of less than 500 micro-organisms per 100 ml of 
water (the E-Coli count, as it is known), the Jukskei River regularly attains incredible E-
Coli counts of over 13 million organisms per 100ml25. In January 2001 there was a 
national outbreak of Cholera that commenced in rural areas of Kwazulu-Natal that were 
dependent on public streams for their water supplies, and the epidemic soon spread, 
entering Johannesburg in Alexandra township.  
 To compound these problems, the lack of space In ‘Alex’ forced many residents to 
construct shacks close to the banks of the Jukskei River, which runs through Alex, and 
with each bout of heavy rains, these constructions were exposed to severe risk of being 
washed away with the flood. In the summer of 2000, many were killed after being 
washed away by the floods. However, it is not just Alex but urbanisation as a whole that 
                                                 
22  The Presidential Lead Programme kick-started the delivery efforts of the newly elected government  
after 1994 and were intended to serve as a ‘model’ of delivery under the Reconstruction and  
Development Programme which they were leading.  
23  Ministry in the Office of the President (1995): The RDP The First Year Reviewed. Pretoria: RDP  
Office, p. 16.  
24  Cock, J. & Koch, E. (1991): Going Green: People, politics and the environment in South Africa.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 136.  
25   South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) radio report, 2003; 
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is at fault in this upper area of the catchment: the encroachment of the city on Jukskei’s 
upper catchment has compressed the river’s flow into short and heavy bursts, as the 
vegetation and soil that previously held back some of the flow and fed it to the river 
long after the rains has been removed and replaced by asphalt and storm-water drains. 
In fact, I would argue that this problem is not restricted to the Jukskei but that the entire 
catchment has become destabilised by the urbanisation and other land denuding 
activities such as mono-cropping. I have argued elsewhere that in this sense the floods 
that inundated Southern Mozambique in the summer of 2000 were man-made and as a 
result need serious attention in the context of a catchment management strategy for the 
Crocodile-Marico Water Management Area26.    
 Since 1994, institutional responses to the water crises in Winterveldt and Alex have 
been forthcoming. Like Moretele mentioned above, Winterveldt was given priority 
under the Presidential Lead Programme, as it received an RDP allocation of R39, 1 
million to provide all areas in the settlement with a basic level of water services, 
resulting in the roll-out of 1500 public stand-pipes27. This project is an example of the 
national rollout of water supply services which has provided water to more than 7 
million people of the 12 million South Africans who had no such services before 1994. 
From the point of view of bulk supply, it has meant considerable investment in supply 
lines throughout the supply areas of the Water Boards.  
 Alex, in turn, was the scene of a highly controversial resettlement scheme run by the 
City of Johannesburg, in which 7000 families were relocated to Roodepoort (where 
those eligible received low cost housing) or Diepsloot settlement (where the remaining 
group were settled on stands with basic water and sanitation facilities). While there is no 
question that the living conditions of all concerned improved as a result of the scheme, 
it was a controversial project for three reasons. First, the residents had their own reasons 
for living in Alex, such as proximity to work, the low cost of shacks relative to formal 
housing, or simply family ties to the area. There was therefore considerable local 
resistance to resettlement. Second, the resettlement move was seen as an opportunity to 
purge the area of illegal immigrants, as the resettled families were only eligible for a 
house or a stand if they could prove that they were South Africans. Third, Alex is 
located some 10km from Sandton, one of South Africa’s most up-market business areas 
and the scene of the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). There was 
deep suspicion that Alex was being cleaned up before the WSSD, as the gap between 
Sandton and Alex was fast becoming a symbol of everything that the WSSD was about. 
At the same time, the pollution of the Jukskei River has led to the establishment of the 
Jukskei River Forum, the strongest forum in the Crocodile River catchment, as well as 
one of its oldest28.        
                                                 
26   Schmitz, T. (2000): Concrete alone will not spare us floods. Because engineering has altered our  
natural water systems, a social response to climatic disaster remains essential. Article in The Sunday  
Independent, March 12, 2000.  
27  This was defined in the Reconstruction and Development Programme and in the White Paper on  
Water Supply and Sanitation as 25 litres of water per capita per day at a distance of not more than  
200m from a household.  
28  Interview with Manda Hinsch, DWAF Mpumalanga province water quality division, 16/7/2001.  
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 In summary, urban development in the catchment has resulted in a range of different 
impacts on the water resources in the area which can be broken down into impacts 
stemming from different kinds of urban areas. These first of these impacts is the 
continually increasing water demand coupled to the destabilisation of the quantity and 
quality of runoff in white suburban areas. The second impact is the range of problems in 
monitoring the water quality and reducing the pollution loads of industry and mining in 
industrial areas. The third is the problem of low quality water services, water leakage 
and illegal connections in townships. The fourth is the health hazards and biological 
contamination of the catchment’s rivers in informal settlements.    
 In many ways the Crocodile River catchment has contributed to the need for a 
national water resource management strategy because of the level of economic activity 
that takes place within it. Water demand in the catchment is far in excess of what is 
naturally available, as a result of the intensity of the economic activity that it harbours. 
The Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging triangle, which is located mostly in the 
Crocodile catchment, is South Africa's industrial heartland and national economic motor, 
accounting for about half of GDP and being the home of 206 of the country's largest 
300 companies29. The table below shows the water demand projections for Gauteng 
Province, in which these cities are located, and a comparison between the 1980 and 
2010 demands reveals a 246% increase in demand, which is much higher than the 
aggregate national increase in demand. To the extent that the productive and 
consumptive water needs of the inhabitants of the region are met, the (geographical 
concentration of) pressure on water resources will be increased concomitantly. 
The catchment is in many ways dominated by the urban development along its 
Southern ridge. From its earliest days, Johannesburg and other towns along the 
Witwatersrand from Randfontein in the west to Springs in the east grew at the explosive 
rates typical of a gold rush. Because of the enormous gold deposits under the 
Witwatersrand range, urbanisation proceeded despite the fact that the water resources of 
the area could not support such an expansion.  
As a result, the Witwatersrand is one of the only urban areas in the world that is 
located on a watershed rather than along a river, on a lake or at the coast. Furthermore, 
Johannesburg is the only city in the world on a watershed whose waters run to two 
different oceans: the Crocodile drains into the Indian Ocean (via the Limpopo), while 
the Vaal drains into the Atlantic (via the Orange).  
The urban development along the Witwatersrand has continued unabated for more 
than a century, although it has gradually changed direction: early development was 
along the Witwatersrand, i.e. eastwards and westwards, while the current wave of 
expansion is northwards, as the centre of economic activity has moved out of central 
Johannesburg and into Sandton, and out of Sandton and into Midrand. Thus the 60-km 
strip between Johannesburg and Pretoria is being parcelled off for industrial and 
residential development. 
The consequences of this development for the catchment cannot be understated. 
Since 1923, water has been imported into the catchment from the Vaal River to satisfy 
the rapidly growing demand in the upper reaches of the Crocodile. Currently 70% of the 
                                                 
29  Izindaba 1995. 
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catchment’s total urban water demand is satisfied through importation of water from the 
Vaal River system30. Therefore in terms of water quantity, a key consequence of this 
urban development has been the increase of water supply in the catchment as a result of 
the ‘return flow’ into the Crocodile from the City’s sewerage works and surface runoff. 
Water consumption in the Crocodile River catchment is well in excess of the naturally 
available water: the catchment has a mean annual runoff of 550 million cubic metres per 
annum, and yet it receives an average annual transfer from the Vaal of 615 million cubic 
metres per annum, i.e. the water consumption and flow in the catchment is more than 
double the naturally available flow31. 
 
Table 5.1  
Annual water demand in Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging complex32. 
Year Annual water demand, million m³ 
1930 22 
1935 41 
1940 89 
1945 120 
1950 163 
1955 212 
1960 285 
1965 402 
1970 434 
1975 575 
1980 777 
1985 670 
1990 871 
1995 1214 
2000 1629 
2005 - 
2010 2692 
 
 
This situation leads Fred Pearce to make the comment that: 
 
“To the North, another east-flowing river, the Limpopo, is almost emptied for long periods as it runs 
along the border between South Africa and Botswana, en route for Mozambique. The flow only 
recovers after receiving 500 million cubic metres annually of sewerage from Johannesburg and 
Pretoria”33.   
                                                 
30  DWAF (1990): Crocodile River (Western Transvaal) Catchment Study. Urban demands and return  
flows, p. vii. 
31  DWAF (1997): Overview of Water Resources availability and utilisation in South Africa. Pretoria: 
DWAF, pp. 13,54. 
32  Source: adapted from McKenzie, R.S., (1994): Water Supply: a Concrete Challenge for the New  
 South  Africa. Unpublished paper by consultant from Ninham Shand Consultants. 
33  Pearce, F. (1992): The Dammed. Rivers, Dams, and the Coming World Water Crisis. London: The  
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The overall quantity and quality of water in the catchment is therefore a function of the 
urban development in the south. Because more water is used in the catchment than is 
naturally available, return flow from the cities has become a source of additional water 
downstream. On the one hand this provides the catchment with an extra source of water 
than would not normally be available. On the other hand two key problems are 
associated with urban return flow. The first of these is that the volume of return flow is 
a function of the efficiency of water use within the urban conglomerates: the catchment 
receives what the cities have not consumed. And as will be explained in more detail in 
chapter seven, water use in Greater Johannesburg in particular is highly inefficient, with 
unaccounted for water making up a considerable proportion of overall consumption. 
The water supply infrastructure is generally old and badly maintained and water losses 
are intolerably high in view of the high costs of supplying this water to the city from 
distances of up to 400 km away. The second problem generated by the dependency on 
return flow is the fact that the quality of the water flowing out of the urban areas leaves 
much to be desired. The water in Hartbeespoort dam which receives return flow from 
Greater Johannesburg has shown a tremendous increase in total dissolved salts, 
resulting amongst other things in a rise in the pH of the water from 7.2 to 9.2 between 
1928 and 1984 34 . In addition, leakages from sewerage plants and pollution from 
informal settlements has led to biological contamination of the water: the reservoir was 
oligotrophic when first filled but became eutrophic thirty years later and is now 
hypertrophic35. Pollution adds to quantitative water supply problems in that reservoirs 
such as Hartbeespoort need to be flushed out regularly, but this can only be done if there 
is sufficient rainfall to warrant the release of large quantities of water from the dam.      
 
White commercial irrigation development 
The second key feature of the catchment is the development of irrigation along the 
river’s main channels, i.e. the Crocodile, the Elands, and the Pienaars. Irrigation 
development has taken place within the catchment since the end of the nineteenth 
century and in the wake of the colonisation of the area. In general the first irrigation 
development was private in nature and only after the unification of South Africa in 1910 
did the state become involved in irrigation schemes. This combination of private 
irrigation and state development that took place in the early decades of the twentieth 
century laid the foundations for much of the water resources development that exists in 
the catchment today, as the infrastructure that exists cannot easily be rerouted into the 
                                                                                                                                               
Bodley Head, p. 279. 
34  The salts include Nitrates, Phosphates, Chlorides and Sulphates. Nitrates and Phosphates result from  
the use of detergents, while the presence of Chlorine is the result of the biological decontamination of  
the water to enable its consumption in urban areas. The pH is a measure of the alkalinity or acidity of  
the water, which should be 7 under normal circumstances but which has now become highly alkaline.    
35  These terms refer to the amount of oxygen available in the water, which can support plant and animal  
life. Due to the presence of nitrates and phosphates in the water, plant growth proceeds to the point at  
which all oxygen in the water has been used up. See Fuggle, R.F. and Rabie, M.A. (1992):  
Environmental Management in South Africa. Johannesburg: Juta, pgs283-287.  
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service of other sectors of the economy or other sections of society: it is quite literally 
cast in concrete. Early water resource development is the cornerstone of existing water 
resource development, and therefore it is necessary to dwell on it for some time in this 
section.  
The truly commercialised agricultural development that we witness today in the 
Crocodile River catchment developed in step with the development of the towns and 
cities in the area, as the agricultural enterprises in the catchment had a ready and highly 
accessible market for their produce in Johannesburg, Pretoria or Rustenburg, but could 
only develop when these towns themselves developed. Many of the crops currently 
grown are oriented to the urban market, i.e. the productions of fresh vegetables and high 
value crops such as tobacco, cotton, citrus and nuts. However the area also produces a 
lot of maize, sunflowers, soya and animal fodders.  
As indicated in chapter three, the original utilisation of the water in the catchment 
was based upon what early water law referred to as the ‘normal flow ‘of public streams, 
or the flow that could be depended upon on a continuous basis36. Having occupied the 
land and driven back the Sotho inhabitants of the area, one of the first activities 
undertaken by white settlers was the development of the available water resources: 
 
“Potgieter wie se huis op Ou Dorp gebou was, het met die aanlê van die dorp, as eerste taak beveel 
dat ’n uitkeervoor of Ouvoor gemaak moet word om te voorsien in die behoeftes van lei en drinkwater 
vir die dorpe, erwe, en ook om te dien as besproeiingskanal vir landerije waarop graan en ander 
produkte vir die gemeenskap geproduseer kon word […] Dit het die tradisie van die Trekkers geword 
om oral waar hulle gevestig raak uitkeervore uit die riviere en spruite te maak. Nadat P.J. Fourie die 
plaas Krokodildrift van Albertus Venter geruil het, en hom permanent teen die Krokodilrivier gevestig 
het, was dit dan ook een van die eerste take wat hulle onderneem het, nl. om voorsiening vir 
besproeiingswater te maak [...] Die oewerbewoners verder teen die rivier af het nou oral 
uitkeerdamwalle in die rivier gebou en Ouvore gegrawe om hulle eiendomme te besproei”37.38. 
 
Settlers thus initially utilised locally available water resources and developed these 
resources to the extent that their financial and physical abilities allowed. Once land 
rights had been defined and recorded at the local magistrate’s office, a complicated 
game of alliance building and conflict over access rights began. In some cases, farmers 
had a mutual interest in permitting the construction of servitudes on their land, for 
instance to pool resources and construct weirs and furrows that served more than one 
farm. In other cases, the development of irrigation on one farm was to the detriment of 
the development of other farms, and water resource development generated conflict.  
                                                 
36  As opposed to the peak flow that was the result of recent rainfall.  
37  De Beer, B.K. (1975): Agter Die Magalies. Pretoria: Postma Publikasies, pp. 101-120. 
38  Translation: During the layout of the village, Potgieter, whose house was built on Ou Dorp, ordered  
that a furrow should be dug in order to satisfy domestic water needs, the needs of villages and  
properties, and also to serve as an irrigation canal for the land on which grain and other produce for  
the community. It became tradition amongst Trekkers to dig furrows from rivers and springs wherever  
they settled. After P.J. Fourie traded the farm Krokodildrift with Albertus Venter and established  
himself permanently on the banks of the Crocodile River, one of his first tasks was to ensure access to  
irrigation water. In this period downstream riparians built barrages and dug furrows to irrigate their  
properties.  
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Thus after the period of settlement and before the construction of major storage 
works in the catchment, i.e. in the first two decades of the twentieth century, there was a 
rush to record and define the allocation of water rights along the river. In addition, 
because of riparian law, there was a premium on the ownership of land adjacent to 
public streams, and this gave impetus to the consolidation of land ownership adjacent to 
water sources.  
On the Crocodile River itself, two important Water Court cases were held in 1914 
and 1917. In 1914, a controversial figure by the name of A.C. van Marseveen, who was 
to hold up the construction of the biggest dam in the catchment for a considerable 
period of time in later years, applied for a permit to use a defined portion of the 
Crocodile River for irrigation and another portion for tertiary purposes (power 
generation). For this purpose a weir was to be constructed across the river. In 1917, a 
certain James Mackingtosh applied for the determination and recording of the rights to 
the Crocodile River in the Districts of Pretoria and Rustenburg. In both cases it was 
necessary for the presiding Judge to determine the water rights of riparian users on the 
basis of what the 1912 Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act referred to as the 
‘normal’ flow of the Crocodile. This normal flow was to be distributed amongst 
riparians in proportion to the land area which it was to be used on. This ostensibly 
simple procedure was however riddled with problems, of which one in particular is 
relevant to the prevailing situation in the catchment today.  
This problem was of a technical nature: the determination of rights to the normal 
flow of the river was dependent on an estimation of this normal flow, but this estimation 
had to be based on guesswork. By 1914, the river had only been properly gauged for a 
period of nine years in succession, a very meagre statistical base upon which to lay 
down the rights to the flow of a river39. In this period, perhaps luckily for the quality of 
the overall statistics of the Department given South Africa’s erratic rainfall record, there 
had been one year of exceptionally high rainfall. The Report of the Director of Irrigation 
stated that: 
 
“The average annual flow entering the reservoir for the nine years ended 30th September, 1913, is 
6,939 million cubic feet, but the average for the year 1908-09, in which the abnormally high flood 
occurred, was only 3,964 million cubic feet”40.  
   
Thus the flow in the flood year almost doubled what was considered to be the normal 
flow of the river. This illustrates the somewhat arbitrary nature of the water allocations 
that took place in the catchment in its early years. In a similar case on the Hex River in 
Rustenburg District held in 1920, the Judge had to rely on eyewitness accounts of the 
strength of the river due to the lack of data41. Not only were the allocations of water that 
                                                 
39  Very little activity took place in the Department during the war years, and the 1914 report was written  
after the war. By the time the case was held there were thirteen years of statistics on which a  
judgement could be based.  
40  Department of Irrigation (1914): Report of the Director of Irrigation, p. 6. Report in Government  
Archives, University f the Witwatersrand. 
41  Transvaal Water Court Case no. 60, applic.tion by R.F. Camphor for the research establishment and  
registration of rights to water along the Hex River. Pretoria: State Archives.  
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farmers received as a result of these cases resultantly arbitrary, but subsequent 
development of water resources in the catchment was similarly based on a weak 
statistical base. The Hartbeespoort dam, which is the largest dam in the catchment, was 
in this sense an experimental piece of technology. There was some controversy over the 
height of the dam wall, but the Director of Irrigation wished to press ahead with the 
project and commented that: 
 
“In deciding now upon a particular height of dam we are practically committing ourselves for all time. 
To wait till sufficient data were available to design the works with the fullest assurance that the 
dimensions adopted would give a maximum of economy and efficiency would mean shelving the 
project indefinitely, as many years of further gauging would be necessary. We have at present the 
results of 91/2 years accurate gauging of the flow, which includes very extreme years of drought and 
wetness, such as 1907-1908 and 1908-9, and I consider we are justified now in fixing the essential 
dimensions of this large storage dam”42.    
 
The essential dimensions of this dam had however not been fixed – amongst other 
things, the importation of water from the Vaal river catchment strongly increased the 
amount of water flowing into the dam, and in 1970 the crest of the dam was raised by 
2,44m by adding crest gates onto its spillway, increasing its capacity by some 20%43.   
Before major storage works had been constructed in the catchment, therefore, the 
land had been irrigated by means of a range of technical interventions in the course of 
the public streams in the catchment, and in accordance with allocations of the Transvaal 
Water Court44. However after the First World War construction of major storage works 
started in earnest, which strongly affected the overall allocation of water, as it was now 
possible to allocate not only the normal flow of a river but also its surplus flow. The 
Hartbeesport Dam was constructed as part of the Hartbeespoort Irrigation Scheme, a 
government water scheme that served as a job creating scheme for impoverished whites 
returning from the war. It also served as means to consolidate colonial rule, as the black 
communities living on the western bank of the Crocodile River in the command area of 
the scheme were removed to land situated further west. While land belonging to white 
farmers on the east bank was acquired for the scheme by direct purchase, the ‘Native 
lands’ were ‘exchanged’ for more arid land45. Thus the increasing inequalities in access 
to land between white and black farmers had a correlate in increasing the inequalities in 
access to water. To add insult to injury, paid construction work on the site was only 
allocated to whites. Through this very direct process, water in the catchment was locked 
into the service of the white minority, while the black population was physically 
removed from ready access to water sources. Thus distributional scarcity became a key 
element of water scarcity in the catchment. 
                                                 
42  Department of Irrigation (1914) Op. Cit, p. 6. 
43  DWAF pamphlet (undated): Hartbeespoort Dam and De Beer. Pretoria: DWAF 
44  The construction of diversion weirs and digging of irrigation furrows went hand in hand with the  
removal of indigenous vegetation from the land in preparation for ploughing and sowing. Thus, on a  
very small scale, began the transformation of land use in the catchment that was ultimately to lead to  
the destabilisation of the rivers that we witness today.    
45  Department of Irrigation (1914) Op. Cit, p. 68, 71. 
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Irrigation development in the catchment increased sharply in the first decades of the 
twentieth century. However, after 1930 the rate of expansion slowed somewhat, and 
reflected a linear rather than exponential growth pattern. Before the advent of dams, 
riparians along the Crocodile itself had, through extremely hard manual labour and 
unassisted by the government, brought some 2000 Ha under irrigation46.47. As time went 
on, government irrigation schemes began to join the still expanding private initiative, 
and a few irrigation boards were established. By 1920, the catchment as a whole had a 
total of 15 924 ha under irrigation, of which a full 92% was the result of private 
initiative. By 1940 the total irrigated area had more than doubled to 34 680 ha, and the 
percentage of privately managed irrigated land in the catchment had dropped to 44%48. 
Since that time the total irrigated area in the catchment had almost doubled again to 
some 60 000ha, but the proportions of land area under irrigation in government water 
schemes as against that under private irrigation have changed again. Since 1940 the 
irrigated area in government water schemes has remained relatively constant while the 
irrigated area on privately irrigated land has increased steadily, profiting from the 
increased return flows from the urban areas in the south of the catchment49. At present 
there are five government water schemes in operation in the catchment, and although 
these schemes serve a large area, private irrigation accounts for some 65% of the land 
under irrigation in the catchment50.        
In the catchment as a whole, little terracing of agricultural land has taken place and 
irrigation takes place in the valley floors rather than on hillsides. The average annual 
water consumption of the irrigation sector in the catchment is 480 million cubic metres, 
or 87% of the catchment’s Mean Annual Runoff (MAR), supplying some 60 000ha of 
land. This average water supply figure however smoothes over large seasonal, regional 
and inter-annual differences in consumption, as some areas are more arid than others 
and less irrigation water is used in wet years or in wet periods of the year. In general the 
western and northern areas of the catchment are drier and have higher evaporation rates. 
Thus more irrigation water is needed for the same level of agricultural production in the 
lower Crocodile than in the upper Crocodile, and the same applies to the Elands River 
relative to the Pienaars River.   
In view of the fact that on average only 62% of South Africa’s MAR can practically 
be exploited, the Crocodile’s irrigation sector on its own is consuming in excess of the 
exploitable water resources of the catchment. 79% of this consumption takes place 
                                                 
46  For instance De Beer, quoted in note 35 above, mentions that in digging the Die Kroon furrow,  
farmers occasionally came across large rocks which could not be removed given the technology and  
resources at their disposal. These rocks were worn down by lighting fires under them and, when they  
were well heated, pouring cold water on them, cracking the rock. This exhausting process needs to be  
placed against the background of the quantum leap in irrigation development that was enabled when  
the state moved in to build dams. The Hartbeespoort canal serves 13 361 ha of land.   
47  DWAF pamphlet: Hartbeespoort Dam, and De Beer, Op. Cit.  
48  The remainder is broken down into 11% irrigation aboard and 45% government water schemes 
49  See DWAF (1991): Krokodilrivier (Wes-Transvaal) Opvanggebiedstudie. Op. Cit, figure 2. 
50  This is based on a breakdown in the 2001 Situation Assessment carried out for the catchment which  
shows water consumption per category. It is further based on the assumption that 12 500 m³ are  
required per hectare per annum. This slants the statistics in favour of private irrigated land because  
state water schemes are less water efficient than private irrigation schemes.  
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within the Crocodile River channel itself, while 8% is accounted for by the Elands River 
and 13% by the Pienaars River. Large areas of the main river channels have been 
proclaimed as state water control areas, in which the use of water is subject to state 
licensing. These areas generally stretch up to ten kilometres on either side of the main 
river channel and thus contain most of the areas that can be practically utilised for 
irrigation purposes. They also generally lead up to a major dam in the area, i.e. they 
serve to protect the water resources feeding into which the dam. Lastly, they tend to 
apply to north-western regions of sub-catchments as well as in the main river channel of 
the Crocodile, i.e. they protect the bulk of the water resource as well as protecting the 
resources most prone to drought and evaporation51.       
Irrigation development within the catchment tends to fall into three different 
categories, each with their own associated dynamics. These are government irrigation 
schemes, irrigation boards and private irrigation. Government irrigation schemes are in 
essence irrigation schemes whose management lies with the government. Many such 
schemes were developed between the First and Second World Wars as public works 
schemes designed to alleviate poverty among white South Africans. The waterworks in 
these schemes were thus constructed and maintained by the government, and water 
supplies to them were in the past subsidised to the point at which payment did not only 
not cover the cost of construction of the works, but also did not cover much more than 
30% of the annual operation and maintenance costs. By 1970 a Commission of Enquiry 
in Water Matters declared that this situation was untenable in view of the rising scarcity 
of water, and that water prices should be raised to at least cover operation and 
maintenance costs 52 . Secondly, Irrigation Boards are farmer-controlled irrigation 
schemes which may have been constructed using exclusively private capital but which 
may also have made use of government irrigation development subsidies. The Irrigation 
Boards were statutory bodies run by a management committee elected from the group of 
farmers on the scheme itself, and tasked with overseeing water distribution and rate 
collection. Thirdly, private irrigation is irrigation that takes place on individual farms 
without reference to a government or private irrigation management body.  
 
Bophutatswana  
The third area of importance in the catchment is the area which, in the past, fell within 
the former homeland of Bophutatswana. Although the area has of course been 
reincorporated into South Africa, and although the lines separating the area from white 
commercial irrigation areas or urban areas may be more blurred than they were in the 
past, there is still much reason to treat the area as an entity in itself. The legacy of 
colonialism followed by apartheid is such that it is still here that economic 
marginalisation is concentrated, and where an entirely different environmental crisis is 
unfolding to that in the urban areas. Thus some 70% of South Africa’s poor live in the 
                                                 
51  Thus the water control areas lie in the north west of the upper Crocodile sub-catchment, the upper  
catchment area of the Hex river tributary of the Eland, and the main channel of the lower Crocodile  
where evaporation is high.  
52  See DWAF (1986): Management of the Water Resources of South Africa, ch. 1 pp. 10, 29, 33. 
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former homelands, despite the fact that these areas account for only 50% of the 
country’s population. In the ex-Bophutatswana area, the poverty rate is 67%53.   
Bophutatswana was created as part and parcel of ‘separate development’ or 
apartheid policy implemented by the National Party which came into power in 1948 
and remained in power until 1994. Apartheid created a set of separate territories, each 
with their own administrations, by consolidating its Native Reserves and Tribal Trust 
Lands, and by designating to each black South African a ‘citizenship‘ of one of these 
‘nations’. In 1913 the Natives Land Act, otherwise known as the 1913 Land Act, 
officially declared the overwhelming proportion of South Africa's land area to be out of 
bounds to potential black landowners, restricting them to so-called Native Reserves. 
These areas were generally marginal lands located outside the main centres of 
production. The Act restricted the ownership and leasing of land by Africans to 
‘homelands’ or ‘native reserves’ which by 1936 totalled about 6.21 million hectares, or 
13.8% of the national land area54. This move effectively placed 86.2% of the country’s 
land under the control of 6% of the country’s population (i.e. the white minority). By 
contrast, some 50% of the country’s population was forced to reside in the 
impoverished homelands, to which millions were forcibly removed during the apartheid 
period. Ostensibly, Bophutatswana was a homeland for North Sotho speaking peoples, 
although in practice there was no clear separation between the ethnic categories that the 
government had created. As part of the consolidation, black farmers who had bought 
land in areas that the apartheid government had designated as ‘white’ were expropriated 
and (forcibly) relocated to one of Bophuthatswana’s territories. However, this 
consolidation did not result in one clearly identifiable piece of land but in a scattering of 
five areas located in the North West of the Country in the (then) Northern Cape and 
Transvaal provinces. As shown by annexure 1, two of these chunks of land are located 
within the catchment, of which the eastern chunk lies within the catchment and the 
western chunk extends into the Marico River catchment. Bophutatswana was not the 
poorest homeland – these were concentrated in the Northern Province and Eastern Cape 
Province – as it ranks 6th richest of the 10 homelands. Nevertheless, it is an area in 
which poverty in the catchment is highly concentrated.    
In Bophutatswana, because of the absence of major storage works and because of its 
location outside well watered areas, most of the population was dependent on 
groundwater supplies. In a rather haphazard fashion, some settlements had been 
provided with boreholes while others had not. The provision of water supplies had for 
many years been the responsibility of the homeland administration in Mmabatho on the 
border with Botswana:  
 
                                                 
53  This statistic uses a relative poverty indicator, i.e. ‘poor’ means the poorest 40% of South African  
 households. Drawn from: SALDRU (1995): Key Indicators of Poverty in South Africa. University of  
Cape Town: Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, pg 11. 
 
54  From Turner, S and Ibsen, H (2000): Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa. A status report.  
Bellville: University of the Western Cape Programme for land and Agrarian Studies research report no.  
6. 
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“The Department of Water Affairs (Bophutatswana) is responsible for the provision of water supplies 
countrywide and the Bophutatswana Water Authority for the maintenance of schemes. The rural areas 
mainly depend on groundwater supply schemes. These consist of boreholes equipped with windmills, 
diesel or electric pumps, and hand pumps. Some regional schemes are in the process of being 
implemented and few rural areas have piped water. Construction, operation and maintenance costs 
have been met by the government although in some areas the communities have contributed labour 
and pay a nominal amount for fuel. About 60% of the rural population has access to a reasonable 
water supply”55.  
 
The cup, being half full, was also half empty: while 60% of the population may have 
had access to a ‘reasonable’ water supply, this meant that 40% of the population did not 
have sufficient access, in an area characterised by low and erratic rainfall and an 
absence of surface water resources. In addition, of course, this ‘reasonable’ water 
supply was for domestic purposes only, i.e. with the exception of a number of farming 
projects financed by the homeland government, the local population was not supplied 
with a quota of water for production. Thirdly, the administration of water projects was 
not in the hands of local village water committees but was vested in the Bophutatswana 
Water Authority. There was little incentive to maintain schemes, and such schemes as 
existed were maintained by a remote authority in Mmabatho. In 1992, a severe drought 
crippled the rural areas of South and indeed Southern Africa, resulting in a strong drop 
in groundwater tables in the North West Province56. As a result, many rural water 
supply schemes failed in this year leading to severe water shortages57. This event 
illustrates the vulnerability of the rural population in this area of the catchment: while 
the water security of urban residents is high and is related to surface water systems, the 
water security of the rural population is low and is related to the functioning of 
groundwater systems. A notable exception to this rule exists in the Zeerust area, where a 
large underground aquifer provides a stable source of water. However the rate of 
recharge of this aquifer is difficult to estimate, especially given the rapid changes on the 
surface of the catchment as a result of which infiltration rates are also changing.        
The structural deprivation of the Bophutatswana area was laid down in the 1977 
IDCOM report on the division of water between South Africa and the homelands. This 
report rather contorted the rules of the internationally agreed Helsinki declaration and 
proposed a distribution that was highly in favour of white residential and commercial 
areas. The formula calculated the average use per capita in any one sub-catchment area 
and used this as the basis for the allocation of water. Thus a homeland would in 
principle receive water in proportion to the land area in occupied in any one catchment. 
However the method of water division also declared that: 
 
“It was not considered practicable to return water from lower-lying areas to higher-lying areas and 
because the lower lying areas are often dependent on water originating from the upper portion of the 
catchment area”58.  
                                                 
55  WRC (1994): Development of Drought Response Policy Options for the Cost Effective Provision of  
Water Supply to Rural Communities Subject to Recurring Droughts. Pretoria: WRC, p. 16; 
56  I.e. also in Bophutatswana, which was located partly in this province. 
57  See Vogel, C. (2001): Water in a Thirsty Land. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand.  
58  IDCOM (1977): Report of the Interdepartmental Committee Concerning the Division of Water  
between the Black States, the remainder of the Republic of South Africa and the Republics of  
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This formulation is rather tautological if consideration is given to the fact that access to 
water resources was a prime consideration in the demarcation of the homelands in the 
first place: as can be seen from the map of the Crocodile river catchment, the border of 
Bophutatswana neatly avoided all major water sources in the catchment as well as major 
irrigation developments, and much of the shape of the border is in fact explained by 
factoring in white residential and irrigation areas on the other side of the border. 
Bophutatswana lay upstream of white South Africa and it was not considered 
practicable to return water to the higher lying areas. By contrast, during the apartheid 
period in which the report was written, it was considered practicable to forcibly remove 
black people from white farms and residential areas and drop them off in 
Bophutatswana, often without access to even a natural source of water. As if this were 
not enough, the report added that:  
 
“Where there are surpluses in the higher-lying sub-catchment areas, a portion thereof is allowed to 
flow down the river where it will be possible to improve the allocations to lower-lying sub-catchment 
areas within the prescribed limits”59.   
 
For Bophutatswana, the report added that  
 
“The water which is […] due to Bophutatswana is only the water available from the Limpopo 
catchment area and does not include water which is imported from the Vaal river area.”60 
 
This strengthened the idea that the main river channels, which carried the imported 
water, could not be allocated to the homelands. However the spatial contradictions of 
apartheid were such that water from the Vaal River was supplied directly to Rustenburg, 
on the border of Bophutatswana, by Rand Water board. This supply included a pipeline 
to Rustenburg’s black townships, a bulk supply which was duly added to 
Bophuthatswana’s allocation. Although according to the above principles 
Bophutatswana had no right to this water, it would have been highly illogical to stop the 
bulk supply pipe in the white townships and supply the black townships in the area from 
an independent source located in Bophutatswana. Thus Rand Water sold bulk water to 
Bophutatswana, under an arrangement agreed upon by a joint technical commission 
consisting of representatives from both “countries”.  
The result of these formulae were that Bophutatswana as a whole received an 
allocation of 150 cubic metres of water per capita per annum, while white South Africa 
received an allocation of 300 cubic metres of water per capita per annum. The resultant 
allocation was 596 million cubic metres per annum for white South Africa and 75 
million cubic metres for Bophutatswana61. Again, this excluded the water imported into 
the catchment from the Vaal, which was almost exclusively allocated to white RSA.     
                                                                                                                                               
Bophutatswana and Transkei. Pretoria: Government Printer, p. 15.  
59  Ibid, p. 16.  
60  Ibid, p. 114. 
61  Ibid, pp. 129-130. Note that the first figures relate to Bophutatswana as a whole and not just the  
portion located in the Crocodile. Note also that the second figures are for all tributaries of the  
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While the cities in the catchment consume large amounts of water and affect the 
overall quality of water in the catchment, the former homeland areas are degraded as a 
result of the endemic poverty. Natural resources of many kinds have been placed under 
stress as a result of overpopulation. Key issues here are the interlinked problems of 
deforestation and erosion. Because the poor are predominantly reliant upon wood as an 
energy source, the harvesting of wood resources for cooking and warmth is an 
important activity in many rural areas. However the increasing population density that is 
the result of both a natural increase in the population and the overcrowding of the 
homeland areas has placed a burden upon the bushland in the catchment. In turn, land 
denudation has given rise to soil erosion, as a result of which the silt levels in rivers and 
streams are gradually increasing over time. Over the long term, this affects the storage 
capacity of the dams in the catchment. Land cover and land use maps of the catchment 
area show that the overwhelming proportion of the former homeland is degraded forest, 
woodland, thicket, bushland or grassland. The environmental deterioration is such that 
the map of the homeland is entirely congruent with the degraded area. Notable 
exceptions are two nature reserves, the Pilanesberg and Borakalala Nature reserves; 
each situated in the former homeland and the first the site of Sun City. Within the 
homeland are, the western portion contains a large belt from west to east of degraded 
thicket and bushland, while about 40% of the eastern portion of the homeland consists 
of degraded forest and woodland. Donga’s and sheet erosion scars are either within or 
downstream of the homeland areas, with a strong concentration to the north of the 
Pilanesberg62.      
 
Water supply development in the catchment  
In the section above, some aspects of the overall water supply situation in the catchment 
have been already been highlighted in the context of the water management issues faced 
in each of the three main zones found in the catchment. The purpose of this section is to 
paint a picture of the main sources of water supply in the catchment that feed into these 
three zones.   
At its most basic level, development of water supply in the catchment was, as has 
been seen, originally the result of white commercial agricultural development in the 
area. In the first instance this development was small scale and locally financed, either 
by individual farmers at their own initiative and expense or by a group of farmers 
working together and pooling their resources. In the second instance this development 
was spurred on by the dam building activities of the Department of Irrigation, which led 
to a spate of dam building efforts in the catchment in the first three decades of the 
twentieth century. As a result, the catchment had dams in Buffelspoort, Hartbeespoort, 
Rietvlei, Olifantsnek, Lindleyspoort, Bospoort, Bon Accord, and Bischoffs (see table 
5.2 below). Secondly, going hand in hand with this development of white commercial 
irrigation was the capture of the strategic water resources of the catchment for the 
benefit of these interests. The flipside in the catchment was the gradual consolidation of 
                                                                                                                                               
Limpopo system and not just the Crocodile.   
62  See annexure II. 
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Native Reserves, leading eventually to the creation of a zone of deprivation located 
outside the main river channels inside Bophutatswana, where a strong dependence was 
created on such groundwater sources as were available.  
 
Table 5.2 
 Storage dams in the Crocodile River catchment63  
Sub-catchment Name of Dam Capacity/ 
million m³ 
Completion Purpose 
Upper Crocodile Buffelspoort 10.3 1935 Irrigation 
 Roodekoppies 102.6 1984 Irrigation 
 Hartbeespoort 198 1923 Irrigation 
 Rietvlei 12.2 1933 Domestic/Irrigation
Elands Koster 11.8 1964 Domestic/Irrigation
 Olifantsnek 13.7 1928 Irrigation 
 Lindleyspoort 14.4 1934 Irrigation 
 Bospoort 18.3 1933 Irrigation 
 Mankwe 4.0 1980 Domestic 
 Vaalkop 55.3 1972 Domestic/Irrigation
Apies/Pienaars Bon Accord 4.2 1925 Irrigation 
 Roodeplat 43.5 1959 Domestic/Irrigation
 Klipvoor 42.3 1970 Irrigation 
 Bischoffs 3.5 1915 - 
 Leeukraal 0.6 1980 Domestic 
 Nooitgedacht 1,5 1967 Domestic 
 Warmbaths 8,5 1964, 1982 Domestic 
Lower Crocodile Bierspruit 3.6 1960 Mining 
 
Thirdly, the explosive growth of urban development along the Witwatersrand and the 
continuous water shortages experienced in this upper area of the catchment led to the 
importation of water from the Vaal River system from 1923 onwards. In turn, the 
importation of water into the catchment meant that further irrigation development could 
be contemplated, drawing on the return flows from the urban areas in the upper reaches 
of the catchment. This meant that a new spate of dam building efforts could be 
contemplated, and from 1959 onwards there was a second wave of dam building in the 
area.  
Fourth, the continuous growth of water demand in the catchment and the economic 
importance of the catchment at a national level meant that more inter-basin transfer 
schemes were developed across the country, linking the Crocodile to a series of 
catchments on the eastern escarpment of the country by means of their importation into 
the Vaal River system.       
A crucial mediating role in the development of the water resources of the catchment 
was thus played by the growth of the Witwatersrand. The water supply problems and 
                                                 
63  Drawn from DWAF (2001): Crocodile Marico WMA Situation Assessment, section 4.3.1. 
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subsequent solutions of this area had an impact on areas as far as 400 km away to the 
East and 280 km away to the North West. As a result, it is well worth looking at the 
history of water supply on the Witwatersrand.  
Phases of scarcity on the Witwatersrand 
In 1886 the Witwatersrand was sparsely settled by white farmers following the colonial 
annexation of the Transvaal. The response to (agricultural and domestic) water demand 
at the time was the construction of farm dams and the exploitation of the many springs 
that existed along the ridge.  
 
Table 5.3 
Population growth in Johannesburg - the early years64 
Date  Population 
1887 3000 
1889 100 000 
1904 270 317 
1911 496 331 
1922 573 662 
1929 617 325 
 
 Gold was discovered on the Witwatersrand in 1886, leading to a rapid change in the 
predominantly rural character of the area. Johannesburg is a typical ‘gold rush’ town: its 
growth, sustained by the massive gold deposits beneath its surface, has been spectacular 
from the start. The table below shows some statistics of population growth.  
 As the table above shows, the city’s population grew to from 3000 to 100 000 in the 
second two years of the city’s existence. While the city had obvious and great economic 
potential, presently holding close to 51% of the world’s known gold reserves on the 
Great Reef65, its geographical location was unique in world terms, being situated on top 
of a ridge, at the southern top of the Crocodile river catchment, and 45 km from the 
nearest river, with only a few farm springs available for water resource development. 
With the possible exception of the ancient Inca capital of Macchu Picchu, most cities 
are located on a river, by a lake, or at the estuary of a river. Johannesburg, however, was 
not an agricultural capital but a mining town: water was needed for production from the 
start.  
 The first gold diggers drew their water from the Fordsburg creek, which is now just 
west of the central business district. Laburn states that: 
 
“From the very beginning of the Witwatersrand, from the first tent pitched, the first adit opened, the 
first shaft sunk and the first ounce of gold extracted, water has been a problem, a problem of shortage 
and not abundance”66. 
                                                 
64  Rand Water Board, (undated, probably 1963): 60 Years of meeting a demand. 
65  DWAF (1986): Op Cit, p. 2.14. 
66  Laburn, P.J. (1970): An historical overview of the water supply of the Witwatersrand. Johannesburg:  
Rand Water Board. WITS.  
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There were two important springs in Johannesburg at the time - the Natalspruit on what 
is now End Street, Doornfontein, and another, which I presume to be the Westdene 
spruit, in what is now the suburb of Westdene67. These two springs probably had a 
capacity of a mere 1 125 m³/day, stretched to supply 100 000 residents in 188968. At the 
time, water was an open access resource, and prospectors could use water from these 
springs for free. A lively water trade opened up, with small scale entrepreneurs carting 
water to the first camps in the area and selling it by the bucketful. However just as there 
was a scramble for gold, there was also a scramble for water, and with a growing 
population, the few undeveloped springs that existed on the ridge could not meet the 
rapidly growing demand. 
 One example of the conditions faced by the prospectors and some evidence of the 
water scarcity that prevailed at the time is provided by the concession granted to an 
entrepreneur by the name of J.B.Robinson, who intended to construct a tramway from 
Langlaagte on the main gold reef in central Johannesburg (just south of Brixton), 27 km 
to the South West, to Klipfontein on the Klip river, to enable diggers to crush their stone 
at this distance from Johannesburg69.  
 The initial anarchy soon made way for institutional development around the 
management of water. A Diggers’ Committee was established, which began to submit 
claims to the government in Pretoria for the development of urban services and the 
recognition of Johannesburg as a Municipality. In response to this, and mirroring 
somewhat the developments in post-apartheid Johannesburg, the government issued 
concessions to private contractors for the provision of services in the city70.   
 Into this ready made market sprang a number of new companies. In 1888 the first 
concessionary, the Johannesburg Water Works Company, was established. The first 
water resource development for the city took place in that same year and under their 
auspices: the Doornfontein springs were dammed and a reservoir was constructed. The 
company developed (dammed) a number of existing springs in Doornfontein and Berea 
and constructed a reservoir on top of the ridge on the Doornfontein farm where the 
springs arose71. However 1889 was a drought year, so that the reservoir filled slowly, 
and the company was forced to turn its taps off for three hours a day to ration supplies. 
It thus became clear by 1889 that this first water reservoir was inadequate, and by 1889, 
the company was looking to secure additional water rights from farmers in the area. 
Similar opportunities were developed along the Rand by two other companies, one 
working from farm dams to the north of the ridge and another developing farm water 
between Johannesburg and current day Soweto (in Ormonde). The private companies 
                                                 
67  Both the Rand Water 1964 60-year retrospective report and Laburn’s 1970 lecture mention a spring on  
the grounds of a General Hospital. There are no fewer than 172 hospitals in Johannesburg, leaving a  
lot of room for doubt on the location of this spring, but J.G. Strydom Hospital in Westdene is  
definitely known in JHB as ‘the General Hospital’, and it is located on a spring. 
68  The Waterworks Company that developed these springs provided a supply equal to this quantity.  
Whether the Westdene spring is included in this calculation is not clear. 
69  Laburn, P.J. Op. Cit.  
70  Van Rensburg (1986): Johannesburg: One Hundred Years. Johannesburg: Van Rensburg, 24, 36, 252- 
3  
71  Rand Water (1963): Op Cit. The reservoir is the Yeoville Reservoir, which still stands today.   
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provided significant discounts to bulk users, with more than quadruple the price being 
charged to small (domestic) users72. 
 Water Companies continued to spring up in various confined localities, such as the 
Zuurbekom Water Company on the farm Zuurbekom, using groundwater close to the 
origin of the abovementioned Klip River, a tributary of the Vaal. The Johannesburg 
Water Works Company bought out the Zuurbekom Company’s rights to this water and 
installed a pumping station at Zuurbekom which enabled transport of this water to 
Johannesburg. Zuurbekom is still in operation today: it pumped 7.83 megalitres a day to 
Johannesburg in 199673. The Zuurbekom source was powerful and steady and was 
located, as stated, some 27 km from Johannesburg, i.e. it involved development of 
sources at a significant remove from the demand centre as well as the construction of 
bulk supply capacity over this distance74.  
 It seems somewhat inevitable that in a situation in which mines were closing down 
for lack of processing water and in which private water companies were springing up, 
competing for limited supplies, public bodies would step in to regulate and secure 
supplies for the general good. This is what happened in the Greater Johannesburg 
municipal area, mirroring a general development in the country through time (over 
many decades) from private control over water to public control. On a number of fronts, 
public water provision was felt to be needed in the area. Firstly, private companies such 
as the Johannesburg Waterworks Company had to incur major investments to develop 
water sources and reticulate supplies into the city, and the aforementioned company ran 
at a loss until it was taken over by another entrepreneur. Secondly, the price of water 
was pegged at a level intended for profit, and residents felt the prices to be exorbitant. 
Third, the major importance of the area in economic terms and the pitiful water supplies 
to the area required a “scheme for the creation of an unfailing water supply for the Rand 
and the mines, taking into consideration future requirements” 75 . Thus through the 
concession system the continuity of water supply was made dependent upon market 
forces, and the embryonic municipal council of Johannesburg advocated the creation of 
a public body.  In 1899 Rand Mines Limited joined hands with Consolidated Goldfields 
of South Africa Limited and Messrs. S. Neumann & Co. in an effort to set up a 
collective drive for secure water supplies. On the initiative of the Municipal Council, a 
Witwatersrand Water Supply Commission was appointed, which in 1902 recommended 
the establishment of a Water Board (to be called Rand Water Board), based on the not-
for-profit principle and setting uniform rates along its supply line. The Rand Water 
Board was gazetted in 1903 and was operational by 1905, giving birth to what is now 
the giant of South Africa’s bulk suppliers, or water boards. Its mission of “preparing a 
scheme for an unfailing water supply for the Rand” from its first report in 1906 was to 
prove more daunting than this simple mission statement suggests, as each successive 
scheme that was developed to supply water to the area soon ran out of capacity to meet 
the exponential growth in water demand that took place in the region. The Johannesburg 
                                                 
72  Laburn, P.J. (1970): Rand Water Board (1963), Op. Cit. 
73  Rand Water (1996): Annual Report. Johannesburg: Rand Water. 
74  Laburn, P.J. (1970): Rand Water Board (1963), Op. Cit. 
75  Rand Water (1906): [first] Report of the Rand Water Board to the Colonial Secretary of the Transvaal.   
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Water Supply Commission that hade suggested the creation of Rand Water had also 
suggested that the Board should be empowered: 
 
“To acquire, either by voluntary agreement or by compulsory expropriation under arbitration, such 
water sources, sites for water boring, protective areas, dams or reservoirs, and such existing 
undertakings for the supply of water as it may deem fit”76  
 
Although Rand Water did purchase a range of farms which had water rights and springs 
or farm dams which yielded strong and dependable supplies, the prerogative of dam 
ownership and management remained with government, and Rand Water obtained 
allocations of water from government dams for its urban supply purposes that were 
balanced with other needs supplied from those dams.   
 The first water supply scheme of importance was a groundwater source located at the 
farm of Zuurbekom. Its supply was so powerful that it held the promise of supplying all 
of Johannesburg’s needs for some time to come – providing 7.83 Mega litres per day. 
This scheme provided welcome relief to a water starved city and provided the 
foundation upon which Rand Water could begin to construct its bulk supply network. 
This network soon expanded beyond Johannesburg: in the 1910-1911 financial year, its 
supply line provided water to six more municipalities. While Johannesburg was 
therefore the initial raison d’être for the water board, the economic and demographic 
development that took place in the region was such that the board rapidly took on a 
regional water supply function. As it grew and extended its sources of supply, 
Johannesburg’s consumption as a percentage of total bulk water sales declined. Other 
metropoli sprouted and grew in the area, and the Witwatersrand developed into an urban 
conglomerate. From the development of the Zuurbekom scheme onwards, supply 
increased exponentially – while Zuurbekom provided 7.83 mega litres per day in 1903, 
90 years later Rand Water sold 2648 million mega litres or 2.6 trillion litres per day 
from a range of interlinked schemes stretching over a distance of 400 km.  
 Table 5.4 below shows the development of water demand in what was to become the 
PWV area. As can be seen, the water demand in 1930 of 60.2 Mega litres per day was 
already far in excess of the Zuurbekom scheme’s capacity. And from 1930 onwards, the 
compound growth continued to the present day, being projected to continue to grow 
exponentially in the future. 
At the beginning of Rand Water Board’s financial year on the 1st of April 1912, the total 
water supply available to the board was some 36 Ml/day (13 million cubic metres per 
annum) , an amount which 
 
“Was then little more than sufficient to meet the domestic and health requirements of the Board’s 
consumers”77. 
 
Rand Water then sent two successive deputations to Cabinet in Cape Town, requesting 
permission to abstract 9 mega litres a day from a disused mine shaft on the 
                                                 
76  Rand Water (1906): Op Cit.  
77  Rand Water Board (1913): Annual Report. Johannesburg: Rand Water, p. 2 
 187
Gemsbokfontein property of the Western Rand Estates, Limited company. The 
government at the time turned down both requests on the basis that it would not 
sanction the use of water which could affect the area of supply of the Klip and Mooi 
rivers, stating a particular concern for the situation of farmers in these valleys. The then 
Dept. of Irrigation was, as the name suggests, primarily concerned with water needs for 
irrigation, and secondly, water law was at the time slanted against public ownership of 
water. In this regard it is no surprise that this decision was taken.  
 It was then that the Board commissioned an investigation into all possible schemes, 
spread over various catchments, within a radius of 80 km of Johannesburg. All such 
schemes were however limited in their supply capacity and could not guarantee a supply 
of more than 90 Ml/d. The Board already recognised that this would not be sufficient in 
the long term. Eyes were therefore cast on the Vaal River, at which four possible sites 
had been identified for the construction of a barrage78. Of the possibilities, the Linequee 
scheme was seen to be the least cost solution in view of its relative proximity to 
Johannesburg79.  
 
Table 5.4 
Annual water demand in PWV complex80 
Year Annual water demand in 
PWV in Megalitres / day  
Water sold to Johannesburg in 
Megalitres / day 
1930  60.3 30,067 
1935  112.3 46,761 
1940  244.08  71,986 
1945  329.10 106,940 
1950  447.02 140,071 
1955  581.40 167,143 
1960  781.60 227,950 
1965  1102.47 301,513 
1970  1190.23 326,596 
1975  1576.92 458,402 
1980  2130.90 554,411 
1985  1837.45 462,390 
1990  2388.69 595,753 
1995  3329.35 604,458  
2000  4467.48  -  
2005   -  -  
 
To the west lies the Marico River catchment, which together with the Crocodile system 
forms one of the nineteen ‘Water Management Areas’ that are the basis of South 
                                                 
78  A barrage is an artificial obstruction in a river.  
79  Rand Water Board (1914): Annual Report. Johannesburg: Rand Water, 1914. 
80  PWV stands for Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging complex, South Africa’s industrial heartland.  
 Sources: Source: adapted from McKenzie, R.S., (1994): Water Supply: a Concrete Challenge for the  
 New South Africa; Rand Water (1994): Annual Report. Johannesburg: Rand Water 
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Africa’s new catchment management system. The Crocodile and Marico catchments are 
physically separate from each other but will in future fall under the same management 
unit once the proposal for the creation of a Catchment Management Agency for the 
Crocodile-Marico system has been approved by the Minister. To the east of the 
Crocodile River basin lies the Olifants river basin, which also contributes to the 
Limpopo, but which drains eastwards and only joins the Limpopo inside Mozambique. 
The Olifants River is used very intensively, and it is linked to the Crocodile River 
catchment in that its water is used to cool the coal-fired power plants that supply the 
highly industrialised Crocodile area with its electricity. 
 The pumping distance to the top of the ridge, from where water could gravitate 
downwards into Johannesburg, would be some 56 km horizontally and some 600m 
vertically. Significantly, this was South Africa’s first inter-basin transfer scheme, 
connecting the Vaal River basin to that of the Crocodile. 
 The scheme was given the go-ahead in 1913 but had to be delayed on account of the 
First World War, and eventually reached completion in 1922. The barrage enabled new 
levels of water consumption, but by 1932 the Rand Water Board was already 
experiencing shortages and imposing restrictions on water consumers. Rand Water and 
the Department of Irrigation thereupon jointly investigated the construction of the Vaal 
dam, about 45 km upstream of the Vaal barrage as the crow flies, to supply water to 
irrigators downstream as well as to enhance the storage to which Rand Water had access. 
The dam was constructed in 1938 with a capacity of 998 million cubic metres. In 1955 
the dam wall (overflow portion) was raised by some 3 m, raising its capacity to 2 188 
million cubic metres., to cope with rising demand, and again in 1985 by 3 more metres, 
so that capacity was raised to 2 536 million cubic metres.  
 For many decades, the supply capacity of the Vaal dam set to rest the demand for 
further infrastructure development, although the dam wall was raised twice after its 
initial construction. However, the demand growth in the PWV- area was spectacular, as 
table 4.3 above shows. The table shows the water demand projections for Gauteng, and 
a comparison between the 1980 and projected 2010 demands reveals a 246% increase in 
demand, which is much higher than the aggregate national increase in demand.  
 With the construction of the Bloemhof dam in 1981, the Vaal River as a whole had 
reached optimum utilisation81. The catchment area of the river, being a major tributary 
of the Orange, is inside South Africa’s largest catchment and constitutes the country’s 
largest sub-catchment, but contributes only 7.8% of national Mean Annual Runoff82. 
Further development in the PWV area therefore meant that the water supplies of the 
Vaal River itself would have to be augmented by inter-basin transfers from catchments 
located on the Drakensberg escarpment to the east of the Vaal River. In this way, the 
water supplies of a range of catchments in the country would be linked to one another 
by means of inter-basin transfer systems supplying a very large area with water in a 
manner not dissimilar to an electricity grid. Institutionally, the level at which planning 
takes place leaps from the catchment level to the planning of the water needs of six 
catchments, and the Crocodile River catchment becomes but one demand centre whose 
                                                 
81  The Bloemhof dam lies some 265 km downstream of the Vaal Dam as the crow flies. 
82  DWAF (1997): Op. cit, DWAF (undated): Vaal River. Life Blood of a Nation. 
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water needs need to be accounted for in the overall delivery arrangements. Thus while 
water supply to PWV area remains a key priority, the supply area of this ‘water grid’ 
includes the coal-fired power generation plants on the Eastern Highveld, the 
petrochemical plants on the Eastern Highveld, mines in the area downstream of the 
PVW area, such as the Orange Free State Goldfields and Iron and Manganese mines in 
the Northern Cape, the town of Kimberley, several smaller towns, and some 62 000ha 
of irrigated land such as the Vaalharts Irrigation Scheme in the Northern Cape.  
 The construction of a water grid on this scale militates against the idea of managing 
water within the natural unit of the catchment, as the concept of catchment management 
proposes. Inter-basin transfers of water break down the natural barriers between 
catchments and create institutions devoted to the management of the resource at a much 
larger level of operation. DWAF describes the Vaal River supply system as follows:  
 
“All the water transfer schemes and dams within the system are managed as a single unit to obtain the 
most favourable water yield from the system. Water is transferred forward and backward between 
catchments to achieve this objective. Sophisticated computer models are used to calculate the risk of 
water restrictions and to operate the system accordingly. The Vaal River System is complex, which 
complicates the optimal utilisation of resources. For these purposes models were developed with 
which to analyse these complex systems and determine the best operating rules. They are also used to 
determine when the next augmentation projects should be built”83.   
  
This quote illustrates three very important institutional aspects of South African water 
resource management. First, as argued above, it illustrates the degree to which South 
African water resource management had transcended the catchment level long before 
the idea of catchment management came into sway as a possible tool for the 
optimisation of resource use. Secondly, this quote illustrates the way in which natural 
water systems can become interlinked through human agency and through a range of 
sophisticated technical interventions, whereupon water allocation becomes a function of 
planning within institutions rather than the result of natural endowments of certain areas. 
The water endowments of regions which for millions of years have been subject to 
climatic variations and the contours of catchments, have within the space of a few 
decades become subject to the outcome of computer models by technical specialists in 
the Department of Water Affairs at national level. Thirdly, the quote illustrates 
something of the disciplinary focus which water management had from the 1960’s to 
the 1980’s when the inter-basin transfer schemes were constructed. Water management 
in this period was very much the domain of civil engineers rather than that of, for 
instance, ecologists or social scientists, and the prevailing mind-set was technocratic in 
that rather than constructing interactive institutions consulting with civil society on 
matters of water allocation, water allocation was determined by a small group of 
technical specialists on the basis of criteria laid down by government planners, such as 
the concept of ‘assurance of supply’. This concept underlay the water allocation system 
used in the period. It meant that water demands in any one region were categorised 
according to priority, whereupon the assurance (expressed as a probability) with which 
these demands could be met became a key to the determination of the water delivery 
                                                 
83 Ibid.  
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system. The highest degree of assurance of supply was accorded to those users deemed 
to have the most important strategic value for the nation as a whole: Power generation, 
fuel production, industry and mining and essential primary uses such as basic domestic 
use and stock watering. It must be emphasised however that this ‘assurance of supply’ 
was ultimately a subjective criterion for allocation: irrigation water, which had enjoyed 
priority use after the promulgation of the 1912 Irrigation and Conservation of Waters 
Act, was now accorded inferior status relative to for instance the import substitution of 
fuel in the period in which South Africa was suffering from an oil boycott. Assurance of 
supply underlay the allocation system of the new water supply grid that was under 
construction in the northern half of the country.  
 The physical construction of a water grid began in 1969 with the Tugela-Vaal 
scheme, commencing a process of importation of water from the moist eastern 
catchments in the country.  
 The inter-basin schemes supplying the Vaal with extra water all make use of the 
basic topographical and climatological fact that the catchments draining the 
Drakensberg Mountains in an easterly direction are short, well watered and steep, 
draining the African plateau from a height of up to 3000 m above sea level down to sea 
level in just 150 km. On the other hand, water needs are highest in the shallower basins 
in the west of the country. By damming tributaries of east-bound rivers high up in the 
mountains and pumping this water into supply dams just over the ridge, the direction of 
flow of many rivers is reversed and water is stored for a maximum length of time in the 
cool mountains where evaporation is low (because of lower temperatures and a better 
relationship between dam volume and dam surface, i.e. deeper, narrower dams), before 
being released to augment the supplies of dams in the more arid areas.  
 The first such scheme was the Tugela-Vaal scheme, constructed in 1969. The Tugela 
was dammed at the Driel weir near the escarpment, and connected by means of a 38 km 
canal which enables water to be pumped a mere 90 m uphill near the Oliviershoek pass, 
into a balancing dam and on into the Sterkfontein dam on the Wilge river tributary of 
the Vaal. This transfer scheme is capable of delivering 20 cubic metres per second or 
173 Megalitres per day84.  
 The next such scheme was the Usutu-Vaal, operational since 1985 and initiated 
primarily to supply the Camden power station in Ermelo with water. Two dams were 
constructed on the main upper tributaries of the Usutu River and pumps installed to 
enable engineers to pump water over the watershed into a reservoir at Onverwacht, 
directly into the upper reaches of the Vaal. The Usutu -Vaal scheme can deliver 5 cubic 
metres per second or 43 Megalitres per day85. It doubles as an emergency scheme for 
the Vaal.  
 Following the Usutu-Vaal scheme, the Slang river scheme (Slang-Vaal) was 
developed, reaching completion in 1989. This scheme pumps water from the Zaaihoek 
dam on the Slang River into a tributary of the Vaal, and has a capacity of 3 cubic metres 
per second or 26 Ml/d.  
                                                 
84  DWAF undated: Vaal River. 
85  DWAF undated: Wateroordragskemas. 
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 Finally, the massive Lesotho Highland Water Project (LHWP) aims to develop 
Lesotho’s considerable water delivery capacity for export to South Africa as well as 
securing local water supplies and generating hydroelectricity. The scheme commenced 
in 1986 with the signing of a treaty between the two countries. The scheme envisages 
six large dams in Lesotho’s Maluti mountains, ultimately submerging 10% of the 
country’s land area and connected by means of pumping stations and delivery tunnels to 
deliver water to the Axle river south of Bethlehem in the Orange Free State, which 
flows into the Liebenbergsvlei river tributary of the Vaal (via the Wilge). The scheme 
encompasses four phases to be completed in 2020 with a total delivery capacity of 70 
cubic metres per second (605 Ml/d). In 1998 phase one became operational, with the fist 
18 cubic metres per second or 105 Ml/day flowing into the Vaal Dam. 
 Four inter-basin transfer schemes have thus been developed to augment the water 
supplies of the Vaal River, and this process has not yet reached completion. It cannot 
yet be said that water demand management is therefore an inevitable consequence of 
scarcity in the Vaal river basin: there is still room for supply to be further be augmented. 
However, there are moves in this direction from various quarters.  
 For one thing, re-use of water is a key feature of the Vaal River system: by the time 
the water of the Vaal flows over Augrabies falls in the west of the country, it has 
probably passed through many urban water supply systems, flowed over irrigated land, 
or cleansed crushed ore. For instance, in a process that is the inverse of that in the 
Crocodile, some 30% of the bulk allocation to Rand Water Board at the Vaal Dam 
flows back into the Vaal River as purified sewerage86. Similarly, return flows from 
other points of demand in the catchment augment supplies downstream, albeit at the 
cost of water quality.  
For another, inefficient water use is costly because the capital costs of augmentation 
schemes are reflected in water tariffs. An official at Rand Water Board once confided to 
me that RWB was in strong opposition to DWAF’s (uncritical) continuous search for 
new sources of supply. His argument was that in view of the history of the country 
massive inefficiencies in water usage had developed, so that a focus on efficiency could 
well reduce consumption sufficiently to avoid further infrastructure expansion for ten or 
more years. Boycotting of local authorities in the final apartheid years had led to the 
build-up of massive maintenance problems in many areas - Soweto, with three million 
inhabitants, is said to lose more than 50% of its water through leaky pipes. As a result 
Rand Water (Community Based Projects Division) has initiated an employment 
generation campaign whereby new employees from disadvantaged communities are 
trained to monitor, spot, report and repair leaks in the delivery system. The savings in 
water through this project more than cover the labour and training costs of the new 
employees. In purchasing raw water, Rand Water has to pay the present day cost of 
augmentation schemes to the Department of Water Affairs and is therefore 
understandably critical of the way (the cost) at which new supply schemes are 
developed87. 
                                                 
86  In the Crocodile the return flow actually increases the amount of water flowing through the catchment  
while in the Vaal River system, return flows merely serve to diminish losses. 
87  Interview with George Constantinidis, Rand Water, 1997 
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Box 5.1 
Scarcity and Water Pricing 
 In terms of chapter five of the National Water Act, Act no. 36 of 1998, the Minister may from 
time to time establish a water pricing strategy and set water use charges in order to fund the direct 
and related costs of water resource management, development and use. Such a Raw Water Pricing 
Strategy was gazetted on the 12th of November 1999, with far reaching implications for the 
emerging Catchment Management Agencies, and with particularly far reaching implications for 
the Crocodile-Marico WMA. As the custodian of so-called government water schemes, the 
Department historically had a sectoral approach to water pricing which included a subsidy on 
agricultural water use, the payment of the full cost of water by the urban/industrial sector, and an 
absence of pricing policy for forestry because this sector is rain-fed. Pricing was related to the 
historical capital cost of the existing dams – recovering some form of notional loan on the capital 
costs of a dam over a period of some four decades. In the agricultural sector tariffs were such that 
they did not even cover the operation and maintenance costs of schemes – thus the costs of 
operating and maintaining agricultural works were recovered from the revenues of water sold to 
the urban/industrial sector. The new water pricing strategy is based on the user pays principle in 
which all water use sectors pay for at least the operation and maintenance costs and part of the 
capital costs of government water schemes. Agricultural users must now also pay a refurbishment 
levy which enables irrigation schemes to be refurbished over the long term. However the lack of 
water availability has put an end to further expansion of irrigation schemes, unless through water 
demand management measures that enable more land to be cultivated for the same amount of 
water. Thus the cost of new irrigation schemes no longer enters into the calculation of water use 
charges. By contrast, previously disadvantaged ‘emerging farmers’ who establish a Water User 
Association will still be subsidized and need only pay the operation and maintenance costs of their 
schemes. Thus there is room for expansion of irrigation, but only in the developmental field and 
not in the realm of commercial water use. All water users in a water management area are now 
being registered to take stock of actual water use and to relate this to the cost of managing the 
water in this area. This extends beyond users who draw from government water schemes to 
include users who draw from private schemes or who may profit from catchment management 
activities in some way. Thus over and above the capital costs and operation and maintenance costs 
of government water schemes, a catchment management charge will be introduced into tariffs 
which carries the costs of the administration and planning of catchment management in a water 
management area. This means that the financial viability of a CMA is dependent on the consumer 
base, the volume of water being sold, and the unit cost of managing the resource in that particular 
area. It also means that where water resource management was previously financed through the 
tax base, it will henceforth to a large extent be financed from water sales. This development is in 
line with the overall intention to decentralise the institutions of water management and allow head 
office to withdraw from direct implementation but retain its core function of regulation. However, 
a significant complication arises in this financing system where the transfer of water between 
catchments is concerned. Bulk water users such as water boards are the institutions who bear the 
costs for the catchment management charge, which they then hand on to their clients by billing 
them. However in the case of the Crocodile Marico system about half of the water in the system is 
imported from other catchments and pumped into the catchment by Rand Water Board. Rand 
Water Board is paying a catchment management charge in the Vaal Catchment where it draws its 
water but financing this by charging users in the Crocodile system. This financing system 
therefore privileges water exporting catchments over water scarce catchments and in the case of 
the Crocodile Marico catchment means that the CMA must be financed from only half the water 
used in the catchment. This rather controversial policy issue is under review at the moment. 
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Implementing catchment management policy in the Crocodile River catchment  
While the sections above describe the main water resource management issues in the 
catchment as well as its water supply development, this section focuses on the 
institutional changes that have taken place within the catchment since 1994. Of the 19 
Water Management Areas in South Africa, the Crocodile-Marico WMA is one of the 
areas in the country in which progress in implementing a catchment management 
strategy has been the greatest88.  
To the west lies the Marico River catchment, which together with the Crocodile 
system forms one of the nineteen ‘Water Management Areas’ that are the basis of South 
Africa’s new catchment management system. The Crocodile and Marico catchments are 
physically separate from each other but will in future fall under the same management 
unit once the proposal for the creation of a Catchment Management Agency for the 
Crocodile-Marico system has been approved by the Minister. To the east of the 
Crocodile River basin lies the Olifants river basin, which also contributes to the 
Limpopo, but which drains eastwards and only joins the Limpopo inside Mozambique. 
The Olifants River is used very intensively, and it is linked to the Crocodile River 
catchment in that its water is used to cool the coal-fired power plants that supply the 
highly industrialised Crocodile area with its electricity. 
Changes in the regional offices before 1996 
The promulgation of the National Water Act (NWA) in August 1998 fundamentally 
changed the rules and the institutions that govern the allocation of and control over 
water. In its simplest form, the transition envisaged was one from the management of 
water resources in regional offices and homeland administrations under the guidance of 
riparian law, to the management of water resources by catchment management agencies 
on the basis of a permit system. As mentioned in the legal section of chapter 3, the rules 
governing water allocation hinged on the riparian doctrine, which tied water control to 
land ownership and thus concentrated it in the hands of a minority. For several reasons, 
this situation had become untenable. First, the economy had for several decades been 
diversifying away from its agricultural base, and the link between riparian land 
ownership and access to water had to be severed. Non-riparian water users such as 
burgeoning towns and mines needed firmer legal bases for access to the resource. 
Relative to the 1912 Irrigation and Conservation of Water Act, the 1956 Water Act 
already represented a move that increased the powers of the state to allocate water in the 
public interest, and for many years this Act sufficed because it enabled urban centres 
and mines to obtain access to the resource where the previous act had firmly placed 
agricultural water use above industrial water use. However, the riparian system 
remained intact in 1956, such that the bulk of the nation’s water was still privately 
controlled. Over time, though, the increasing scarcity of water, the rapidly changing 
                                                 
88 Because catchments in South Africa vary greatly in size, the ideal of catchment management has 
been replaced somewhat by a system in which several adjacent catchments may fall under one water 
management institution while retaining the catchment as the basic unit of water management. This 
hybrid is known as a Water Management Area, of which there are nineteen in South Africa.   
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nature of the economy, and the stark inequities in access to water began to militate 
against the rigidity of a system that accorded permanent rights to one set of users while 
denying access to other sectors of the economy and sections of the population. The 
allocation of water in the public interest required a flexible system of water allocation 
based on temporary permits rather than on permanent rights. As it turned out, the 1998 
Water Act was to place the responsibility for this permit system the door of the 
envisaged catchment management agencies. Second, the rules had to be adapted such 
that water use efficiency could become a criterion to judge applications for water use. 
As argued earlier, the rising cost of new supply augmentation schemes was beginning to 
raise questions about the management of the water in the centres of demand, especially 
as increasing the efficiency of water use could be achieved at a lower cost than simply 
increasing overall supply. Third, water abstractions by South Africans were increasingly 
encroaching on the natural realm from which this water was being drawn. The water 
supply of Kruger Park, for instance, was under threat from the abstractions of all 
upstream users in the Olifants river system, and the new rules needed to turn history on 
its head and accord permanent rights to the environment while removing permanent 
rights from human settlements along the river. In general, environmental considerations 
needed to be placed higher on the agenda in the new policy. Fourth, the distributional 
scarcity generated by the riparian doctrine was one of the many factors generating the 
civil unrest and opposition to the apartheid government, as civic movements and 
political leaders pushed for better living conditions for the poor majority. The new 
permit system needed to recognise that access to water was a basic human right, and the 
new water allocation system needed to take cognisance of the needs of the poor. Equity, 
therefore, was to become a new allocation criterion. Summing up these regulative 
aspects of the new water policy that emerged, the then Water Affairs and Forestry 
Minister Professor Kader Asmal, declared:   
 
“The new water policy embodies our national values of reconciliation, reconstruction and 
development so that water is shared on an equitable basis, so that the needs of those without access to 
water in their daily lives are met, so that the productive use of water in our economy is encouraged, 
and so that the environment which provides us with water and which sustains our life and our 
economy is protected”89. 
 
This required not only a rethink of the rules governing water allocation and the 
nationalisation of the country’s water bulk, achieved through the repeal of the 1956 
Water Act in 1998, but also a fundamental rethink of the institutions that had managed 
water resources until 1997. Just as the rules of water allocation were to be subject to 
review, so the institutions of water resource management were judged to be in dire need 
of change to suit the new set of goals summarised above. In 1994, the Department of 
Water Affairs and Forestry was seen by its new Minister to be an ‘inaccessible, 
centralised bureaucracy in which the needs of the people on the ground, in particular the 
black majority, were not taken into account’. The policy response was that the 
‘responsibility for the development, apportionment and management of available water 
                                                 
89  See Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (1997): White paper on a National Water Policy for  
South Africa. Pretoria: DWAF, p. 2.  
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resources’ should be ‘delegated to a catchment or regional level in such a manner as to 
enable interested parties to participate’90. The Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research’s Peter Ashton, who set out the first contours of South African thinking on 
catchment management, used the phrase ‘a transition from technology push to user pull’ 
to describe the transformation that was required91.  
Historically, the day to day management of water resources was indeed rather 
centralised, although it must be said that some decentralisation of the department had 
already been taking place in the 1980’s. In those days, ‘head office’ in Pretoria was 
directly responsible for a number of tasks directly related to implementation of water 
policy in addition to those of policy making. Thus functional units such as geo-
hydrology, survey, hydrology, and Irrigation and Engineering Services had field offices 
throughout the country that reported directly to head office. These offices were rather 
isolated from the public. An exception, however, was formed by the so-called ‘Circle’ 
offices of irrigation and engineering services, which were responsible for water supply 
schemes and which were locally based and had regular contact with stakeholders (in 
irrigation works). Towards the second half of the 1980’s the circle offices were 
amalgamated with the field offices of the various functional units run directly from head 
office to create new regional offices that integrated the various functions of the 
department under the umbrella of one decentralised office 92 . Henceforth, a broad 
panoply of water resource management functions was administered by the department’s 
regional offices, under the leadership of the Deputy Director General: Regions, who sat 
in Pretoria. In the pre-1994 context, the concept of a region referred to a province in 
terms of the provincial demarcation that prevailed in those days. This meant that there 
were regional offices in Natal, Orange Free State, Cape Province and Transvaal93. 
Essentially, therefore, the administrative boundaries that existed had been drawn on 
political lines, presenting the Department of Water Affairs with a range of coordination 
problems in cases where catchments cross-cut provincial boundaries. This issue did not 
apply to the Crocodile, which at that time fell entirely under the auspices of the 
Transvaal regional office, located in the catchment near Pretoria. It was recognised at 
the time that integrated catchment management would be a useful tool, but this 
recognition was strongly tempered first by the assumption that such catchment 
management would be administered from regional offices, and that the set of 
stakeholders consulted would be limited to those for whose needs the department had 
historically catered:  
 
                                                 
90  Ibid, pp.28 and 29. 
91  As far as I can establish, the first serious attempt to conceptualise a catchment management policy  
here was: Department of Water Affairs and Forestry / Water Research Commission (1996): The  
Philosophy and Practice of Integrated Catchment Management: Implications for Water Resource  
Management in South Africa. Discussion document. This was written by Dr. Ashton.  
92  The information on the reorganisations of DWAF in the late 1980’s is drawn from e-mail  
correspondence with Fanie Vogel, associate at Ninham Shand Consulting Engineers, in early March  
2003. Fanie Vogel was previously Director at DWAF: North West Province.  
93  Actually the situation was a little more complex: the drainage regions A, B and X, located in what is  
now North West, Limpopo and Mpumalanga, except the Komati, fell under the Transvaal regional  
office, while the Management of the Vaal and the Komati fell under the Highveld office.  
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“There is a strong motivation for integrated catchment management at the regional level by the 
coordination of the activities of local bodies such as irrigation boards, water boards, agricultural 
unions, regional development advisory committees and conservation committees under the auspices of 
the DWA”94. 
 
This statement, made by the Department in 1986, illustrates some of the tensions around 
catchment management that were beginning to emerge. First, the emergence of the self-
contradictory idea of ‘catchment management at the regional level’ shows that there was 
already a desire to experiment catchment management without upsetting the 
demarcation of provincial responsibilities. The compromise position was that the 
regional offices would manage a number of catchments while retaining their provincial 
character. Second, the idea that stakeholders existed not to provide input but to be 
‘coordinated’ illustrates the paradox of the time in the state’s relationship with civil 
society: it needed information from stakeholders to further its coordinating tasks, and 
thus some level of civil society participation in planning was required. It is also 
illuminative to consider that the irrigation boards, water boards, agricultural unions, 
regional development advisory committees and conservation committees mentioned are 
all stakeholders created or endorsed by the government of the time. Their relationship 
with government was a close one, and the independence of their voices relative.  
This was the situation just before the advent of change in 1994. After 1994, the new 
regional offices underwent more change even before the concept of catchment 
management began to take root. In terms of the new Constitution of South Africa, the 
country was to be divided into nine provinces in a federal system that provided for a 
Premier, a Legislature and Ministers in each province. Accordingly, the water resource 
management responsibilities of the Transvaal regional office in Pretoria were moved to 
the provincial capitals of Pretoria, Mmabatho, Pietersburg (now known as Polokoane) 
and Nelspruit. In the cases of the Northern Province/Limpopo and North West Province, 
a new Water Services office had been created to spearhead the water supply and 
sanitation delivery effort.  
Thereupon, water resource management staff in the water quality and survey 
divisions of the Transvaal regional office was transferred to the regional offices. The 
regional offices also inherited the responsibility for the management of irrigation 
schemes located in the province. In some cases staff members were physically relocated 
to the new regional offices, while in others a reshuffle of responsibilities was enough 
and the staff member could stay put in his or her original office. What had been the 
Highveld regional office now became the Gauteng regional office 95 . Strategically, 
however, the management of water in terms of quantity remained centralised at the 
Transvaal regional office, which continued to exist and to provide services to the 
regional offices. In the run-up to the establishment of catchment management agencies, 
it was decided that each regional office was to take the responsibility for two water 
management areas and for initiating the catchment management process. The Crocodile-
Marico water management area, which falls predominantly within the North West 
                                                 
94  DWAF (1986): Management of the Water Resources of South Africa. Pretoria: DWAF, p. 6.67. 
95  From a telephone conversation with Rens Botha, DWAF regional director: Gauteng, 3/3/2003. 
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Province, was allocated to the Gauteng office, which meant that the North West 
regional office did not have any water management areas to look after96. 
 
The birth of catchment management policy 
The idea of Integrated Catchment Management (ICM) as the panacea for the 
multifaceted problem of water resource management had been advocated in Agenda 21, 
the programme of action of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in 1992. In the same year, a preparatory international conference on water 
and the environment was held in Dublin, which resulted in the so-called Dublin 
declaration that was to have a powerful impact on South African water policy 
formulation97.  
In essence, from the point of view of human planning, the idea behind catchment 
management is that an agency responsive to a multi-stakeholder forum can build 
negotiated consensus among stakeholders. In doing so, it can allocate water in response 
to changing needs, optimise use efficiency by planning at the level at which all knock 
on effects of water use are felt –at the river basin level - and provide a platform for all 
stakeholders, including the poor, to claim for use. From the point of view of the 
sustainable use of natural resources, the ideal of catchment management stems from the 
need to consider all discrete interventions in water resources (pollution and abstractions) 
within the context of one management framework because of the cumulative impact of 
these interventions at the catchment level. Agenda 21 and the Dublin declaration each 
emphasized different aspects of this process – in general, against the background of 
much agreement on key issues, Agenda 21 stressed the importance of ecological 
impacts while the Dublin document stressed the importance of public participation. 
Also, Agenda 21 stressed catchment management while the Dublin declaration was less 
prescriptive on the institutional solutions that countries needed to adopt. For instance, 
Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 stated that:  
 
“The widespread scarcity, gradual destruction and aggravated pollution of freshwater resources in 
many world regions, along with the progressive encroachment of incompatible activities, demand 
integrated water resources planning and management […] integrated water resources management, 
including the integration of land-and water-related aspects, should be carried out at the level of the 
catchment or sub-basin”98.  
 
The Dublin declaration, by comparison, emphasized that:  
 
“Since water sustains all life forms, a holistic approach is needed for the development of human 
societies and economies [which] includes not only the need to look at the whole water cycle […] but 
also the intersectoral needs…the second principle in the needs for a participatory approach in 
institutions and arrangements for water development and management”99. 
                                                 
96  Interview with Rens Botha, director: Gauteng Regional Office, 26/7/2001. 
97  This was a preparatory document for the UNCED process. 
98  United Nations (1992): Agenda 21, chapter 18, sections 18.3 and 18.9. see  
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev. 
99  United Nations (1992): International Conference on Water and the Environment: Development Issues  
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In South Africa, the political transition in 1994 launched a set of values into which the 
idea of catchment management fitted very well. The foundation of the Reconstruction 
and Development Programme was the idea of: 
 
“An integrated programme, based on the people, that provides peace and security for all and builds 
the nation, links reconstruction and development and deepens democracy”100. 
 
Catchment management certainly reflected the ideals of programme integration and 
deepening democracy. However, the launch of a programme aimed at the rollout of 
basic services such as access to domestic water supply and sanitation was the key focus 
of the department, and the more nebulous ideal of catchment management played 
second fiddle, albeit as the single most important policy item after community water 
supply and sanitation. One indication of this difference in status is perhaps contained in 
the fact that the White Paper on Water Supply and Sanitation Policy was released 
immediately after the elections in April 1994, while the White Paper on a National 
Water Policy for South Africa which proposed catchment management was only 
released three years later in 1997. However, this delay was also due in part to the South 
Africa’s exclusion from UNCED: while political change was underway and there was 
no shortage of environmental advocates in the country, South Africa was not allowed to 
participate in UNCED, and catchment management had to enter the country through a 
back door rather than through national ratification of the UN declaration. Dr. Peter 
Ashton, an environmental scientist and water specialist at the Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research in Pretoria, had been advocating catchment management for many 
years. In 1996 he was commissioned by the Department’s scientific services directorate 
together with the Water Research Commission to consolidate his arguments in favour of 
catchment management in a discussion document o the philosophy and practice of 
catchment management101. This document fed into a public debate at the time on the 
review of South Africa’s water law and by virtue of its quality and the credentials of its 
author, soon dominated discussions on the new institutional solutions for water 
management in the country in spite of the rather radical reorganization of institutions 
that it required. Fast on the heels of this document came another, more practical 
document, providing the overall guidelines for the introduction of catchment 
management into the country102.   
Together, these documents came out strongly in favour of the introduction of 
catchment management into South Africa. However international experiences with 
catchment management were varied and each variant had its own set of institutional 
                                                                                                                                               
for the 21st Century. Dublin, Ireland, January 1992: Dublin statement and report of the conference, p.  
13. 
100  African National Congress (1994): The Reconstruction and Development Programme. Johannesburg:  
Umanyano, p.7. 
101  Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, Water Research Commission (1996): The Philosophy and  
Practice of Integrated Catchment Management: Implications for Water Resource Management in  
South Africa. Pretoria: DWAF. 
102  Water Research Commission (1997): Guidelines for Catchment Management to Achieve Integrated  
Water Resource Management in South Africa. Pretoria: WRC. 
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consequences. The ‘philosophy and practice of catchment management’ document 
reviewed a number of these experiences and contrasted the experiences of Great Britain 
with those of Australia and New Zealand. In Britain the state had retained a large degree 
of control over water resource management, and public participation in water resource 
management was relatively minimal. In Australia and especially in New Zealand, by 
contrast, water resources management was to a large extent found to rely on the 
negotiations within multi-stakeholder forums. In these cases, the state had a back-bench 
position and catchment management authorities were highly self-regulatory.  
The recommendation drawn from the study was that South Africa should shift from a 
situation in which catchment management is in the hands of central and regional 
government, to a situation in which the state, while providing overall policy guidance, 
leaves much of the praxis of catchment management up to the multi-stakeholder 
platforms in each area. The ‘guidelines’ document focused more on the obstacles that 
lay in the way of this process, underscoring for instance that: 
 
“The present generalized lack of technical and managerial expertise means that a mechanical 
decentralization or delegation of functions is unlikely to achieve the objectives of more responsive and 
effective water management unless delegation goes hand in hand with systematic capacity building 
and effective monitoring and support from the National Department”103.    
 
In this way, a rather paradoxical set-up began to emerge whereby it was left to 
historically centralist and non-participatory institutions at the national and regional level 
to create decentralized and participatory institutions at the catchment level. It will be 
argued below that this became an important stumbling block for the implementation of 
catchment management in South Africa.  
Institutionally, catchment management was an important break with the past in that it 
proposed management based on natural rather than political boundaries. However this 
left open the question what was to become of the regional offices which had carried out 
the hands-on management of the nation’s water resources for so long. Clearly, the 
package of tasks accorded to Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs) in terms of the 
law would make the work of the regional offices obsolete. However it was not clear 
whether these offices would continue to exist, albeit with a strongly diminished set of 
tasks, and nor was it clear what the transition process was to look like.  
The White Paper on a National Water Policy stated that the regional offices ‘do not 
necessarily reflect the intent of Principle 23‘, which advocated a decentralised and 
participatory management system104. However, it did not make it clear what was to 
happen to them, and only mentioned a transition period in which the national 
department provided capacity building, monitoring and support to the newly created 
institutions105.    
In other respects, the Catchment Management Agencies were to be strikingly 
different from their predecessors. Not only were the new institutions to be much better 
suited to the management of water resources from an ecological point of view, but they 
                                                 
103  Ibid., p. 12. 
104 This is a reference to principle 23, one of 28 principles underlying the new Water Act. 
105  See DWAF (1997), Op Cit, p. 29. 
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were also to absorb much of the agenda of the new democratic state. On this agenda 
stood an important point, namely the redress of historical inequities, or distributional 
scarcity. In the realm of equity, the White Paper declared that: 
 
“In the context of the reform of the water law, the right to equality requires equal access by all South 
Africans to, and benefit from the nation’s water resources, and an end to discrimination with regard to 
access to water on the basis of race, class or gender” 106 
 
This definition of equity was then given operational content, which was very clear on 
the issues of rights with respect to access to water services, but not very clear on the 
issue of equity in access to water resources. On services, it was announced that a 
‘Reserve’ of water would be set aside from the needs of the economy to ensure that the 
basic needs of the population and the needs of the natural environment are met. The 
right to water for all other purposes was made subject to authorization through a 
licensing system to be implemented by the CMAs. This meant practically that every 
South African had the right to 25l per day, to be increased as standards of living 
improved107. It was also designed to ensure that the productive needs of the economy 
could not encroach on the basic needs of the population or environment.  
On water resources, policy was vaguer. It made the obvious point that ‘it is not 
practical nor possible to divide up South Africa’s water resources so that each person 
has access to the same amount of water’, but stopped short of providing for a basic 
allocation of water for productive purposes108. Instead it declared that: ‘what is of 
concern to most South Africans […] is that the way in which water is allocated and used 
should bring maximum benefit to them, whether directly or indirectly’109. This point has 
been much debated subsequently, as there is a large proportion of the population who 
are structurally excluded from the formal economy and would stand to benefit from a 
basic allocation of water with which to produce food110. However, the policy does make 
it clear that what was intended was a more equitable allocation of water, even if this 
cannot be claimed as a right. For instance, section 6.2.2 states that: 
 
“After providing for the Reserve and international obligations, the basis for granting a license to use 
water available in the area will be to achieve beneficial use in the public interest which will include 
consideration of the need for programmes of corrective action”111.   
 
                                                 
106  See DWAF (1997), Op Cit., p.7. 
107  Ibid, pg: 16 
108  Ibid, p. 12 
109  Ibid, p. 12 
110  In 1999 the Department did bring out a ‘General Notice’ regarding ‘general authorisations’, which  
permits unlicensed abstractions up to a fixed maximum abstraction rate in catchments that are not  
water stressed. These authorisations are precisely intended for small scale subsistence or small scale  
commercial activities, but they do not affect the status quo in water stressed catchments. There is still  
a need to place an allocation for basic productive use in the Reserve.  
111  Ibid, p. 17 
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The rest of this chapter will trace the institutional change resulting from the 
catchment management process, as well as the progress achieved in the pursuit of 
greater equity in access to (productive) water. 
Implementing catchment management policy  
The implementation of catchment management was from the onset permeated with a 
particular interpretation of what the concept of catchment management meant. This 
interpretation emphasized the development of a higher level or apex institution rather 
than emphasizing the strengthening of the many and diverse grassroots institutions 
which constituted structure through which a catchment could be managed. In addition, 
in the early years, there was no clear vision on the demarcation between the roles of the 
state and civil society in catchment management institutions. Both of these factors led to 
delays in implementation. This section looks at how the process appeared to those 
responsible for policy development and clarification - the officials in the directorate: 
catchment management in Pretoria.  
The directorate was established at the Department’s national office in July 1997. At 
that point there was no strategy document on catchment management that could 
accompany the White Paper - which had just been released in April. The directorate was 
a role player in the definition of its own identity, and did not start with a clearly defined 
set of tasks. The then director remembers it thus:  
 
“The first part [of my career in the department] was very wooly in terms of understanding what the 
White paper was saying and what the (then) Water Bill was saying and immediately it seemed to be 
this emphasis of getting the people involved in decision making, so that was the first push. There was 
not in my mind great talk about what this institution was going to look like. We started talking to 
people and slowly as the Water Bill developed to its sixth and seventh editions, it became clearer what 
the vehicle was going to be. Obviously the word CMA was getting a lot of attention, but we did not 
really understand what a CMA meant. Because in people’s minds the idea was to create this institution 
to take over wholly or partly the functions of the regional offices. It might not have appeared to be a 
daunting task initially but once one started looking at how are we going to develop these institutions, 
the more thought one gave to it the more confounded it got in terms of: if we set it up, will it be able 
to perform the functions we want it to perform, how will it perform these functions, do we want a 
small organisation, do we want another big organisation, how much is Water Affairs prepared to 
delegate…these were the questions that were beginning to come out”112.  
 
However, enough was clear from the White paper and discussion documents that had 
been commissioned to make it clear that the agencies that were to be created needed to 
be the apex of a multi-layered system of stakeholder consultations. This system needed 
to reach from the smallest unit of water resource management – institutions whose 
primary purpose is to enable the management of water for the benefit of its members – 
to the level of the catchment as a whole. This area could theoretically be as large as the 
Orange-Vaal river basin at 49.6% of the surface area of South Africa. From the outset it 
was clear that much thought needed to go into resolving how CMAs were to be 
structured, what their component parts were to be, and how the state would interact with 
                                                 
112  Interview with Haroon Karodia, then national director: catchment management ,21/6/2001 
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civil society associations with an interest in claiming access to the resource or managing 
its quality.  
Clarity was lacking on the structure of the intermediary level between grassroots-
level institutions and the umbrella structure of the CMA, and on the degree to which the 
responsibility for the management of water resources could be handed over to civil 
society. Thus on the first issue, the 1998 Water Act devoted separate chapters to 
Catchment Management Agencies and Water User Associations (the latter being the 
grassroots institutions) but not to the widely debated and in some cases already existing 
river forums which could act as intermediaries between individual water user 
associations and the catchment as a whole113.114. There seemed to be consensus among 
the consultants commissioned to produce discussion documents on the matter that the 
Australian model of catchment management was appropriate to the South African 
context. Thus Ashton was of the opinion that: 
 
“Ideally, South Africa should look at a gradual shift from a situation where ICM is regulated and 
controlled by central and regional government levels (as in Britain), but still with some stakeholder 
consultation, to the community-based self regulatory approach towards which Australia seems to be 
moving. This would allow sufficient time for learning and the development of an appropriate skills 
base: the country could expand ICM from the present relatively small core of skilled people at central 
and regional government level […]. On the ground, this could take the form of identifying priority 
catchments, and working initially with a catchment forum, or some similar participatory organisation. 
This forum could be gradually developed into a catchment committee, taking more responsibility and 
accountability as local capabilities are developed and enhanced. The next step could be the 
development and constitution of a catchment board or authority, whose legal, executive and fund-
raising status would depend on the needs of the local situation115.  
 
The institutional task team of the water law reform process confirmed this view, but 
conceptually there was still some confusion around the relative roles of state and civil 
society in managing catchments. According to the 1997 ‘guidelines for catchment 
management’, the task team had recommended ‘the initial establishment of statutory 
participatory catchment forums’, leading up to the ‘constitution of catchment 
authorities’116. However in the same breath the guidelines state that what came out of 
the water law review process was the need for the ‘initial establishment of state-driven 
catchment management structures, which receive increased decision making powers in 
accordance with their growing capacity to assume more responsibilities’. Clearly CMAs 
could not simultaneously be a statutory forum drawn from civil society and a state 
driven structure, and this dilemma was to become a characteristic of the implementation 
process throughout. In the early years the words ‘Authority’ and ‘Agency’ were used 
interchangeably, although ‘authority’ tended to be associated more with a civil society 
body and ‘agency’ with a decentralized organ of the state. In the 1998 Water Act 
‘Agency’ is used, the minister is given the authority to appoint the board of the 
                                                 
113  Chapter seven 
114  Chapter eight 
115  DWAF/WRC (1996), op. cit, p. 51. 
116  Water Research Commission (1997): Guidelines for Catchment Management to achieve Integrated  
Water Resources Management in South Africa. Pretoria: WRC, p. 11. 
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organization, and it is not made clear in what way such an agency should relate to the 
public stakeholder forums on water resource management117.        
Given the aim of a shift from ‘technology push to user pull’, the question needs to be 
asked to what extent there were already civil society structures which could be counted 
on to take up the challenge of the ‘community based self regulatory approach’. In the 
various catchments throughout the country there were incidences of river forums, 
organized around a particular issue, which had arisen thanks to the initiatives of 
individuals, and had been built into participatory forums on the strength of the mutual 
interest of stakeholders in the resource. Thus in the Crocodile River catchment forums 
such as the Jukskei and Hennops River forums predated the establishment of the 
directorate: catchment management, as did the Sabie-Sand forum in the Incomatiriver 
basin and the Olifants river forum on the Olifants river’s middle reaches 118 . 119 . 
Strangely, the water law review process skipped over the very important intermediate 
institutional level between the catchment management agencies and the individual water 
users within the catchment, devoting chapters to Catchment Management Agencies and 
to Water User Associations but making very little work of anything in between these 
two. Provision is made for the establishment of Catchment Management Committees 
(CMC’s) to carry out task on behalf of the Catchment Management Agency, and 
conceivably these CMC’s could become the eyes and ears of a CMA, but it is worth 
noting that this intermediate level has not received the same amount of policy attention 
as the CMAs and WUAs120.  
At this point two important points need to be made about the expectations of the 
catchment management process. The first is that when the directorate was established, 
in each river basin, or water management area, there could be one or two forums 
representing a number of the basin’s tributaries. In no case, however, was a catchment 
covered, ‘wall to wall’, with representative forums. The implication was that the ideal of 
participatory catchment management could not be realised without prolonged 
mobilisation of interested parties in those areas in which such forums did not yet exist. 
It could therefore be expected that the transition to catchment management would be 
long. We will return to this argument. The second point about the existing forums is 
that, using an environmentalist’s distinction between ‘green’ and ‘brown’ issues, these 
forums are strongly oriented towards green issues 121 . With the exception of the 
                                                 
117  See Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (1998): National Water Act, Act no. 36 of 1998.  
Pretoria: Governemnt Gazette. Item 81(1) of the Act states that ‘ The members of the governing board  
of a catchment management agency must be appointed by the Minister who, in making such an  
appointment, must do so with the object of achieving a balance amongst the interests of water users,  
potential water users, local and provincial government and environmental interest groups’. Of course  
the Minister makes such appointments on the advice of individuals from civil society. The point being  
made here is that it is not made clear in the Act what the powers and functions of civil society  
institutions are, whereas it is made clear what the role of the state is.   
118  Sometimes the river is also spelled ‘Inkomati’. 
119  Drawn from interviews with John Reynolds, date? and Ndileka Mohapi 15/5/2001, 
120  This point was confirmed in a telephone conversation with Bill Rowlston, who helped to draft the new  
Water Act, on 17/3/2003.  
121  Brown issues emerge from a concern with the location of society in the environment and the access to  
natural resources that are needed to eke out a livelihood. Thus basic access to water for consumption  
and production, soil erosion which undermines productivity, salinisation of irrigated soils, etc. are  
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announcement on general authorizations to abstract limited amounts of water in certain 
catchments without having to apply for a license, water reform that enhances the access 
of the poor to productive water has not yet taken place122. At present catchments are 
going through the process of registering existing water uses, after which CMAs and the 
Department will have a database that can be used for implementation of a water 
allocation and licensing policy. Until then, however, the allocations of water in each 
catchment are much as they were during apartheid. This means that for the moment the 
‘brown’ issue of reallocating entitlements to use water is not on the CMA agenda, and 
the key issues on the table are conservationist or ‘green’ in nature. The crucial point 
about this insofar as participation in catchment management structures is concerned is 
that whatever participation takes place is within the confines of the existing allocations 
of water. Thus for instance a consultant involved in public participation processes in the 
Incomati system mentioned that the participation exercises did not manage to reach out 
and include small scale users involved in subsistence production if they were outside 
prominent institutions such as an irrigation scheme123. Those who want to participate 
because they wish to claim a portion of the resource that they have never been entitled 
to will have to hold their claim until systems to handle them are in place. In general, 
therefore, bringing the poor on board in catchment management structures is limited by 
the fact that for many poor producers the main water issue is precisely the lack thereof. 
We shall return to this argument.   
Despite the fact that it was clear that it would take a considerable time to establish 
participatory catchment management structures, the department initially had 
expectations that the structures could be created relatively quickly. These expectations 
had to be corrected fairly soon after the directorate was established. The then director of 
catchment management comments:  
 
“When I read my DG’s performance contract with the Minister, it read something like that one 
catchment management agency should be set up within the first three months of the promulgation of 
the Act, then you would have all established within the first three years of the Act. I went back to the 
CDand said that with the little knowledge that I have, I don’t think we are going to meet this124. And 
we quickly changed the DG’s performance contract. We were faced with the choice: either do it with 
the stroke of a pen (we can create all of these in a day, we don’t need three months to create them) or 
the alternative was to really sit and think about what we wanted. The initial expectation was that 
within one to three years all these agencies would be in place, and also in terms of the Act, within six 
months all the Water User Associations in terms of the irrigation boards would also be sorted out125. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
brown issues. Green issues, by contrast, focus on ecosystem functioning and are concerned with the 
natural world in a way that factors human populations out of the debate. The emphasis is more on 
conservation and ecosysterm rehabilitation that on human survival. Typically the green/brown 
dichotomy is also applied to differences of opinion between the countries of the North and those of the 
South on the basic approach to questions of environmental decline.   
122  Government Gazette (1999) General Authorisations in terms of section 39 of the National Water Act,  
1998. Pretoria: Government Gazette no. 20526, Oct 1999.  
123  I.e. users who do not utilize large quantities of water.  
124  I.e. the Chief Director: water utilization to whom the director: catchment management reports.  
125  Interview with Haroon Karodia, Op. Cit, 21/6/2001. 
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The ‘stroke of a pen’ comment referred to the possibility of the state creating CMAs by 
itself, without the extensive public participation needed to create solid institutions for 
user-driven water resource management. In the end, this would only have duplicated the 
existing regional offices, which was not what was intended, and the department 
embarked on the longer route of facilitating public participation exercises in each water 
management area to create institutions that would be in tune with sentiments on the 
ground. The dilemma was resolved thus:   
 
“ We produced what we call the ‘issues document’ … it is not a document that one goes and 
implements immediately – it opens one’s mind in terms of what is required. And what that said was 
that CMAs cannot be created as quickly as one would have thought (although the legal guys were 
pushing for it). Then we said what do we need to do to create this – that is when we produced our 
guideline document. I think that was a big step in that it started giving people a much clearer idea as to 
what was required”126. 
 
Currently, many practitioners in water resource management have adjusted their 
timeframes for the implementation period from three years to some ten– and even then 
this is often qualified with the statement that CMAs may exist but will have to go 
through a long learning curve before they can become strong and stable. Of the 18 water 
management areas for which a CMA is to be established, only one fully fledged 
(complete) proposal for the establishment of a CMA has now been handed in to the 
Department and two other draft proposals have been submitted. No CMA yet exists127.   
 
Implementation at the intermediary level 
At the apex of the implementation chain, a lack of conceptual clarity on what constitutes 
a catchment management agency led to unrealistic expectations of the speed at which 
these structures would be established 128 . It also led to a chronological separation 
between mobilising for participation (which is occurring now) and a reform of the 
entitlements to water (which is still pending). The result, based on an assumed 
relationship between entitlements to water and a will to participate in forums, is that 
catchment management started off on a footing that pursued green rather than brown 
environmental goals. By doing so, the full inclusion of poorer communities has been 
deferred to a later date129.  
                                                 
126  Ibid. 
127  A ‘water management area’ is explicitly separated conceptually from a ‘catchment’ by the Ministry,  
as it is envisaged that water management areas (which are institutional constructs) could coincide with  
catchment boundaries (which have natural boundaries) but may also be larger or smaller units. This is  
a deviation from original policy recommendations and is the result of the fact that the size of natural  
catchments varies very strongly, with very large river basins existing on the western and northern  
interior of the country and very small river basins existing all along the eastern shoreboard of the  
country. Water Management Areas are thus a pragmatic compromise on the scientific principle of  
Integrated  Catchment Management. See Schmitz, T. and Ashton, P. (1998): Ensuring Equity and 
Integrated Water Resource Management in South Africa. Pretoria: DWAF. 
128  By this I mean both the head office of the Department in Pretoria and the focus on a Catchment  
Management Agency rather than on river forums federations of Water User Associations, or  
individual Water User Associations.  
129 I am not arguing that there are no poor communities represented in CM but that those who have no  
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At the intermediary level, the result of this approach has been that the state, as the 
arbitrator of what constitutes sufficient participation or representation, has come into 
conflict with those (consultants and staff at regional offices of the department) tasked 
with generating ‘sufficient’ participation to enable a new water management institution 
to be established. Thus conflicts have emerged between the directorate: catchment 
management on the one hand, and civil society institutions such as river forums and 
water user associations on the other, on the degree to which stakeholders in any supply 
area have been consulted in the establishment of new water management institutions. 
Where the state may claim that public consultation processes do not reflect the 
demographics of an area, representatives of the budding water management institution 
may claim that invitations to public gatherings were sent far and wide but that the 
turnout was disappointing. In one case, involving the establishment of a Water User 
Association by transforming a previously white irrigation board, the board was 
chastised by the regional office of the department for not including enough 
representatives from previously disadvantaged communities on the management 
committee of the WUA. The members of the board for their part ‘have no objection to 
helping the previously disadvantaged’ but saw no point in allowing representation onto 
their organization by individuals representing at most 2% of the total water used in the 
area. At the interface between government and the local water management institutions, 
there is a fundamental conflict of objectives. The state on the one hand wants to ensure 
broader representation in water management institutions even if such representation 
does not come with any tangible increase in access to water. The water management 
institution on the other hand is forced by law to transform and in order to continue 
carrying out its day to day business must comply with government regulations. Neither 
institution has much to offer (in entitlements or in a welcoming attitude) that will in fact 
induce such participation. Because the Department is not present to a great degree in the 
transformation processes (unless through the medium of consultants), it is faced with 
the choice of accepting the machinations of the institution undergoing transformation 
and rubber stamping the change, or accepting long delays in the establishment of 
institutions on which the department is legally bound to deliver. Currently a policy 
process is underway to create a clear definition of what constitutes sufficient 
consultation130. In the meantime, processes that will – it is hoped - ultimately lead to the 
establishment of participatory water management institutions, have been considerably 
delayed as a result of tensions around the comprehensiveness of the consultations that 
took place.  
The responsibility for the establishment of catchment management agencies lies with 
the regional offices. The intention was that they would build the capacity needed to run 
CMAs, and in the long run they were expected to transfer all or part of their staff and 
other resources to them. However, this ‘capacity building’ is set in a conceptual 
framework based on the idea of CMAs as agencies of government: the thinking is that 
                                                                                                                                               
entitlement to water have little incentive to participate in catchment management forums. 
130  I have come to this conclusion personally mainly on the basis of a number of meetings I have been  
privy to, but there are also prominent cases such as that of the Hennops River forum which have  
raised such debates.   
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there are more water management areas than regional offices (in a ratio of 19:9), and 
therefore capacity building efforts are required in order to ensure adequate technical 
support to CMAs. It is still a matter of debate whether staff will be trained by regional 
offices and then transferred to the CMAs. Given the lack of clarity with regard to the 
question whether CMAs are civil society or government institutions, such moves 
strengthen the impression that CMAs are government institutions rather than institutions 
in civil society. This thinking again reflects a tension in the thinking of practitioners of 
catchment management between those who perceive CMAs as state run and those who 
see them as self-regulatory institutions in civil society. The dominant paradigm amongst 
practitioners has been one in which CMAs are agencies of government, even if much of 
the initial thinking on catchment management emphasized self-regulatory authorities 
located in civil society. Some variants of the thinking see CMA’s as state institutions 
that are ultimately accountable to a Catchment Management Forum, which in turn 
represents civil society.  
However, this variant has not found its way into formal policy on catchment 
management. There are two conflicting discourses at play here: one of them sees civil 
society representatives as knowledgeable and capable individuals who can negotiate 
amongst themselves the regulatory frameworks required for the collective self-
management of the resource in a particular catchment. The other sees the ultimate 
decisions on water resource management as the preserve of the state, requiring 
considerable technical expertise and a resultant need for CMA’s to be ‘capacitated’ 
through the intervention of the regional offices. Some of the practitioners interviewed 
by the author (who wish to remain anonymous) were of the former opinion, and they 
argued that building capacity through the regional offices creates the impression that 
civil society cannot be trusted and that it is the state that needs to run CMA’s. Others 
are of the impression that ultimately the state is the custodian of water resources in the 
country, and it is the Minister who approves or rejects proposals for the establishment of 
CMA’s, thus essentially the management of water resources is in state hands (even if 
the state has set up institutions which are intended to be responsive to civil society)131. 
Inherently water resource management is a highly complex and technical discipline, and 
the informed participation of civil society in debates is not possible without 
considerable effort being invested in general awareness raising on the consequences of 
the various relevant pieces of legislation, matters affecting the quantity and quality of 
water available, etc. Thus it does seem somewhat inevitable that a core technical team 
would be needed in each water management area in any case, even if only to help 
inform the citizenry on the kinds of choices they are faced with. This does not however 
speak to the question whether or not such a team is or should be employed by the state.  
At the regional offices themselves, whether there is a strong motivation to implement 
the catchment management system or not (and most staff members would agree that it is 
a step forward), lack of staff and separate funds earmarked for catchment management 
reportedly hinders the process substantially. Thus of crucial importance to the 
implementation process is the fact that of the nine regional offices, only two (i.e. 
Kwazulu Natal and Western Cape) have separately appointed staff to drive the 
                                                 
131  Interview and meeting, 15/5/2001,4/4/2002. 
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catchment management process, despite its importance nationally 132 . Nor do the 
regional offices have a separate budget for catchment management. The consequence of 
these problems is that catchment management is usually carried out by regional office 
staff - usually from the water quality division – alongside their already existing tasks. In 
other words, the new task of ensuring the establishment of a CMA has been added to 
what were already full time jobs. As a result, the responsible staff is hampered in their 
tasks and cannot do their work in the way that they would perhaps like to. Whether the 
task is considered to be important enough to make time for it and then carried out 
energetically and adequately is therefore a function of the personal opinions, personal 
ambitions, leadership abilities, and interest in catchment management displayed by the 
person to whom the task falls. This process is determined more by the ‘luck of the draw’ 
than could be the case if the regional offices were in a position to put out advertisements 
and recruit personnel that is both suitably qualified for the task and sufficiently 
motivated to apply. The importance of this point is perhaps best illustrated by the fact 
that the CMA proposal for the Incomati basin, which is currently the furthest developed 
process towards the establishment of a CMA, is often associated with the personal drive 
and commitment of the director: water quality in the Mpumalanga regional office. On 
top of this, the lack of clarity with respect to the future of the regional offices has 
created difficulties at the regional offices in appointing new staff and even in retaining 
old staff members. Starkly put, the responsibility for the establishment of CMAs lies at 
the door of the regional offices, and there has been a feeling amongst regional office 
staff that by establishing CMAs they were contributing to their own downfall.   
  In the Gauteng regional offices, the view was taken that the responsibility for 
catchment management should fall to whichever directorate in the regional office has 
the capacity to take on that function133. This approach gives a decidedly one-sided spin 
to what should be a participatory and multidisciplinary process by locating 
responsibility for implementation within one focused directorate rather than spreading 
the load over the regional office. To compound the staffing problems at the regional 
offices, catchment management does not have a dedicated budget at regional level, and 
this means that expenditure on CM needs to be separately motivated each time134. The 
issue of dedicating both budgets and staff to CM is currently a topic on the agenda of a 
restructuring process at the level of the chief directorate; water utilisation of which 
catchment management forms a part.    
A consequence of the lack of sufficient staff to ensure ongoing and dedicated support 
for the catchment management process has been the fact that the regional offices have 
had to farm much of the work on public participation out to consultants. This kind of 
work would normally be carried out by departmental officials, but work pressure has led 
to such work being carried out by external agents. In practice it has meant that much of 
                                                 
132  The Western Cape office has also taken the interesting initiative of regrouping its staff into different  
sections, each being responsible for the management of a particular water management area. The  
regional office has thus been remodelled along the lines of the future water management areas.   
133  Interview with Rens Botha, DWAF Gauteng regional office, 26/07/2001. 
134  The information in this paragraph is drawn from a joint interview with Eustacia Bofilatos, Deputy  
Director Catchment management, and Derek Weston, Assistant director catchment management,  
7/6/2001. It was separately reported by Ndileka Mohapi, 15/5/2001 
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the work that was carried out in relation to public participation processes had to be 
formulated in the form of contracts between DWAF and the relevant consultants. This 
has had a number of negative consequences, one of which has been the labour intensity 
of overseeing the work of consultants, and another the high cost of consultants relative 
to departmental staff. Ultimately the appointment (or redeployment) of staff specifically 
employed for catchment management would probably cost the department less both in 
financial terms and in terms of the logistics of supervision than is the case with the 
employment of consultants. Having said this, though, the work of some consultants has 
been markedly good and has contributed very positively to the catchment management 
process. For instance, an official from the directorate catchment management 
commented on public participation processes in the Crocodile-Marico system, one of 
which was facilitated by a consultant and the other, which was not. The comment was to 
the effect that where consultants has played a role, public participation was much higher 
than in cases where the river forum was left to run its own participation processes. The 
reason presented for this was that the consultants in question conducted their work in 
the appropriate languages of the area (predominantly Northern Sotho), and that they had 
had a history of close interactions with a range of community organizations in the area 
in the past. Thus the official stated that    
 
“I don’t have any problem with the consultants being employed to bring people together but […] you 
have these two extremes: the process that is pushed by a consultant, that in my view is going well, and 
one that is pushed by the city council, which is not“135.  
 
This view is confirmed by a representative of the youth desk of the Apies-Pienaar 
forum. Asked why in his opinion the Apies forum was a strong and representative one, 
he answered that ‘I would attribute that to the consultants. Most of the work was done 
by them. This thing of water user associations and catchment management is very new 
to the disadvantaged and the consultants employed people who come from the area and 
speak Northern Sotho.’ Asked what the main issue was that was holding people together 
in the forum, he responded that ‘the main problem is the leakage of sewerage into the 
river. Especially in the rural areas people catch the fish and eat pap and fish, and now 
they find that there are not so many fish left in the river’136. This final comment 
illustrates that it is not only the quality of communication and mobilisation strategies 
that is important, but also whether or not there are ‘real’ issues in any one river around 
which participation in a forum can be built. The Apies River apparently has more to 
offer in terms of livelihood strategies than just water, and the sustainable access to fish 
is reported as a ‘brown’ rallying point. Even in this case, however, it is not clear who is 
represented on the forum and who is not, and it is not clear in policy what ‘sufficient’ 
representation means. That the Apies is considered to be ‘good’ forum is therefore 
rather arbitrary, as it rests merely on the personal impression of the official in Pretoria 
charged with overseeing public participation in the Crocodile Catchment.  
                                                 
135 Telephone conversation with Mr. A. Malatse, Apies River forum, 10/01/02. 
136  Ibid. 
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Implementation at the ‘grassroots’ level  
The catchment management ideal is that all actors that impact on the overall quantity or 
quality of the resource be allowed to provide input to the management of the resource at 
the level at which all knock-on effects of collective uses come together- at the level of 
the catchment. Thus whatever higher-level structures are put in place to facilitate the 
transmission of ideas and the representation of certain water uses up to the catchment 
level, the key aspect of catchment management is the participation of local water users 
in its consultation system. In turn, this requires that user organisations have knowledge 
of existing processes and the capacity to present their case at forums to which they may 
or may not be invited. In South Africa, the lowest official tier of water management 
institutions is composed of so called Water User Associations (WUAs). In theory these 
institutions – both in South Africa and elsewhere in the world - are located in civil 
society and are managed by water users for their own benefit. This idea is formulated as 
follows in the 1998 Water Act: 
 
“Although water user associations are water management institutions their primary purpose, unlike 
catchment management agencies, is not water management. They operate at a restricted localised level, 
and are in effect co-operative associations of individual water users who wish to undertake water-
related activities for their mutual benefit”137.   
 
WUAs are managed by and directly beneficial to users, and as such they provide the 
ideal building blocks for a water management strategy that is stakeholder driven. 
However three issues are worth raising here that provide some nuance to this picture.  
The first is that many budding WUAs in the form of irrigation schemes were 
previously managed directly by parastatal corporations in the former homelands, with 
little room for input into their management by farmers. Typically in the apartheid era 
chiefs allied to the homeland system would obtain state sponsored projects in their areas 
as a reward for support, and irrigation projects were among the projects initiated. 
Currently many of these projects have fallen into disrepair and many farmers have 
abandoned them because of a combination of declining infrastructure, the rising costs of 
remaining in agriculture, and the insecure land tenure on schemes. Current processes 
aimed at the revitalisation of these schemes include so-called Irrigation Management 
Transfer (IMT), through which the management of the schemes is transferred to the 
users, coupled to the upgrading of the schemes and the inclusion of new farmer groups 
in the association. Because of the history of these particular projects, user management 
of the WUAs is a long-term goal rather than a founding principle, and can only be 
achieved through intensive training of the beneficiaries before handover.  
The second issue with WUAs is that in many cases (e.g. in the Western Cape) WUAs 
are being established by extending the supply area of what was previously a white 
irrigation board to include other local users such as mines or settlements under the 
                                                 
137  Government Gazette (1998): National Water Act, act no. 36 of 1998, p. 98. Cape Town: Government  
Printer.  
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umbrella of a collective water management institution. One of the central goals of the 
transformation of these institutions is to ensure that they are more ‘representative’ of 
South Africa’s demographics. However without water reform this is not possible, i.e. 
the water in such schemes has already been allocated to white farmers and reallocation 
of such water will still take an estimated five years at least. To nevertheless achieve 
transformation, what is currently occurring is that the boundary of the WUA is extended 
to include local mines, rural settlements and / or municipalities. This certainly ensures 
that the WUA becomes more representative, but it raises as many questions as it appears 
to solve. First, the character of the institution itself is changed from an irrigation board 
regulating access to water among farmers to an institution distributing water among 
different and often competing needs. By definition, this is no longer regulating a service 
on behalf of members, which was the original definition of a WUA, but it is regulating a 
resource on behalf of government. Here again the state/civil society paradox raises its 
head: is a user organization in civil society being transformed into a state organisation 
run by citizens in civil society? The nature and direction of the transformation process is 
in question. Second, the original irrigation board remains a stakeholder within this 
structure and it can be questioned whether it has been transformed or absorbed into a 
broader structure.  
A third issue related to WUAs is that catchment management can be seen as a is a 
Swiss cheese in that in terms of the Water Services Act, the management of water 
services is an autonomous function of local government. Thus any one catchment – 
which the ministry has the mandate to govern – is peppered with water supply areas that 
fall under the jurisdiction of municipalities. Catchment management, in other words, 
cannot be effectively carried out without extensive participation from local government.   
For various reasons, Water User Associations (WUAs) were for many years the 
Cinderella of catchment management. The building that was under construction was 
being built by starting with the chimney, and it is not until recently that WUAs have 
begun to receive the attention that they require as basic building blocks of catchment 
management strategies. The transformation of irrigation boards is a case in point. The 
July 2001 progress report on this opens with:  
 
”Section 98(4) of the NWA provided that all irrigation boards would have to submit a proposal to 
transform into a water user association to the Minister within six months of the commencement of the 
Act (i.e. not later than 31 March 1999). Due to the large number of institutions involved and the fact 
that this was a learning process for all involved, this deadline was extended to August 1999. A final 
deadline was given as 29 February 2000 and it was agreed that by this date all irrigation boards would 
have to submit, in the least, a letter of intent and a willingness to transform”138.     
 
The former director of catchment management provides a narrative that gives some 
context to this development:  
 
“In terms of the Act, within six months all the Water User Associations in terms of the irrigation 
boards would also be sorted out. If I can just look at the WUAs - we needed to know exactly what we 
meant by transformation processes. We (the department as a whole) were expecting that within six 
                                                 
138  Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (2001): Progress Report on Transformation of Irrigation  
Boards into Water User Associations. Pretoria: DWAF.  
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months all the irrigation boards would be sending us their applications, proposals, new constitutions – 
and then we would transform all of them. Six months came and went, and we asked for an extension 
of three months, which the minister signed. The additional three months came and went and we asked 
for another extension […]. One, there wasn’t the expertise out there to drive transformation. Two, we 
did not have any real guidelines about how it should happen. We were in the process of developing 
guidelines for the establishment of WUAs that made it as easy as possible for the applicants as well as 
for ourselves (so when we evaluate the proposal we know that a certain number refers to a certain 
thing and we don’t get five hundred different kinds of proposals). That made life a little but easier 
because we were getting twenty or thirty applications all at one go because they were all identical. Our 
expectation was within a few months we were going to transform everything. The reality was on the 
one hand that we had to provide a lot of assistance / guideline support in terms of how this was going 
to happen. The law was clear but we had to provide the support. Obviously the fact that we might 
have problems with a particular proposal or constitution slowed the process in that there were 
problems with involving the poor, involving all the users in a particular area, and we put them in. The 
process of contacting and bringing every user in a given area did not happen because people did not 
see others as users – for example farm labourers (who use water for drinking and possibly small scale 
farming) were often not seen as users by farmers. Contact the municipality – try and bring them in. 
But don’t make it too big, otherwise it will become a catchment management agency“139. 
 
A number of things are clarified by this narrative. Firstly, the department did not want 
to treat each application on its own terms and wanted a clear set of criteria against 
which to judge incoming applications. However, the Water Act mentions the need for 
transformation but does not go into great detail about what this means in practice other 
than indicating that all water management institutions should be demographically 
representative. It was thus necessary to develop a set of criteria that would guide the 
transformation of WUAs as well as facilitate the evaluation of proposals, and this is 
what was done. A ‘Guide on the Transformation of Irrigation Boards and certain other 
Boards into Water User Associations’ was published in August 1999, half a year after 
all irrigation boards were to have been transformed in terms of the National Water Act. 
The overwhelming bulk of this guide is devoted to the need to document aspect of the 
functioning of the budding Association – its supply area, its number of members, the 
waterworks under its command, the membership of the management committee, etc. 
None of this relates to transformation per se and would in principle be adequately 
addressed by merely filling in what had already existed in the old irrigation board. 
However this is not to say that the document does not necessitate change: a number of 
crucial passages in the guide call for a considerably more inclusive institution. Thus 
section 5.4.8.1 states that:  
 
“For the transformation process the constitution must make the association accessible to all water 
users of the water resources concerned”140.  
 
And (in relation to the membership of the management committee), section 5.4.14.1 
states that: 
 
                                                 
139  Interview with Haroon Karodia, Op. Cit, 21/6/2001. 
140  Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (1999): Guide on the Transformation of Irrigation Boards  
and certain other Boards into Water User Associations. Pretoria: DWAF / CSIR. 
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“Effect must be given to the requirements of section 2 of the Act where an obligation is placed on the 
Minister to establish institutions to assist in achieving the objectives of the Act and to ensure that they 
have appropriate community, gender and racial representation”141.  
 
To achieve this, the guide suggested that the board in question identify all other interest 
groups using water from the water resources controlled by the institution. This included 
local authorities, scattered domestic users, mines industry, commerce, and 
environmental or recreational interest groups. In essence therefore transformation meant 
expansion in supply area and meant a change from a single user sector to a multi-
sectoral institution. Why this should be the case still remains unexplained, and it is a 
source of much debate amongst policy makers and practitioners.  
By November 2001, of the 196 irrigation boards due for ‘transformation’ in terms of 
the Act, 18 WUA constitutions had been approved by the Minister and the 
transformations had been finalised142. Clearly, what the drafting team of the National 
Water Act had expected to be a six month process has even after four years delivered 
results that are far short of expectations. What are the reasons for this? 
The two reasons for delayed implementation advanced by the director of catchment 
management are highly plausible. The transformation of what were predominantly 
white irrigation boards into institutions that were representative of the demographics of 
South Africa is a process that could expect to encounter fierce resistance, as had been 
indicated by the willingness of the then South African Agricultural Union to take the 
nationalisation of water resources to the Constitutional Court in 1997 143 . It could 
therefore not be expected that transformation would result from exchanges of 
correspondence between 196 irrigation boards and the tiny staff complement available 
in Pretoria and the various regional offices to implement the policy. In this case, again, 
the resolution of the problem has been the principle of government by consultancy, 
whereby the transformation process is farmed out to consultants, thus overcoming a lack 
of staff at the cost of a large portion of the budget. This has however not prevented even 
correspondence between budding WUAs and the Department from becoming very 
infrequent144. On the other hand, even with a large staff complement it is questionable 
what transformation would entail in practice as policy is far from clear on what it is 
intended to achieve.  
It is also true that while the Act called for the establishment of WUAs, this did not 
mean that there was a strategy for their establishment or that the procedural 
requirements within the department to process the assessment and approval of incoming 
requests was immediately up and running. Clearly time was needed for a WUA strategy 
to be developed, and in this sense the expectation expressed in the Act that irrigation 
                                                 
141  Ibid. 
142 Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (2001): notes on Water User Association  
Transformation/Establishment. Pretoria: DWAF, Nov 30 2001.   
143  In practice this may merely mean that alongside established economic interests such as agriculture 
 and mining there may be a representative on the management committee of a WUA representing 
 the ‘previously disadvantaged’. In this case the representative in question would be outnumbered 
 by established commercial interests. 
144  Interview with the executive of the Hartebeespoort Irrigation Board, 12/02/2002. 
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boards would be transformed within six months of the promulgation of the Act was 
rather unrealistic.  
A third factor, which is more qualitative and does not refer to the speed of 
transformation but to its direction, is that the current debate on WUAs reveals a lack of 
conceptual clarity on the nature and purpose of these institutions. Where there has been 
a conceptual lead-in to policy development on catchment management with the 
commissioning of papers such as those outlining its ‘philosophy and practice’, the 
conceptual preamble to the implementation of Water User Associations has not been 
quite as rich (although these documents are beginning to emerge). The interpretation 
given to the term that appears to prevail among departmental staff is that of a relatively 
large scale organization devoted to the management of macro-infrastructure common to 
numerous water users such as irrigation associations, or to the allocation of the resource 
along a stretch of river among various different kinds of users such as municipalities, 
mines or irrigation schemes. In other words, this interpretation of WUAs is that of an 
institution which manages a common resource. This pulls the concept of a WUA into 
the ambit of the responsibilities of the Department: it is an institution to which 
responsibilities could be devolved if the capacity exists in it to take on such tasks. 
However this interpretation, while perhaps correct in the local context amongst actors 
who use the concept in this way, is not the common understanding of a WUA. A WUA 
is a grassroots institution located in civil society that has been established to manage a 
water service on behalf of its members (who are typically irrigators but may be 
providers from other economic sectors too) WUAs may aggregate upward in federations 
that manage the resource on behalf of a number of constituent WUAs, but this 
federation is not strictly a WUA unless it performs water related services for its 
members.  
The consequence of this interpretation has been that the transformation of irrigation 
boards, for instance, has tended to refer to the expansion of the area of the board to 
include other water users in the area. Rather than transforming the organisation itself but 
retaining its core functions, the core function has been changed. Whether this constitutes 
transformation is a matter for debate: the organisation has to manage a different and 
more diverse set of interests, and is managing a resource in addition to a service.  
 
Conclusions  
This chapter analysed the organisational responses to water scarcity at the catchment 
level. It did so by focusing on various aspects of the implementation of catchment 
management policy in South Africa, drawing on examples from the Crocodile River 
catchment. As was the case in chapter three, the chapter commenced by constructing a 
picture of the legacy that water resource management in the catchnment had left behind 
when the new policy of catchment management was introduced in 1997.  
Broadly speaking the catchment could be subdivided analytically into three different 
zones – areas featuring urban development, areas featuring white commercial irrigation 
development, and arid, poor and underdeveloped areas generated during apartheid.  The 
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margins of the well-watered areas along the main river channels dovetailed with 
geographical subdivisions under apartheid, leaving the arid and unproductive uplands to 
the ‘homeland ‘of Bophutatswana. Unusually, the upper reaches of the catchment 
experienced rapid urbanisation from the gold rush onwards, resulting in a highly 
concentrated zone of water demand in an area with very limited natural supply.  
The catchment featured almost permanent water scarcity, which evolved through a 
number of phases as time passed. First, water was used directly at its natural source. 
Second, local water resources were developed. Third, high potential dams within or in 
the vicinity of the catchment were developed. Fourth, the water resources of the 
catchment were optimised by linking water sources to each other in a catchment-wide 
water use system. Fifth, water was imported from other catchments on a large scale. The 
only anomaly in this progression was the construction of the Vaal barrage and later the 
Vaal dam, which supplied the headwaters of the Crocodile from across the watershed in 
the early phases of water resources development in the region. Institutionally, the 
management of scarcity has also moved from the local– through water user associations 
and municipal interventions – to the catchment level. 
Having thus set the scene, the chapter turned to the analysis to the intended transition 
from ‘technology push to user pull’ in water resource management through the 
establishment of Catchment Management Agencies and their constituent bodies. A key 
issue throughout has been a lack of clarity on the relative roles of state and civil society 
in managing catchments. A lack of clarity in policy has led to delays in implementation 
on a number of fronts. It has led amongst other things to unrealistic expectations of the 
speed at which catchment management structures could be established, a lack of clear 
definition of what constitutes sufficient consultation, and a misinterpretation of the 
concept of a Water User Association. Furthermore, the fact that the establishment of the 
new user-pulled institutions did not occur simultaneously with a reform of entitlements 
to water has meant that catchment management is still concerned predominantly with 
green rather than brown environmental issues. A concern with the role and participation 
of poorer communities in these institutions persists as a result, and the only real 
participation from poorer communities appears to be in those areas in which access to 
the resource has been enhanced or was a historical fact. Lastly, the expectation in the 
Act that both WUAs and CMAs would be established rather rapidly after the 
promulgation of the Act overlooked the rather obvious need for the development of 
strategies through which these institutions would be achieved, much of the substance of 
implementation since the promulgation of the Act has been the search for appropriate 
implementation strategies. Recognizing this omission, strategies have now been 
developed, and the timeframes for implementation have been adjusted accordingly.  
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6 
Reponses to water scarcity in the 
Hartbeespoort area  
Introduction 
 
This chapter looks at the rural dimension of institutional responses to water scarcity. It 
does so by examining the water-related institutional transitions in the Hartbeespoort 
area in the period between 1996 and 2006. As an hour-glass through which much of the 
water of the upper Crocodile River must pass, the Hartbeespoort area provides a locality 
at which many water resources related decisions and institutions come together1. Out of 
these decisions and institutions, a broad picture of the locality emerges, out of which 
those elements that relate specifically to scarcity must be gleaned and highlighted. A 
range of local organisations were historically allocated specific water management tasks, 
and in the post-apartheid period these institutions both were joined by new institutions 
concerned with water management and themselves underwent change. To a degree, 
these changes were induced by the need to manage water more efficiently and to ensure 
a dependable supply of clean water to users in the Hartbeespoort area as well as 
downstream. Also, however, the changes were induced by the skewed access to water 
for both consumption and production, and thus they involved the state-directed 
transformation of an exclusively white irrigation board as well as the efforts of a newly 
delineated district municipality to deliver water supply and sanitation to communities 
ignored by the previous administration. All these transformations were rooted in the 
past – in the agricultural roots of the South African economy that favoured irrigation 
development, in the subsequent industrialisation of the area and diversification of water 
demand, and in the dispossession and forced resettlement of the original population in 
the area into badly serviced townships or arid and even less well serviced homelands. 
                                                 
1  As well as water imported from other catchments 
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This history of water resources development is in some respects quite literally cast in 
concrete, as previously constructed dams and bulk water supply systems are a semi-
permanent feature of the environment. Current patterns of local interaction with regard 
to water allocation and distribution revolve around dated water management 
infrastructure and ingrained forms of decision making onto which new interventions are 
grafted. In Giddens’ words, current constitutions and reconstitutions of the material 
world are conditioned and constrained by the modifications of nature and society that 
we have created 2 . In this open-ended, non-linear historical materialist perspective, 
recent institutional transformations that have taken place need to be described with 
regular reference to the historical developments that shaped them and brought them 
about. Therefore, in this chapter, as elsewhere, current institutional transformations are 
consciously embedded in extensive analyses of historical developments. 
This leaves open the question what the boundaries are of the Hartbeespoort ‘area’ to 
be described, or what the ‘unit’ of analysis is. Amongst other things, this area embraces 
the largest dam in the Crocodile River catchment, a large scale government irrigation 
scheme, and the District Municipality of Madibeng which contains a number of the 
impoverished black settlements from the apartheid era as well as a number of white 
farming communities. Does the Hartbeespoort ‘area’, then, refer to political jurisdiction, 
to water resources endowments, or both? In practice, on both fronts, to delineate is to 
beg the question why a particular demarcation was chosen and not another. In the realm 
of political boundaries, one could for instance identify the ‘area’ as consisting of the 
former municipality of Hartbeespoort (the dam, the residential area surrounding it, and 
the command area of the Hartbeespoort irrigation scheme) and the rural town of Brits 
which draws from the dam. However, this would imply accepting apartheid-era 
boundaries and glossing over the bifurcation between the resource-rich in the 
predominantly white valley floor and the resource-poor in the predominantly black 
townships and arid rural (ex-Bophutatswana) homeland areas. The re-demarcation of 
local government in South Africa took place precisely to recombine rich and poor into 
‘viable’ economic and political units. Hartbeespoort and Brits were absorbed into the 
Municipality of Madibeng which, with its area of 3 814 km², is an order of magnitude 
larger than these two former white enclaves. In the realm of water natural resources 
endowments, on the other hand, Hartbeespoort epitomises the idea of knock-on effects 
in water resources management by collecting the polluted return flow from urban and 
agricultural areas upstream in the dam, while the dam is central to the distribution of 
water to a wide range of water users extending far downstream. Precisely the question 
of geographical delineation is highly problematic in local South African water resource 
management institutions, as will be explained in more detail in this chapter. Having 
identified this caveat, however, and allowing for a grey zone between the ‘local’ and the 
‘regional’, most of the discussion in this chapter relates to institutional practices in 
wards 19, 21, 29 and 30, or South Eastern Madibeng, containing the shores of 
Harbeespoort dam as well as Brits and ward 19 east of Brits.  
This chapter is divided into two parts. In part one I examine the historical responses 
to water scarcity in the Hartbeespoort area, looking in sequence at the struggles for 
                                                 
2  Giddens (1995): A Contemporary critique of historical materialism. London: Macmillan, p. 54.  
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control of the area, the construction of the Hartbeespoort dam and irrigation scheme, 
quantitative developments in water utilisation, the diversification of water demand, and 
the growing problem of water pollution. This lays the foundation for section two, in 
which I analyse the conflicting issues faced by policy makers, water users and water 
management institutions in the area in the transition period from 1994 to the present.  
 
Historical Responses to water scarcity in Hartbeespoort  
The discovery of gold in Johannesburg in 1886 sparked a gold rush and induced the 
rapid transformation of what was then known as ‘Ferreira’s Camp’ into a burgeoning 
town. By the turn of the century, Johannesburg was a town from which the more genteel 
gold prospectors fled for a weekend away in the countryside 3 . At this time, the 
Hartbeespoort area, some 50 km to the North West of Johannesburg, was known as a 
site of exceptional natural beauty, teeming with wildlife, to which gold prospectors 
could travel for a weekend of hunting4. This area, which is now flooded by a dam, 
highly polluted by return flow from the Greater Johannesburg metropolitan area, and 
one of South Africa’s prime real estate development areas, was at that time still fairly 
close to its ‘original’ natural state.  
The hunters came to shoot Hartbees, a species of antilope, which populated the area 
in large numbers at the time, and their sport was often exercised near the ‘poort’, a gap 
in the Magaliesberg range. This poort, in turn, is the current site of the Hartbeespoort 
dam where the Crocodile River cuts through the mountain range. In the course of 
geological time, slowing down to the north of the Magaliesberg, the Crocodile River 
deposited fertile silt on the plain, and the combination of fertile land with a narrow gap 
in the mountains created an ideal site for the development of the large scale irrigation 
scheme that now exists at Hartbeespoort.  
However, the dam was not injected into ‘neutral’ territory, nor did it manage to 
emerge as a water supply project until the political opportunity structure presented itself 
in the form of a unified South Africa backing both Afrikaner and English ‘poor white’ 
rural interests after 1910. In the Hartbeespoort area, three waves of colonisation 
preceded the construction of the dam, rearranging local power relationships, 
entitlements to natural resources, and changing the political prospects for the large scale 
development of water resources. These changes are described in brief below.  
At the beginning of the 19th century, the area was controlled by the Po polity, a 
Tswana Chiefdom whose heir at the time was named Mogale 5 . The name 
‘Magaliesberg’ is derived from ‘Mogale’s Bergen’, or Mogale’s mountains, i.e. the area 
fell under his jurisdiction and, as the name suggests, the Boers referred to the 
                                                 
3  Trapido, S. (1986): Putting a plough to the ground. Accumulation and Dispossession in Rural South  
Africa 1850-1930. pg 342. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. Trapido places particular emphasis on the 
prestige associated with a gentrified lifestyle in the rural power structures of the South Africa of the 
time. A visit to the country was a network opportunity in much the same way as a game of golf is in 
the modern day.  
4  See Petley, R.P. (2005): Hartbeespoortdam butterfly conservancy. Thesis submitted to University of  
   Pretoria. Pretoria: University of Pretoria.  
5  I.e. Mogale was the heir to the throne. 
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‘Magaliesberg’ in those terms. However, in the hundred years from 1820 to 1920, the 
Po gradually lost control of their land and associated water resources as these were 
claimed by the Zulu, the Afrikaners and the British respectively. After South Africa 
declared Union, legislation enacted by parliament served to further dispossess and 
weaken the Po, until they were forced to work their land as labourers or migrate to the 
emerging cities in search of work. 
The first wave of colonisation came in the 1820’s when Mzilikazi, a Zulu general, 
reacting to events further south, invaded the area and annexed the Magaliesberg. 
However, the Zulu victory was short lived, as in the second wave of colonisation, Boers, 
disaffected with the British control of the Cape colony, migrated into the area in the 
1830’s under the leadership of Paul Kruger, evicted Mzilikazi and began to claim land 
in the area. This victory over Mzilikazi changed the prospects for the Po tribe, some of 
whom were able to migrate back into the area. However, those Po that returned to the 
area often did so in much weakened economic circumstances, and when they returned, 
they did so to find much of their ancestral land occupied by the Boers. The Boers, 
however, were conciliatory out of personal need. They had just arrived in the area, and 
required labour to clear and cultivate the land they had occupied, so that they often 
allowed the Po to settle on their land as sharecroppers in return for a promise of labour6. 
Others were put to work as labourers, digging irrigation furrows for the new colonists7. 
For the Boers, access to water was a key factor in determining settlement: the best land, 
i.e. the land adjacent to a river or the land in the Magaliesberg containing springs, was 
favoured by the Boers, and six of the eleven first farms just downstream of the poort 
were named after their water sources: Hartbeesfontein, Zandfontein, Bokfontein, 
Krokodildrift Oos, Krokodildrif Wes, and Elandsfontein8.  
The capture and relocation of the water resources of the Crocodile River in the 
Hartbeespoort area would appear to have commenced after the colonisation of the area 
by the Boers, i.e. after 1830. One of the first activities that the Boers engaged in after 
settlement along the Crocodile River and its tributaries was the harnessing of water 
resources9. Along the course of the river, farmers began to construct barrages in the 
river to raise the local water level. This was coupled to the digging of earthen furrows to 
divert the water away from the river and along the contour of the land, where the water 
was led by gravity through secondary and tertiary furrows to the land below. Given the 
rocky terrain and the limited tools the farmers had at their disposal, the construction of 
weirs in the river and the digging of furrows was an extremely labour intensive process. 
Given the absence of cement, the farmers had to transport in limestone by ox wagon 
                                                 
6  See Trapido, S (1986): Putting a plough to the ground. A history of tenant production on the  
 Vereeniging Estates, 1896-1920. In: Beinhart, W., Delius, P. and Trapido, S. (1986): Putting a plough  
 to the ground. Accumulation and Dispossession in Rural South Africa, 1850-1930. Johanesburg:  
 Ravan Press.  
7  See Shillington (1986): Irrigation, Agriculture and the State: the Harts Valley in Historical  
Perspective. In: Beinhart, W., Delius, P. and Trapido, S (1986): Op. Cit.  
8  De Beer (1975): Agter die Magalies. Fontainebleu, South Africa: Postma Publikasies, p. 633. I draw  
 quite strongly on this book as it provides an extensive social history of Afrikaner settlement in the  
area. At the same time it must be cautioned that this source is deeply biased in favour of the Afrikaner  
settlers. 
9  Ibid, p. 102. 
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from the Skurweberg 5 km to the south, and they produced the cement themselves using 
makeshift ovens. Also, the river had to be diverted long enough to build a barrage and 
allow the cement to dry. If the diversion leaked or if rains swelled the river, the barrage 
would be destroyed and the farmers had to start their work again. Furthermore, the 
course of the irrigation furrow was along the contour of the land, which meant that all 
obstacles along the route of the furrow had to be removed, including large rocks. Where 
farmers came across these rocks, they built a fire and heated the rock, after which they 
would pour water on it, often resulting in the cracking of the rock.  
In order to surmount these obstacles, collective action was required in the form of 
both negotiations with regard to land use planning, such as around the registration of 
servitudes, and the pooling of labour across farms10. These interventions would appear 
to have been one among the first institutional responses to water scarcity in the area. 
Where the Boers owning riparian land had first dug their own furrows from the river, 
upscaling of their production required the digging of longer furrows upstream of their 
land, i.e. on the land of a neighbour. This meant agreeing to the registering of servitudes 
and the investment of labour and materials in the new furrows. Thus for instance De 
Beer describes a meeting about a furrow ‘project’ that was to be undertaken by the 
occupants of two farms along the Crocodile River in March 1893. The occupants of the 
farms ‘Krokodildrift Oost’ and ‘De Kroon’, met to agree on the construction of a new 
furrow and the registration of a servitude to lead a furrow across De Kroon to 
Krokodildrift Oost below it. This required the digging of a furrow that was ultimately 
some 5 km in length and which crossed the Lynspruit, a stream separating the two farms, 
about halfway along its course. The servitude was registered two months later in May 
1893. The weir across the Crocodile as well as the part of the furrow leading across De 
Kroon were to be dug and financed by both farms. The maintenance of the furrow 
across De Kroon was to fall to the occupants of De Kroon, while the maintenance of the 
section across Krokodilrift Oos was to fall to the occupants of the latter farm. The water 
was distributed equally in the sense that the water flowing during the day was for use on 
De Kroon and the water flowing at night was for Krokodildrift Oos11.   
Wealthier farmers were able to leverage the resources to harness the river’s potential 
without cooperation with others. For instance, Hendrik Schoeman, a General in the Boer 
War, owned a farm just south of the current dam wall, and he commanded the resources 
to have a private dam built upstream in the Skurweberg which supplied his farm with 
ample water12. When the Hartbeespoort dam was built, this farm disappeared under 
water.  
A total of ten such furrows were dug just north of the dam, leading off from either 
the Crocodile River or from the tributary streams that lead to the Crocodile from springs 
in the Magaliesberg on either side of the river. To this day, many of them still exist and 
are maintained by the local farmer population. At the site of the current dam the historic 
                                                 
10  A servitude is a legal restriction attached to property ownership that entitles a person other than the  
owner to transfer water across the property. For many farms it was advantageous to allow the water to  
cross the property of a higher neighbour before flowing onto the land, thus maintaining water pressure  
and maximising the supply area of the furrow.  
11  De Beer (1975): Op Cit. 
12  Ibid. 
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earthen furrows or ouvore are part of the infrastructure of the Hartbeespoort Irrigation 
Board and they still supply water to 1713 ha of land13.  
In the first half century after settlement, therefore, the extent of water resources 
development was very much dependent on the resources that farmers themselves could 
muster on their own or collectively. The colonial state was not in a position to invest in 
infrastructure development, especially as both the borders of the colony and its ruling 
elite were under dispute. Dispatches of farmers had been sent to Pretoria to ask for 
investment in irrigation at Hartbeespoort, but in 1899 war broke out and such plans as 
existed were shelved for the moment. Recruitment for the war drained the farms of 
labour, and in the war itself many farms were burned to the ground. In the first decade 
after the war, therefore, the (Afrikaner) farmers were concerned more with 
reconstruction than with new plans for water resources development. For black farmers, 
the Boer War had the positive effect of increasing demand for agricultural produce, 
while the evacuation of white farms in the Transvaal temporarily increased the area of 
land available to them for cultivation14. However, this change in their fortunes was short 
lived, as after Union, a range of legislative measures were introduced to curtail the 
productive opportunities of black farmers.  
With the British victory in the Boer War, the third wave of colonisation had now 
taken place and the British were in charge of the administration in Pretoria. 
Relationships between Boers and the British were very strained, and matters were not 
improved when the new staff at the Irrigation Department claimed not to be able to find 
requests for assistance in irrigation development that the Boers had submitted to the 
Transvaal administration before the war. The new Irrigation Department was scantily 
staffed, and its director accused the Transvaal section of having created too many ‘grand 
schemes’ which were far beyond the capacity of the Department to deal with at the time: 
 
“The Irrigation Department was created in 1904 and was carried on under the handicap of a severe 
financial depression […].The policy of the big state scheme was in vogue […]. The big Transvaal 
projects were nearly all too large and far too costly to be feasible at the time, and in the way of actual 
irrigation development very little had been achieved at the date of Union”15.    
 
Nevertheless, the British had realised – through the Anglo-Boer War - that political 
stability could not be achieved in South Africa without the cooperation of the large 
landowners in the Transvaal. The British High Commissioner approached the Boer 
leaders with an offer of relative autonomy in 1906, and the rapprochement that this 
generated eventually led to the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. Crucially 
for the development of irrigation, this meant that the post-union government was in 
                                                 
13  Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (undated): Hartbeespoort Dam / Hartbeespoort Government  
Water Scheme. Pretoria: DWAF. There is a discrepancy here with the 2800 ha mentioned in the  
DWAF 1987 ‘Besproeieingsgebruike en terugvloeie’ study mentioned below. Presumably this is to a  
large extent accounted for by the decline in productivity both of the old furrows and of the land under  
irrigation since they were first constructed in the 19th century. 
14  Maylam, P. (1986): A History of the African People of South Africa from the Early Iron Age to the  
1970’s. Cape Town: David Philip, p. 138  
15  Union of South Africa (1919): Report of the Director of Irrigation for the period 1/4/1918 to  
31/3/1919. Cape Town: Government Printers, pgs 1-2. The ‘date of Union’ is 1910. 
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essence an alliance of ‘gold and maize’, and that it was essentially sympathetic to 
investments in agriculture16. However, a mere four years later, the First World War 
broke out, and such plans as there were for large scale infrastructure investment were in 
the main postponed until after the war.  
The Irrigation Department, having insufficient funds for the development of large 
scale schemes in the Transvaal, did however have sufficient funds to commence the 
process of collecting and documenting climatic and hydrological data, and it also 
undertook a range of studies with regard to the question of the feasibility of building a 
dam at Hartbeespoort. The total annual flow of the Crocodile River was measured from 
1905 onwards, the land below the dam and the dam site itself were surveyed, and 
diamond drill borings were made of the rock structure below the dam to establish 
whether the enormous weight of the water and the dam would be supported by the 
surrounding geological structures17.  
After the First World War, circumstances had changed in such a way as to favour the 
scheme. The Union of South Africa was faced both with the effects of economic 
depression and with the unemployment amongst soldiers returning from the war. The 
construction of large scale irrigation works using (white) labour and the settlement of 
destitute (white) families on government irrigation schemes became a means to 
counteract the effects of the Depression while investing in the infrastructure and 
economy of the emerging nation. Also, the tensions after the Boer war had made way 
for the realpolitik of coexistence, and thus the government went ahead with the scheme 
where it had not done so before.  
Building the Hartbeespoort dam 
At the beginning of the First World War, the South African Department of Irrigation 
submitted an Act to parliament that would enable the construction of the Hartbeespoort 
Irrigation Scheme. This was the first time that the Union of South Africa was embarking 
upon water resource development on a large scale, and a separate piece of legislation 
was therefore created to regulate the institutional and technical issues emanating from 
the venture: 
 
“Be it enacted by the King’s Most Excellent Majesty […] for the purposes of a system of irrigation, 
drainage and water communication which has been prepared and shall be known as the Hartbeespoort 
Irrigation Scheme […]. The Governor-General may, out of moneys specially appropriated by 
parliament and as provided in […] the Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act, 1912, authorise the 
construction […] of the [said scheme]”18.   
 
The Act made provision for the reservation of a portion of the ‘normal flow’ of the 
Crocodile River, a quantity yet to be determined by the Water Court, for irrigation 
                                                 
16  Kirsten, van Zijl and Vink (1998): The Agricultural Democratisation of South Africa. Cape Town:  
Francolin, pg16. The concept of an alliance of gold and maize was developed by the historian Stanley  
Trapido.  
17  Ibid, p. 67 
18  Department of Irrigation (1914): Hartbeespoort Irrigation Scheme Act. Cape Town: Government  
Gazette 
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purposes19. Under riparian law, each landowner owning land adjacent to a river had an 
associated right to a portion of the flow of the river. This portion had to be determined 
by a Water Court through a highly technical process based on the historical flow 
statistics of the river which, in general, were in short supply at the time. In this historic 
decision, a portion of the water in the river was set aside for irrigation, thus 
commencing the first overall allocation of the water available in the catchment.  
In addition to the reservation of normal flow, which is possible without storage, the 
building of a dam also made it possible to capture the water from peak flow events. This 
dramatically increased the amount of water available for human use in the catchment 
and, through storage, the dependence upon climatic events could be replaced by a 
reasonably secure assurance of supply. Thus the act stated that:  
 
“The Governor-General may construct the Hartbeespoort dam and impound in the storage reservoir 
created thereby the whole of that surplus water of the Crocodile and Magalies Rivers and their 
tributaries which discharges into the said reservoir”20.  
 
Expropriation and ethnic depopulation  
Another key effect of the Act was to make provision for expropriation. Land and water 
that had until now been taken by armed force was now subject to legal process. Land 
was required by government for the construction of the dam, its access routes, 
settlement of construction workers and, above all, for the settlement of farmers. This 
expropriation affected both white and black. However, while whites were paid for the 
land they lost or sold some land but retained and improved their water rights, black 
landowners were simply resettled in areas with substantially less access to water21.     
Thus the preparations for the construction of the dam went hand in hand with the 
expropriation of those members of the black population who still resided in the area. 
Some members of the Mamogale family that had ruled the area a century ago still 
resided in the area, living on missions or owning tracts of land. With the development of 
the scheme, the area downstream of the dam was earmarked for white settlement, and 
the Mamogales were forced to move out:  
 
“Provision is made for legalising an exchange of a large tract of irrigable land owned by certain native 
tribes, with other land situated outside the limits of the scheme”22 
    
and  
 
“In the western part [i.e. the west bank of the Crocodile River, T.S.] the Government had two separate 
objects in view in acquiring land; firstly, to secure a large area for settlement, and, secondly, to effect 
                                                 
19  South African law at this time made provision for ‘normal flow’ and ‘surplus flow’ which referred to 
  the dependable flow and the peak flow in the river respectively.  
20  Department of Irrigation (1914): Hartbeespoort Irrigation Scheme Act. Cape Town: Government  
Gazette, p. 336. 
21  Ibid, p. 344. 
22  Union of South Africa (1918): Report of the Director of Irrigation for the period 1/4/1913 to  
31/3/1917. Cape Town: Government Printers, p. 68 
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the removal of a large native population established upon a number of farms along the western 
margin of the commanded area. These farms are registered in the name of the chiefs Jacobus Mare 
Mamogale, Johannes Mare Mamogale, and Darius Mogale”.23, emphasis added.  
  
The end result of this expropriation, as well as a wide range of subsequent resettlements 
in the apartheid period, was that the fertile and well-watered part of the Crocodile River 
valley became white-owned land extending 10km to the east and west of the river. The 
upper reaches of the valley on either side of the river were later apportioned to 
Bophutatswana. Figure 6.2 below illustrates how closely land distribution between 
white and black in the catchment as a whole corresponds with the availability of water. 
The entire main channel of the Crocodile River as well as the catchment’s major dams 
is located in previously white ‘RSA’24.    
The effect of the expropriation of land on the black population in the area was 
compounded by the fact that the construction of the dam and its ancillary works 
consciously drew on white rather than ‘native’ labour. The first mention of work related 
to the dam is in 1918, for the construction of a 12km railway from the town of Brits to 
the site of the dam which enabled the transport of 40 000 tonnes of cement to the site25. 
This work was carried out by a ‘mixed’ labour force. However, by 1919, a clear policy 
of supporting white labour had emerged and the village that was to be laid out for the 
construction team was built using predominantly white labour:  
 
“When the village was laid out and the houses designed, it was assumed that native unskilled labour 
would be employed and the natives’ camp was to be placed on the right bank of the river. In March 
1919, however, Government decided that the works were to be carried out wholly by white labour, 
and later that plots of ground should be allotted to the men, and they should have one day a week free 
to work their land. It was hoped by these means that some of the men would become useful 
agriculturalists and something higher than mere labourers working for a daily wage […]. Provision 
was to be made for instructing the men so that in time they might become capable of taking up 
irrigable land under this or other Government Irrigation schemes”26.   
 
 
 
                                                 
23  Ibid., p.71 
24  The Republic of South Africa, or RSA, was the white residential and business portion of South Africa 
  during apartheid. 
25  The report mentions 8 miles 
26  Union of South Africa (1919): Report of the Director of Irrigation for the period 1/4/1918 to  
31/3/1919. Cape Town: Government Printers, p. 63 
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Figure 6.2 
Correspondence between land allocation and water availability27 
 
 
 
The scope of work expanded rapidly in the next years, including work to temporarily 
divert the river, the construction of an access road, and ultimately the laying of the 
foundations for the dam itself. In 1920 the Department reported the employment of ‘107 
whites and 28 natives’; in 1921 this had rocketed to 2500 whites and an unspecified 
number of blacks. In 1923, unforeseen ‘difficulties’ led to a request for permission to 
employ ‘a limited amount of native labour’, i.e. 100 people, to swell the ranks of the 
labour force as the dam neared completion28.  
 
                                                 
27  Source: adapted from DWAF 1986: op. Cit 
28  Union of South Africa (1920): Report of the Director of Irrigation. Cape Town: Government Printers,  
Union of South Africa (1921): Report of the Director of Irrigation. Cape Town: Government Printers,  
Union of South Africa (1922): Report of the Director of Irrigation. Cape Town: Government Printers,  
Union of South Africa (1923): Report of the Director of Irrigation. Cape Town: Government Printers,  
esp. pgs 23-25 of latter report. 
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Box 6.1 
Apartheid and Bophutatswana in a nutshell29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Once the dam wall began to rise above its foundations, the diversion tunnel was closed 
and the dam began to fill in January 1923. The attention was now turned to the 
excavation of the main canals, which were dug by 464 workers on the west bank and 
1450 on the east bank30. This input of labour illustrates the tremendous upsurge of 
labour investment that was made possible with state support for irrigation development 
relative to the ‘self help’ period that had gone before.   
 
 
                                                 
29  See: Ministry in the Office of the Deputy President (1998): Poverty and Inequality in South Africa.  
Pretoria: Ministry in the Office of the Deputy President, Harrison, D. (1990): The White Tribe of  
Africa. Pretoria: Sigma Press; Davenport, T.R.H (1991); South Africa: a Modern History. London:  
Macmillan; Statistics South Africa (2001): Primary Tables for North West Province. Census ’96 and  
2001 compared. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa.   
30  Union of South Africa (1923): Op. Cit, p. 25 
The ascent to power of the National Party in 1948 created the political space for the introduction  
of ‘apartheid’ in 1960. Apartheid built upon laws and practices such as the 1913 Land Act which 
prohibited black people from buying or owning land outside Native Reserves delineated by the 
Union Government. It hinged upon the spatial separation of racial groups and a colour bar in the 
workplace. Under the Mixed Marriages Act of 1949 intermarriage between the races was 
forbidden and the Population Registration Act of 1950 was designed to allocate each South 
African to a ‘racial group’. The Group Areas Act of 1950 enabled the zoning of residential land 
for different racial groups. In 1960, The Promotion of Bantu Self Government Act was passed, 
which envisaged the transformation of the Native Reserves into self governing ‘Bantustans’ or 
‘Homelands’. Once these homelands were ‘independent’, its residents were to lose their South 
African passports. Between 1960 and 1980, more than two million black South Africans were 
forcibly removed to these homelands, ‘clearing’ white rural and urban areas that had been zoned 
off as ‘white’ under the Group Areas Act. The homelands became reserves of the unemployed, 
aged and infirm from which labour was contracted to work in the mines and on farms Ultimately 
87% of South Africa’s population was to live on 13% of the land area. The homelands were 
administered by traditional rulers who willingly or unwillingly entered into an alliance with the 
apartheid regime. Theoretically a prerequisite for resettlement was the presence of a borehole, 
spring, river, or dam at the point of resettlement but often these instructions were ignored, the 
water supply systems had broken down or were dysfunctional during droughts, or the natural 
sources available were unreliable and often polluted. Bophutatswana was the geographically most 
unrealistic homeland, in that it consisted of six separate pieces of land, some of which were more 
than 300km apart, of which two were separated by a strip of some 20 km wide on the fertile 
Crocodile River Valley floor (see figure 6.1.2 ). Bophutatswana was created in 1972 and declared 
to be an ‘independent’ Republic in 1977. Just prior to reintegration into South Africa in 1994 it 
had a population of some 2.5 million people. 67% of the people in Bophutatswana can be 
categorised as poor, and the homelands together account for 70% of South Africa’s poverty. The 
backlog in basic infrastructure provision is concentrated in the rural parts of Bophutatswana. In 
the North West Province into which most of Bophutatswana has been absorbed, the percentage of 
the population with access to piped water increased from 81% to 86% between 1996 and 2001 
despite a population increase of 28% in the same period.
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The utilisation of water in the Hartbeespoort Government Water Scheme  
In 1925, the dam was completed and it finally filled to full capacity in March of that 
same year. Although the main irrigation canals had not yet been completed along their 
full length, the water stored in the dam already supplied irrigation water to a total of 162 
initial agricultural users, of which 97 were farmer-owners and 65 were lessees.  
While the storage of water was a success, the settlement of ‘suitable’ individuals on 
the land and the provision of technical support to enable these individuals to realise the 
potential of the scheme appears to have created problems. The government had already 
coupled construction work to settlement, i.e. many of those set to work on the scheme 
were later settled on it as future farmer, but the profession of farmer did not necessarily 
meet with the ambitions of each settler drawn into the scheme. Many were drawn into 
the scheme out of poverty rather than out of a genuine interest in agriculture, and were 
technically ill equipped for the task. The scheme, after all, was established with poverty 
relief in mind, rather than with a view to creating an efficient agricultural system. With 
the completion of the scheme, there was a sudden and vast increase in the amount of 
water available, as well as a vast increase in the land that could be cultivated under 
irrigation. For the first few years after the scheme’s completion, settlement remained 
short of potential, and for this reason, major irrigation works were placed under direct 
government control rather than allowing an independent, farmer-controlled irrigation 
board to hold sway:  
 
“Under a large storage scheme the whole nature of agriculture is changed. Intensive cultivation is 
required, and where one owner farmed before the scheme, 100 farmers may be necessary when the 
scheme is completed. The business of causing this great change, of rapidly multiplying the number of 
settlers, is quite beyond the powers of a board of farmers […]. The desirability of handing over the 
whole management of the scheme eventually to a private board should not be lost sight of, but at the 
outset the business of investigation, acquiring land, dividing it up, getting suitable settlers, financing 
and advising them, constructing and maintaining the scheme and collecting rates should be undertaken 
by the state”31.  
 
 
The Hartbeespoort irrigation scheme, then, became what was known as a Government 
Water Scheme, i.e. the distribution of the irrigation water, the maintenance of the 
furrows and the administration of payments for the irrigation water supplied were all 
carried out by government officials in the employment of the Transvaal provincial 
administration. The high costs involved in creating the scheme created some pressure on 
the Department of Irrigation officials to make a success of the scheme, but the initial 
results were disappointing and direct control of the scheme was one means for the state 
to ensure its success. The preliminary data emerging from a number of other schemes 
throughout the country showed that settlement was slow, agricultural production took a 
long time to materialise and the payment rates for water were low32.  
Although the growing markets in Brits, Pretoria, Johannesburg and even overseas 
held a lot of promise for farmers, the institutional and infrastructural environment for 
                                                 
31  Union of South Africa (1923): Report of the Director of Irrigation, op. Cit, p. 2 
32  Ibid. 
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agricultural production was hostile at the time. Markets for agricultural produce were in 
the very early stages of development, with promising prospects but little in the way of 
support to link the farmer to the market through traditional mechanisms such as market 
and product information, credit, grading, pricing support, transport or storage. Nor did 
the economy of the time offer much solace, as the scheme was completed just before the 
Great Depression. Because of disappointing payment rates on all its large irrigation 
schemes, Government was forced to introduce a clause enabling the reduction of 
charges on new irrigation schemes where markets slumped, rainfall was far below 
expected, or crops were damaged33.  As a result, agricultural production grew falteringly, 
and it was not until the emergence of strong cooperatives and, after 1948, apartheid era 
state support for agriculture that full use could be made of the water made available by 
the scheme.  
At the time the dam came into operation, in the area of access to land, the new 
farmers played on a reasonably level playing field with regard to each other in that each 
was allotted or leased a plot of between 10 and 15 hectares. This land had been bought 
up and/or cleared for the purpose of the scheme, and many Boers had relinquished 
portions of their original land holdings to the scheme in the knowledge that such land as 
they kept for themselves for irrigation now had a far greater assurance of supply than 
ever before. However, the original Afrikaner landowners still retained farms of several 
hundred hectares in size, and therefore the scheme juxtapositioned a small number of 
established large scale farmers alongside a large number of emerging, small scale 
farmers. Property values had soared as a result of the completion of the scheme, and 
many existing owners of land took advantage of this situation by putting some of their 
land up for sale to the state. In fact, such was property speculation that one owner, 
whose property was essential for the construction of the dam, succeeded in holding up 
construction for about two years until a court case forced him to accept the state offer of 
compensation for his land and denied him the exclusive right to trade at the building site.  
In total, the irrigation scheme eventually commanded some 12 800 ha of ‘new’ 
land34.The old furrows dug by the settlers in the region had already enabled a total of 
2800 hectares to be irrigated, thus creating a total of 15 600 ha of irrigable land under 
the scheme35. Settlers wishing to establish themselves as farmers could obtain loans 
from the Department, and thus a large number of new settlers were leasing land in an 
attempt to create a viable agricultural enterprise36. Both the settlers who had dug out the 
‘ouvore’ or ‘old furrows’ that preceded the building of the dam and the new farmers 
were given a fixed allocation of 6200 m³/ha/annum of water from the dam. This 
amounted to a total average annual utilisation of 105,34 million m³ per annum for 
irrigation under the scheme37.   
                                                 
33  Ibid., pg .1 
34  I.e. not previously irrigated. In 1925, the canals had not yet been completed and thus the total area  
under the command of the scheme still grew after the dam had been filled.  
35  Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (1987): Krokodilrivier (Wes-Transvaal)  
Opvanggebiedstudie.  
Pretoria: DWAF, p. 2-5; 
36  Union of South Africa (1925): Op. Cit., p. 17. 
37  Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (1987): Op. Cit, p. 5-9; 
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In addition to the older weirs and ouvore, the scheme now had 550 km of canals 
criss-crossing the area to the north of the dam. This new infrastructure was qualitatively 
little better than its predecessor in that the ‘canals’ were simple earthen furrows which 
leaked an (at that time) unknown amount of water into the soil. However at the time 
these canals were constructed there was as yet little pressure to increase water use 
efficiency. The dam had made possible an enormous increase in the amount of water 
available, thus opening a large tract of land up for irrigation. For the moment, water was 
in ample supply. Furthermore, the irrigation works served a social function, providing 
employment to poor whites, and the scheme was implemented not so much with a view 
to economic viability as to its ability to absorb a white labour force. Access to water 
was subsidised to the extent that on average, water rates amounted to between 0,5 and 
1,2% of gross yield for the average plot of land on a government water scheme, and 
covered a mere 30% of the operation costs of the scheme, let alone capital 
depreciation38.  
While agricultural production was inward looking and vulnerable, it was destined to 
become increasingly embedded within a network of support institutions that expanded 
in number and intensity between the completion of the scheme in 1925 and the era of 
deregulation of South African agriculture that commenced in the mid-1980’s39. Between 
1910 and 1945, a number of policy developments contributed to the transformation of 
rural production in the area from low-tech, inward looking exploitation to high capital 
intensity, high external input agriculture. Where sharecropping had been practiced 
widely throughout the area, legislation aimed at increasing labour supply to the mines 
was passed limiting the number of ‘native’ tenant families on any one farm to five40. 
White farmers were given the power to evict those sharecroppers not willing to submit 
to their whims, and thus potential competition from black sharecroppers was eliminated. 
This change also drove a transition to mechanised production that was strongly 
accelerated by the establishment of the Land Bank in 190841.  
Initially, agricultural production was geared towards products with a long shelf life 
such as grain, (dried) fruit, and tobacco. The emerging markets in Pretoria and 
Johannesburg provided a steadily and increasing demand for produce, but could not as 
yet be supplied with fresh produce42. As the roads in the area were improved and 
refrigeration made its debut, it became possible to produce vegetables for the fresh 
produce markets of Pretoria and Johannesburg, and thus farmers were able to diversify. 
It would appear that maize, tobacco and citrus were the dominant crops in the early 
period of the scheme. The Magaliesbergse Koöperatiewe Tabaksplanters Vereniging 
(MKTV) was established in 1909 with a state loan to build storage facilities, and the 
Magaliesberg Koring Koöperatiewe Maatskappij (MKKM) was established in 193043. 44. 
                                                 
38  Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (1986): Management of the Water Resources of South  
Africa, p. 1.33  
39  Kirsten, van Zijl and Vink (1998), Op. Cit, pgs 71-82;  
40  I.e. the 1913 Land Act. 
41  Ibid., pp. 18-30; 
42  De Beer (1975): Op Cit, p. 82 
43  The Magaliesberg Cooperative Tobacco Planters Society 
44  Magaliesberg Grain Cooperative 
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Lastly, the Magaliesberg Citrus Cooperative was established in 1959. These 
organisations, which were essentially self help initiatives established by the farmers 
themselves, provided price support, pre-harvest financing and technical support, and 
enabled the expansion of production from the demand side.    
In 1954, The Department of Water Affairs invested in a project aimed at increasing 
the water use efficiency of the scheme through the lining of the irrigation furrows. All 
the furrows were lined with concrete in the hope of releasing 33% of the water of the 
scheme for further extension of the scheme and for the release of water to other users 
downstream. In the process, the farmers on the scheme lost a portion of their legal rights 
to the water as the Department was of the opinion that this water was not being put to 
fruitful use45. 
By the early 1970’s, the water needs of the irrigation scheme were beginning to pose 
serious problems for the further expansion of the area. Increasing water scarcity in 
South Africa as a whole was leading to growing political concern for the high 
concentration of economic development in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand- Vereeniging 
triangle, and a policy of industrial decentralisation was pursued as a direct response to 
growing water scarcity46. The industrialisation of the agricultural town of Brits was one 
of the results of this decentralisation programme, whereby industrialists were 
encouraged to relocate their business to areas close to the homelands where there was 
ample supply of cheap labour. As a result, Brits expanded rapidly, with a corresponding 
increase in its demand for water. In 1970, the spillway of the Hartbeespoort dam was 
raised such that the total capacity of the dam increased from 148 million m³ to 193 
million m³47. In this way, water supply downstream of the dam was increased by a 
potential 23.3%, depending on rainfall conditions. This development heralded the 
further diversification of demand for water from the Hartbeespoort dam, which I 
describe in the net section. Furthermore, in the 1970’s, the farmers owning land along 
the historical ouvore submitted an application to the Department of Water Affairs for 
their furrows and farms to be included within the overall management of the irrigation 
scheme. The Department approved this application and by doing so, a number of the 
large old farms that predated the Hartbeespoort scheme were included under the 
umbrella of furrow maintenance and rate collection.    
 
The diversification of demand  
In the period when the dam was constructed, agriculture was still the mainstay of the 
local economy, and the lion’s share of the water allocation in the dam was reserved for 
irrigation. A small quantity of water had been reserved for domestic use in white 
settlements close to the dam such as the villages of Schoemansville and Kosmos..  
However, over time three successive developments served to transform the ultimate 
purpose of the dam from an impoundment for irrigation into a powerhouse for local 
                                                 
45  De Beer (1975): Op. Cit,  
46  See Davenport (1991): Op. Cit, p. 399 
47  Departement van Waterwese (1970)Verslag van die Sekretaris Van Waterwese vir die tijdperk 1 April  
1970 tot 31 Maart 1971. Pretoria: State Printers, p. 27 (Report of the Director of Water Affairs for  
the period from 1 April 1970 to 31 March 1971  
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economic development in general. Firstly, the upper limits of irrigation development 
were reached in the upper Crocodile. Secondly, water was imported from the Vaal River 
catchment, augmenting the naturally available supply in the catchment. Thirdly, 
economic changes led to a diversification of demand in the area such that the ample 
supply of water for irrigation no longer remained unquestioned.  
Figure 6.3 below illustrates the very significant impact of the completion of the 
Hartbeespoort dam on both the irrigated area in state water schemes and on the total 
irrigated area in the upper Crocodile catchment. In the historical process described 
above, settlers in the area invested in the development of private irrigation at the turn of 
the century such that in 1920, 9490 ha was under private irrigation. 
The ouvore near Hartbeespoort represented 2800 ha or 29,5% of the total private 
irrigation in the upper Crocodile catchment. The rest had taken place upstream of 
Hartbeespoort in the various tributaries of the upper Crocodile: the Magalies, 
Skeerpoort, Rietspruit and Jukskei rivers. At that time, the state had not yet come to the 
aid of farmers through the construction of water schemes. The Hartbeespoort scheme 
dramatically changed this state of affairs. The dam was completed in 1924, i.e. between 
1923 and 1926, and since that time, the total area under irrigation in the upper 
catchment remained relatively constant.  
 
Figure 6.3  
Growth in Irrigated Area / Upper Crocodile48 
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48  Developed on the basis of statistics from Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (1987): Op. Cit,  
p. 2-3 and Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (2003): Crocodile (West) and Marico Water  
Management Area. Overview of Water Resources Availability and Utilisation. Pretoria: DWAF,  
September 2003, Annex 3; The distinction between government water schemes and private schemes  
has fallen away in 2000, because government water schemes have been handed over to farmers. 
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“When the village was laid out and the houses designed, it was assumed that native unskilled labour 
would be employed and the natives’ camp was to be placed on the right bank of the river. In March 
1919, however, Government decided that the works were to be carried out wholly by white labour, 
and later that plots of ground should be allotted to the men, and they should have one day a week free 
to work their land. It was hoped by these means that some of the men would become useful 
agriculturalists and something higher than mere labourers working for a daily wage […]. Provision 
was to be made for instructing the men so that in time they might become capable of taking up 
irrigable land under this or other Government Irrigation schemes”49.   
 
The figure also illustrates how the greater part of the private development of irrigation 
had already taken place at the turn of the century: between 1926 and 1987, the area of 
land under private irrigation remained relatively constant. In the realm of government 
water schemes, the land area under irrigation remained similarly constant.  
Figure 6.4 
Growth in Irrigated area in the Crocodile River Catchment50 
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On the other hand increasing return flows of urban/industrial water did enable a small 
increase in irrigated area in the upper Crocodile recently.  
 
 
 
                                                 
49  Union of South Africa (1919): Report of the Director of Irrigation for the period 1/4/1918 to  
31/3/1919. Cape Town: Government Printers, p. 63 
50  DWAF (1987, 2003): Op Cit. 
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A second important point is that the importation of water into the Crocodile river 
system from the Vaal River system and later from other river basins resulted in a steady 
increase of urban return flow over time. The greater part of these water imports were 
released as ‘return flow’ into the upper Crocodile subcatchment and therefore flowed 
into Hartbeespoort dam. As a result of this return flow into the Hartbeespoort dam, 
water was stored in excess of the amount that is naturally available in the upper 
catchment. The interbasin transfer from the Vaal River system into the Witwatersrand 
augmented the flow in the Crocodile in the form of return flow from urban areas. Return 
flow from the Johannesburg area augmented flow in the Upper Crocodile, while return 
flow from Pretoria augmented flow in the Pienaars River tributary. This meant that 
whereas the western areas of the catchment still suffered from acute water shortages, 
there was now in the main channel a potential powerhouse for further satisfaction of 
demand: return flows made further expansion of settlement and economic activity 
possible. 
 
Figure 6.5  
Growth of water imports into the catchment 
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However, again, such expansion would only be possible through abstractions from the 
main water channel, or through the implementation of major works for the transfer of 
water to other subcatchments. Thus far this has been implemented in relation to the 
Vaalkop dam, which receives a transfer from Roodekoppies dam. Table 6.1 below 
illustrates this situation with the aid of dam water requirements in the catchment.  The 
table shows the clear east-west distribution of scarcity in that the western dams almost 
all have annual water shortages while the eastern dams almost all have water surpluses, 
with the notable exceptions of the Klipvoor and Roodekoppies dams. It is noteworthy 
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that the only dam located in the eastern half of the catchment which has a water deficit 
is located on the Moretele River inside the former homeland of Bophutatswana. 
Roodekoppies dam, for its part, receives water transfers from Hartbeespoort dam, and 
thus has a positive water balance despite being located in the western half of the 
catchment. 
The Hartbeespoort dam, then, grew in importance in time as it received more water 
in the form of return flows from the urban areas upstream. This leads to the third point, 
namely, that the demand for water diversified over time. The transformation of the 
economy in the area between 1924 and 1994 included after the further expansion of 
mining (7% of GGP), the development of a manufacturing sector (22% of GGP), the 
urbanisation of the upper Crocodile, and the development of a service industry (about 
20% of GGP). 
 
 
Table 6.1 
Annual Water Requirements per Dam / million m³/annum51 
Dam Name  Storage Capacity 
(million m³) 
Annual water 
surplus / deficit 
Location: ‘east’ 
or ‘west’52 
Lindleyspoort 14,417 - 6.7 West  
Koster 12,176 - 3.2 West  
Olifantsnek 14,200 - 8.5 West 
Vaalkop 0,760 - 3.3 West  
Buffelspoort 10,328 - 10 West  
Hartbeespoort 194,626 + 31.2 East 
Roodekopjes 102,600 + 5.2 West 
Rietvlei 12,197 + 4.9 East 
Klipvoor 43,800 - 17.7 East 
Bon Accord 4,293 + 6.5 East 
Roodeplat 43,691 +10 East 
  
The role of agriculture in the economy declined to some 2% of GGP53.  These economic 
developments had a related effect on water utilisation, as shown in figure 6.6 below. 
Table 6.6 illustrates the current dominance of ‘urban’ and industrial water use in the 
catchment. At 47%, the urban sector consumes almost half of the water supply in the 
catchment and has pushed back the historical dominance of the irrigation sector. And 
because of the specific location of the urban sector in the upper reaches of the 
catchment, the return flow from urban areas has enabled the diversification of demand 
in lower areas of the catchment which were until recently locked into agriculture. Of 
course, this diversification was only possible through the increasing importation of 
water from other catchments that is illustrated by figure 6.5 above. In 2000, the upper 
                                                 
51  DWAF (1986, 1987, 2003): Op. Cit.  
52  Of course this is a relative concept; I have made a rough division between dams in the east and dams  
in the west of the catchment.  
53  DWAF (2003): Op. Cit, p. 9 
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Crocodile River received an inward transfer of 279 million m³ of water whereas its 
natural yield is 336 million m³. 
 
Figure 6.6 
Sectoral breakdown of water demand / whole catchment  
Water utilisation / sectoral breakdown
Irrigation 37%
Urban 47%
Rural 2%
Mines/Ind. 11%
Power 3%
 
 
Allowing for system losses of around 30% in the urban areas in the upper catchment, 
this still means an increase in the availability of water in Hartbeespoort dam of 32% 
above natural yield. As a result, water could be released for various purposes in the 
areas below the dam, i.e. in the lower Crocodile area. This situation is illustrated in 
figure 6.7 below. Figure 6.7 shows that urban and industrial demand are beginning to 
make inroads into the dominance of the agricultural sector below Hartbeespoort. To a 
large extent, this diversification is mediated by the bulk supplier Magalies Water Board 
which utilises extra water made available in the Vaalkop dam. Vaalkop dam receives a 
transfer from the Hartbeespoort dam via the Roodekoppies dam, and is a key source of 
water for the bulk water supplier Magalies Water Board. This board was established in 
1969 to supply the bulk needs of the platinum mines in Rustenburg and Thabazimbi, but 
its area of supply was later extended into former Bophutatswana to include a range of 
rural domestic users. Since then its supplies have expanded rapidly, and Vaalkop dam 
now has a purification facility that can deliver 210 Megalitres of water per day to its 
various consumers. This facility in turn is being upgraded to expand delivery to an iron 
smelter in Thabazimbi, and the Development Bank of South Africa enthusiastically 
claims that  
 
“Applying national averages and existing ratios regarding the forward and backward linkages created 
by bulk water supply, the successful implementation of the programme will lead to an increase in the 
South African GDP of R 69 million per annum”54. 
 
                                                 
54  DBSA (2005/6): 2005/6 Activities Report. Midrand: DBSA, p. 34 
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Figure 6.7 
Sectoral breakdown of water demand / Hartbeespoort dam55  
Water supply from Hartbeespoort dam 
Other 2%
Ind. 15%
Urban 6%
Irr. Bd. 69%
Ouvore 8%
 
Whether these claims are true or not, it is certainly the case that the economy of the 
Crocodile River catchment has been changing rapidly since the discovery of platinum, 
and Rustenburg, Brits and Thabazimbi have become growth points whose development, 
like Johannesburg before them, depend wholly on the importation of water. The water 
demand category of ‘industrial’ use in figure 6.7 above refers to industrial usage in 
these three towns, of which Brits and Thabazimbi fall within the municipality of 
Madibeng.  
The urban return flows into Hartbeespoort dam have also enabled the further 
expansion of irrigation in areas which until recently only had rain fed agriculture. As  
illustrated in figure 6.4 above, irrigation was virtually non-existent in the lower 
Crocodile before 1950 and grew to some 17000 ha in the current period. And last but 
not least, the dam had extra capacity for the provision of water for domestic use in the 
new district municipality of Madibeng downstream of the dam, and a range of mines 
and industries located in the Madibeng area could be given a higher assurance of supply. 
This urban return flow feeding further expansion, however, has come at a price in that it 
is severely polluted. 
                                                 
55  Source: correspondence with Chris Hattingh, Department of Water Affairs and Forestry Hartbeespoort  
office, Sept. 2006 
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Box 6.1  
Schematic representation of the new role of Hartbeespoort dam  
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 Many of the problems of urban development in the upstream area of the upper 
Crocodile have been passed down to Hartbeespoort dam through the inflow of 
biologically and inorganically contaminated water. This has created a dilemma between 
storing sufficient water and storing water of sufficient quality at Hartbeespoort. This 
issue is discussed in the section below.  
 
Return flow and the institutional response to pollution  
In terms of the 1956 Water Act, and as a measure designed to combat scarcity, purified 
water that has been used for industrial or urban purposes after having been abstracted 
from a public stream, must be returned to that public stream at the place from where it 
was abstracted or at another place to be determined by the Minister. On a large scale 
this means that in principle, water sourced from the Vaal River for use in Johannesburg 
should be returned across the ridge. However for practical purposes and due to the 
needs in the Crocodile River catchment, the return flow from the urban areas along the 
upper edge of the catchment is allowed to flow into the Crocodile and its tributaries. On 
a smaller scale, it means that individual mines and other industries abstracting water 
from the tributaries of the Crocodile, are obliged to return the water after use to the 
stream it was drawn from. In addition, the Act indicates that industrial water users (and 
municipalities) should purify the effluent to a prescribed standard before returning it to 
the stream. In practice this amounts to the imposition of ceilings for the concentrations 
of toxic substances present in the water discharged. However Fuggle and Rabie 
comment that given the fact that some 400 new chemical compounds are introduced 
onto the South African market every year, it is virtually impossible to monitor, legislate 
against and punish pollution offenders in specific cases56. Also, Howard et al suggest 
that setting such effluent standards, known as Uniform Effluent Standards or UES, 
regulates the input of effluents but not the quality of the receiving water or the 
assimilation capacity of the receiving water57. Different water bodies react differently to 
the same input of effluent - for instance through differences in the evaporation rate - and 
thus what matters for water quality is not so much the input of effluent as the quality of 
the water that is receiving the effluent.   
 Despite its drawbacks, the monitoring of both organic and inorganic concentrations 
of pollutants remains an accessible way to keep track of water quality, and it is therefore 
a persistent way of presenting data in the literature. The two main sources of water 
quality deterioration in South Africa are salinisation on the one hand and eutrophication 
on the other hand. Salinisation refers to the salinity of the water, i.e. to the concentration 
of dissolved minerals and salts, while eutrophication refers to the negative effect on 
water of excessive nutrient loading. Salinity is produced by mining activity, which is 
widespread in South Africa, and it is exacerbated by irrigation. Eutrophication, on the 
                                                 
56  See Fuggle, R.F. and Rabie, M.A. (1992): Environmental Management in South Africa. Cape Town:  
Juta, p. 487 
57  Howard, M., Mangold, S and Mpabane, S. (2005): State of the Environment Report for North West  
Province. Mmabatho: North West Provincial Government, pg 2. of chapter 10.  
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other hand, is the result of human settlement, and the concomitant release of nutrients 
into water courses.  
 Since it was built in 1925, the Hartbeespoort dam has witnessed widespread 
urbanisation in the upper Crocodile area, it has witnessed the expansion of mining 
activity, and it has witnessed the development of irrigation. The impoundment acts as a 
trap for all pollutants that are transported downstream from the towns, mines and farms, 
and over time, the quality of the water impounded in the dam has deteriorated severely. 
A number of reasons can be advanced for this deterioration.  
Firstly, there are currently a total of nine purification works upstream of the dam, and 
although in theory these plants should be responsible for the control of water quality, in 
practice purification measures are not keeping abreast of pollution. In fact, it is 
sometimes argued that releases from these plants have to a large extent been responsible 
for the increasing pollution of the water in Hartbeespoort dam. The main problem with 
these plants is the release of nutrients such as phosphates and sulphates which are not 
sufficiently removed from urban wastewater. Harding et al estimate a total current 
annual discharge of 175 metric tonnes of Phosphorus into the dam from various 
purification works, of which 48% is sourced from the Northern Sewerage Works in 
Johannesburg that decants into the Jukskei River, and the rest is sourced from the 
remaining eight smaller plants 58 . In principle a reduction by 90% of Phosphorus 
discharges is possible through a ban on detergents containing phosphates and the 
upgrading of the purification plants to include phosphate filters. However this would 
require a long term investment in public awareness and in the overall capacity of the 
purification works.  
The nutrients flow downstream and upset the ecology of the dam by - amongst other 
things - encouraging the wild growth of surface water plants and algae. Financial 
problems encountered by these purification plants have resulted in the limiting of their 
ability to treat wastewater to within the range of pollutant concentration prescribed by 
the Uniform Effluent Standards59.  
Secondly, storm water ingress into sewerage transportation systems is a major 
problem in the areas upstream of the dam. In theory, urban waterborne sewerage 
systems are closed systems, transporting wastewater in closed pipes to the purification 
plants, where the water is cleaned again. However, in many areas the sewerage systems 
of Johannesburg are more than fifty years old, and the financial problems of the city 
have limited the amount of maintenance that the system receives. In addition, limited 
monitoring of building practices has led to widespread disregard for the practice of 
connecting household storm water drainage to sewerage systems. On the one hand, 
inadequate maintenance of the sewerage system leads to the cracking and breaking of 
pipes through old age, the interference of tree roots, the blockage of sewers, cracking of 
pipes by movements of earth through mining and other activities, etc. On the other hand, 
the ingression of storm water into the sewerage system overloads the sewerage system, 
and thus raw, untreated sewerage exits the system and joins surface water runoff. The 
                                                 
58  DH Environmental Consulting (2005): Hartbeespoort Dam Remediation Project. Cape Town:  
DHEC 
59  DH Environmental Consulting (2005): Op, Cit, pg 37.  
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typical sewer blockage rate in South Africa is 3 per kilometre per annum, ten times the 
international average60. With the 8900 km of sewerage pipes in Johannesburg, this 
constitutes an almost insurmountable problem in the management of discharge. While 
effluent standards may be monitored at the wastewater plant, therefore, much of the 
wastewater does not in fact reach the purification plants and it flows uncleaned into the 
dam.  
Thirdly, inadequate sanitation and organic waste disposal in poorer areas upstream of 
the dam result in both bacteriological pollution and enhancement of the nutrient load. 
The informal settlements along the Jukskei River are a case in point: the Jukskei forms a 
continuous source of raw sewerage that flows into the dam and further raises its nutrient 
content. Samples taken of the river water from 71 sampling sites by the Water Quality 
division of Johannesburg’s Development Planning and Environment Directorate 
showed that in 87% of the cases, the water of the Jukskei could be categorised as either 
‘bad’ or ‘unacceptable’ through a combination of sewerage, mining and industrial 
pollution61. The counts of e-coli bacteria in the water have been known to rise in the 
millions in the past, although urban renewal measures have succeeded in reducing these 
to between 60000 and 90000 / ml. These counts are still several orders of magnitude 
larger than the prescribed ‘safe’ count of 200, but they do indicate that initiatives in the 
realm of urban renewal are slowly beginning to have an impact upon public health and 
water qualit 62 . Nevertheless, pollution of the Jukskei renders the water in the 
subcatchment unfit for domestic or recreational use all the way to the junction with the 
Crocodile River and severely affects the quality of the water in the dam63.  
 As mentioned above, the combination of these forms of pollution in the upper 
Crocodile led to a severe deterioration in the quality of the water in the Hartbeespoort 
dam. In the dam itself, the main problem that emerged was eutrophication - the over-
enrichment of the water by nutrients such as nitrates and phosphates. Biologists use 
three basic categories to describe the quality and biomass production in a lake from 
oligotrophic (low in productivity and species abundance) through mesotropic to 
eutrophic (high productivity, high species abundance but low species diversity)64. Since 
1985, the water in the Hartbeespoort dam has regularly been described as hypertrophic, 
i.e. it has extremely high productivity leading to extreme populations of certain species 
but the diversity is extremely limited:  
 
“Hartbeespoort is an extreme case of nutrient enrichment, caused by the entrapment of much of the 
effluent generated by industry and urban development in and around Johannesburg. The results have 
been spectacular blooms of the alien floating plant Eichornia crassipes (water hyacinth), as well as so-
                                                 
60  Water Wheel (2005): Stormwater Ingress Threatens Urban Health. Pretoria: Water Wheel, June 2005  
61  City of Johanneburg (2002): Zooming in on the Dirty Water Hotspots. www.joburg.org.za, May 2002 
62  Jukskei river pollution levels are regularly reported in The Star (e.g. Jukskei poses major health risk,  
09/10/2003, Jukskei river project flows into trouble, 22/10/2000), Engineering News (e.g. R1,3 Bn  
Alexandra renewal project advances, Pretoria: Engineering News, 19/06/2006), www.joburg.org.za, 
May 2002 (Greater Johannesburg State of the Environment Report), and www.dwaf.org.za .  
63  City of Johannesburg (1995) : State of the environment report / water. Johannesburg  
64  DWAF (2002): Trophic Status Assessment. Pretoria: DWAF 
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called ‘hyperscums’ of the blue green algae […] which causes taste and odour problems in drinking 
water [and] may be toxic in some stages of its life cycle”65 
 
In the realm of access to water, the eutrophication of the water in the Hartbeespoort dam 
began to generate a number of problems. Firstly, while in theory water emanating from 
upstream purification plants should be potable, the reality with regard to the water in the 
dam is that it is unsafe for human consumption and that therefore downstream users are 
excluded from the utilisation of water for domestic purposes unless considerable effort 
is invested in its re-purification. As will be described in more detail below, the 
Municipality of Madibeng is responsible for the provision of domestic water to a large 
population located downstream of the dam, and it is facing rising expenditure on water 
purification on behalf of its consumers.  
 
Figure 6.8 
Pollution of Hartbeespoort Dam  
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Secondly, and although much less tangible, Hartbeespoort and the Magalies range 
provide recreational ‘services’ to the surrounding population, and tourism is an 
important aspect of the economy of the area. In 2000, the number of tourists visiting the 
Hartbeespoort dam per month grew above 50 000, and this trend is set to continue. 
However, the progressive growth of pollution has limited the recreational activities that 
can be undertaken in and around the dam, and in this sense; also, access to water has 
been reduced.     
Excessive nutrient enrichment is not the only pollution related problem that the dam 
faces: a second major problem lies in the area of salinisation. Because of the extensive 
                                                 
65  Fuggle R.F. and Rabie M.A. (1992): Op. Cit, p. 287 
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grid of interbasin transfer schemes, water is transported over long distances before it 
reaches Hartbeespoort. Along its course, water evaporates and the remaining water 
becomes more enriched with salts, which, at high concentrations, can also limit the uses 
to which water is put. Already at the Vereeniging and Zuikerbosch intakes from the 
Vaal river system from which water is pumped across the ridge into Johannesburg, the 
annual Total Dissolved Salts concentration rose from some 200 mg/l in the 1940’s to 
some 350mg/l nowadays. By the time the water reaches the Hartbeespoort dam the TDS 
concentration has risen to 366 mg/l. This already affects crop production to some degree: 
downstream of the dam, i.e. at the site of the Hartbeespoort Irrigation Scheme, salinity 
has limited the range of crops that can be grown to those which have a high tolerance of 
salt. While tobacco used to be grown on the land of the scheme, this no longer takes 
place, because the tobacco no longer falls within the public health norms with regard to 
chlorine content. In addition, only those lands which have sufficient drainage can be 
used for irrigation66. Downstream of the irrigation scheme, salinity rises sharply as a 
direct result of the irrigation scheme. The Roodekoppies dam, located some 40 km 
downstream of Hartbeespoort, contains water with a TDS content of 622 mg/l, which 
threatens the production of crops under irrigation67.    
Overall, then, the return flow into the Hartbeespoort dam from the Upper Crocodile 
area has both increased the quantity of water available and strongly deteriorated its 
quality. Where in the past, Hartbeespoort itself was a frontier in terms of water scarcity, 
the construction of the dam temporarily alleviated local scarcity, providing irrigation 
water and shifting the scarcity frontier downstream and westward. With the growth of 
return flow, Hartbeespoort became a supply station for demand areas downstream. 
These areas in turn required institutions that could respond to local water demands of 
various kinds.  
In an effort to respond to these demands, both existing and new institutions 
developed interventions and played out their respective roles in the transition period in 
response to a new political opportunity structure. These responses were bound by the 
physical infrastructure, the institutional infrastructure, the policy environment and the 
state of the water resources of the area when South Africa entered its democratic period 
in 1994. Part two of this chapter is devoted to describing these responses.   
 
Responses to water scarcity after 1994  
For each category of demand around and below Hartbeespoort dam, change was the 
order of the day in the period between 1994 and the present. Fuelled by return flow, the 
dam, which had originally been built to supply white agricultural interests, could now 
open up economic development downstream against the backdrop of a completely new 
political dispensation that favoured an equitable distribution of water amongst the 
various stakeholders in the area. Certain areas of demand, such as domestic use in ex-
Bophuthatswana, had simply been ignored in the past, and a concerted effort was 
required to bring bulk supplies to (or bore for) water in these neglected zones. 
                                                 
66  DWAF (1987): Op. Cit, p. 8-7 
67  Howard, M., Mangold, S and Mpabane, S. (2005): Op. Cit.  
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Agricultural water users, for their part, had lost their historical position of privilege and 
were under increasing pressure to pay an economic price for water and allow non-white 
users into the institutions for water management such as irrigation boards. In the realm 
of mining and industry, the discovery of platinum reserves in the North West province 
promised to guarantee a new wave of economic growth favouring industrialisation in 
Rustenburg, Brits and Thabazimbi. And finally, amid this change, the Magaliesberg and 
the Hartbeespoort dam gained importance as nature reserves and recreational areas 
which also represented a category of water ‘use’, albeit based on the intrinsic rather 
than on the economic value of water.  
Ultimately, these water management issues were inserted into or acted on by a range 
of institutional vehicles, of which the new South African municipalities, the new water 
boards and a new water management institution known as a ‘Water User Association’ 
were to be the key variants68. It is therefore necessary to diverge for a moment to 
describe these new institutions and the roles they have taken up.  
 Firstly, in terms of the Water Act of 1998, local activities exclusively related to water 
management were provided with a new institutional format in the form of the Water 
User Association. Thus local groupings with ambitions in the realm of water utilisation 
could look to this format as a vehicle to achieve their particular goals. For new 
groupings, the Water User Association (in theory) provided an off-the-shelf legal 
vehicle to achieve certain water management goals. However, for existing irrigation 
boards in particular, the concept had no such voluntary connotations, as the Act 
prescribed that they must transform into Water User Associations within six months of 
the promulgation of the Act. The section below describes water user association policy 
in more detail.  
 Secondly, the re-demarcation of South Africa’s municipalities meant that local 
government was operating within an entirely new geographic framework. Apartheid-era 
entities were amalgamated into new units that had to strive towards political 
reconciliation on the one hand and towards a balance between the demands of 
development (in this case access to water for production and consumption) and the 
demands of affordability on the other hand. In the context of the new constitution the 
new municipalities were charged with the responsibility for the extension of domestic 
water services to achieve universal coverage. Furthermore, in the context of the 
Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Programme, they were given the opportunity 
to draw down grants and subsidies for irrigation development and the expansion of 
agriculture for poverty alleviation purposes.  
 In Hartbeespoort, three primary and interrelated institutional responses to the new 
situation have emerged: the voluntary establishment of a Water User Association on the 
basis of civil society mobilisation for the sustainable utilisation of water, the 
compulsory transformation of a former irrigation board, and the claims on water 
resources made by a new Local Municipality seeking to achieve developmental goals69. 
                                                 
68  That is, the concept of Water User Associations was new to South Africa. Water User Associations 
existed around the world for many decades and the idea was imported into South African water policy 
in the 1990’s.  
69  In a process parallel to institutional developments in and around Hartbeespoort and the Municipality  
of Madibeng, Magalies Water Board has also undergone a transformation in supply area, orientation  
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These institutional responses are detailed below, but before doing so a number of 
pertinent aspects of Water User Association policy are detailed here.     
 
Water User Association Policy 
Internationally, the term ‘water user association’ (henceforth: WUA) has come to be 
associated with local institutions that manage a particular form of water service. 
Traditionally, the term is associated with farming, and thus a WUA is seen as an 
organisation managing an irrigation system – as seen for instance in the following 
definition:  
 
“The term “Water User Association” refers generally to a grouping of farmers, usually of one 
hydraulic unit, command, or irrigation district, in one formal body for the purpose of managing parts 
of an irrigation system”70 
 
However, it is quite conceivable that other forms of water related service are performed 
by a WUA, such as the conservation of a lake for recreational purposes or the joint 
utilisation of water source by users in the agricultural, mining, industrial, domestic or 
recreational sectors. This broader definition of a WUA found its way into South African 
legislation, and in the 1998 Water Act a WUA is defined as follows: 
 
“Although water user associations are water management institutions their primary purpose, unlike 
catchment management agencies, is not water management. They operate at a restricted localised level, 
and are in effect co-operative associations of individual water users who wish to undertake water-
related activities for their mutual benefit. A water user association may exercise management powers 
and duties only if and to the extent these have been assigned or delegated to it”71, emphasis added.    
 
The wording of this policy gives away some of the conceptual problems that the 
department seems to have had with WUA’s at inception. First of all, the Act makes the 
strange statement that WUA’s do not manage water. In practice, this is clearly not true: 
the main thrust of the day to day activities of an irrigation board, for instance, is 
precisely to ‘manage’ large quantities of water. Further reading of the Act and other 
milestones in water policy, however, reveals the desire to distinguish between the 
management of water as a resource and the management of water as a service. Formally, 
the role of the state is to manage the resource (protection, supply and allocation of water) 
while the role of WUA’s is simply to provide a ‘connector’ service to individuals.  
In practice, the separation between resource management and service management is 
much murkier than policy would suggest. The huge impact of the ‘management of water 
as a service’ in Johannesburg on the overall ‘management of water as a resource’ in the 
                                                                                                                                               
towards bulk water supply and clientele. This chapter focuses on institutional developments in the  
direct vicinity of the dam, and thus only occasional mention is made of Magalies Water Board.   
70  World Bank (1997): The Legal Framework for Water Users’ Associations. A Comparative Study.  
Washington: IBRD technical paper no. 360, p. 1 
71  Government Gazette (1998): National Water Act, Act no. 36 of 1998. Cape Town: Government  
Gazette,  
chapter 8.  
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catchment as a whole is a case in point. The difficulty of sustaining this analytical 
separation between ‘authority’ and ‘service provider’ has to some extent been alleviated 
by the legal caveat in the Act that management powers may in some cases be delegated 
to a WUA. Clearly it is difficult to manage a water service without affecting the overall 
quantity and quality of the resource, and given the fact that existing irrigation boards in 
South Africa account for more than 50% of national water consumption, the role of 
these organisations in the overall management of the resource was due to feature before 
very long. However, in the period after 1998, most of the attention of the department at 
the time was on water services and on catchment management, and thus WUA’s 
gradually became the Cinderella institution of water policy in comparison with Water 
Service Authorities, Water Service Providers, and Catchment Management Agencies.  
What was clear at the time of the drafting of the Act was that Water User 
Associations were to become instruments for transformation of the existing irrigation 
boards. The irrigation boards continued to exist after the promulgation of the Water Act, 
but it was stipulated that:  
 
“Within six months of the commencement of this Act, a board must prepare and submit to the 
Minister a proposal […] to transform the board into a Water User Association”72    
 
According to a member of the drafting team for the Act, the team had given a lot of 
thought to the fact that the internal demographics of the existing Irrigation Boards were 
far from representative and that much of the focus of their transformation would have to 
be on achieving a better representation 73 . The main transformation tool was the 
acceptance or denial by the Minister of the submitted transformation proposal, which in 
turn was strongly based on the demographic representation of the board’s members.  
After the promulgation of the Water Act in 1998, the new WUA policy set a number of 
processes in motion that affected the various water management institutions in existence 
in the Hartbeespoort area. These are in turn, the institutional responses to pollution, the 
transformation of the Hartbeespoort Irrigation Board, and the water-related management 
issues faced by the Municipality of Madibeng. It is to these transformations that the 
attention is now turned.  
 
The Hartbeespoort Water Action Group  
In 1994 the shores of Hartbeespoort dam had become one of the country’s most 
attractive sites for property development, being both a site of natural beauty with strong 
potential for tourism development and a site where the well-to-do could buy expensive 
property outside Johannesburg and Pretoria. Hartbeespoort was essentially a white 
residential area, served by the ‘white’ Municipality of Hartbeespoort, and serviced by a 
black labour force. The idyllic surroundings of this community were however being 
undermined by the enormous pollution loads that were streaming down from 
Johannesburg and being trapped behind the dam wall. Hartbeespoort had become the 
                                                 
72  Government Gazette (1998): Op. Cit, section 98(4). 
73  Conversation with Bill Rowlston, who was part of the drafting team of the NWA, on 7/4/2003. 
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most polluted dam in the country, and its contamination was leading to increasing 
concern for the residents of its shores.  
In 2001, the action of a number of individuals living in the Hartbeespoort area led to 
the establishment of the Hartbeespoort Water Action Group (hereafter: HWAG), a ‘non-
profit, community oriented volunteer organisation’ working to rebalance the ecosystem 
of the dam. The organisation was established in 2001 as a direct result of a powerful 
bloom of algae covering some 3km of the western bank of the dam that was causing a 
strong stench and was affecting the economy of the area. The current chairman of the 
organisation was known for his vocal stance on environmental issues in the area and he 
was approached by officials at the Department of Water Affairs’ local office with regard 
to the question whether he would be prepared to take action in the area, to which he 
responded positively on condition that the department make some contribution towards 
the initiative. He had a history of some 12 years of community development involving 
amongst other things the provision of water supply and sanitation in former 
Bophuthatswana areas under the flag of the Independent Development Trust during the 
drought of the early 1990’s. As a result of this history he had extensive involvement 
with government officials at all levels and had a comprehensive understanding of 
institutional development in the area. This reportedly led the DWAF officials to believe 
that he would be the appropriate person to drive an initiative with regard to water 
quality in the area.  
In February 2001 the future chairman of the HWAG initiated a meeting of about 
seventy different individuals and organisations to discuss issues pertaining to pollution 
in and around the dam. The group consisted of local tourism organisations, local 
economic forums, housing developments or settlements adjacent to the dam and deeper 
into the ‘interior’, the North West departments of Water Affairs (DWAF), Agriculture 
Conservation, the Environment and Tourism (DACET) as well as the local bulk water 
supplier, Rand Water. In this sense, the stakeholders were those that had either existing 
economic interests in the area or had political responsibility for certain aspects of the 
water quality situation. At the meeting, it was decided to establish the HWAG formally 
in order to seek short and longer term solutions to the problem. HWAG was later 
registered as a ‘Section 21’ company, or non-profit organisation, to carry out the tasks 
assigned to it. It operated as a volunteer organisation with no permanent staff members, 
and depended strongly on the energy and commitment of a small group of individuals.   
Rand Water withdrew from the subsequent efforts of the HWAG within eight months 
of the initiative out of concern that the group were laying the ‘polluter pays’ principle at 
their door, i.e. that Rand Water would have to contribute financially to the remediation 
of the dam. A debate had arisen on how far up the water chain responsibility for water 
pollution could be placed, and this had ultimately led to Rand Water’s withdrawal.  
The HWAG’s first activity was to lobby for funds at the door of DACET, DWAF 
and the local community for further study of the dam and for interventions to improve 
water quality. When a second large algal bloom developed in 2003, some R 1,2 million 
was put forward by the water quality directorate of DWAF as a short term measure for 
the removal of the algae from the dam, which reportedly had a very positive effect on 
the dam water in the following season. In the meantime, discussions were moving 
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forward with DACET on the initiation of a study which would compile and summarise 
the numerous existing studies that had taken place in the area over time into a document 
that could be used to identify a number of remediation options for the dam74. A number 
of studies had been carried out on the past, but little had come of them in a practical 
sense. The existing studies - from 1950 and 1985 - had become outdated and it was felt 
that these should be summarised and brought up to date with the latest measurements of 
pollutant concentrations in the area. DACET agreed to come on board and a study of the 
area was contracted out to DH Environmental Consulting. This organisation completed 
the study in 2004, resulting in a series of recommendations for the remediation of 
Hartbeespoort dam which were subsequently accepted by both DWAF and DACET as 
the way forward. Other than financing the study, however, neither DWAF nor DACET 
reportedly advanced funds or manpower for the furtherance of the goals of HWAG until 
2006, when the two departments established a committee that would lobby within 
government for the release of manpower and funds towards the remediation objectives 
set out in the 2004 study. Some funds were raised in the community itself to continue 
the data collection in the dam so that changes in the water quality over time could be 
monitored on an ongoing basis. Also, the funds raised enabled the appointment of a 
young graduate to carry out the scientific work, but when the funds ran out in 
November 2006 her contract was terminated75.  
A boost to the publicity around the issue was given when the Minister of Water 
Affairs and Forestry responded positively to an invitation to visit the dam in August 
200576. The Minister suggested that the HWAG put together a proposal for the total 
remediation of the dam itself within three months, but this proved difficult to do. 
Eventually a meeting of government departments took place in April 2006, at which the 
various departments declared that they did have the mandate to go ahead with the 
remediation exercise but still needed to devote a proportion of their manpower and 
funds towards this end.  
Technically speaking, civil society based ventures such as the HWAG should receive 
institutional support from the so-called Catchment Liaison Committee, an organisation 
which is part of the broader Catchment Management Agency that is in the process of 
being established in the Crocodile – Marico Water Management Area. However eight 
years after the promulgation of the National Water Act, there is still no Catchment 
Management Agency in the Crocodile, there are very few funds forthcoming for 
institutional development and the HWAG is not receiving any such dedicated support in 
the realm of institution building. DWAF has assisted by hosting forum meetings along 
stretches of the various rivers – such as the meetings of the Kwena river forum for the 
area downstream of the Hartbeespoort dam. However, according to the chairman of the 
HWAG, both the Kwena River forum and the Hennops River forum have fallen apart as 
a result of ‘participation fatigue’, i.e. the communities represented are beginning to feel 
                                                 
74  The blooms are physically removed from the dam by volunteers in boats owned by the HWAG.  
75  Interview: Garry Mackay, Chairman of the Hartbeespoort Water Action Group, 06/06/2006 
76  DWAF Press statement, 10/08/2005 
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that their issues are not being addressed through the medium of the catchment 
management process and its constituent bodies77.78. 
In 2003, the HWAG began to explore the possibility of registering themselves as a 
Water User Association. They studied the existing guidelines for establishment that the 
department had produced and held public participation meetings, drafted a constitution 
and objectives, and submitted the proposal. At this point the process ran into trouble:  
 
“What happened was that because it is a new entity that is foreign to a lot of people the guidelines 
keep getting extended and added to and so forth and it becomes very difficult as a person who is not 
doing this full time to actually keep up with all the changes and to keep submitting documentation on 
a regular basis until it meets their needs and as I say the needs were not all that clear either because 
they didn’t have any models to gauge it against so we would have been the first recreational and 
agricultural and domestic consumption water user association in the country and it may very well still 
be - I am not sure anybody else has formed along those guidelines”79.  
   
For the moment, the process of establishing a WUA, then, has run aground. Neither 
DACET nor DWAF have assisted the institutional development of the HWAG in a 
material sense although they have certainly contributed to the amount of information 
available on the chemistry and ecology of the dam. The consequence is that HWAG 
remains a voluntary organisation dependent on the part time input of labour and time. 
Where perhaps through the creation of a WUA a basic building block would have been 
created for interactive catchment management in the Crocodile River basin, 
bureaucratic procedures have thus far hindered the emergence of such a stakeholder-
based structure. Therefore, for the moment, water quality management remains a bipolar 
world with state technocrats on the one hand and civil society actors on the other. 
On the other hand, although the period between 1994 and 2004 showed few results 
other than the creation of a voluntary organisation, it does appear as though the results 
of the 2004 dam remediation study are now beginning to bear fruit. Rand Water Board 
has been identified as the implementing agent for the recommendations coming out of 
the study and a number of initiatives hold hope for the future in the realm of water use 
efficiency, sustainability and equity. Thus in the area upstream of the dam, existing 
wetlands are being identified along the Crocodile and its tributaries, and locations are 
being identified where artificial wetlands could be created. The artificial wetlands are to 
be targeted for the introduction of plants which remove phosphates and nitrates from the 
water. These plants are to be selected and nursed for their utility in the craft industry, 
and in this way it is hoped that jobs will be created in plant nurseries, plant harvesting 
and the tourism/craft sector. For instance, the corporate social responsibility arm of the 
supermarket concern Woolworths has committed itself to the promotion of crafts from 
wetland plants80. 
                                                 
77  The Hennops river flows into the Crocodile from the upper South Eastern reaches of the catchment  
78  This idea of participation fatigue is shared by Derek Weston, DWAF deputy director Catchment  
Management, who is currently working together with DANCED to resuscitate public participation in 
catchment management in the Crocodile River catchment. Telephone conversation, July 2006.  
79  Interview: Garry Mackay, HWAG, 06/06/2006, Op. Cit.  
80  Information gained from Gill Ledger, vice CEO of HWAG in its early stages. She is now involved in  
the upstream spects of Hartbeespoort Remediation Project. Private correspondence, November 2006.  
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The wetland rehabilitation projects upstream of Hartbeespoort link into the broader 
framework of the ‘Working for Wetlands Programme’ launched by the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism and the Department of Water Affairs and Tourism 
in 1996 and operational by 2002 with an annual budget of R 30 million. This 
programme is juxtapositioned alongside the Working for Water Programme of the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry which is a public works programme creating 
jobs through the paid removal of invasive alien vegetation that reduces water 
consumption and releases more water into the public stream. The programme links 
strongly into the issue of water scarcity, as it is estimated that between 30% and 50% of 
South Africa’s wetlands have been degraded in the past 40 years. Wetlands have a 
powerful effect on water resources by slowing down and storing water during floods, 
while releasing water again in periods of drought. They also provide plant cover that 
slows down evaporation, a major problem in South Africa, and both capture silt and 
purify the water of organic and inorganic contaminants. The rehabilitation of wetlands 
is a labour intensive task which is carried out by poor communities: currently ‘Working 
for Wetlands’ is employing 2230 previously unemployed individuals nationally under 
its rehabilitation programme. For example, the former wetland at Rietvlei near Pretoria 
historically provided the town with some 20% of its water while the rest was imported 
through Rand Water Board. This wetland was severely degraded both by pollution 
flowing down from the Witwatersrand area and by the annual burning of reeds. Through 
labour intensive methods, the canal draining the area has been blocked by the 
construction of several gabions to refill the wetland, generating 55 jobs and helping to 
rehabilitate Pretoria’s original water source, strengthen its capacity to absorb pollution 
and protect it from evaporation81.  
Nor have efforts to establish a water user association for the Hartbeespoort dam been 
shelved. The Deputy Regional Director: Water Quality of the North West Province 
Department of Water Affairs has pursued the issue of the quality of water in 
Hartbeespoort dam and the integrated approach that is required to solve them for many 
years. His department urgently advocates the establishment of a water user association 
and estimates the start up costs of the remediation to be of the order of R 18 million. It 
further estimates that once a water user association has been established for the dam 
area, its annual budget should be of the order of R 800 000.-per annum. This excludes 
major items such as annual algae and fish removal and the monitoring of water quality 
in the dam, which amount to a further R 1 million82. Rand Water Board, which as 
mentioned above has been identified as the implementing agent for the remediation 
project, estimates the total costs of the remediation of the dam to be of the order of R 30 
                                                 
81  See: Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa (2006): Working for Wetlands. Pretoria:  
Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa, p. 5 
82  See North West Province (2006): North West Environmental Management Series no.5. Mmabatho: 
 North West Province Provincial Government. The fact that the establishment of a water user  
association is advocated by the provincial office but still held back by the national office illustrates the  
fact that there are different interests within the department. In this case the national department is  
primarily concerned with appropriate representation of previously disadvantaged communities, while  
the provincial department is concerned with practical matters pertaining to water quality and would  
like to move things along at a higher pace.   
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million. This extremely high cost reportedly cannot be met from local funding, although 
both Rand Water and the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry are prepared to 
commit funds towards the project. For the moment hopes are pinned on the raising of 
the bulk of the project’s funds from foreign donors, and in the meantime the project is 
going ahead on the strength of what can be raised locally. This involves the planting of 
riparian vegetation to protect the bank of the various rivers upstream of the dam, the 
creation of a number of artificial wetlands through the construction of gabions, and the 
pumping off of excess algae from the dam water surface as stopgap measures83.   
 
Transforming the Hartbeespoort Irrigation Board84  
In 1994, with the advent of democracy, the Hartbeespoort Government Water Scheme 
that had been launched with the filling of the dam in 1925 was almost seventy years old. 
In some institutional respects the scheme had undergone little change: both the 
administration and the water distribution were still being run by government. The 
original ouvore and the ‘new’ canals completed in 1925 were still in place and being 
used as they always had been. However on a number of other fronts the tide of change 
was coming in, and from 1998 onwards, the scheme began to undergo change.  
 The original, relatively egalitarian situation of equal farm size had gradually made 
way for a process of subdivision and amalgamation, such that in general farm sizes 
varied from 3 to 30 ha. Whereas there were 162 farmers on the scheme after the first 
settlements in 1925, there are now 900 farmers on 1600 properties in four different 
management wards. However, in 1970, farmers owning land along the ouvore had 
applied to become members of the government water scheme, i.e. to fall under its 
furrow maintenance programme. The large properties that had always existed alongside 
the ‘welfare’ plots were then absorbed into the scheme and these farmers became role 
players. Also, processes of consolidation on the old government water scheme had led 
to the emergence of a number of large farms, of which one is some 800ha in size. From 
the point of view of rates collection, these large farms had become the mainstay of the 
irrigation board’s income.  
Currently the farmers generally grow vegetables for the urban markets in 
Johannesburg and Pretoria, as well as Soya beans and citrus. This is rotated with wheat 
as a winter crop85. Tobacco used to be in vogue but the high chlorine content of the 
water has rendered the tobacco improvident and currently it is only grown on sandy 
soils with good drainage.  
Between 1948 and 1954, the Department of Water Affairs had invested in a major 
rehabilitation exercise, cleaning out the existing canals and lining them with concrete to 
save water. Now, however, these canals are more than fifty years old, and they are 
beginning to deteriorate. Where there is a lot of clay in the soil, irrigation and water 
                                                 
83  From a telephone conversation with Johan Stoop, lead engineer with Rand Water Board, February  
2007. 
84  Unless otherwise indicated the information in this section is drawn from interviews with the chairman  
of the Hartbeespoort Irrigation Board and with the Executive of the same board, 02/05/2002 and  
12/02/2002 respectively  
85 Not with citrus of course, as this cannot be rotated!  
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movement has resulted in the movement of soil and this has cracked the lining of the 
canals. Obviously, this strongly increase the rate of water loss. Where the lining is not 
cracked, it is still in good condition: the concrete was of good quality and it is still 
holding out well.  
The scheme receives an allocation of 83 million m³/ annum of water from 
Hartbeespoort dam. Figure 6.8 above show that this allocation amounts to 69% of the 
total average water supply available from Hartbeespoort dam. However this budget 
excludes losses – it is a productive allocation. Generally in years in which there was 
sufficient water in the dam the board could count on some 120 million m³/a, thus 
compensating for the water losses in the system. Historically this surplus allocation 
acted as a hidden subsidy to the irrigation board: it paid for 83 million m³ but received 
120 m³. One of the uncertainties the board currently faces is the way in which the new 
water tariffs and water use charges will be calculated, because if the board is charged 
for system losses it will substantially reduce their income. The income of the board 
currently stands at an average of R 11,5 million per annum from water sales. However 
this income literally fluctuates as much as the seasonal rainfall, because the board pays 
for full allocation of water even if it does not use it, i.e. if farmers do not require water 
because of good rains. This then leads to ‘underconsumption’ and a lack of income in 
‘good’ years. Paradoxically, therefore, a dry year is good for the income of the board, 
but as shown below, this water may not be there to sell.   
The allocation of water from the dam is ordered twice a day from the dam manager, 
who releases the quota into the canals or into the river. The annual quota starts on the 1st 
of October, when the Department looks at the water availability in the dam. The quota is 
then determined on the basis of water availability. In dry years the irrigation board may 
only receive a small percentage of their quota. Thus in the drought of 1992, for instance, 
only 20% of the water allocation was released into the irrigation system. By 
consequence, the irrigation board paradoxically loses income in dry years such that they 
cannot maintain the system adequately. To counteract this, the organisation builds up a 
financial reserve in good years, which is drawn down on in periods of drought. 
Furthermore, in dry years the canals only flow for 24 to 36 hours a week, because at low 
levels of pressure the losses are very high. Losses in the system average 45% but at low 
pressure they show a strong increase. Obviously the system is in need of a major 
upgrade but the costs of doing this have been estimated at around R 200 million. There 
are insufficient funds for even minor upgrades, and this the system has entered into a 
long term decline. 
Lack of funds also means improper monitoring of the quantities of water utilised: 
The distribution of water is administered through variable water pressure at different 
sluice gates: the board measures the pressure and a certain pressure is deemed to 
correspond with a specific quantity of water: 50m³/hour, 70 m³/hour and 100m³/hour. 
The sluices are operated by hand, in increments of 12 hours, and because of varying 
pressure in the system farmers are asked to accept a margin of error of 10%, i.e. the 
allocated water is between 90% and 110% of the allocation. However, because the 
system is very old, it is not possible to know to what extent the deemed allocation 
corresponds with the actual allocation.  
 253
In 1998, following a reorientation of priorities within the Department of Water 
Affairs away from further expenditure on the overheads of irrigation schemes such as 
Hartbeespoort, the farmers on the water scheme were encouraged to form an irrigation 
board so that the responsibility for the infrastructure could be transferred to them. Part 
of the cutback in departmental expenditure involved cutting approximately 1000 
members of the staff of government water schemes off the payroll, and thus in many 
cases the staff members continued their employment as salaried members of the 
irrigation board86. Thus for instance the current chairman of the Hartbeespoort Irrigation 
Board formerly managed the scheme on behalf of government but now draws a salary 
from the irrigation board. Initially this idea of irrigation management transfer reportedly 
met with a lot of resistance amongst the farmers because they felt that the department 
had allowed the canals to fall into disrepair and now they were being saddled with the 
responsibility for a decrepit system87. The feeling as reported to me in an interview was 
whereas other irrigation schemes that were being transferred to farmers were fairly new, 
this one was very old and dilapidated and Government should repair the scheme before 
handing it over88.  This resistance led to delays in the formal transfer of infrastructure to 
the board, but ultimately the opportunity of creating a farmer managed irrigation system 
that could begin to cut back on overheads and thus reduce the per hectare cost of water 
supply was an attractive option to the farmers. In 1998 the responsibility for the 
maintenance of the system was transferred to the irrigation board, although the formal 
ownership of the system remained with DWAF.   
In terms of the policy of irrigation management transfer, the new irrigation board 
was given three years to adjust to its new economic realities. The existing subsidy on 
the water tariff was removed over a period of three years. 1999/2000, the farmers paid 
between R 600 and R 700 per hectare in water tariffs. This cost represented a situation 
in which the board received only 66.7% of the subsidy. Over the next two years, the 
subsidy was further reduced, until on the 1st of October 2002, the board was on its own 
financially. And in this period, the irrigation board managed to bring irrigation water 
tariffs back to the 1999 level of R 700. - per hectare where DWAF had predicted they 
would lie at around R 1000.-, i.e. they managed to cut costs substantially relative to the 
period as a government water scheme. However, it must be borne in mind in this 
context that the tariffs only cover operation and maintenance costs (i.e. small repairs) 
and cannot hope to build up the kind of capital needed to refurbish the scheme.  
The Hartbeespoort Government Water Scheme had just transformed into an irrigation 
board when the 1998 Water Act was promulgated. In terms of the Act, as mentioned 
above, they were required to transform again into a Water User Association and to this 
end were obliged to submit a proposal for transformation within six months of the 
promulgation of the Act. Having created this legal vehicle for transformation, a crucial 
issue was how this was to be carried out in practice. Section two of the Water Act 
emphasises the idea that in order to promote equity and redress the results of racial and 
gender discrimination, the Minister should ensure that water institutions have 
                                                 
86  DWAF (2003): Annual Report 2002/2003. Pretoria: DWAF. 
87  Conversation with F. Van der Merwe, Chief Engineer Irrigation, DWAF, 21/06/2006. 
88  Interview with the Hartbeespoort Irrigation Board, 12/02/2002.  
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‘appropriate’ community, racial and gender representation 89 . This issue became a 
fundamental stumbling block for the implementation of Water User Association 
policy90. The history of the Hartbeespoort area that has been described above illustrates 
the fact that the area was ethnically depopulated in the first half of the 20th century, and 
thus achieving a ‘representative’ WUA could only be achieved with a fundamental 
reorganisation of entitlements, such as through land reform and water reform. However 
the reform of water allocations was deferred to the future, as a function of the yet to be 
established Crocodile-Marico Catchment Management Agency. Therefore, water users 
were almost by definition white users, and the demand for ‘appropriate’ representation 
began to haunt the process.  
In 1999 DWAF published a guide on the transformation of irrigation boards into 
water user associations. It suggested that:  
 
“The question of appropriate representation can be effectively addressed by requiring as part of the 
transformation process the identification of all other interest groups using water from the water 
resources controlled by the institution to be transformed”91.  
 
This group was further defined as including local authorities, citizens taking drinking 
water from the system, mines, industry and commerce, and environmental and 
recreational interest groups.  
When the irrigation board set in motion a process for the establishment of a WUA, 
therefore, it was inconceivable that the existing board could be considered 
‘representative’ in racial or gender terms, and the only way to get the proposal accepted 
was to expand the operational area of the association. The Department of Water Affairs 
favoured the formation of a multi - sectoral WUA in the area in which domestic water 
needs as well as the needs of mining and industry were represented92. This was in line 
with policy at the time which sought to solve the problem of inadequate representation 
of existing water user organisations through amalgamation:  
 
“It is the policy of the DWAF to encourage the establishment of Water User Associations that are 
inclusive of all stakeholders in the area of operation. It has been the DWAF position that in such 
instances, all existing institutions are also encouraged to amalgamate into one single institution. 
DWAF policy also clarified that it is only under certain circumstances that some institutions might be 
allowed to maintain their autonomy”93.  
                                                 
89  Government Gazette (1998): Op. Cit, section 2; 
90  Personal observation. At any rate, an interview with Derek Weston, deputy director: catchment  
management confirms that it held up the establishment of WUA’s in the Hartbeespoort area for a long  
time.  
91  DWAF (1999): Guide on the transformation of Irrigation boards and certain other boards into water  
user associations. Pretoria: DWAF, pp. 14,15.  
92  Amongst other things, the Department had demanded that meetings be called which all users of water  
in the area could attend, irrespective of the quantity of water used. This included for instance the  
domestic water use of farm workers. My personal observation from participation in WUA policy  
formulation is that there was a desperate attempt to make WUA’s ‘representative’ even if the reality  
was that there were few non-white water users with a real ‘stake’ in productive water use. Only  
through land reform and gradual land purchase can the historical process of exclusion be reversed.   
93  DWAF (2001?): Scenarios under which separate smaller water user associations might be established.  
Pretoria: DWAF, undated internal document that was part of 2001 policy process.   
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In the case of the transformation of the Hartbeespoort Irrigation Board, the existing 
members of the board conveyed their irritation to me over the demand that they should 
invite other categories of user to meetings on the establishment of a water user 
association. They were of the opinion that the membership of or participation in water 
user associations should be related to quantity of water used94. This strategic narrative, 
of course, favours those with a large stake in water use. However, in order to obtain the 
status of a WUA the conditions of the department had to be accepted, and broad public 
meetings had to be called at which all potential stakeholders could appear to make their 
case heard.    
The WUA thus to be established was to include a number of mines abstracting 
directly from the canals, as well as the municipality of Brits (later renamed Madibeng). 
However, as will be seen, this did not assist the process much, as the Municipality of 
Madibeng pursued its own agenda and claimed control of the assets of Hartbeespoort.   
 
The Court case over Hartbeespoort 
In June 2001, the Pretoria High Court sat to decide on an application by the local 
council of Hartbeespoort against the Municipal Demarcation Board to set aside the 
incorporation of Hartbeespoort into the local municipality of Madibeng95. The process 
of re-demarcating South Africa’s municipal boundaries was strongly linked to the desire 
to correct past imbalances and to unify a geographically and ethnically fragmented 
population into (socio) economically viable units. Thus the demarcation process paid 
attention to the location of water resources alongside other resources such as centres of 
employment, health care, electricity, etc. By including Hartbeespoort (and Brits), the 
demarcation board at once achieved three major goals for the municipality. Firstly, it 
claimed access to water resources for a predominantly rural area which had suffered 
greatly during the drought of 199296. A part of the former homeland of Bophutatswana 
was now to be reincorporated into the municipality, thus reversing a lengthy process of 
separation and dispossession that has been described to some extent above. Secondly, 
the community around Hartbeespoort was known as a rich white community as the 
picturesque surroundings attracted an inflow of well to do South Africans. This would 
enable the cross-subsidisation from rich to poor of water and electricity rates. Thirdly, 
Hartbeespoort has a thriving tourism sector and provides job opportunities.   
 When the judge ruled that the municipality of Madibeng should not utilise the assets 
of Hartbeespoort dam until the entire court case had been heard, the ruling sparked 
demonstrations by the South African Municipal Workers Union in Pretoria, claiming 
that ‘Hartbeespoort whites sabotage service delivery to the poor’97 . The SAMWU 
concern stemmed from an action by eight former white councillors of Hartbeespoort 
                                                 
94  Interview with the Hartbeespoort Irrigation Board, Op. Cit.  
95  SAPA (2001): Judgement reserved in Hartbeespoort case. SAPA, 13/06/2001. 
96  From an interview with Garry Mackay, Op. Cit. 
97  SAPA (2001): Union protest at court over “whites only” Hartbeespoort. Johannesburg: SAPA. 
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who had created a company in their name, privatised all the assets of the municipality, 
and transferred them to the company98.  
 At the end of the court case, the Judge ruled in favour of incorporation of the assets 
of Hartbeespoort into the municipality of Madibeng. This followed the argumentation of 
the defence for the demarcation board to the effect that it was constitutionally 
impossible to reinstate the original Hartbeespoort local council, as it had been formally 
disbanded.  
 Given this heated political context, the idea that the town of Brits/Madibeng and the 
Hartbeespoort Irrigation Board could be induced work together to create a new, multi - 
sectoral water user association was rather far-fetched: the formation of the water user 
association was taking place against the background of a more prominent political 
struggle at municipal level. In this struggle, gaining control of Hartbeespoort and its 
resources were an important part of the plan for the economic viability of Madibeng 
Local Council.  
 
Madibeng Local Council  
The Madibeng Local Council was established as a result of the Municipal Structures 
Act of 1998. It covers some 3800 km² and embraces the Crocodile River from the land 
surrounding the Hartbeespoort dam in the south to the confluence with the Moretele 
River some 70 km to the north. The population of Madibeng is some 340 000, of which 
77,5% belong to a rural household and 22,5% to an urban household, i.e. it is a 
predominantly rural municipality99. However, Madibeng is not exclusively rural: the 
geographical area of the municipality includes the rural town of Brits and the former 
local municipality of Hartbeespoort.  
 As a rural municipality, Madibeng as an institution is a new geographical construct 
emerging from various phases of local government transformation that have aimed to 
create democratic and representative local administrations that are economically viable 
and that can intervene in their area of jurisdiction in the interests of poverty alleviation 
and development. These goals have been achieved to a large extent, certainly in the 
realm of democratisation, but they have also been compromised on a number of 
significant fronts.  
In the realm of municipal viability, much depends on the ability of a municipality to 
raise revenue from the sale of water and electricity. This in turn requires a significant 
proportion of the population consuming more than the basic minimum quota of 6 
kilolitres of free water per household per month, and it requires widespread connection 
to the electricity grid. In poor rural areas, the majority of the population receives 
subsidised (free) water through public standpipes or yard taps at the cost of the 
municipality rather than at their own cost. The viability if this situation depends very 
                                                 
98  See South African Municipal Workers Union (2001): Press Statement: Union to protest outside  
Pretoria high court tomorrow in Hartbeespoort “whites only” case. Johannesburg: SAMWU. Also:  
Congress of South African Trade Unions (2001): Court Ruling unconstitutional – SAMWU. In:  
COSATU Weekly News, 15/06/2001 
99  Demarcation Board (2003): Adjustment of powers and functions municipality reports / Bojanala  
District Municipality Report, p.3. 
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much on the income derived from the sale of water in those (peri)urban communities 
that exist in the municipality. In the context of Madibeng, therefore, the incorporation of 
Hartbeespoort and Brits within its municipal boundaries was a necessary (if not 
sufficient) prerequisite for financial viability. This was no exception to the national rule: 
in 1998, two thirds of South Africa’s municipalities were financially highly stressed, 
and one third simply economically unviable. By re-demarcating the municipal 
boundaries in the country, an attempt was made to correct apartheid imbalances and to 
create viable economic entities. Because 75% of South Africa’s poverty is rural, this 
presented an extra challenge in the case of rural municipalities100. In most cases the 
impact of demarcation in rural areas has been that the boundaries of small towns have 
been extended to include adjacent rural areas101. Therefore, in the case of Madibeng 
both Hartbeespoort and Brits were absorbed into the wider rural municipality. 
In the realm of political viability, whereas representative democracy unfolded 
throughout South Africa from 1994 onwards, local government retained a caveat 
designed to ensure the acceptance of rural local government by powerful rural interest 
groups, especially traditional leaders and commercial farmers. In terms of proclamation 
R65 of 1995, the provincial Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for Local 
Government was empowered to identify ‘interest groups’ who could nominate 
representatives to the District Council amounting to a maximum of 10% of the Council 
seats102. Therefore, while Madibeng has a democratically elected council, the white 
farmer interests at Hartbeespoort and the interests of traditional leaders in ex-
Bophutatswana are represented out of proportion to their actual share of popular support. 
This, then, was one of the prices of reconciliation.       
The municipality has a sixty-member council under a full time executive mayor, of 
which 49 are ANC councillors, 6 are members of the Democratic Alliance, DA, only 
one is from the New National Party and the remaining four are from smaller Christian 
parties. Thus the area that was once a bastion of white rural Afrikaner interests is now 
quite overwhelmingly ANC controlled and little remains of the former influence of the 
(old) national party, although most ex-national party members now vote DA.  
Delayed by the institutional transformation involved in the formation a new structure 
of local government, the municipality did not begin to (systematically) implement 
programmes such as extension of water supplies until the 2001/2002 financial year. 
Until then, water supply projects in the area were nationally driven through amongst 
other things the Reconstruction and Development Programme which led to an additional 
15000 peri - urban households (of the total of 74000 urban and rural households in the 
municipality) being provided with water supplies in the period between 1994 and 2000. 
This rapid extension of water supplies increased the percentage of households with 
                                                 
100  SALDRU (1995): Key Indicators of Poverty in South Africa. University of Cape Town: Southern  
Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, p. 9. 75% of South Africa’s poverty is concentrated  
in rural areas and in terms of the SALDRU poverty definition, 57% of the population in North West  
Province is poor and 67% of the population of Bophutatswana is poor.  
101  Pycroft (2002): Addressing Rural Poverty: Restructuring Rural Local Government. In: Parnell, S., 
  Pieterse, E., Swilling, M. and Wooldridge, D. (2002): Democratising Local Government: the South  
African Experiment. Cape Town: UCT Press.   
102  Pycroft (2002): Op. Cit., p. 111 
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access to potable water in Madibeng by 20%, such that by 2003, only an estimated 2.6% 
of the population remained without access to domestic water supplies103. To a degree, 
this development was a matter of luck in that before demarcation the eastern margins of 
Madibeng fell within the geographical area of a large water supply project launched by 
Rand Water in partnership with a range of transitional rural municipalities in the ODI 
area to the north west of Pretoria. The project was a showcase for Rand Water in its 
ability to enter into ‘public-public partnerships’ and enabled the connection of an 
additional 400 000 people to the public tap104. For government, too, this area was an 
early showcase of water supply development. Apart from being necessary, water supply 
in dense rural settlements like ODI enabled government to make rapid strides forward in 
the ‘numbers game’ of water supply delivery, a goal much more difficult to achieve in 
sparsely settled rural areas.  
In the financial year of 2001/2002, the Municipality launched its first Integrated 
Development Plan, a synopsis of development goals for the next five year period. In the 
realm of water, the municipality set itself the goal of achieving universal coverage by 
2006, i.e. in a time span of five years105. Table 6.2 below illustrates the main features of 
this programme.  
 
Table 6.2 
Water services extension in Madibeng 106 
Feature 2001/2002 2002/2003 2003/2004 2004/2005 
Expenditure on 
water services 
(R)  
18,441 924 23, 926 206 59,674 411 31,027 860 
Purchase of 
water (R) 
804,636 967,601 13,977,800  -  
New yard 
connections 
 -  9197 5 wards 
(unspecified 
no.) 
1 ward 
(unspecified 
no.) 
Bulk pipelines  4 2 1 
Reservoirs 2 1 2 1 
 
      
As table 6.2 shows, expenditure on water services as well as the direct purchase of 
bulk water from the water boards began to increase from 2001 onwards. This brought 
with it the expansion of basic municipal water infrastructure in the form of bulk 
pipelines and water reservoirs. In 2004/2005, according to Departmental figures, an 
additional 2,502 people were connected to the public tap, followed by 12, 954 in 
2005/2006. The total number of additional people served between 1994 and 2006 is 
                                                 
103  Demarcation Board (2003): Ibid.  
104  Schmitz (1999): Piloting Public-Public Partnerships: Successful cost recovery in Rand Water’s Odi  
supply area. Doornfontein: Centre for Policy Studies Policy Brief #19; 
105  Municipality of Madibeng (2005): Integrated Development Plan 
106  Compiled from Municipality of Madibeng (2005): IDP, op. cit.  
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estimated at 97, 411, with a further 15, 910 planned for 2006/2007107. Of course, this 
excludes those who have ‘served themselves’ by connecting their water supplies 
illegally, and it says little about the sustainability of the services provided.  
The municipality abstracts its water both at the dam and further down the Crocodile 
River near Brits. In the former case, there is a purification plant located at the dam itself, 
and in the second case, raw water is abstracted from the Crocodile and pumped to a 
reservoir in Brits, where it is purified. In the northern area, the municipality has 
inherited the responsibility for the boreholes that supplied drinking water to rural 
communities in the former homeland.  
Presumably because the bulk supply lines lie within the municipal boundaries, 
Madibeng is responsible for the bulk transport of water from the source to areas of need, 
where this would normally fall under the responsibility of water boards. As a Water 
Services Authority in terms of the Water Services Act of 1997, it is responsible to 
ensure water supply and sanitation provision but not necessarily responsible for 
operation and maintenance. For this, it has entered into water services partnerships with 
bulk providers Rand Water and Magalies Water. These boards in turn have, since 1994, 
marketed themselves as potential water services providers to enter into partnership with 
municipalities in retail supply, i.e. they have extended their responsibilities beyond bulk 
supply to include connector infrastructure. The division of tasks is such that Rand Water 
essentially caters for (extensions of) urban supply, Magalies Water caters for rural 
supply, and Madibeng retains operational responsibility for supplies inside Brits and the 
former municipality of Hartbeespoort. Thus the municipality has been demarcated or 
zoned into three different areas which fall under the responsibility of one of these three 
‘water services providers’. This makes for a rather complex situation, which the 
municipality tried to simplify when the new director of technical services arrived at the 
municipality (the department of technical services would have preferred to deal with 
one provider only). However, it proved difficult to change this situation as ‘an off the 
shelf’ contract between Madibeng and the water boards had already been signed, and 
thus the municipality has to live with multiple service providers108. As time passed and 
the municipality began to experience the day to day issues of water management in the 
area, it became evident that there were many complaints in the municipality about the 
response time of the service providers but that there was little to be done about this as it 
was not tabulated in the service agreement. Whereas the Water Services Act and the 
Municipal Services Act were designed to open a ‘market’ in water service provision, 
therefore, in practice Madibeng has little room for manoeuvre in choosing its water 
services partners.  
The identification of the needs in the area proceeds through a water forum at which 
the various councillors in the municipality can raise their concerns with regard to water 
in their wards. In addition the municipality has established a call centre where 
consumers can report burst pipes, leakages, pressure problems and so on. These 
                                                 
107  DWAF (2006): National Water Information System for Water Services Provincial Profile for North  
West Province  
108  I.e. drafted by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry  
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problems and issues are then logged into the operation and maintenance framework of 
the municipality and if necessary passed on to Rand Water or Magalies Water.  
The water quality problems at Hartbeespoort dam are passed on directly to the 
Municipality of Madibeng as an ‘externality’, i.e. the polluters upstream of Madibeng 
are not penalised in any way for the pollution they create. Madibeng, by contrast, faces 
high purification costs and problems associated with the taste and odour of the water it 
supplies. The municipality has high recurrent costs for the chemicals involved in 
purification at the two points at which water is abstracted from the river. This extra cost 
is sourced from its equitable share, from a DWAF operation and maintenance subsidy, 
and from rates paid by consumers, i.e. the costs are ultimately borne by the consumers 
in Madibeng and from the taxpayer in general. This adds to the overall cost of water 
provision in the area, which is already high because there is no cost recovery at all in the 
rural areas (the policy of free basic water is being implemented in the rural areas) and 
low levels of cost recovery in urban areas. Currently the municipality is experiencing 
water shortages as a result of the limitations of the purification plants: the plants cannot 
deliver more (purified) water than they are doing and further extension of supplies is 
dependent on the financing of an upgrade of the purification systems. Despite 
favourable increases in the return flows to Hartbeespoort, therefore, actual water 
shortages remain as a result of low purification capacity. The impending upgrade of the 
Magalies Water Board’s purification facility at Vaalkop dam will alleviate this situation, 
but of course the costs of this installation will have to be recovered through the water 
tariff and in this sense, water users in Madibeng are due to subsidise the externalities of 
water utilisation upstream.     
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has described the post-apartheid organisational responses to scarcity in the 
Hartbeespoort area, and it has done so in two phases. In part one, the chapter describes 
the broad history of water resources utilisation in the Hartbeespoort area. This history 
laid down the basic framework for the changes that were to come, both in terms of the 
physical infrastructure that is the point of reference of the various institutions, and in 
terms of the socio-political infrastructure that was to have its own ramifications in terms 
of what could or could not be transformed. In part two, the chapter analyses the concrete 
institutional transformations that took place, driven by changed political circumstances 
and by a fundamentally different situation with regard to water supply and water supply 
infrastructure.  
In the period before the construction of the dam, the expropriation and 
disempowerment of the originally occupants of the land around Hartbeespoort led to the 
effective control of the Crocodile river valley floor by Afrikaner farmers who, as yet 
unsupported by the state, mustered private resources towards the construction of water 
control infrastructure. Blacks were reduced to the status of farm workers and resided on 
white farms or were removed to Native Reserves, the forerunners of the homeland of 
‘Bophutatswana’. During and after the construction of the dam, poor whites gained 
social protection through irrigation development as employees in construction and later 
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as budding farmers on the Hartbeespoort Government Irrigation Scheme. Through these 
means, the white population gained effective control of (and a stake in) the water 
resources in the area in the area while the black population lost control of (and its stake 
in) the same water resources. Curiously, one hundred years later, the post-apartheid 
government would vigorously call for more ‘representative’ water user associations 
without altering the entitlement relations on which this representation is based. 
Hartbeespoort is still essentially a white residential area, and Hartbeespoort Irrigation 
Board is still essentially a white irrigation board. Despite the demands of the 1998 
Water Act, no water user associations have yet been created in the area, the WUA 
process is frozen and northern donors such as DANCED and DFID are arriving to flog 
the dead horse into life again. At the heart of this problem is a very basic policy issue of 
participation. Is broad participation in water management institutions being promoted as 
a ‘nice to have’ in a new democracy, or is it being promoted from a real wish to 
transform the entitlement relationships in water? And if the latter is the case, clearly 
participation has become a stumbling block rather than a vehicle for transformation. 
Only land reform and supportive credit policies from the Land Bank can bring black 
farmers into the Hartbeespoort irrigation scheme. And the demographic breakdown of 
the population around the dam is, for the moment, still determined by the spatial 
policies of the past and cannot become ‘representative’ at the wave of a wand.  
Nor are water resource management objectives being achieved in the absence of 
strong local organisations. On the one hand the civil society support that exists for the 
clean up of the Hartbeespoort dam is not being built upon, while the pollution of the 
water is a hindrance to development both locally and downstream of the dam. Powerful 
intervention is needed to alleviate the problems, and yet no application for the formation 
of a WUA at Hartbeespoort has yet been approved in Pretoria. Similarly, a 
refurbishment of the canals of the Hartbeespoort irrigation scheme would release 
enormous quantities of water for development downstream. The prospect of such 
investments, if conditionalities were attached, could entice transformation. At the 
moment the hands-off approach, at any rate, is not leading to convincing transformation.  
The enormous growth in return flow from the upper Crocodile River, for its part, is 
shifting the water scarcity frontier further north and further west. The nature of 
Hartbeespoort dam has changed fundamentally from a dam supplying white irrigators to 
an engine for economic development in Madibeng municipality as well as further west 
in places like Rustenburg. Return flow has made possible the extension of basic water 
supplies to households throughout Madibeng, it has made possible the growth and 
industrialisation of Brits and Thabazimbi, and it has led to the growth of irrigation in the 
lower Crocodile. However the bill for this economic expansion has been sent to the 
Municipality of Madibeng, whose income is to a large extent dependent on the sale of 
water which it must purify before it can be used.  
For the moment, the Municipality of Madibeng is the only public domain which is 
actively intervening in water resources management in the area. Neither the catchment 
management agency nor local water user associations have materialised, and yet there is 
a democratically elected, representative organisation present that is intervening in the 
interests of equity and economic development. The representatives of the former white 
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municipality of Hartbeespoort, in an abortive attempt to privatise their public domain, 
have been absorbed into the new municipal entity and now the former municipality 
cross-subsidises the expansion of basic water services in greater Madibeng. 
Lastly, the Hartbeespoort area clearly illustrates the various phases of scarcity 
posited in chapter two. In the first phase, local water resources are harnessed and 
utilised at points close to the natural source. In the next phase, these local resources no 
longer suffice and resources are mustered towards a long term solution for collective 
water demand: in this case, a major local dam. Following this, and to the extent possible 
sources in the catchment are linked to one another to solve water supply problems over 
a large area. Once this no longer suffices, water is imported from other catchments and 
catchments are connected to one another in a large scale supply grid. For the moment, 
this grid is still ensuring an ever increasing demand in the catchment, although with the 
escalating costs of importation and purification, increased water supply in the area is 
increasingly dependent on the local willingness and ability to pay the economic price 
that is attached to this extra water.  
7 
Urban water management in the 
catchment 
Introduction 
In chapter four, some of the impacts were analysed of the tremendous growth in water 
demand that took place in Johannesburg over the last century. This growth in demand 
resulted in the creation of a water supply grid that stretches across much of the northeast 
of the country, drawing water from the eastern escarpment into the urban conglomerate 
in the upper reaches of the Crocodile River catchment. The gold reserves on the 
Witwatersrand fuelled an enormous economic and social transition in South Africa from 
an insular agrarian society to an urbanised, industrialised and open economy. However, 
this transition could only take place if the problem of water scarcity on the Rand were 
overcome. Water was so scarce in the catchment area that it placed limits on growth 
from the early twentieth century onwards. As a result, increased water supply to the area 
became the sine qua non of South Africa’s economic future, and a ‘supply orientation’ 
to scarcity permeated all the institutional levels of water management from the national 
level to the local level.  
In this chapter, as in chapter five, the attention is focussed on the local level; 
although this time the institutions reviewed are located in an urban rather than in a rural 
area. The case of Johannesburg is reviewed because of its dominance in the catchment 
in areas such as water demand, gross geographic product and effect on the rest of the 
catchment1.  
                                                 
1  This has its advantages as wel as its limitations: on the one hand Johannesburg is a microcosm of  
South Africa’s urban resource utilisation patterns, but on the other hand it is unique in it size, location  
and economic importance. One cannot generalise the findings emerging from a single case and in  
selecting a case one should be mindful of the limitations this imposes. South Africa contains an  
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At the level of organisational responses to scarcity in Johannesburg the major urban 
issues are the introduction of water demand management in an effort to gain control 
over water consumption and wastage, while at the same time extending water supplies 
to previously disadvantaged communities2. However the scarcity-related institutional 
‘projects’ of water demand management and service delivery to the poor are in many 
ways intermeshed with a range of issues that are not directly water related. As a result, a 
careful extrication process is needed to highlight conflicts over water against the 
background of broader political and economic processes in the Greater Johannesburg 
area. Notably, this resounds with Lowi’s research from the Jordan River basin which 
concludes that “when a dispute over water resources is embedded in a larger political 
conflict, the former can neither be conceived of as a discrete conflict over a resource, 
nor be resolved as such”3. It resounds also with Long’s conclusions that ‘projects’ 
cannot be seen in isolation but take place in dynamic interaction with society as a whole. 
The challenge, then, is not to extricate conflicts over water, but to define and locate 
them in the dynamic setting in which they take place.  
What, then, are these ‘larger’ political issues? At the level of institutional 
transformation water management is first of all affected by the structure of municipal 
finances, simply because the sale of water constitutes a major portion (more than one 
third on average) of municipal revenue. Given this central role, water is drawn into the 
politics of local government transformation and is affected by the changes in local 
government generally. This pans out into a range of local water issues such as the tariff 
structure for water, water metering and water cut offs in poorer areas.  
Secondly, it is affected by the broader project of nation building. Concretely, this 
refers to the amalgamation of the multiple and schizophrenic local authorities that 
‘separate development’ or apartheid had engendered. All tiers of government, led by 
general policy frameworks such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) and its successor the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR), 
embarked on the general project of reassembling fragmented government institutions 
and linking together policy areas that had previously existed separately from one 
another. Thus the ‘apartheid city’ was to make way for the ‘Unicity’, launching 
Municipal Infrastructure Programmes (MIP’s) under the umbrella of a single Council.  
 Thirdly, water management is affected by the national drive to separate governance 
from service delivery through the legislation of public-private partnerships in local 
service provision. The city launched a panoply of ventures that came to be labelled as 
‘privatisation’ initiatives or Municipal Service Partnerships (MSP’s), drawing private 
                                                                                                                                               
enormous diversity in geographical, economic, cultural and socio-political patterns, and while the  
Rand has quite literally become a symbol of South Africa in economic terms, it is of course a Mega- 
city and, in water management terms, one of a kind. 
2  Although running through this is the permanent issue of planning for the normal growth in demand in  
the city.  
3  Lowi, M. (1993): Water and Power. The politics of a scarce resource in the Jordan River basin.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pg 9. This ties in with Long’s idea, mentioned in chapter  
one, that ‘projects’ cannot be separated from the society around them but exist in dynamic and  
ongoing interaction with them.  
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sector operators into the ambit of municipal service provision in various mixes of state 
and market.  
Lastly, the political transition has substantially increased the entropy of local 
government, placing multiple and sometimes conflicting demands upon what is often a 
relatively small group of actors who have to muddle through the plethora of policy 
directives, hamstrung budgets and local exigencies, attempting to keep an eye on the 
ball and produce outcomes that satisfy the demands of a needy population. During the 
time span which this research covers, political and administrative change was the only 
constant, and in this turbulence, fledgling institutions for water management emerged in 
an equally fledgling set of relations with organizations in civil society. Again, the 
transformation of local water management institutions is not just a rational or clean-cut 
policy issue of bringing the existing situation S to a desired situation S’, as described in 
policy analysis literature 4 . Actors in the water management game are locked into 
responses to what has happened in the past rather than being able to commence with a 
clean slate. History plays a very important role, having laid down the physical structures 
that deliver water, having created the institutions that must be transformed, and having 
created a culture that responds to events in particular ways, such as for instance the 
‘repertoires of contention’ that typify South Africa protest action5. To understand the 
present, we must attempt to understand the past, and thus much space in this chapter is 
also devoted to the historical responses to water scarcity that created the present 
situation.  
Figure 7.1 below illustrates the intermeshing of organisational responses to scarcity 
with issues that are generated from the sphere of local government and creates a visual 
aid for the issues that are dealt with in this chapter. In the first section, an overview is 
presented of the historical responses to water scarcity in the city. In the two sections 
thereafter, different aspects of the recent transformation of local government in 
Johannesburg are presented with specific focus of course on the water management 
institutions. In the next section the emergence of a new water utility for the city is 
described, leading to the question raised in the following section what kind of 
relationship has developed between the city and this new utility. In the section therafter 
the concrete challenges facing the utility are unpacked and an overview is presented of 
the initiatives that the utility has implemented since its establishment towards the 
‘management’ of scarcity. 
                                                 
4  See for example Swanborn (2002): Evalueren. Amsterdam: Boom, pp. 37-60. these kinds of works  
tend to create the impression that policy implementation is a linear process from blueprint to outcome  
whereby results can be examined and causality can be unpacked. In reality, government officials tend  
to ‘muddle through’ a range of sometimes conflicting policy directives and the information at their  
disposal with regard to both the intended and unintended consequences of intervention.   
5  I am referring to the resistance tradition of dance and singing which so often accompanies South  
African protest action.  
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Figure 7.1 
Responses to water scarcity within local government  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, in the last section, an overview is given of the relationships that have developed 
between the city, the water utility, and civil society, since the transformation of water 
management began.  
 
Historical responses to water scarcity in Johannesburg  
The greater part of the history of water supply on the Witwatersrand6 could be depicted 
as a continual race against the clock to develop the next supply augmentation scheme in 
response to an explosive growth in demand. This history spans a little more than a 
century, from the birth of the city of Johannesburg in 1886 to the birth of water demand 
management thinking around 19977. Much of the history of the development of water 
supply to Johannesburg and its surroundings has been described in chapter four. In this 
section, the attention is turned to the internal water management legacy that lay at the 
                                                 
6  In this text I use the names ‘Witwatersrand’ and ‘Johannesburg’ intermittently, but not without reason  
in each case. When I speak of the Witwatersrand, or the Rand, I mean the entire gold ridge from  
Germiston in the West to Benoni and Springs in the East (including Johannesburg) . When I refer to  
Johannesburg I mean ‘only’ the city of Johannesburg.   
7  Although formal policy on water demand management was launched with the 1997 White Paper on a  
National Water Policy for South Africa, certain ideas were bandied about before then. A key actor in  
developing these ideas was George Constantinidis of Rand Water, who stated that “the basis of  
conservation is economics: more is spent on purification than on dams […] 30% of local authorities  
are basically bankrupt so how can you push through tariff increase because of project levies”  
interview: George Constantinidis, RW, 18/4/1996. 
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doorstep of the city’s new managers when the racially and administratively fragmented 
city was unified in 1995.  
 Johannesburg has a rather unfortunate and unusual water supply history, 
distinguished by three central features, namely the physical location of the city, the 
effects of the gold rush, and the effects of apartheid. Each of these features placed a 
mark on the institutional and physical management of water in the city. These features 
also continued to exert their influence until 1994, when the city embarked upon a major 
institutional transformation process that is described in more detail below.  
 With regard to the first aspect, much has been said already in chapter four. Suffice it 
to state here that the city is built on top of a watershed with very little in the way of 
locally available water supplies, and yet over the last century, ways had to be found to 
continually augment water supplies to the city in response to the rapid growth in 
population that it experienced from 0.1 million in 1889 to 3.5 million in 2004. Water 
supply development was rapid and reached ever further into the hinterland, annexing 
local water supplies for the benefit of the Rand area and enabling water utilisation 
practices in the city that were rather wasteful but were in many ways connected to the 
design and politics of the apartheid city. 
 With regard to the second aspect, namely the gold rush, the key effect on water 
management was a powerful local drive to wrest water management out of private 
hands and to place it firmly under the control of public bodies. This drive needs to be 
placed in the context of the political battle between (often British) gold prospectors on 
the Witwatersrand and the administration of the (Boer) Transvaal Republic in Pretoria. 
This battle centred on the recognition/non-recognition of Johannesburg as a 
municipality, which would provide the prospectors with some local administrative 
autonomy in an area controlled by the Boers. At the same time the explosive growth of 
the city rapidly underscored the need for some form of administration of the area.  
 In a satirical version of things yet to come, the city was plagued by the consequences 
of informal settlement from its very early beginnings, although the (very) first informal 
settlers were on the whole white prospectors rather than displaced and/or impoverished 
blacks searching for employment. An unlikely group of some 18 farms strung across a 
hill, and the farms of Langlaagte, Turffontein and Doornfontein in particular, rapidly 
became the scene of explosive in-migration by prospectors who set up camps on these 
farms. The extraordinarily rapid swell of the population immediately led to the 
traditional problems associated with informal settlements in respect of poor sanitation 
conditions, poor access to water, and other aspects such as bad roads. These issues were 
discussed amongst the prospectors, and on the 17th of November 1886 there was an 
impromptu meeting of a Diggers’ Committee, the first local authority (by proxy) of 
Johannesburg 8 .The Diggers’ Committee granted water rights to applicants and 
functioned as a court of appeal in disputes. The lack of sanitation facilities featured as 
the top priority issue for residents of the time. Deputations were sent to Pretoria in order 
to get Johannesburg recognised as a municipality, so that a local institution would have 
                                                 
8  This date is still commemorated as the ‘birthday’ of the city. Source: van Rensburg, C. (1986):  
Johannesburg: One Hundred Years. Johannesburg: Van Rensburg.  
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jurisdiction over the area, could raise tax and could begin to initiate infrastructure 
development.  
 However, the Government in Pretoria was wary of providing Johannesburg with the 
formal institutional status of ‘Municipality’, and therefore maintained its existing status 
as a ‘stand’ town whereby stands were leased to residents by the State. The 
administration of the area was thus consciously kept in limbo, an issue which was the 
source of much discontent in Johannesburg itself. The upshot of this situation was that 
the delivery of services, rather than being a function of the stand town, was ‘leased’ out 
to private contractors in the form of temporary concessions – for street lighting, water 
supplies and sanitary services. In the realm of water, this led to a string of concessions 
for water provision to private companies along the Rand. As a result, the narrower 
struggles over water supply and adequate sanitation were placed in the broader political 
context of struggles for local autonomy. The local drive to establish public control over 
these privately managed services was embedded in the broader political battle of the 
time. After the Anglo-Boer war, the broader political scene changed dramatically, and 
thus, at a local level, the conditions were in place for the establishment of public 
institutions of water management at the municipal and water board levels.   
 By 1902 political circumstances had changed. The Treaty of Vereeniging had been 
signed, heralding the end of the Boer War, and an interim administration was being 
established under Lord Milner which would hold sway until the Act of Union that 
united South Africa in 1912. The immediate result for Johannesburg was that a Town 
Council was established and given the powers to plan town development. The 
concession system was abandoned as part of an effort to regain local autonomy over 
planning. Following recommendations made by the Witwatersrand Water Supply 
Commission, Rand Water Board was established in 1903 and given tasks related to the 
securing of bulk water supplies for the Rand area as a whole. The concession system 
was abandoned as part of an effort to regain local autonomy over planning. Thus, 
commencing in 1905, Rand Water took over the management of water supply 
companies such as the Vierfontein syndicate and the Johannesburg Waterworks 
Company.  
 The distribution of water within the municipality of Johannesburg (retail supply) was 
to be placed in the hands of the Town Council, which was henceforth a bulk customer 
of Rand Water along with other municipalities and major mining enterprises9. This 
enabled the establishment of a water supply, sewerage and drainage system and the 
planning of the town in general. From 1903 onwards major capital projects were 
initiated in the city which included the realm of water supply and sanitation projects10. 
 The non-white population was at this time not considered to be a permanent feature 
of the municipality, and no formal plans were initially made for their settlement. This 
resulted in the development of large slums to the south west of the city centre formed by 
the in-migration of non-white work seekers. Nevertheless the Town Council was soon 
forced to do something: an outbreak of influenza in an Indian settlement in 1918 
prompted the creation of a planned Indian location, and Orlando (now a part of Soweto) 
                                                 
9  Rand Water (1906): Annual Report. Johannesburg: Rand Water; Chris van Rensburg (1986); op. Cit 
10  Rand Water (1906): Annual Report. Johannesburg: Rand Water; Chris van Rensburg (1986); op. Cit 
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was launched as a ‘model’ settlement in 1932. People were moved from the informal 
settlements into the townships created by the city. These townships had very minimal 
levels of service such as communal standpipes located at a considerable distance from 
the home and sparsely provided pit latrines. These services were over - utilised from the 
onset, as residents of informal settlements tended to utilise the services provided to 
formal settlements.  
 Ultimately the informal settlements to the south west of the city were amalgamated 
into the South Western Township, or SOWETO 11 . These areas were not given 
independent jurisdiction over the management of their services, although they remained 
bulk customers from the point of view of Rand Water. The institutional result of this 
situation was the creation of Regional Services Councils formally responsible for 
administering local water supplies (and other services) at the regional level. This 
facilitated the spatial planning of ‘separate development’ or apartheid, and led to the 
overlapping of responsibilities between the Regional Services Council (RSC) and the 
Johannesburg City Council. At the level of wastewater management, management was 
centralised: 96% of the wastewater of the Central Witwatersrand is treated in four 
wastewater plants operated by the Johannesburg City Council12. At the level of water 
supplies, the RSC administered bulk connector infrastructure to townships located at a 
‘comfortable’ distance from white residential, production and retailing centres. Each 
township was responsible for rate collection and rate setting. This institutional headache 
of multiple administrations within one metropolitan region became symptomatic of 
what has been termed the ‘apartheid city’, and for the greater part of the twentieth 
century Johannesburg was racially demarcated into a series of parallel local government 
bodies each of which had very different resources bases and levels of service13. Until 
1984, townships were regarded as part of the city but were not represented on the (white) 
town council. These areas were permitted to elect bodies whose powers were restricted 
to an advisory capacity vis-à-vis the Town Council. In 1984, the embattled apartheid 
regime attempted to introduce reforms including the establishment of black local 
authorities (against a background of non-representation of the majority of the population 
at provincial and national level). These areas had neither an industrial nor a commercial 
tax base and were nevertheless expected to finance service provision, and the ‘reforms’ 
led to new waves of protest which included the boycotting of service charges14 .15. In 
1986 the Soweto Rent Boycott was launched by a grouping of local civic organisations, 
which included claims for improved services and internal cross-subsidisation of services 
across the city16. The boycott was highly successful, mobilising the participation of 80% 
of Soweto’s residents and forcing the Transvaal Provincial Administration to the 
                                                 
11  From Chris van Rensburg (1986); op. Cit.  
12  Lotter, L. (1995): Management of the water cycle in a metropolitan area. In Fitzgerald et al  
(1995): Managing Sustainable Development in South Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press  
13  Concept from Tomlinson, R. (2000): Ten Years in the Making: a History of Metropolitan  
Government in Johannesburg. Johannesburg: Urban Forum;  
14  There were prohibitions on economic development in townships, and economic activity was forcibly  
located in white areas. See Tomlinson (2000). Op. Cit.;  
15  Friedman, S. (2001?): A Quest for control: High Modernism and its Discontents in Johannesburg,  
South Africa. In: Urban Governance around the world. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Centre.  
16  Tomlinson (2000): op. Cit.; 
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negotiating table with a view to creating a unified rather than a racially 
compartmentalised city17. Just four years later, the negotiation process was given extra 
impetus by a landmark speech by then state president Frederick de Klerk in February 
1990. In this surprise speech, De Klerk announced the unbanning of a wide range of 
resistance movements such as the African National Congress, the Pan African Congress, 
and the South African Communist Party. In the period of détente that followed a wide 
range of concrete institutional and policy initiatives were embarked upon that resulted in 
preliminary structures that were to be the focal points for the transition to democracy.  
 In the same year, i.e. 1990, the so-called Soweto Accord was signed by the 
negotiating parties, establishing a permanent negotiating forum in the form of the 
Central Witwatersrand Metropolitan Chamber. Not surprisingly, the geographical basis 
for the negotiation of a new city structure was the boundaries of the Central 
Witwatersrand Regional Services Council which had provided bulk services to each 
metropolitan sub-structure. Thus the limits of local government as an institution 
coincided geographically with the delivery boundaries of water and electricity.  
 The negotiating forum appointed a temporary local government council which was to 
govern the city until the first local government elections in 1995. All in all, the 
negotiations brought a range of different parties to the negotiating table and did much to 
create movement towards a settlement of disputes. However, some key issues remained 
unresolved, such as the question whether the preferred provider of services would be the 
public or the private sector. This issue is described in more detail in the sections below. 
Suffice it here to state that firstly, despite an official political settlement, the issue of 
cost recovery for water, or the non-payment of water bills, is a source of recurrent 
conflict between the city’s administration and its residents. Secondly, the issue of 
‘privatisation’ of water services is also a source of recurrent conflict between the city’s 
administration and trade unions, civic organisations and the South African communist 
party.  
 A century after the birth of the city of Johannesburg, water was thus managed by a 
multitude of parallel administrations. On the one hand scarcity had been held at arms 
length: water was being imported into the city through a range of inter - basin transfer 
schemes, and the exponential growth in demand had been met all along by extending 
the city’s claim on the water of its hinterland. On the other hand, the non-white 
population of the city had low levels of service and poor maintenance, while the city as 
a whole could not account for roughly one third of the water it bought from the bulk 
supplier. These were the primary water issues facing the new local administration at the 
advent of democracy. The story of the response of the new administration to these 
challenges will be described below, but first a small interlude is in order to explain the 
background of the water policy package that emerged in the city.    
Interlude: background to the transformation of water management in Johannesburg   
In order to understand the transformation that took place of the water management 
structures in Johannesburg after the advent of democratic rule in 1994, a small interlude 
in the narrative is in order. The reason for this is that the restructuring of urban services 
                                                 
17  Ibid  
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in the city took place during a period in which a strong global current had begun to flow 
involving the reorganisation of local government following the debt crises in the poorer 
countries of the South and the recession that took hold of major industrial nations in the 
1980’s. These events and the political ideology that accompanied them ushered in a 
period of local government intervention packaged as so-called ‘municipal service 
partnerships’, or co-production for short. This transformation did not only affect 
Johannesburg: it was a new theme in local government that influenced the thinking in 
local governance across the globe, but its specific timing and its dovetailing with the 
contingencies of democratisation and the call for greater equity in South Africa meant 
that it soon took centre stage in the changes that took place in the city after 1994. 
The transformation of Johannesburg is in many ways linked to the trans-national 
expansion of a new type of Multinational Corporation, specialised in the construction, 
operation and maintenance of urban services. Thus, for instance, this new-era 
multinational could specialise in areas such as urban refuse removal, electricity 
distribution, transport, water supply, water purification, or it could provide 
combinations of such services integrated into packages. The genesis of the new urban 
services multinational is rooted in events in Europe and the United States in the late 
1970’s and early 1980’s, and has different specific origins in the various countries. A 
common theme amongst them is a fundamental shift in the approach of local 
government in the provision of urban services relative to the past. In all cases, this shift 
has been towards the sanctioning of a greater role of the private sector in service 
delivery, but the precise mix of state and market has differed from country to country. 
Both in the United States and in Great Britain, co-production initiatives were linked to 
the desire to cut back on public expenditure, as well as to the desire to ‘free’ or ‘create 
space’ for the market and increase the overall efficiency of service provision. In both 
countries, also, co-production was seen as a means to combat urban decay and the idea 
thus had a specifically municipal bent18.  
In some cases, the model followed was for local government to withdraw and to sell 
or contract out various aspects of service provision to the private sector. In Great Britain, 
for instance, state-owned infrastructural assets in the water sector were subdivided and 
sold to the private sector. In France, local government remained the owner of the water 
supply infrastructure, but the operation and maintenance of systems was transferred to 
the private sector under a series of concessions. In other cases, rather than the state 
pulling back and allowing a greater role for the private sector, local government itself 
was restructured and remodelled along principles normally associated with the private 
sector. Thus in the Netherlands and Germany, local government introduced incentives 
for cost-cutting and efficiency gains, without relinquishing government authority over 
service delivery. In the urban wastewater sector, for instance, Germany introduced 
build-operate-transfer schemes in the state of Niedersachsen for the upgrading of 
infrastructure. Government retained responsibility for the water quality of lakes and 
rivers, as well as for the financing of urban infrastructure. The private sector constructs 
                                                 
18  Mitchell-Weaver, C., and Manning, B. (1991): Public-Private Partnerships in Third World  
Development: a Conceptual Overview. In: Studies in Comparatvie International Development, Vol. 26  
no. 4.  
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and operates a scheme for a defined period, after which it reverts to government. The 
advantages for the state are that the infrastructure is constructed with cost-saving 
solutions, and run efficiently. For the private sector, the advantage is that it can obtain 
investment capital at rates subsidised by the state, making the enterprise viable from this 
perspective19.  
This shift in the approach of western local governments in the provision of urban 
services is currently having a major effect on the provision of urban services in the 
poorer countries of the world. In many middle and lower income countries, local 
government transformation is being driven on the one hand by a weak financial position 
and outdated, inadequate infrastructure, which necessitates review. Rural-urban 
migration and population growth has placed pressure on urban infrastructure, and 
decision makers in many municipalities are faced with difficult choices with regard to 
the trade offs between extending service provision to the un-served versus maintenance 
of existing infrastructure. This takes place against the background of stressed municipal 
budgets and many competing and urgent needs. Co production arrangements are often 
considered against the background of the prospect of enticing investment from foreign 
corporations in infrastructure development, and of leveraging private sector capital for 
social and economic development.  
On the other hand, transformation is being driven by foreign corporations based in a 
number of western countries, assisted in some cases by multilateral institutions such as 
the World Bank. Historically, because of the roll back of the state in urban services 
provision in the United States, Great Britain, France and Spain, new markets were 
created in Europe and America that enabled the genesis and expansion of private 
companies with expertise in amongst other things urban water supply and sanitation 
provision. These companies expanded within the borders of the nation states in which 
they come into existence through a variety of mechanisms. In Great Britain, the rollback 
of local government was politically driven and ideologically motivated. Under the 
government of Margaret Thatcher, the size of government was called into question, and 
the Thatcher government was synonymous with the rollback of the Welfare state. The 
practice in the U.K. was to segment service provision into zones, with each service 
being subject to its own contract and being contracted out or sold to its own choice of 
firm20. In France, discretion over different service provision models was devolved to 
local authorities, setting in motion a process of contracting out service provision to the 
private sector. These situations, though different in approach, had the same overall 
effect, creating the space for the emergence of specialised firms who could tender for 
contracts in different geographical areas. Next, the drive for increased profits implied a 
gradual increase in the scale of the activities of the more successful companies. Having 
reached the upper limits of their growth capacity within their respective countries (for 
instance water is now 75% privatised in France), they subsequently began to expand 
across national borders, creating a series of new multinational corporations specialised 
                                                 
19  See Lorrain, D. and Stoker, G., 1997  
20  Coing in Lorrain, Dominique, and Stoker, Gerry (1997): The Privatisation of Urban Services in  
Europe. London: Cassel: 156. 
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in urban services provision. Thus, again taking examples from the water sector, the 
CEO of Britain’s Thames Water is currently aiming to source one third of the 
company’s revenue from outside Great Britain. These new multinationals are currently 
estimated to earn an annual US $ 400 billion in revenues from water sales, of which the 
greater part still comes from consumers in the countries of origin of these multinationals. 
The world’s leading company is the French Suez Lyonnaise, based in Paris, which 
accounted for $32 billion in sales in 1999, covering a range of urban services such as 
water supply, water purifications, electricity provision and refuse removal21. At the 
current level, the global private water industry is 40% of the size of the world oil 
industry and 30% larger than the world pharmaceutical industry22. Leveraging some of 
the capital generated by such companies for urban development purposes is an enticing 
prospect to many urban planners. However, this should not occlude that fact that many 
urban planners and NGO’s have piloted partnerships between civil society organisations 
and the state in the provision of services which do not necessarily offer much prospect 
of leveraging capital but which do offer other significant advantages such as sustainable 
service delivery and community upliftment: urban water services provision in Brazil is 
highly participatory and as a result both low cost and appropriate to each specific local 
set of needs. In many parts of the world, the state has partnered with village level 
community organisations to provide services in areas which may not be attractive to 
private sector investors for lack of the prospect of returns on investments. Co-
production, again, is more than just public-private partnerships.  
 
Johannesburg after 1994: transforming the apartheid city  
Since 1997, there has been an ongoing public debate about the overall governance 
structure of the city of Johannesburg which eventually led to a fundamental 
transformation of the institutions that manage services in the city. This of course 
includes water services: water services are a politically important but institutionally 
relatively small component of the overall transformation of the city.  
In a nutshell, the city’s transformation programme has resulted in the establishment 
of a partnership programme or co-production of water services between the local state, 
an independent utility, and a private consortium, bound together by a series of contracts 
and monitoring arrangements. The most important rationale that the administration of 
the city had for embarking on an institutional restructuring of the city was, as is the case 
in many other municipalities in South Africa, the unfolding of a financial crisis which 
was beginning to paralyse the key functions of the administration at a time when 
politically many promises had been made to upgrade existing services and extend 
service provision to the poor23. This financial crisis, then, provided the impetus for a 
transformation programme that included the creation of an independent water utility at 
the level of the city as a whole and the farming out of the management of this utility to a 
                                                 
21  Ibid, p. 4. 
22  Ibid. 
23  According to Statistics South Africa, in June 1998, total local government liabilities in South Africa  
amounted to R 76 billion. See Statistics South Africa, Financial Statistics for local authorities for the  
year ended 30 June 1998. Pretoria: Statistics South Africa  
 274
private consortium 24 . However, the development is by no means restricted to 
Johannesburg alone: the depth of the problems besetting local government in South 
Africa led to a range of policy and legal measures aimed at abetting the financial crisis 
by contracting out the provision of services to independent institutions. Thus at the 
national (policy) level, both the Water Services Act and the Municipal Systems Act 
made provision for a separation between water services authorities and water service 
providers as a means to pull destitute municipalities out of their respective doldrums25.  
 In 1997 Johannesburg experienced its worst ever financial crisis. Its income was 
reduced by arrears owed to the city to the tune of R 2, 1 billion, spending was 
pressurised by a budget deficit of R 300 million, and it had an overdraft of R 405 
million26. The city had developed large backlogs in the rollout of new infrastructure, 
and had not been able to maintain existing facilities in 1996. In response to the crisis, a 
team of consultants was drawn in to analyse the situation, and each municipal line 
function was asked to provide its own introspective assessment. In essence, the outcome 
of this review (according to the city’s managers) was that the unification of 
Johannesburg in 1995 had resulted in a bloated and inefficient administration. The 1995 
local government elections had ushered in Johannesburg’s first unitary city council, 
integrating eleven separate apartheid-era administrations under the responsibility of one 
central council, the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council (GJMC). Between 1995 
and 2000, this council presided over four local authorities, known as Metropolitan sub-
Structures, which each had their own elected council but were subject to the rulings of 
the Metropolitan Council. This new structure represented a considerable degree of 
progress relative to the past in cutting back on parallel structures. However, the analyses 
carried out in the wake of the financial crisis in 1997 ‘found’ that the existing two-tier 
system of decision making was unwieldy and that after the December 2000 elections the 
entire city should come to fall under one council with a single executive mayor27. The 
plan, known as iGoli 2002, envisaged the abolition of the four local councils the 
rationalisation of the city’s management team, incorporating “only those functions 
critical to the formulation of policy, the regulation of contracts, and the coordination 
and management of service delivery”28. Furthermore, it was decided to ring-fence each 
line function in financial terms, meaning that the responsibility for financial control lay 
not with the central finance department but with each line department in itself.  
A key thrust of this new ring-fencing programme was the establishment of ten 
independent service provider companies, legally structured into either utilities, agencies 
                                                 
24  Interview with Kenny Fihla, 8/8/2001. Fihla was appointed as head of the chairperson of the council’s  
 transformation committee in 1997.  
25  A ‘water services authority’ refers to any urban or rural Municipality which is constitutionally bound  
to ‘progressively ensure efficient, afforbdable, economical and sustainable access to services’. A  
‘Water Services Provider’ means any person who actually provides water services to consumers or  
another water services institution. The two may be the same institution, but they need not be.  
26  Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council (2000): iGoli 2002. Making Greater Johannesburg work.  
www.joburg.org, accessed in December 2004.  
27  This view is certainly not uncontested: see for instance Friedman, S.: High Modernism & its  
Discontents in Johannesburg, South Africa. In: Blair, Ruble et. Al (eds.): Urban Governance around  
the world. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Centre, 2001.  
28  This formulation is from the Municipality website.  
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or corporatised entities (UAC’s). These entities, which had previously been departments 
within the municipality and had featured on the municipal budget, would be 
transformed into business enterprises and held at (financial) arms length from the ‘core’ 
policy work of the council and its support institutions. This element of iGoli 2002 was 
highly controversial, as it went to the core of tensions within the ruling alliance between 
the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party (SACP), 
and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The SACP and COSATU 
were feeling increasingly alienated from government policy which was taking a strong 
pro-market stance. From October 1999 onwards, the iGoli 2002 plans led to growing 
tensions between the Johannesburg Council and organisations opposed to the 
privatisation of municipal services, which included the South African Communist Party 
(SACP) and the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU). SAMWU in 
particular embarked on a plan of mass action, in which it made vocal its opposition to 
iGoli 2002 in general and in which it used each concrete step of the Council in the 
direction of restructuring as an opportunity to organise strikes and protest marches29. 
iGoli 2002 was particularly threatening to SAMWU, as it was not yet clear at the time 
how many of the city’s workers would remain in their jobs as municipal workers after 
the transformation, and SAMWU potentially stood to lose a large number of members.   
 The technical consequence of the iGoli 2002 plan was the restructuring of sections of 
the municipal administration into a series of separate private sector companies known as 
‘Municipal Business Enterprises’ (MBE’s). This concept refers to a private company 
(legally registered as a business enterprise and operating on profit principles) operating 
under contract to the municipality.  
 The city council was to provide the overall policy framework within which a range 
of municipal service providers - the MBE’s – were to operate, but it was henceforth 
divested of the financial responsibility for these entities. In essence, there were three 
institutional models for an MBE and each service was assigned an institutional 
framework within which to operate. As mentioned above, these institutions were termed 
UAC’s – Utilities, Agencies, and Corporatised Entities. Each institutional ‘breed’ was 
to enter into its own form of institutional relations with the city Council. In short, the 
institutions could be distinguished from each other as follows. First of all, a number of 
entities were to be restructured as utilities (and this included the new water utility). 
They were to operate in a monopoly market but raise their own revenue. Secondly, a 
number of agencies were to be created for specified functions (i.e. roads and storm 
water, parks and cemeteries) and were to draw their revenue from Council’s income. 
Thirdly, a number of municipal functions were to be relinquished to the market and 
become corporatised entities. These institutions were to operate in the open market (i.e. 
Johannesburg Zoo, Fresh Produce Market, etc.) but in some way contribute to the 
broader socioeconomic and cultural aims of the Council30.  
                                                 
29  There are reams and reams of newspaper articles on SAMWU’s opposition to iGoli 2002, but see for  
instance The Star, 19/9/1999: Jo’burg rides roughshod over objections, The Star, 25/10/1999, Unions  
take to the streets, Business Report, 13/12/1999, SAMWU may take national action, The Star,  
27/6/2000, Municipal strike aims to cripple iGoli  
30  Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council (2000): iGoli 2002. Op. Cit. 
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According to Kenny Fihla, a key architect of the iGoli programme, these entities 
represented some 50% of the former Council organogram31. In this sense, restructuring 
represented an enormous potential reduction in the city’s monthly payroll and in many 
respects this constituted the main thrust of the financial recovery strategy32. Over and 
above the creation of the utilities, agencies and corporatised entities, three organisations 
were earmarked for overt and full privatisation, namely Rand Airport, Metro Gas, and 
the Johannesburg Stadium33. 
Creating Utilities for the city 
Amongst the new organisational structures, three utilities were to be formed for 
electricity, water and sanitation and waste management, which would operate under 
license from the Council and would be run by a board of directors also appointed by 
Council. The term ‘utility’ in this organisational context refers to a number of facets 
such as a ‘public’ service which is characterised by ‘usefulness, practicality and 
standardisation’34. In other words, the service provided by such an institution caters for 
needs and/or wants, it is implemented in a satisfactory manner and beneficiaries receive 
the mass-produced service in a predictable, formulaic manner. A closer analysis of 
municipal publications also reveals ubiquity to be an essential characteristic of these  
utilities: unlike other institutions such as libraries, clinics, airports or markets, utilities 
are not geographically localised. They are therefore assumed to ‘be everywhere’. Of 
course this closely relates to policy ideals of achieving universal access to basic services 
such as water, and clearly responding to scarcity in unserved areas such as squatter 
camps contributes to the ubiquity of a utility. The legal format for the utilities was the 
‘Municipal Business Enterprise’ mentioned above, which meant that the utilities were to 
be registered as private companies operating on profit principles, but they were to retain 
their public character in that the sole shareholder and contractor was to be the 
municipality.  
By separating the financial statements of the utility from those of the Municipality, 
as is the case in many other countries where service provision is farmed out to third 
parties, it was hoped that loans for capital development could be raised in markets to 
which the Municipality could under normal circumstances not obtain access. In addition, 
some of the profits generated by the restructuring of the utilities into private companies 
would accrue to the Municipality through company dividends, as the municipality was 
                                                 
31  Interview with Kenny Fihla, op. Cit. 
32  Hlubi Biana of the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) puts a different figure to this  
rather throwaway estimate, namely that of the city’s original staff complement of 26000 people, only  
8000 now remain on the city payroll and all the others have been transferred to the UAC’s. From a  
telephone interview with Hlubi Biana, SAMWU, 14/05/2003. 
33  The term privatisation is usually used very loosely to describe a wide range of possible ways in which  
public and private goods produced by the public sector are henceforth produced wholly or partly by  
the private sector. In the extreme case the ownership and management of of public assets is transferred  
to the private sector. Forms of ‘privatisation’ which are much more common involve a partial transfer  
of ownership and/or management of public assets to the private sector. In the case of water  
management, the most common form of privatisation is a long term but temporary concession. In the  
Johannesburg case, the time horizon is shorter than the average concession and therefore bears the title  
of ‘management contract’.   
34  The Oxford dictionary offers these associations.  
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to be the monopoly shareholder in the companies. Crucially, however, as will be seen 
later, the municipality was thereby also divesting itself of the responsibility for 
institutions which were in fact its key source of income.  
Box 7.1:  
Local government restructuring in South Africa  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since the adoption of the Interim Constitution in 1993, as is the case in so many areas of work in South 
Africa, local government has been undergoing a process of transformation. This process consisted of three 
phases – a pre-interim phase, an interim phase and the final or implementation phase. The second phase was 
important to the implementation of policy at the local level in that it saw the establishment of a Municipal 
Demarcation Board and the promulgation of the Municipal Demarcation Act. The task of the Demarcation 
Board was to re-draw all the boundaries of local government – which it carried out by dividing the entire 
country into new municipalities such that South Africa now has 285 ‘wall-to-wall’ municipalities, down 
from the original 834. These are categorised into type A, meaning metropolitan areas, type B, meaning local 
municipalities, and type C, meaning district municipalities. The previous boundaries had been created for 
political reasons and did not create financially viable municipalities in the disadvantaged areas. The new 
boundaries have changed significantly as many rural and urban areas have been amalgamated and in other 
instances towns are combined with each other or extended to include informal settlements. The Demarcation 
Board examined the available resources in each locality and the administrative and financial capacity of 
each municipality when determining the new boundaries. The new system is designed to improve service 
delivery by rationalising the available resources, creating appropriate economies of scale and eliminating 
duplication and fragmentation of services. Municipalities need to put in place mechanisms to assess whether 
services are being delivered efficiently and effectively. The concern with this amalgamation is that residents 
may be geographically distant from the service centres and where rural and urban areas are combined, rural 
interests may be subjugated to urban interest. The demarcation process presents its own set of challenges in 
that the demarcation board took account of all resources in a given area and not only water resources. 
Currently the third and final phase of local government transition is underway, ushered in by the 5 
December 2000 local government elections. It is characterised by two main features. The first of these is the 
flagging and promotion of local government as an independent sphere of government, not inferior to the 
other two spheres. The second is the developmental role that is expected of local government as the hub of 
service delivery and the centre from which local economic development programmes will be launched. The 
greatest concern of local government is whether the allocation of the additional functions and 
responsibilities will be accompanied by funding and institutional capacity that are needed to fulfil this role. 
Some of the consequences include a change in the functions to be carried out at local government level and 
a disruption or fragmentation of existing work patterns. At the moment there is no clear policy on this 
matter. Currently many municipalities are experiencing budgetary and human resource constraints. Their 
inability to generate enough revenue from local sources has resulted in some municipalities being largely 
dependent on the so-called national equitable share and grants. Many are unable to devote a large proportion 
of their budgets to service delivery or economic development, as the funds they have at their disposal are 
often locked into operational costs, based on fixed line items. The requirement for the development of 
Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) by all municipalities is expected to be very important in redefining the 
manner in which local budgets are developed. The idea is that IDP’s will henceforth be more strongly based 
on the priority needs of the locality as the result of a participatory process involving intersectoral 
collaboration. Thus local accountability is central to the IDP process, and the participation of health service 
institutions in local government planning is therefore a key element in the decentralisation of health1. 
However, many municipalities are finding it difficult to comply and follow the guidelines for developing 
IDPs, particularly in the rural areas due to a lack of expertise. Provincial governments are assigned with the 
task of offering technical support to municipalities and assist in assessing whether they reflect local 
priorities, but even the provinces themselves are incapacitated to meet this requirement. This presents 
problems for municipalities, as the IDPs are subject to provincial approval. 
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And the Crocodile River, as will be set out in more detail in later chapters, receives 
transfers from the Middle Vaal to satisfy its local demand. None of these areas can be 
developed further unless more water is imported.   
In this way, then, the utilities were to operate in response to the desires of the 
Municipal Council, creating a fourth institutional level in the linkages running from the 
national level to that of the municipal utility. Box 7.1 above illustrates the key 
institutional linkages between the national Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
and the actors in urban water management. The national department is responsible for 
the overall management of the resource in the catchment, i.e. catchment management 
and the development /maintenance of bulk supply schemes. It determines allocations for 
the various bulk delivery agents such as Rand Water Board and sells water to these 
institutions. Rand Water Board in turn purifies the water and delivers it to 
municipalities and other bulk consumers in its supply area. The municipalities such as  
Johannesburg are constitutionally bound to develop and maintain minimum levels of  
service delivery to its inhabitants. Political responsibility for responsiveness to local 
needs lies with the elected councillors, while the technical responsibility for water 
delivery lies with the utility operating under contract to the municipality. Finally, 
municipal workers are organised primarily through the South African Municipal 
Workers’ Union.  
The launch of Johannesburg Water  
The new water utility was named Johannesburg Water, a legal person registered on the 
21st of November 2000 and a consolidated organisation created by the merger of the 
water departments of the five municipalities that constituted Greater Johannesburg 
between 1995 and 2000.Its staff complement is some 2600 persons, its client base is 
essentially the population of Johannesburg, estimated at some 3 million people, and its 
annual turnover is R 1.9 billion. The formal launch of the utility took place on the 22nd 
of February 2001, by which time a management contract had been signed with the 
Johannesburg Water Management Company (JOWAM), the consortium that won the 
Municipal tender to implement the council’s plans.  
The tender provided for a twelve-person team from the winning consortium to join the 
workers employed by Johannesburg Water and drive the transformation into an efficient 
and market-oriented utility. This twelve-person team became the executive of the newly 
created utility, and in terms of the contract between the utility and the executive, each 
member of the executive had his or her own separate contract which could be anything 
up to five years in duration. Towards the end of this person’s period of service in the 
utility, recruitment and mentorship would take place such that by the end of the five 
year contract all senior executives of the company had been replaced by local 
counterparts35. 
In many other towns and cities throughout the world a concession of long (usually 
thirty years) duration is given to the contracted party in order to leverage multinational 
capital and apply it towards the improvement and expansion of services. In 
Johannesburg’s case, this was not felt to be necessary because it was believed that at a 
                                                 
35  Telephone interview with Jameel Chand, Johannesburg water, 14/05/03 
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water wastage level of 30% for the city as a whole any investments in the efficiency of 
the system would rapidly repay themselves through the potentially massive reduction in 
company overheads of the same 30%.  
 
Box 7.2:  
An overview of key actors in urban water supply 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
At the level of policy expectations, it was hoped that surpluses generated through 
these efficiency gains would register as dividends to Council at the end of each financial 
year, which Council could largely reinvest in the further expansion and improvement of 
 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF): responsible for the overall management 
of the Crocodile River Catchment, i.e. dam construction, inter-basin transfers of water, and 
water flow (forestry, removal of non indigenous species, etc.) Delivers water to bulk 
suppliers such as Rand Water Board 
Rand Water Board (RWB): buys and allocation of water from DWAF at the dam walls, 
purifies the water, transports it in bulk to municipal boundaries, and sells it to local 
authorities 
Municipalities in the catchment such as Johannesburg (point of water entry) and Rustenburg 
(end of the supply line) buy water from RWB. They reticulate it through their supply area, 
selling to domestic and industrial clients before purifying the water again and releasing it 
back into the river channels at a lower point. The municipalities are constitutionally bound 
to minimum levels of service delivery to all residents and are ultimately responsible for 
services, although they may farm them out to service providers on contract. 
Municipal councillors report to their constituencies and their political parties. They are 
responsible and accountable for overseeing the governance of service delivery.  
The municipal administration runs service delivery in accordance with official national and 
local policy and interacts with service providers.   
Municipal service providers are independent legal entities bound by contract to the 
municipalities under service delivery agreements.  
Municipal workers may be transferred to municipal service providers. They are organised 
into Municipal workers unions such as the South African Municipal Workers Union 
(SAMWU).  
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water services but which could also be drawn on by Council to spend on other line 
items on the Council budget. However, such an improvement in efficiency would 
require a rapid transformation in the management approach of the company, and hence 
the tender put out was for a five year contract to a management team with the necessary 
expertise to turn around the company in a short space of time. In short, the main 
intention of bringing in these companies was to bring in management expertise rather 
than investment, and that the application of this expertise would improve services while 
generating revenue for Council. On the other hand the utility itself was to be given a 
thirty year concession to run the city’s water infrastructure, providing it with the 
incentive to invest in long term improvements.  
The winning consortium for the management contract consisted of the British 
multinational Northumbrian with 51% shares, the French multinational Suez Lyonnaise 
with 20% shares, and the South African Water Supply and Sanitation South Africa / 
Group Five with the remaining 29%. Their international competitors in bidding for the 
contract were the French company Vivendi and the British company Thames Water. 
Thames Water had bid at an incentive of 5%, which was the municipal maximum, 
Vivendi had bid at an incentive of 1,25% and the winning JOWAM had bid at an 
incredible incentive of 0,18%36. According to Kenny Fihla, the contract was awarded to 
JOWAM on the basis of two considerations. The first was the reputation of 
Northumbrian in their rapid response mechanisms for client service - an important 
aspect of the public face of the municipality. The bottom line for the Council, however, 
was the price at which JOWAM offered itself:  
 
“The second thing is that they came in, in our view not to make money – we think they were 
desperate to get a foothold in South Africa because they had lost the Durban bid by far…despite being 
highly reputable, despite having all these skills and so on – in fact they are the second biggest 
international water company – they were by far the cheapest”37             
 
Northumbrian and Suez Lyonnaise thus obtained their much wanted foothold on South 
African soil, and they did so in a very important area in water turnover terms. With a 
population of 3 million people, Johannesburg is the largest city in South Africa, 
consuming 1600 mega litres of water per day, and representing a potential annual 
turnover for the contractor of R 1.9 billion.    
 Having won the tender, JOWAM therefore appointed staff members to occupy the 
commanding heights of Johannesburg Water, and the new utility was launched. It had a 
corporate vision and a hopeful set of new captains whose central mission it was to 
integrate the separate water reticulation entities into an efficient unit that could begin to 
grapple with the huge water losses that were draining it of its potential profits. There 
were various ‘standardised’ institutional options available that could drawn from 
international practices and these were presented to the role players in South Africa by a 
range of interested donors. Jameel Chand of Johannesburg Water describes the 
institutional design process as follows:  
                                                 
36  I.e. their incentive was that they would receive 5% of annual profits which took the form of 
  efficiency gains.  
37  Interview with Kenny Fihla, op. Cit. 
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“When the issue around establishing Jo’burg Water as a utility came up, the question was whether JW 
could run on its own. In our feasibility study we recognised that its ability to carry out the service 
delivery and operational activities was constrained by the level skills in the utility, which was large, 
bureaucratic and run on bureaucratic norms. What we decided was to go for a management contract 
with the establishment of the utility. So we had established at the time during the project restructuring 
exercise an advisory board made up of highly skilled people from Australia amongst other places – it 
was funded by various donors. So we had highly skilled people who oversaw this process in terms of 
the establishment of the utility and alongside this bringing in a management contractor for five years. 
Now the World Bank at the time advised us to go for a concession, and I can assure you that the 
World Bank advice was incorrect – it was inappropriate in the political circumstances38. We had to 
take a decision on what model was appropriate - a concession, management contract, joint venture, a 
whole range of things. We are currently assessing the next phase”39.  
 
Concessions are typically offered for a period of some thirty years, offering the 
concessionary a time horizon which enables it to recoup the costs incurred by large 
scale investments made in the upgrading of infrastructure such as bulk mains. It is a 
means to leverage external capital in a context in which municipalities have little 
development capital at their disposal. Johannesburg was indeed in a state of financial 
crisis, but its specific circumstances with regard to water losses appeared to indicate that 
investments in infrastructure upgrading would rapidly lead to large efficiency gains. All 
indications were that such gains could be achieved within a much shorter space of time, 
and in this regard thirty years appeared to be a little excessive. If at all a utility was to 
exist for a period of several decades, it would have to be entirely under the control of 
the municipality.  
Furthermore, the existing situation was one in which all water related employees 
were in fact employees of the municipality. There were few guarantees that the 
concessionary would be willing to take over the payroll of the municipal workers for a 
period of thirty years, in fact international experience tended to show that the 
concessionary would work on commercial terms and that therefore many workers would 
be laid off in the interests of efficiency. Placed in the context of a governing alliance in 
which pro-market policy actors were maintaining strained relations with the trade union 
movement and the South African Communist Party, a concession appeared to be a 
recipe for powerful political upheaval. The municipality had to take steps to ensure that 
it retained a maximum of control over the water utility, and in this respect even a joint 
venture seemed out of the question.  
The best option, it seemed, was to retain full control over the utility through 
monopoly ownership of assets by the city and to allow a team of seasoned experts to 
reorganise the management of municipal water systems, after which the utility would 
either return to the city or continue to act independently but on a short rein. The legal 
form for this, of course, was a management contract tied to the registration of the utility 
as a company with monopoly ownership. Furthermore, the utility was to be steered by a 
governing board appointed by the city.  
                                                 
38  Meaning of course the explosive relationship with the unions at the time  
39  Interview with Jameel Chand, Johannesburg Water, 14/05/2003. 
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 Between policy and action, however, a curious hiccup occurred in the appointment of 
board members in that rather than carefully selecting the board members themselves, 
the municipality employed a recruitment agency to pre - select the candidates:  
 
“The board members were selected on the basis of appropriateness in terms of skill, and if you look at 
any board there are four areas which we look at – one is the finance related skills, the human resource 
skills, the operations environment (in other words someone with skills in that sector, be it the civic 
theatre or Johannesburg Water), and then the legal type skills. So that was the one and most important 
element of the criteria , the second was allowing representivity to allow for transformation processes, 
so you will find that all our boards are representative, we have paid very careful attention to gender 
and affirmative action in that regard, and we enlisted a recruitment agency to bring the right kind of 
people”40.  
 
The main significance of this move is that technical merit rather than a balanced 
political representation of key stakeholders became the criterion for membership of the 
board. Given the explosive nature of the relationships between the municipality on the 
one hand and both municipal workers and civic organisations on the other hand, a 
potentially powerful tool for conflict resolution was cast aside at this stage.  
At the same time, a new network of institutional relations was beginning to 
materialise in the form of standardised channels of communication and recurrent 
meetings with key players in the field:  
 
“Once the board was established a business plan was formulated [on an annual basis, T.S.] The 
Contract Management Unit [of the city, T.S.] had to come to grips with understanding business plans, 
for which it shares formal responsibility with Council and our portfolio committee. We meet with 
Jo’burg Water in the following manner: on a monthly basis we have a Municipal Entities Portfolio 
Committee which is chaired by an ANC Councillor and is made up of the other political parties. It 
makes recommendations which are put forward for approval to the mayoral committee. Once a month 
JW has to be present, and issues and report are presented around critical areas of service delivery and 
regulatory issues. We develop a whole range of compliance and client issues – we deal with tariffs, we 
deal with service delivery, and we deal with all the regulatory legislative parameters set by the 
national department. In the business plan are key performance areas, which are developed into key 
performance indicators with measurement tools. And baseline indicators, followed by the targets to be 
achieved. Our monitoring and evaluation now is in relation to those things. In addition to those things 
there are legislative parameters that set minimum standards of delivery that must be adhered to for 
water and sanitation”41. 
 
Of course in this regard the regular structure of reporting to the municipal entities 
portfolio committee ensured a direct link to elected representatives and in this regard 
ensured political legitimacy as well as the orientation of decisions towards the priorities 
of key political players. However this does not dilute the analytical point made above 
that a policy of inclusiveness with regard to the constitution of the board would have 
further anchored the ownership of the transformation process by actors in civil society.  
A double contract structure was created to bed down both the short and the long term 
goals of the utility. One contract is between the utility and the city (Johannesburg 
Metro-Johannesburg Water), which is a twenty five year contract along the lines of a 
                                                 
40  Interview with Prem Govender, Op. Cit. 
41  Interview with Jameel Chand, Johannesburg Water, 14/05/2003.  
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classical concession. The aim of this contract is to create the room for manoeuvre 
necessary for the utility to recoup the costs incurred in large scale infrastructure 
investments and make profits over the long term despite these costs. The second 
contract runs between the utility and its so-called ‘management operator’ (Johannesburg 
Water-JOWAM), or the elite guard drawn from the winning consortium who are to 
transform the ethos and business practices of the organisation driven by incentives in 
the form of individual performance bonuses on termination of contract. This second 
contract is then just a management service, involving the investment of human 
resources rather than capital. The management team thus established forms the 
executive of the utility for the five years of the contract, empowers the workers through 
training schemes and draws international expertise into the project42. The executive of 
JW is sourced from JOWAM and counted fifteen people at inception each with different 
lengths of contract but up to a maximum of five years, which signals the end of the 
management contract with the consortium. The team was approximately half South 
African and half expatriate. The section below describes how Johannesburg Water, now 
that it had been created as a legal entity, related institutionally to the various structures 
in the city administration that were tasked with oversight of the newly created 
‘municipal entities’.  
Monitoring the new service delivery institutions in the city   
Having created a series of nominally independent entities for service provision in the 
city, the question was how the new ‘lean and mean’ administration was to relate 
institutionally to its new partners. Paradoxically the same administration that had 
integrated eleven separate municipal structures into the ‘unicity’ in the name of budget 
cutbacks and rationalisation itself now prepared itself to spawn a new set of ten 
institutions each with a narrowly defined sphere of competence. The process was one of 
geographical amalgamation of a citywide administration, integrating local units into an 
umbrella structure, coupled to the loosening of bonds with a series of functionally 
differentiated service delivery entities. This led to paradoxical set of transformations 
that sought both to centralise and to decentralise: an increasingly centralised and unified 
administration was to oversee relations with a range of increasingly autonomous 
technical entities. Efficiency gains were the buzzword in both cases: a centralised 
administration could ostensibly cut back on the paperwork and personnel costs of 
multiple layers of administration, while the autonomous entities, run on business 
principles, would deliver services on the basis of incentivised production structures. 
However, the dream of an efficient and lean ’world class’ city presented to the city’s 
managers on the flipcharts of the world bank policy consultants still bore little relation 
to the debt ridden and bureaucratic administration that was still in place, albeit under 
construction. In the breakneck pace of transformation in the city, nudged on by the 
imminent financial crisis, the new entities had been spawned without too much attention 
having been given to the precise nature of the relations between the city and its services. 
Laying the formal blueprint down in the form of contracts and service targets was easier 
to achieve than setting the mechanisms in motion that were to implement them. Once 
                                                 
42  Interview with Mark Lautre, Johannesburg Water, 11/05/2002; 
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the core administrative centre of the city had cut itself off from the service delivery 
entities it had created, the question was how these entities would be brought back under 
some form of de facto control by the city. 
 
Inevitably, some form of mediation was needed between representative democracy and 
technical delivery, or between the city’s elected representatives and its technocratic 
aides. The contractually separate institutions needed to be is re-docked into the citywide 
vision of integrated planning through the medium-term Integrated Development Plan 
(IDP), for which a number of new institutions had to be created inside the city 
administration itself.   
 
Box 7.3  
The administrative structure of the Unicity 
 
 
 
Box 6.5: The new unicity structure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Executive mayor  
Mayoral committee / ‘cabinet’ 
Regional admin: welfare 
services 
Council:217 elected 
councillors CEO: head of admin 
and contracts  
Central administration: 
police, emergency services, 
planning 
Contract Management Unit Shared Services Centre 
Mediation 
Utilities, Agencies and Corporatised 
Entities, including Johannesburg Water 
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These docking units were created in a rather ad hoc fashion and their emergence created 
uproar within the upper echelons of the embryonic service delivery units, who had been 
promised both implementation autonomy within the limits of their service delivery 
agreements and ring-fenced finances, both of which seemed threatened by the 
emergence of a series of oversight institutions. The latter took the form of a Contract 
Management Unit (CMU) and a Shared Service Centre (SSC). These units were to 
provide support functions to the city CEO, or its head of admin, in liaising with the 
service providers and ensuring certain commonalities such as common billing of 
residents, about which more will be stated below. In the meantime, the key element of 
the transformation process are summarised in table 7.1 below. 
 
Table 7.1 
The institutional transformation of water services management 
Policy Ideals Envisaged 
institutional solution 
Problems encountered 
en route 
Solution found en 
route 
Universal access to 
basic water supply and 
sanitation, cutback on 
water wastage.  
Establishment of 
independent water 
utility operating under 
contract to city  
Overloading of tasks of 
city manager in 
overseeing 
transformation 
Establishment of 
Contract Management 
Unit 
Immediate 
improvement in service 
delivery under 
performance contract  
CMU charged with all 
tasks related to 
institutional relations 
between city and utility, 
utility commences with 
service delivery and 
achieves initial 
efficiency gains  
Institutional relations 
are not merely a matter 
of contract but require 
boards to be 
established, accounts 
books to be closed and 
opened, etc. 
Service delivery takes a 
back seat to institution 
building 
Transfer of billing 
responsibilities to ring – 
fenced utility 
Phased transfer of bills 
to utility in batches of 
10 000 customers  
Lack of clarity on 
source of municipal 
income from water sales 
Establishment of Shared 
Services Centre to 
manage all municipal 
service bills  
 
The establishment of the Contract Management Unit 
The Contract Management Unit was rapidly established within the administration of the 
city. Its key task was to translate the policy objectives of the municipal government into 
a series of performance indicators and service targets for the newly independent Utilities, 
Agencies and Corporatised Entities (UAC’s), and to lay these down in service contracts 
that governed the relations between the city and its service providers. Both the CMU 
and the SSC were latecomers and were added hastily to the administrative structure of 
the city to relieve the work pressure on the city CEO, who could not hope to regulate 
the relations with the eleven new entities merely through a series of contracts and who 
needed an administrative apparatus to regulate service delivery. Thus the ‘efficiency 
gains’ of a lean and mean city paradoxically led to the creation of new administrative 
structures to monitor and regulate service delivery which, it was originally hoped, 
would function autonomously and relieve some of the pressures on the administration. 
Nor was this the end of the process. These new entities were immediately faced with 
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three important issues related to institutional restructuring that were in the first instance 
to ‘delay’ the launch of the envisaged municipal entities. These were institution building 
itself, a precise and dependable definition of the role of the Contract Management Unit, 
and a resolution of the channels through which payments for services would accrue to 
the city. The first two issues are dealt with in this subsection while the third is dealt with 
in the next.  
Firstly, the CMU could not immediately move into the operational phase. Such 
efficiency gains as could be achieved, could only be achieved after building (or 
amputating) the institutions, such as Johannesburg Water, with which the city was to 
enter into contract. Time was against the city in the sense that the management echelons 
of the water services entity were to be given five years to transform the water services 
institutions into a single incentivised and efficient unit. On the other hand the de facto 
institutional relations between Johannesburg Water and the city had to be established 
over and above the paper formulations in the services contract. Signing a contract does 
not amount to the same thing as establishing patterned channels of interaction. And nor, 
as the current director of the CMU indicates, was it immediately clear how this was to 
proceed:     
 
“When we established all these companies, which was in the year 2000-2001 - the utilities actually 
were established in January 2001, just a few months (about six months) before we established the 
electricity water and solid waste companies - someone said hey how are we going to oversee the 
performance of these entities so it was a bit late in the day that they realised that we need to establish a 
contract management unit. And those people who oversaw the restructuring like myself, my boss and 
so forth, were then targeted for moving into this unit. So it was a huge mistake – I think one of the 
lessons learnt is that one needs to have both move in parallel - but so be it, the unit was established in 
2001 and it was established with a very rudimentary structure and functionality – when I say 
rudimentary functionality I mean that suddenly two or three people had to grasp what the role of this 
unit was all about, so what they did was they absorbed anything and everything that had to do with 
these companies into the unit” 43. 
 
The atmosphere of haste surrounding the functions of the contract management unit 
continued for some time: on the one hand the CMU was designed to perform an 
absolutely pivotal task in orchestrating much of the institutional restructuring that the 
city was to undergo44. On the other hand precisely this pivotal role became a bottleneck 
in view of the multiplicity of tasks with which the unit was burdened. It was faced with 
the establishment of entities that could report to the city on milestones achieved while 
simultaneously forging ahead on implementation of service delivery amid the 
complexities of monitoring and data collection on a new, reliable and city-wide basis. 
Given the initially small team whose job it was to manage this process, workload was in 
excess of production capacity and priorities had to be made. In the end, it was the 
monitoring function that took the back seat as new relations were forged and the 
governing boards of the newly established entities were put in place.   
 
                                                 
43  Interview with Prem Govender, CMU Director, Municipality of Johannesburg, 19/05/2003 
44  I.e. the transformation of the municipal units providing services to the city.   
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“We spent at least eighty percent of our time doing shareholder issues - the regulatory issues kicked in 
about eight months ago [i.e. Sept. 2002, T.S.] through the quarterly reports where we started to 
monitor service delivery issues pertaining to each utility. There were only four to five key specialists 
in the unit - it was a tiny unit which did not have the resources to go forward […]. If you think about 
three to four people tasked with twelve companies to oversee for the total - the city’s budget is R 10 
billion of which 70% is under the control of this unit, so we oversee R 7 billion. Four to five 
specialised people (supported by administrative staff) were required to fulfil that mandate. So 
something had to give, and the thing that took a back seat was the compliance and regulatory side”45. 
 
The central significance of this statement lies in the temporality of the concept of 
contract management. Whereas on paper the idea of divesting the responsibility for 
operational processes in service delivery results in a neat, clean process, the reality 
appears to be that the policy goal of efficient and cost effective service delivery requires 
a lengthy process of institutional transformation. The efficiency gains attained cannot be 
realised upon signing a contract but require a series of institutional and political 
preconditions to mature, which can in themselves lead to new and unforeseen 
consequences. Thus, whereas the name ‘Contract Management Unit’ suggests a 
primarily technical process, in actual fact the CMU found itself embarking upon a range 
of institution building measures before it could begin to manage contracts.  
A number of important institutional issues began to emerge in the process. The first 
and perhaps most obvious of these was the question how to manage the paradox that the 
newly created utility was on the one hand to be ‘independent’ and on the other hand to 
be made to respond to the political imperatives identified by its formal political head - 
the Council. The solution, of course, lay in the contracts binding the utility to the key 
performance indicators set by the city, but again, this required actually engineering a 
patterned set of interactions and the appointment of individuals to oversee these 
interactions in such a manner that they built confidence amongst both the members of 
the administration and the general public with regard to accountability and the 
monitoring of service targets.  
The second institution - building issue of central importance was the question how to 
manage a second paradox, namely how financially ring - fenced entities were 
nevertheless to enter into financial relations with the city. Above all, the relations 
between the internal finances of the water utility and the city’s budget process were still 
to be resolved in detail.  
The director of the CMU describes these issues as follows:  
 
“It was basically what we call the triple bottom line – we focussed on corporate governance within the 
boards – we had to make sure that all our boards were in place, they were properly mandated and that 
they understood the strategic context of the city so that they could drive the companies from that point 
of view. We spent a lot of time making sure that boards understood their mandates and roles, and so 
forth – all the systems were in place, proper governance protocols were established and so forth. The 
next thing was the financial sustainability of the entities where the city had to close off books and 
open up books, putting in an opening balance sheet – very crucial and it impacted on us a lot, 
understanding an asset register of the companies. Although we had set up these companies, the asset 
register took some time because these companies moved into what you call general accounting 
principles and you had to account for depreciation - the municipalities never ever accounted for 
depreciation, it is amazing […]. Those were very big issues because it was difficult to close one side 
                                                 
45  Interview with Prem Govender, Op. Cit, 20/5/03 
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and open the other side. We didn’t even know how to do it – we came up with a whole range of 
innovative mechanisms which required us to deal with tax – we don’t pay tax, although you account 
for it, and now that companies were operating one had to account for tax, especially around dividends, 
all of these things became crucial issues for us to understand and resolve. So we had to engage our 
revenue services, a whole range of instances to make sure that we didn’t do anything illegal. It was an 
incredible experience in that twelve to eighteen months – just bedding down these systems […]. Now 
that we have bedded most of those things and put in place a corporate governance protocol to deal 
with the code of corporate governance we feel that things are more secure, we have bedded down the 
system we have opened up the balance sheet of the company, and we have closed the city’s books”46. 
 
The issue of corporate governance was relatively easy to achieve in the sense that it 
required the identification of individuals with the appropriate professional mileage and 
social standing to take on the task. The main effect of this issue was to delay the 
moment at which there was an operational system of meetings for decision making. The 
issue of financial ring - fencing, however, was much trickier and appeared easier to 
achieve in a technical sense that it was in a practical sense. For, while the concept of a 
financially independent water utility - raising its own revenue and paying for operations 
and maintenance – was clear enough, the major political question of how a destitute 
municipality was going to deal with the loss of one of its main sources of income (the 
sale of water) had not quite been resolved yet:  
 
“One of the things going forward was the fact that the issue of generating and creating revenue – the 
city is kind of sharing the responsibility with the company, and it is still an ongoing battle. We have 
given over our top customers to the entity …whilst we maintain the rest – the domestic side. And 
revenue collection has been a big fight between us – between the city and the entities”47.  
 
More will be said on this latter topic later under 6.4.2. Suffice it to conclude that for a 
period of twelve months after the establishment of the CMU, therefore, the main thrust 
of the efforts of the contract management unit went into institution building and it could 
not run ahead of itself to monitor the performance of the entities it was in the process of 
establishing.  
 A second key issue related to institutional restructuring lies in the identity of the 
CMU itself. This issue emerged in the process of establishing the new service entities, 
as the CMU began to discover the contradictory nature of its ‘middle management’ 
function. The CMU had a schizophrenic identity in that it had been assigned two 
conflicting roles vis-à-vis the water utility. On the one hand it was tasked with oversight 
and control, laying its loyalties at the door of the Greater Johannesburg Municipal 
Council in ensuring that the demands of the municipality were presented to the utility in 
no uncertain terms and that the terms of the contract between the two players were 
adhered to strictly. However, metaphorically speaking, the policeman was also in on the 
crime in that the CMU also had the role of shareholder to play in building up a solid and 
financially viable utility: it had to ensure conditions that were conducive to the growth 
of a stable unit. As a shareholder the CMU was privy to the internal dilemma’s facing 
the utility, most of which it had created itself by placing demands on the utility in terms 
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of service delivery expansion, service upgrading, infrastructure upgrading, and so on. 
Thus with the one hand it created adverse circumstances under which he utility had to 
perform, while on the other hand it was encouraged to waive these restrictions in order 
to create a viable business entity. Clearly, these roles were in conflict with one another. 
The end result in institutional terms was a split of the CMU into two separate identities: 
one of contract supervision and one of shareholder / institution builder:  
 
“We held two conflicting roles immediately - one was the shareholder role and one was the 
compliance and regulatory role – so we were kind of what they call schizophrenic - we sat on the 
boards when it suited them and when they needed a shareholder we performed that role as the 
shareholder representative. And at the same time we were also asked to do the regulatory function, but 
over that twelve months we never got to do the monitoring of the regulatory and compliance element 
effectively – what we essentially did for that twelve months was to spend our role on shareholder 
activities like corporate governance and financial sustainability of the companies and overseeing the 
performance of the companies from an operational and financial point of view and so forth” 48. 
 
Again, given the stressed conditions under which the CMU had to work in its start-up 
period, it was necessary to prioritise issues, and the most pressing issue of institution 
building, or the shareholder side of the CMU identity, took centre stage. However as the 
utility began to take form, the identity of the CMU as a monitor of contracts resurfaced 
and the dual identity became manifest as a problem within the organisation. Rather than 
resolving the organisation’s dilemma, however, it was in fact split in two with each 
subsection retaining one of the organisation’s previous identities:  
  
“After twelve months this issue of the conflict emerged and we engaged a team using USAID funding 
to help us unpack the roles, with the result that we have a shareholder strategic plan and a CMU 
strategic plan which says: we could not perform our monitoring as effectively as we would have liked 
to because we had to bed down systems within the unit around shareholder issues which was never 
done before in the history of municipalities in South Africa or Africa for that matter. So we spent that 
time but in parallel to that process we were doing things in a very ad hoc manner, as the Council had 
requested data on monitoring service delivery and regulatory issues on tariffs and so forth we took 
them as they came along but we spent at least eighty percent of our time doing shareholder issues - the 
regulatory issues kicked in about eight months ago through the quarterly reports where we started to 
monitor service delivery issues pertaining to each utility [...]. These strategic plans have now been 
approved, and Council has approved a split of the CMU into a shareholder unit and a contract 
management unit – so we are now embarking on a monitoring and evaluation programme for each of 
the entities, putting together key performance indicators, key performance areas, and that is going to 
be the basis of overseeing the regulatory and compliance aspects together with the client issues around 
service delivery in the CMU”49. 
 
All in all, the establishment of the CMU with its attendant practical problems in actually 
establishing a new set of institutional relations had the effect that in the first eighteen 
months of the utility’s existence, the CMU could not actually monitor service delivery 
on behalf of the city. There was a contractual agreement between the city and the utility 
that for the moment meant little in practice as institution building went ahead and the 
CMU began to define the tasks that it was itself tasked to do. In the meantime, the 
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newly created water utility, rather than being closely monitored and guided in the 
directions desired by Council, was in fact operating very much on its own.  
 
The establishment of the Shared Services Centre 
In a parallel process, the ring-fencing of the finances of the UAC’s led to a series of 
dilemma’s surrounding the control of municipal income. By cutting its bond with the 
utilities, agencies and corporate entities, the city had effectively cut itself off from its 
main source of revenue, i.e. the sale of services to residents. Other than property taxes 
and means tested income transfers from central government (the so-called equitable 
share), local government in South Africa only had the sale of services from which to 
finance its ambitious infrastructure and service delivery programmes 50 . In effect 
therefore, the creation of the UAC’s emptied the municipal coffers into the internal 
finances of the UAC’s with little more than a contract to steer the way in which they 
utilised these revenues.  
Overnight, therefore, this created a problem of maintaining indirect control, which 
ostensibly was laid down in management contracts and service level agreements but 
which in fact created an immediate and urgent cash flow problem within the 
municipality.  
On the one hand it was reasoned that the municipality remained sole shareholder of 
the water utility. As a result, it would be the sole beneficiary of the financial 
improvements that were the result of cutting back on water losses and improving the 
rate collection system. On the other hand, the utility itself needed time to reorganise 
itself and it could be expected that it would take some time before Johannesburg Water 
began to make a significant profit. Therefore it could be reasonably expected that 
municipal income from the dividends of (amongst other entities) Johannesburg Water 
would take some time to materialise.  
In addition to the time-lag, the historical reality was that income from the water 
accounts was integrated into municipal accounts, and that revenue from water sales was 
utilised for purposes other than merely the operation and maintenance costs of those 
institutions concerned with providing water services in the city. An element of cross-
subsidy to other organs within the municipality was a reality, even if the precise nature 
of this transfer was not transparent. Cutting this source of income off therefore had the 
potential consequence that many non-water activities in the city would be threatened in 
their existence as the municipality would have to find short and long term solutions to 
the question where the substitute revenue was going to come from.  
In essence, therefore, the policy of ring - fencing was strongly at odds with its short 
term consequences. This conflict ultimately had a strong impact upon the transfer of 
water accounts from the municipality to the new utility, as localised control over 
accounts lay at the heart of the ring-fencing strategy.  
                                                 
50  The so-called ‘equitable share’ is a financial transfer from central government to local government  
that is dependent on the level of income a municipality has. It is by no means sufficient to replace  
income from sales of electricity or water. 
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The original intention had been to transfer the municipal water accounts to 
Johannesburg Water in batches of 20 000. A staff member of Johannesburg Water 
recalls the following:  
 
“On the transfer of billing, in the original deal that we signed between Johannesburg Water and the 
City – the so-called Service Delivery Agreement - it was agreed that Johannesburg Water was to take 
over billing for water customers in an incremental manner, but that it would in fact take over the 
billing. That was to take eighteen months to two years, in data bases of which there are some sixty 
nine. We would take over one every three months, so that after a couple of years we were in control of 
our own revenue”51.  
 
However, this plan entailed commencing the transfers at the bulk end, i.e. transferring 
the most voluminous commercial consumers first. Upon signing the Service Level 
Agreement (hereafter: SLA), the transfer of databases did in fact commence. A total of 
fifteen thousand high-end customers were transferred to Johannesburg Water, 
representing 3% of the total of some 500 000 customers but because of the special status 
of the high-end consumers this 3% brought in about 33% of Johannesburg Water’s 
ultimate revenue from water sales. However this phased transfer of customers was 
brought to a halt by the city administration when it was realised what the consequences 
of continued transfer would be. At the same time that the ring-fenced entities were 
being established, fence ‘cutters’ within the same administration were at work ensuring 
that financial flows returned to the city or moved between one entity and another. A key 
landmark in this process was the establishment of the so-called Shared Services Centre, 
which was henceforth to handle the joint billing of all UAC’s in the city. This entity had 
not been envisaged in the original iGoli plan, and it was a stop-gap measure introduced 
to stem the flow of finances out of the municipal coffers.  
The chair of the municipal portfolio committee on water affairs describes the diluting 
of the ring-fencing process as follows:     
 
“Indeed, the intention was to ensure that these stand alone utilities are ring-fenced, that they are 
responsible for their customer base, they are responsible for the entire value chain, opening an account, 
providing a service, dealing, credit control, marketing, customer service, you name it. But there are 
some technical issues which the city has to resolve first […]. But […] in as much as we have the stand 
alone utilities, the issue of cross subsidisation in local government is a reality. For cleaning the streets 
for example, they are not charging any specific individual. For providing libraries, parks, the zoo and 
other public booths if you like which are commonly shared by the city of Johannesburg there must be 
some elements of cross-subsidisation because the truth is that it is Johannesburg Water and City 
Power which generate a surplus in their business. The rest really, they survive on the basis of 
subsidies. Now the city cannot afford to say: we will only get a dividend as a 100% shareholder of 
Johannesburg at the end of the financial year. You can’t because we need to cross subsidise these 
services virtually on a month to month basis. Now what we have done is to ensure that the system is 
driven by a business plan which Johannesburg Water developed, and of course there is a Service 
Delivery Agreement between the city of Johannesburg and Johannesburg Water as a service provider, 
to say: these are the targets we are setting ourselves in terms of extending the infrastructure, ensuring 
access, etc. etc. And then we will say: how much will it cost as water to achieve these targets, 
including operating expenses, the cap-ex, and all your running costs. Then the city guarantees those up 
                                                 
51  Telephone interview with Mr. Anthony Still, CEO: Johannesburg Water, 02/03/2004. 
 292
front. But then the surplus goes back to the city as I have said, to pay for primary health care, libraries, 
parks, cemeteries, and everything else”52. 
 
The Shared Services Centre was visualised as a unit which would handle all the billing 
of services provided to residents by the city. It is a centralised clearing house located 
within the municipal administration which handles customer bills for key services such 
as water, electricity, refuse collection and so forth in an integrated manner. The great 
advantage of its existence from the point of view of the administration is that its revenue 
from service provision is unified and that there is therefore a single point of reference in 
as far as the city budget is concerned – a very important issue for a city struggling to 
balance its books. Revenue would thus remain under the control of the city, and the 
service providers such as the water utility would be paid for their services by the Shared 
Services Centre.  
However, this was certainly not in line with the original iGoli vision of financially 
ring-fenced entities – on the contrary, it gave a new lease of life to a process of financial 
centralisation that had been taking place within the city for some time. In the immediate 
post-election period, i.e. after 1995, the city had been run by four metropolitan councils 
under the umbrella of the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council, which, 
paradoxically, had in fact been ring - fenced themselves, creating in each case “an 
administrative edifice that would be able to stand alone as a discrete entity”53. In fact, 
the existence of multiple and independent administrative structures within the city was 
one of the key rationales for the iGoli 2000 plan which centralised the administration 
under one council partly in order to cut costs and remove inefficiencies.    
The move to create a Shared Services Centre dealt a serious blow to the relations that 
were being built up between the city and the ‘independent’ service providers: on the one 
hand entities such as the water utility were being given the freedom to run their 
organisations on a new set of principles and provided with the incentive to cut costs and 
begin to make a profit. On the other hand the financial means with which these entities 
were to carry out these improvements were kept out of their reach. Furthermore, rather 
than Johannesburg Water making profit by cutting back on water wastage and 
reinvesting this profit into its organisation, it was now at the discretion of the 
Municipality to determine how much Johannesburg Water would need to achieve its 
efficiency gains, and the city claimed the profits it generated.  
The CEO of Johannesburg Water was incensed by the move, and it drew the 
attention of Johannesburg Water away from its core mission, replacing it by a struggle 
to regain the operating and development capital on which it had depended:    
 
“We got the top customers, but we have not been able to take over more – we have had a big fight 
with the city on this but the long and the short of it is that they did not honour the agreement if you 
like – they kept the billing in the revenue unit of the city where there is a consolidated bill. All of that 
it is still being vigorously discussed because we would like to get control of more of our customers - 
we don’t think it is an optimal solution for either ourselves or the city - we think we can do better than 
them and we should get control over more of our customers so that it under negotiation and I am not 
sure how it is going to turn out. The impact is that we feel we are getting less money – we feel we are 
                                                 
52  Interview with Councillor Brian Hlongwa, 23/05/03. 
53  City of Johannesburg (2001): Johannesburg: a City in Change. Johannesburg: Zebra Press, p. 18 
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losing more money as commercial billings that we would do ourselves. There are a lot of data 
problems to fix up – people who are not on the data base, people who are getting incorrectly billed, 
people whose adjustments to their account are not going through, etc. – so what we would call 
commercial losses. The net result of that is that we feel we are losing money that we should be getting 
or that alternatively there is money to be got and that it will take a few years to fix this all up and it is 
being delayed. The net impact of less money is more pressure on the water tariffs for those people 
who are paying and less money for rehabilitation of the network”54.   
 
Rather than becoming an independent for-profit entity, therefore, Johannesburg Water 
has become (or rather remains) an entity which needs to apply to the municipality for 
amongst other things the capital expenditures necessary to cut back on water 
consumption. Privatisation as a means to gain control of water scarcity has ground to a 
halt in mid-process, and the majority of the water bills remain in the hands of the 
Municipality. The institution that was called into life in order to get a grip on water 
losses and extend water supplies to the poor has lost the main incentive to carry out its 
work and must make do with the income from the bills transferred until now and with 
such income as the Municipality chooses to transfer to it from the Shared Services 
Centre. 
In defence of their stance, the Municipality advances the issue of the transaction 
costs involved in isolating water revenue from the rest of municipal finances. The 
argument seems to be that as water accounts were integrated within municipal finances 
for many years, it is a difficult task to extricate purely water related income and 
expenditure from broader financial flows. Thus on the one hand the launching of 
Johannesburg Water as a ring-fenced entity is advanced as being central to the financial 
recovery of the city, but on the other hand the launching of the Shared Services Centre 
is defended on the grounds that ring fencing is difficult to achieve in practise! As yet 
this policy paradox does not appear to have been resolved. Both parties do appear to 
agree that data issues make it rather difficult to extricate water accounts from the rest of 
intra - municipal transactions. The question however is who is to be responsible for 
carrying out the process of uncluttering: the utilities or the Municipality. The chair of 
the municipal portfolio committee maintained that it should be the city which retains 
control over the separation process:  
 
“One [reason for the Shared Service Centre, T.S.] is the fact that the data that the city has is seriously 
contaminated – you need to clean up the data to a point at which the levels of accuracy are acceptable 
[…]. Now the question was at what point do you get your data to the point at which you can easily 
ring-fence just water. Because remember: whilst you are building these utilities, the city continues to 
function and you need to continue billing from month to month. I think we have arrived at a point at 
which we are beginning to rethink the whole approach: instead, what you would have is a Shared 
Revenue Service Centre. What that entails is that water in a phased manner would begin to take over 
on a database to database basis, their clients. They would be responsible for everything that I have 
explained, but in terms of sending out the bill, you need to be able to ensure that the customer receives 
                                                 
54  Telephone interview with Mr. Anthony Still, CEO: Johannesburg Water, 02/03/2004. Prem Govender  
of the CMU puts it as follows: “We will have fights about us treading on their toes – they say we are  
trying to run their company – we are trying to understand the dynamics without interfering in their  
company too much – but the role of the city as a shareholder is such that if there are water bursts and  
when there are problems with sanitation the community comes to the mayor to complain, they don’t  
go to the JW”. 
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one bill which pays for wastes, for assessment rates, for services which are supplied by us, for water, 
for sanitation” 55. 
 
In an interview, the CEO of Johannesburg Water confirmed that the city’s databases of 
water consumers was rather inaccurate and that in fact inaccurate billing accounted for a 
significant proportion of ‘unaccounted for water’, i.e. of the 30% of Johannesburg’s 
water that is unaccounted for, not all is lost in physical terms. The cleaning up of the 
billing system is therefore a major priority within Johannesburg Water, as it yields 
immediate financial gains. However, the CEO had expected this aspect to be located 
within the ambit of Johannesburg Water rather than within the municipality, and also 
confidently states: “we think that we can do a better job than them”. It was unaccounted 
for water that provided the incentive for companies to bid for the Johannesburg contract, 
and it was through an independent utility that the city expected to cut costs, raise 
income and cut back on water losses. By halting the privatisation process, the intended 
responses to scarcity have been hung in limbo, and the end result would appear to be 
determined more by political relations between the new utility and the city than by the 
technical specifications of the service delivery agreement.  
Interestingly, the question of control over billing is also strongly related to the 
problem of non-payment for services which features strongly in Johannesburg. Through 
the Shared Services Centre, the city administrators aim to gain more control over non 
payment that they would have if each service entity was to run its finances separately:  
 
“Otherwise what you would have – let us take waste as an example – if the waste management utility 
is confronted by non-payment, what must they do? They cannot say that they will not pick up the 
refuse: it is a public health issue and they must. So they do not have leverage in terms of credit control. 
So these issues have to be looked at holistically. That is why it has been easier in terms of top 
customer for water electricity and waste, to give them those bills. But on the domestic part of it, the 
survey that we have done suggest that separate billing would lead to people prioritising services such 
as electricity for payment (because unlike water you cannot argue that electricity is a basic right – you 
can use alternative sources of energy). Within the Shared Services Centre water can be fully 
responsible for their clients or customers but at the same time consolidate the billing city wide. Now 
of course that would mean having a service level agreement between water and the Shared Service 
Centre” 56.  
 
Perhaps the most significant about-turn in policy terms lies in the legitimisation 
provided for the establishment of the Shared Services – a legitimisation that is based on 
efficiency arguments. Whereas in the run-up to iGoli 2000 efficiency was used as the 
central argument to establish the service entities and ring- fence finances, now the same 
argument is used to achieve the opposite, namely to ensure that control over billing 
remains within the municipality.  
 
“The benefit of doing this of course will be the meter reading: you have to have two separate people 
coming to you house: one to read a water meter and one to read the electricity meter. That is not 
efficient – instead of one person moving into your house to read both meters. So that is what the Share 
Service Centre is all about: to identify those common processes that can benefit all the service 
                                                 
55  Interview with Councillor Brian Hlongwa, 23/05/03. 
56  Interview with Councillor Brian Hlongwa, 23/05/03. 
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providers and streamline them, but with a view that to take full charge of finances […]. Rather than 
send out a number of bills, we send out one bill which unifies all the separate bills of the various 
utilities into one”57.              
 
At the time of writing, the outcome of the negotiations between the city and the UAC’s 
on the issue of the Shared Services Centre was still unclear. However this only serves to 
underscore the central analytic point to be made about the transformation of water 
management in the city, namely that the introduction of co - production is not a swift 
and clean process that materialises immediately upon signing a series of technical 
contracts. It is an intensely political process that requires careful policy monitoring and 
strong conflict resolution mechanisms if the end result is to be achieved without 
alienating some of the central stakeholders – in this case the water utility itself. The key 
end results of the reorganisation process – a cutback on water wastage and the rollout of 
new services to the poor in Johannesburg – have been drawn into the political process of 
restructuring rather than being the efficient output of a new citywide organogram. This 
argument is borne out further by the relations between the city and both the municipal 
workers and active civic groups who at various moments in the process strongly resisted 
various elements of what was commonly (and incorrectly) called the policy of 
‘privatisation’. These issues are dealt with in the section below. Before doing so, 
however, it is necessary to unpack in more detail the challenges faced by the new water 
management institution and to elaborate on the ways in which the new utility took up 
these challenges.  
 
Box 7.4  
 ‘Wet industries’ are rare in Johannesburg  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Unpacking the challenges: key issues in water supply and sanitation in the city  
The new water management institutions and their oversight organs were faced with a 
complex set of interrelated challenges. Underneath the city lay a complex grid of 
pipelines geared to the needs of the apartheid city: bulk water supplies to mines and 
industries and a highly distorted domestic water supply and sanitation system that 
extended low level services to remote African and Indian townships and high levels of 
service to the well watered lawns of the white suburbs in the north. The legacy of 
separate development had created black and Indian townships at a great distance from 
                                                 
57  Ibid.  
Johannesburg does not have a large number of industrial high water consumption customers. 
Where the possibility to produce at another location exists, large scale water consumers with 
high water input and/or effluent discharge are mainly located at the coast because the cost of 
wastewater treatment is lower: much of wastewater can be released into the sea. This means that 
the so-called ‘wet industries’ are typically coastal in South Africa. By the same token, high 
effluent quality standards have to be imposed on Johannesburg’s ‘return flow’, as it is a key 
source of water for downstream users such as the town of Rustenburg. This place high demands 
on water purification in the city and further raises the cost of water provided to residents and 
businesses.  
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the low density white residential and commercial areas, as a result of which the city 
featured 8252 km of water distribution pipeline and 8149 km of sewer lines leading to 
the city’s wastewater treatment plants. This is approximately four times the amount of 
infrastructure utilised in cities with comparable income inequalities such as Mexico 
City58, and it leads to high per capita infrastructure maintenance costs.   
Townships had been very much left to themselves since the rent boycotts of the 
1980’s and neither infrastructure upgrading nor state surveillance of actual consumption 
and pollution had been attempted for a very long time. The critical importance of the 
Witwatersrand to the national economy had fuelled an uncritical boom of water imports 
from ever further into the hinterland without much regard to the ways in which the 
water was being used in the city. The water purification works in the north of the city 
were creaking under the weight of the sludge delivered to them and were facing rapid 
rises in the cost of delivering clean water back into the river channels for downstream 
usage. National government had constitutionally guaranteed individual citizenship 
rights to basic levels of service such as 25 litres of domestic water per capita per day at 
no more than 200 metres from each home and a Ventilated Improved Pit Latrine for 
each household. It had thereupon happily devolved the responsibility for service 
delivery to the financially crippled municipalities, but left the big cities to fend for 
themselves and concentrated means tested municipal income support (the so-called 
equitable share) to the country’s poorest areas. Influx control had been waived as 
apartheid legislation was repealed, and the city spawned new informal settlements 
creating the typical primate city headache of unplanned settlement, forced 
expropriations, and forced removals to zoned and serviced plots of land. Broadly 
speaking, the city could be divided into three water and sanitation ‘zones’.  
One was the rich North, with low density suburbs, high per capita water consumption, 
water utilisation for luxury domestic purposes such as swimming pools, gardening and 
car washing, and relatively high volume industrial/commercial utilisation in specific 
zones such as industrial areas, mines and commercial centres. From a background of 
low density living, however, high levels of crime in the inner city have led to a second 
‘great trek’ of white residents out of the town centre and into new residential areas in 
the north of the city. As a result, the area of Sandton has become seriously overstretched 
in terms of effluent infrastructure, and there are many incidents of sewer leakage and 
pollution which have deleterious effects upon downstream settlements.  
The second was the township complex of Soweto to the South West, with lower 
middle income domestic consumption at low levels of service (ranging from communal 
stand pipes to households with multiple connections inside the house and from a 
sanitary bucket to full flush toilets). This area had severe maintenance problems, water 
losses estimated at the same volume of actual consumption, illegal connections, little or 
no metering, and a culture of non-payment for services. Unemployment varies from 
some 50% to 60% in the area, providing little basis upon which the introduction of 
payment for services could be built. Historically residents of Soweto were billed at a flat 
                                                 
58  See Davie, L. (2002): How Jo’burg plans to save that water, www.joburg.org.za accessed in May  
2003; also from interview with Councillor Brian Hlongwa, 23/05/03. 
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rate based on estimated consumption, pegged at R52,90.- against an estimated monthly 
consumption of 20 000 litres per household per month. However recent studies have 
shown that actual per capita consumption is much higher, in the order of 65 to 80 
kilolitres per household per month, so that the bulk of water provided to households in 
Soweto is actually free of charge. In the view of Johannesburg Water, this provided no 
incentive for residents to introduce measures to cut back on consumption such as the 
fitting of water efficient appliances within the household. An important aspect of the 
new range of water policies introduced after 1994 was the introduction of a stepped 
tariff system in which high volume consumers are charged more per unit of 
consumption than low volume consumers. However, this introduced an element of 
cross-subsidy from rich to poor areas which led to a wave of protests from white 
residents, organised for instance in the form of the Sandton ratepayers’ association who 
were against their bills being used to finance improvements in the adjacent township of 
Alexandra.  
The third was the scattering of mineworkers hostels and some 89 informal 
settlements concentrated in but not exclusive to the South of the city and being home to 
some 250 000 residents 90% of whom are underemployed or unemployed and have 
little or mo means to pay for services. A small minority have paid work and use 
informal housing as a means to cut down on monthly expenditures. These areas were – 
in the case of hostels – planned developments with low levels of service, or – in the case 
of informal settlements – unplanned and on the whole serviced by water deliveries that 
were shuttled into the areas by water tanker on a daily basis and sanitary buckets that 
were ostensibly collected once a week but which were beset by problems of irregular 
collection59. High levels of unplanned settlement led to pervasive health problems such 
as regular outbreaks of diarrhoea and the outbreak of cholera in the summer of 2000. 
Also, the physical encroachment of river banks by self-built shacks in areas such as 
Alexandra brought high levels of danger during heavy rainfalls, with attendant 
incidences of drowning and property loss.    
 Within this complex set of problems, the golden goose from the point of view of 
Johannesburg Water ultimately lay in water demand management. The grey zone of 
unaccounted for water became the focus of much speculation and policy building, and 
projected returns on efficiency gains became the motor of the institutional hubris that 
followed. Much like the gold panning and surveying that had given birth to the city, the 
accurate mapping out of existing water consumption levels became the key to 
recovering lost municipal revenue. For this, a large scale technological intervention was 
needed in the city, and it rapidly became the site of conflict between the municipality 
and its residents who had little or no interest in having their water consumption 
measured and accurately billed.  
 However, equal in importance to water demand management from the point of view 
of the city’s political leaders were the electoral promises in respect of the 
constitutionally guaranteed right to basic levels of service - 25 litres of water per capita 
per day at not more than 200m from the home and a VIP latrine on each stand - which 
                                                 
59  The cost of providing chemical toilets alone in the informal settlements is estimated at some R60  
million per annum.  
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were to have been delivered seven years after 1994, or by 2001. The ring-fencing of 
Johannesburg Water was seen as a vehicle for the acceleration of delivery in the area of 
water supply and sanitation, albeit linked into other government programmes such as 
the delivery of housing:       
 
“Firstly IGoli 2002 sought to further basic rights, in other words to ensure that all the institutional 
issues were resolved. In the past as you would know the ….department which was responsible for all 
technical and engineering services, so that would be a mixture of everything from roads parks to water 
to waste – there was really no focus, and as a result you had a lot of problems in terms of 
accountability for specific services. So the idea of establishing stand alone utilities, amongst other 
things, was aimed at creating a greater focus. Now with the establishment of Johannesburg Water 
around 2001 we were able to establish a team which had in the first instance the necessary 
management capacity and expertise – for the first time the city was able to take a broad view on what 
the city’s needs are with regard to water. Now as you would know, this meant in the first instance 
providing for the needs of all residents, including businesses. And it meant developing clear strategies 
around water demand management, which was an issue which had never been dealt with adequately in 
the past. Now this also meant that for the first time, the city of Johannesburg has developed a water 
management plan to have experts who know what the needs of the city are in terms of the necessary 
infrastructure as well as the demands – what the demand or future growth of the city would be. Now 
as you would know one of the key drivers would be housing, because of the pressures of housing in 
South Africa generally – and it mean also ensuring that those houses have access to basic services 
such as water and sanitation”60. 
 
Providing water supply and sanitation in Johannesburg was a reasonably ‘manageable’ 
challenge from a technical point of view. Against the backdrop of the national water 
supply and sanitation challenges, Johannesburg fared extremely well. Whereas in 1994 
some 12 million South Africans did not have access to potable water and some 18 
million did not have access to adequate sanitation systems – respectively 28% and 42% 
of the population – a mere 1% of Johannesburg’s residents did not have access to 
potable water in 1994 and a mere 6% did not have access to adequate sanitation 
systems61. However given the high density of settlement and the health risks associated 
with outbreaks of disease in a city of 3.5 million residents, even these low percentages 
constituted a significant risk. The sanitation problems in particular were a source of 
concern, and the municipality had settled for the high cost solution of physically 
tankering water into the informal settlements and the supply to informal areas of 
chemical toilets. In this way the municipality kept its constitutional promises, but at 
significant cost and on an unsustainable basis - no permanent systems were being 
introduced and there was an urgent need to approach the issue of planned settlement so 
as to absorb immigrants into the city in such a way as to avoid both health risks and 
high supply costs.     
The delivery (or upgrading) of water supply and sanitation systems, however, was 
premised on the capacity of a cash-strapped municipality to maintain a high level of 
annual capital investment in infrastructure. In this sense the unrolling of water and 
sanitation plans was inextricably intertwined with the costs that water losses brought 
with them. A full one third of the water imported by the city could not be accounted for 
                                                 
60  Interview with Councillor Brian Hlongwa, 23/05/03; 
61  DWAF (1994): Water Supply and Sanitation White Paper. Pretoria: DWAF, interview with Brian  
Hlongwa, Op. Cit.  
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and hence from the point of view of the municipality, too, cutting back on water losses 
was a key policy issue, albeit interpreted in financial terms rather than in terms of 
problems associated with the allocation of a scarce resource. In this sense Johannesburg 
is, in a national sense, an island of privilege, in which access to the resource in itself is 
not an important issue but rather the question how to keep abreast with the costs 
associated with a high tech national system of resource capture and importation. Within 
the city, arguments with regard to water are utilitarian and have little to do with staking 
claims to the resource itself:  
    
“Now as you know we buy our water from Rand Water […] we spend an amount of about R 1.2 
billion every day purchasing water. But if you then look at the amount of water that we buy and then 
sell to households as well as firms, there is an amount of about R 300 million that we could not 
account for. That was as a result of a number of problems. One of the problems of course had to do 
with physical losses, because of the ageing infrastructure and we had a lot of leakages. But number 
two: in areas like Soweto which is where the bulk of the poor people live people really are receiving 
water and there are no meters. So in terms of how they pay for the water service, it is based on 
deemed consumption, which is an estimate […] But the big problem with that it is a guesstimate, and 
there is no incentive on the part of water consumers – residents in this case – to conserve. Because 
whether you use more or you use less, your bill is still the same […]. So there is a huge project that 
we are starting now to conserve water – which means amongst other things the issue of education 
generally […]: for people to understand and appreciate the fact that water is a very, very scarce 
resource […].Water is very scarce here – in fact the bulk of the water that people use comes from the 
Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme as you would know – at a very great cost to the country. Now you 
need then to have a programme which raises the awareness and consciousness of people around water 
use and water management. But at the same time you need to put systems in place which would 
enable you to know how much water you are buying, who is using how much water and for what 
purpose. Water is needed for all sorts of things ranging from recreation to households needs for 
cooking, washing, cleaning as well as the needs of industry generally. Now the major challenge here 
is to get to a point where people accept metering: as they use water people must know that there are 
costs associated with water services”62.  
 
Unaccounted for water, therefore, was the key to solving Johannesburg’s water 
management problems and the key to turning Johannesburg Water into a profitable 
company. Upon its creation, the utility set itself a range of five-year targets that were 
expected to make powerful inroads into the legacy of inefficient water use that the city 
had brought with it. The attention is now turned, therefore to the strategy developed by 
Johannesburg Water to turn around the culture of water utilisation in the city.  
The JW/Jowam strategy63 
When Johannesburg Water was created, it was given the (delegated contractual) 
responsibility for providing water and sanitation services to the city and to its residents. 
In one of its first press releases, the utility announced a set of optimistic targets in 
respect of reducing the volume of unaccounted for water on seven different fronts: 
Potential gains for both the city and the utility were thus pegged at R 320 million per 
year at the end of a five year period, or a 58% reduction in losses over the same period. 
However this did not translate directly into profit for the utility, as gains were to be used 
                                                 
62  Ibid.  
63  The information in this section is drawn mostly from an Interview with Mark Lautré, a  
WSSA/JOWAM representative at Johannesburg Water, 11/5/2002. 
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to some extent to achieve the targets set in the service delivery agreement between the 
utility and the city – a capital expenditure programme estimated at a total of R 212 
million set out in table 7.3 below. These plans, however, were diluted on a number of 
fronts. 
Firstly, as mentioned above, the expected transfers of customer databases from the 
city’s administration only occurred partly, as a result of which the available capital was 
strongly reduced. Secondly, Johannesburg Water itself had to embark on a major 
institutional restructuring exercise in order to integrate the various water-related 
administrations within the city into one company and then to introduce a new ethos 
based on efficiency, high productivity and a service orientation towards clients.  
 
Table 7.2 
Unaccounted for water in Johannesburg64  
Source of unaccounted for 
water 
Status Quo (annual 
financial loss in Rands)  
5 Year target (annual 
financial loss in Rands) 
Illegal connections 25 million 15 million
Faulty meters 70 million 40 million
Billing errors 170 million 40 million
Unpaid bills 130 million 50 million
Physical losses 120 million 50 million
City use 5 million 5 million
Free provision 30 million 30 million
Total 550 million 230 million 
  Tot. savings = 320 million 
 
Immediately prior to the establishment of Johannesburg Water there were twenty-two 
different water, sanitation and bulk water departments within the six councils being 
supplied with water by the Metropolitan Council. The Metro Council, in other words, 
was acting as a distributing agent for the various councils acting within its area. In 
addition, because the Midrand Council was brought into this supply scenario, the supply 
limits of the system had been extended considerably to the north of the old city limits65. 
Johannesburg Water, therefore, was the end result of the amalgamation of twenty two 
different institutional entities under the management of an executive brought in by the 
winning consortium. These entities all found a new home in the operations66 division of 
Johannesburg Water. Above this was the office of the Managing director and that of the 
executive Director, and alongside it were new division for finance, capital investment, 
corporate affairs, customer services, and communications and marketing. Many of the 
workers who had been employed at the various decentralised institutions throughout the 
                                                 
64  Adapted from Johannesburg Water (2000): In the pipeline, July 2000.  
65  Midrand lies some 30 km to the North of the Johannesburg city centre.  
66  The operations division consists of the network department responsible for pipes and reservoirs, a  
bulk wastewater department responsible for the six wastewater plants that operate in the city, and the  
low income development department responsible for all the projects concerned with extension of  
services to low income and previously disadvantaged areas.   
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city were migrated inward and came to work at the new offices of the company. These 
consisted of six local regional offices and depots responsible for water services in each 
zone, and a head office in central Johannesburg. Before operational work could even 
begin, therefore, a major logistical exercise had to be undertaken, and in the first two 
years of the five year management contract between the consortium and the utility, the 
utility only functioned as an operational unit for one year – the first year was almost 
entirely devoted to the restructuring process67.  
The finances of Johannesburg Water have to cover running costs as well as capital 
expenditure. The capital investment programme can vary between R 100 and R 200 
million annually depending on the size of the next series of projects to be undertaken, 
and this amount must fund the extension of the system, replacements, the establishment 
of new operational units such as call centres etc. JW has to maintain a collection rate of 
85 to 87% in order to cover costs incurred both cap-ex and op-ex.  
 
Table 7.3 
Capital expenditures envisaged by Johannesburg Water68  
Area of work Budget Description 
Infrastructure upgrading R 50 million Upgrading of sewers, water 
mains, reservoir inlets and 
pump stations 
Low income areas R 44 million R 33 million for service 
provision in the various 
phases of Ivory Park (an 
informal settlement) and R 7 
million for pilot projects in a 
range of experimental areas 
Wastewater treatment R 33 million Upgrading of sewerage 
treatment in the three main 
Southern Works 
New Infrastructure R 27 million Some R 15 million for new 
reservoirs and pipe - work 
Presidential Projects  R 30 million Mainly grant funding for 
service delivery to poor areas 
from the Department of 
Provincial and Local 
Government  
Unaccounted for water R 10 million Setting up of distribution 
zones and zone metered areas 
for enhanced monitoring and 
control 
Operation and Maintenance R 10 million Quality monitoring to ensure 
compliance, telemetry of 
                                                 
67  Telephone interview with Jameel Chand, Johannesburg Water, 14/05.03  
68  From Johannesburg Water (2001): In the pipeline. 
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leakages and maintenance of 
systems  
Customer services R 6 million Establishment of a customer 
services centre aimed at 
enhanced responsiveness and 
accuracy of data 
Planning and engineering 
studies 
R 6 million Refunding developers, 
registering servitudes, GIS 
and hydraulic modelling  
Corporate Services  R 2 million Purchase of land for new 
reservoirs.  
 
However therein the crux lies: there is strong disagreement between JW and the 
Metro about who is responsible for the water accounts, as the institution that controls 
billing also controls finances, and as mentioned above, the city has been reluctant to 
relinquish its control over its key source of revenue. In total Johannesburg has about 
600 000 account holders. JW currently has between 16 000 and 20 000 of these 
accounts which are largely high-end consumers but which also contains a mix of 
‘ordinary’ residential accounts. 
JW now manages these accounts, which includes all the functions such as billing, 
credit control, collection, and so on. There have been ‘different moves’ on the process 
of billing: in terms of the iGoli plan the accounts were to have been transferred 
regularly to JW in batches of fifty to eighty thousand per transfer, until the management 
of all accounts were in the hands of Johannesburg Water. However this has not taken 
place, save for the first transfer: the Municipality is, as mentioned, in the process of 
establishing a Shared Services Centre which will retain the billing of domestic 
consumers within the ambit of the city. This is seen by JW as a breach of contract, and 
it leaves the utility hamstrung in terms of managing the utility efficiently. There are 
worries that the municipality will cream off revenue much needed by JW itself to fund 
the changes to the water infrastructure on which the projected efficiency gains are based. 
On the other hand, the top ten thousand consumers have been transferred to the utility 
and this represents a major proportion of the water consumption and therefore of the 
bills accruing to the utility.  
At the moment JW is collecting on their top ten thousand customers at a 92% rate. 
The growth of consumption because of the expansion of the city stands at about 2% per 
year. Rand Water produces about 3500 mega litres of water a day, and Johannesburg 
represents about 30% of their production (1200 ML/day).  
The township of Soweto holds the key to a lot of JW’s aspirations. Currently this 
area represents some 30% of JW’s consumption, which provides an important incentive 
to the utility in that if it can reduce the area’s consumption by about half in the five 
years of the contract, this will reduce expenditures on total water bought in the city by 
about 10%. Of course, this will be offset by the growth in demand in the city over time, 
but this time, it is hoped, the water will be paid for and thus wasted water will have 
been turned into a source of revenue. A host of intermediate level technology solutions 
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are being piloted to test relations between affordability and water consumption. At the 
low end of the spectrum lies tankered water being provided to informal settlements and 
other areas where water supplies are unreliable. On the one hand tankered water ensures 
low consumption levels but the delivery cost is exorbitantly high. This is gradually 
being replaced by pressurised systems, but being at the low side of the income spectrum 
the utility is faced by problems of cost recovery from residents who have no income 
from which to pay the now commoditised resource. A much practiced solution in this 
area has been the installation of coin operated prepaid meters whereby the water only 
runs when water is paid for directly.  
 At project inception, JOWAM began its work by benchmarking the water loss 
situation in Johannesburg against other big cities in the world. Many ideas about the 
city’s water losses had been bandied about, but studies were limited in their 
geographical scope and little had been done to establish the actual cause of water loss in 
various areas of the city at the time that the company took over. As a starting point, the 
losses were classified into three categories: commercial losses, actual leakage on the 
municipal system, and internal losses. ‘Commercial’ losses are by and large not actual 
losses of water but represent water deliveries to businesses that the municipality was not 
billing. ‘Actual’ losses in the Municipal system represent losses that take place within 
the municipality’s delivery system. Finally, ‘internal’ losses could be categorised as 
water leaks or other wasteful practises that take place on private property, i.e. 
technically off the limits of the Municipal supply system. However, it is precisely on 
private property that much of the cause of water loss is located, and there is a strong 
incentive for Johannesburg Water to invest in on-property improvements to improve 
overall water accessibility in the city. Mark Lautré of Johannesburg Water comments: 
 
“Internal losses are very much part of our unaccounted for water programme. For example JW is 
going into each of the community’s stands and fixing up leaks for free because the cost saving is 
worth much more than us charging them. We have a full list of how much water is lost in which 
suburb – two years down the line we can assess that and say: we now have reliable data. The 
important thing is getting reliable data, and it took us twenty four months to get there. When we 
restructured nobody thought about it then and we restructured on the basis of information at the time. 
A lot of our initial assumptions were incorrect (if you look at 42% [assumed loss in 2000, T.S.] to 
37% now [i.e. in 2002, T.S.] : 1% constitutes about 70 odd million rand, so that’s a lot of money) and 
that is where we got into fights with the companies when they say that two years ago we started our 
work with these assumptions, two years we find that the assumptions are totally incorrect with the 
result that it is impacting upon the operational costs and the budget, the capital requirement has 
changed and they come back to the shareholder and say we therefore require a different amount for 
capex and opex”69.  
 
Within these categories, the actual losses in the municipal system appeared to be 
relatively on par with international experience. By world standards, the municipal 
infrastructure was not all that old, and backlogs in infrastructure investment had only 
begun to develop in the ten years or so prior to the restructuring of the water 
management system. On the other hand, and this was not necessarily in line with 
international experience, there was a real problem with water losses in the townships – 
                                                 
69  Interview with Mark Lautré, Op. Cit.  
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especially Soweto. Similarly, the losses in the commercial sector were estimated to be 
very significant in comparison to municipal delivery system losses. This meant that at 
inception it was expected that administrative improvements would strongly improve 
cost recovery for water. Therefore the key thrust of the JOWAM strategy came to lie in 
the areas of internal and commercial losses. Of these two, commercial losses in 
particular were identified as a key thrust of the company strategy. It must be noted 
however that this approach is of course an approach that particularly suits the company, 
as it means that profits can be raised without incurring heavy expenditure in the 
upgrading of Municipal infrastructure.  
In the first year of the project, there were some constraints because Johannesburg 
Water was not managing all the potential customers in the Johannesburg area, but was 
only dealing with the top ten thousand or so water accounts in consumption terms. This 
in itself represented an important prioritisation of the utility’s activity in its start up year: 
ensuring accurate billing and monitoring payment from the city’s most important bulk 
users was considered to be more important than doing the same with the millions of 
residents whose individual consumption was far less than in the commercial sector. It 
was also a low cost way of staring up the venture: considerably less money would have 
to be invested in ensuring proper billing systems for the top ten thousand consumers 
than in investing in the upgrading of the dilapidated infrastructure in Soweto. Mark 
Lautré of JOWAM put it is follows:  
 
“It is the bigger customers that represent the bigger proportion of the total bill, about thirty percent I 
think. We are trying to improve our billing, clean our data, and make sure that we have everybody on 
the system – that is where we are putting emphasis on in terms of that kind of water – on the 
commercial side. Obviously we have some interventions on the technical side as well, but really we 
think that the improvements can come with minimal investments on the commercial side. And on the 
internal – the internal is linked to big investment, and that is something that we have to look at with 
the shareholder because to turn the situation around in Soweto and other township areas where there 
are these high losses, we have to invest in infrastructure”70.     
 
The fact that the company’s emphasis lies on the commercial clients, however, does not 
mean that it can afford to disregard consumption in the township – some 30% of daily 
water consumption is accounted for by the townships, and in view of the fact that 
internal losses in this area are relatively high, it is an area in which Johannesburg Water 
can potentially achieve a substantial reduction in its overheads. In theory the water 
losses that take place on private properties are simply the responsibility of the property 
owner and therefore it could be called into question whether this area falls within the 
realm of Johannesburg Water’s responsibilities. In practise, however, in a context in 
which the utility is billed for deemed consumption, the private practises with regard to 
water utilisation become relevant and become an area for intervention by the company71. 
While the company estimated that the average consumption per stand in the townships 
was of the order of 70 to 80 kilolitres per month, a range of pilot projects on water 
consumption of which the largest was funded by DANCED established that the true 
                                                 
70  Ibid.  
71  Deemed consumption is the water consumed by Johannesburg according to Rand Water’s statistics: it  
is the total water bulk that goes into both actual water consumption and unaccounted for water. 
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consumption was of the order of 25 to 30 kilolitres per month. Analysing the breakdown 
of the figures in these studies, the company came to the conclusion that one of the 
biggest problems was the system of what is termed ‘block mains’.  
In a classical urban water supply situation two rows of housing stands are aligned 
back to back in a block, around which a ring main is laid which provides water 
individually to each stand. In the townships, however, to save on construction costs, the 
water supply and sewerage mains were originally drawn through the back of the stands. 
As a consequence, the utility does not have access to the mains, and if there are leaks 
they are not visible from the street. Inverting this argument, the advantage to residents 
is that they do have access to these mains, meaning that illegal connections can be 
established with relative ease in the ‘comfort of one’s home’. JOWAM found that they 
could achieve an increase in efficiency of about 15% by ‘eliminating’ these systems and 
putting in a conventional system. However such a move would not be without its 
controversy: Brazilian urban water supply systems are moving in precisely the opposite 
direction by delegating the management of block systems to residents rather than 
wresting it out of their hands by deploying new technology. In addition, replacing the 
infrastructure in any one area is an expensive business – in Soweto alone, the costs are 
estimated at between R 150 million and R 200 million. The cost of replacement of the 
block main in Soweto is so large in relation to the annual budget of Johannesburg Water 
that (according to JW) it cannot be funded out of the running budget unless the project 
would be spread out over many years. Therefore discussions have been entered into 
between JW and the Council with regard to the source of the funds for this particular 
venture. This is a remarkable turn of events in itself, as the original intention in 
launching a partnership with an independent utility was to rid the city of the burden of 
long term infrastructural investments.  
 
Box 7.5 
Storm-water drains 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil society and the public reaction to water management in Johannesburg.  
Thus far, the attention of this chapter has been focussed on developments within local 
government or on relations between the municipality and Johannesburg Water. These 
institutions operate on behalf of the population of Johannesburg or, in other words, on 
behalf of civil society. The question what the institutional responses to water scarcity 
A crucial element of the relationship between the unicity and Johannesburg Water lies in the 
scope of the functions devolved to JW. According to Jameel Chand, JW spokesperson, the 
scope of JW’s activities includes the reticulation of water services to homes and businesses, 
the collection of wastewater from these sites, and the purification of the water before it is 
released back into public streams. The city’s storm-water drains do not fall under JW but 
under the Roads Department. Unfortunately, storm water has a strong impact on the 
sewerage system, as there is ingress into sewers during storms, leading to the leakage of 
sewerage into surface water and the pollution of this water. Communication between the 
Roads Department and JW consist of notification of the other party when such events occur, 
but there is no structural communication between the two on a more integrated form of 
water management.   
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have been has therefore been answered in part. However, the formal institutions 
responsible for water management exist in dynamic interaction with (organisations in) 
civil society. Therefore, in order to obtain a complete picture of urban organisational 
responses to scarcity it is necessary to look at the public response to developments in 
the water field.  
 The attention is now turned to the population on whose behalf these water 
management initiatives were taken – what was the public reaction to developments in 
the city’s water and sanitation management system, and to what extent can these 
reactions be characterised as responses to scarcity? There have until now been, in 
essence, three main categories of public response to ‘the water issue’. These are, firstly, 
public reactions reactions to the introduction of cross-subsidization from bulk users to 
small scale users. Secondly, these are public reactions to dearth, either as claims for 
better services or as a reaction to water cut-offs. Thirdly, these are public reactions to 
the political element of the water issue, namely the issue of the privatisation of services.  
 The latter issue – i.e. the reaction of the South African Municipal Workers’ 
Union, the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions to the iGoli some extent in the sections above. Suffice it here, then, to describe 
the other two kind of pubic reaction in more detail.  
 
Public reactions to the introduction of cross-subsidization 
Commencing with the issue of cross-subsidization, there have throughout the transition 
period been many examples of public reactions to the introduction of a stepped tariff 
system in which the price of water increases in step with the volume consumed. Such a 
stepped tariff system is a means of (re)distribution of water in the sense that it 
introduces an incentive to reduce water consumption while generating funds for a 
lifeline tariff on the low consumption end of the spectrum. High volume users are 
‘taxed’, and the funds generated serve to cross-subsidize low end users.  
In terms of the Water Services Act of 1997, local water services institutions were 
given a degree of freedom in setting the tariffs for the water services they provided, but 
it was made clear in national policy that: 
 
• there should be a ‘lifeline tariff’ set for the poorest consumers that does not 
exceed the operation and maintenance costs of the schemes providing them with 
water72; 
• The tariff structure should discourage wasteful or inefficient use of water vis a vis 
the ‘ norms and standards in respect of tariffs for water services’73. 
 
In view of these policy guidelines it was rather predictable that many water services 
authorities in the form of municipal councils would legislate stepped water tariffs 
whereby bulk users cross-subsidised small scale users. So too in Johannesburg, where a 
                                                 
72  This much debated ‘lifeline tariff’ was later superseded by Free Basic Water Policy, a policy on a  
basic allocation of drinking water for free, about which more later. 
73  See Government Gazette (1997): Water Services Act of 1997. Cape Town: Government Printer, 
 307
stepped tariff system was introduced but which led to a wave of protest from wealthier 
suburbs.  
The Sandton rates boycott 
A rather symbolic example of such public protest against changes in the rates system is 
the example of action undertaken by the Sandton Ratepayers Federation from 1996 
onwards to block cross-subsidies for services provided to underprivileged areas in the 
city74. Sandton is a wealthy (previously ‘white’) suburb in Northern Johannesburg, and 
it includes both luxurious suburban housing and a thriving business centre which is fast 
becoming an alternative site for businesses wishing to escape the urban decay of the city 
centre. With the advancing process of urban decay in the old ‘Çentral Business District’ 
or ‘CBD’, Capital had begun to flee the CBD and, to a large extent, was rerouted to 
Sandton as an alternative development ‘hub’ 75 . Significantly, the location of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange was moved from the CBD to Sandton in August 2000, 
confirming Sandton’s new status as one of the nation’s prime centres of economic 
activity76. Importantly, this new status had been built on low rates: Sandton had kept 
rates low by deliberately going without parks, street lights or a bus service77. Low rates 
and a ‘rural’ image had served to attract business and wealthy residents out of the city 
centre. Thus precisely one of the areas which held the largest potential income from 
rates was artificially keeping these rates low.  
 Across the highway, some 3 km to the east, lies the township of Alexandra, a poverty 
stricken and overcrowded black residential area with high unemployment levels (up to 
60% at times) and extremely unhygienic conditions as a result of overcrowding, limited 
access to clean drinking water and a lack of proper sanitation infrastructure. Alexandra 
covers some 800 ha of land in north-eastern Johannesburg and it was established as one 
of the very few freehold areas in an otherwise racially demarcated city in 1912. This 
status as an ‘administrative oversight’ on the part of the apartheid authorities gave it 
immense popularity, and whereas it was designed for a population of 70 000 its most 
frequently cited current population is some 400 00078. The existing infrastructure is 
severely overstretched, and typically each formal dwelling provides access to water, 
                                                 
74  The Sandton case was very prominent in the South African media in 1996, and it reappeared during  
the 2002 Earth Summit which was held there. It is symbolic because it is a rich white area, one of the  
richest suburbs in South Africa, and it is located very close to the extremely poor township of  
Alexandra. When the two areas were merged after the local government elections in 1995, their  
difficult relations came to symbolize some of the issues faced by the country during the transition. The  
example of Randburg could also have been taken to illustrate the point, however.   
75  This was driven predominantly by extremely high crime levels. Under apartheid crime had been  
artificially kept out of white business and residential areas by both evening curfews for non-whites  
and a disproportionate amount of police patrolling in these areas relative to non-white areas. After  
apartheid the CBD was ‘opened’ to non-white South Africa, on the one hand bringing opportunity for  
non-white business enterprises but on the other hand, by removing the curfew and reducing the  
patrolling, attracting crime from other areas into the ‘lucrative’ inner city.   
76  Sunday Times Business Times, 30/10/1996: JSE set to ditch Jo'burg for Sandton 
77  Camay, P., and Gordon, A. (1998): Sandton Rates Dispute: Local Government  
Restructuring and the Financing of Equitable Services. Johannesburg: CORE.   
78  Figures vary between 250 000 and 750000, but 400 000 is very often cited. Part of the census problem  
is that many residents are non-South African immigrants with temporary or non-existent formal  
residential status.  
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sanitation and electricity to between three and six additional households living in rooms 
or shacks on the property. In addition, in 1999, there were some 3 800 households living 
on an infill site, and 5 500 households living on the dangerous banks of the Jukskei 
River 79 . Because of the overcrowding, water pressure would typically drop to an 
ineffectual trickle during peak use, illegal electricity connections endangered the area, 
and sewerage systems became overloaded. During peak rainfall periods, the Jukskei 
River fills rapidly and has been known to regularly destroy shacks built too close to its 
banks. Because of very poor sanitation conditions and the use of the highly polluted 
Jukskei River by those without access to running water, diarrhoea is endemic to the area, 
especially amongst children, and in warm rainy weather there have been cholera scares 
in the township80.   
 In the wake of Johannesburg’s first democratic local government elections, held in 
1995, the patchwork apartheid city administration was amalgamated into four 
Metropolitan Sub Structures. In this process, Sandton and Alexandra were drawn into a 
single structure, i.e. the Eastern Metropolitan Sub Structure (EMSS). They were thus 
henceforth part of a single financial entity from the point of view of service provision 
and rates collection.  
 In 1996, the newly elected Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 
commenced its work by taking steps to even out the tax base of the city with the slogan 
‘one city, one tax base’. Essentially a key effect of unification was to draw rich and poor 
areas together under the umbrella of a single metropolitan sub-structure. According to 
the city administration, the previously white authorities were 90% self-sufficient, 
spending R600.- per capita per annum on infrastructure, whereas the black local 
authorities were only 10% self sufficient, spending R100.- per capita per annum on 
infrastructure81. To the extent that infrastructure development was funded by local 
government, the financing of infrastructure developments at the level of the sub-
structure would from now on involve some element of cross-subsidization from rich to 
poor areas within the city that had been treated as separate units under apartheid82. A 
key theme of the new municipal demarcation in South Africa was financial 
sustainability, and in the demarcation process wealthy areas were combined with poorer 
areas specifically with the intention to redistribute resources. The amalgamation of 
Sandton with Alexandra into the EMSS is a textbook-case example of this process. 
However, at the level of the city as a whole, cross-subsidies were also to take place 
between the four metropolitan sub-structures in the Johannesburg Metro area, and the 
EMSS had been earmarked for substantial rates increases. In other words, income from 
rates increases in the EMSS was intended to finance developments in other areas. 
 In 1996, and in line with emerging water policy, the newly-elected, ANC-controlled 
Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council increased rates in the Sandton 
area by 385%, with the intention of generating a budget surplus of over R 400 million 
                                                 
79  Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council (2000): report on the interactive planning workshop for  
Johannesburg, Sept. 2000  
80  Such as that in April 2001. 
81  City of Johannesburg (2007): sourced from  www.joburg.org.za, accessed in May 2007. 
82  Central government also drives municipal development through the Municipal Infrastructure 
Programmes (MIP’s) run by the Department of Provincial and Local Government.  
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that could be invested city-wide83. This rather abrupt jump in prices evoked a strong 
reaction from Sandton residents and businesses, resulting in the formation of some 24 
ratepayers organisations which united under the umbrella of the Sandton Federation of 
Ratepayers’ Associations (SANFED) to protest the increases. The protest took on a dual 
form, consisting of rent boycotts driven by consumers on the one hand and legal action 
driven by business enterprises on the other hand. The boycott responses varied, but the 
dominant action taken was to either continue to pay rates at the pre-1996 levels or to 
add 20% to this payment as an indication of what was considered to be a ‘fair’ increase. 
Payment levels for services in Sandton dropped and from a previous high of 90% of the 
population paying their services on time, more than 60% of Sandton’s residents now 
became a conscious non-payer or under-payer. Business, for its part, took the EMSS to 
the High Court, and later to the Constitutional Court, claiming that the rates increases 
were unconstitutional. Eventually, in 1998, the Constitutional Court judged in favour of 
the municipality and upheld the right to cross-subsidise for redistribution purposes84. 
The ratepayers were held liable for the outstanding bills and were approached by 
Council on the settlement of these arrears.  
 Paradoxically, the boycott tool which had become so popular under apartheid as a 
means to bring down or debilitate local government, had now became a means for white 
ratepayers to block redistribution. Precisely in the period in which national government 
launched the ‘Masakhane’ campaign in order to rebuild faith in local government and 
engender a culture of payment for services, the Sandton ratepayers boycott voiced loud 
opposition to payment from the financially most important segment of society85. In turn, 
the budget shortfalls created by the boycott laid more pressure on the municipality to go 
ahead with its privatisation plans, by inducing it to sell of assets as a means to raise 
funds. Because the Johannesburg Metro had specifically targeted the Eastern 
Metropolitan Substructure (of which Sandton as a part) as its milk cow for the city as a 
whole, the fact that this area was resisting payment adversely affected income. For 
instance, a KPMG audit from 1998 estimated that Sandton residents owed some R 200 
million to the city, and this figure was increasing at some R 18 million a month86. For 
an area which was intended to raise funds from which to finance developments 
elsewhere in the city, this was not good news. And whereas the city’s administrators 
were in dire need of finances to keep the city from going bankrupt, in the end, the 
politics of confrontation only served to delay the flow of funds into municipal coffers.  
 Additionally, the ‘white’ fractions of civil society needed to come to terms with 
being governed by a democratically elected liberation movement, and mutual suspicions 
                                                 
83  Figures on the surplus generated vary between R 401 million and R 438 million from one source to  
another  
84  See for instance Business Day, 19/10/1998: Slippery Slope (editorial comment on the end of the  
boycott), Business Day, 15/10/1998: Constitutional Court Declares Sandton Property rates hike to be  
legal. 
85  “Masakhane’ or ‘we will do it together’ was a campaign from the RDP policy period aimed at  
stimulating personal responsibility in contributing to national reconstruction goals. Amongst other  
things, It targeted the culture of non-payment which the liberation movement had itself created in  
order to destabilise the apartheid administration.  
86  These figures need to be treated with some caution. They are from Camay and Gordon (1998): op Cit,  
pg17. 
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tended to fuel conflicts. For instance, embedded within the broader rates conflict was a 
conflict over water prices. In October 1996 confusion arose when Sandton residents 
were charged R 10 million for an amount of water for which the municipality had only 
paid R 5.4 million to Rand Water. Sandton residents immediately saw this as evidence 
of financial mismanagement on the part of Council. However, a Rand Water audit later 
showed the bills to be accurate. The reason for the discrepancy was new water policy, in 
which high volume water users were to be billed disproportionately in accordance with 
a stepped tariff system to discourage wasteful use of water and to cover (cross subsidise) 
the costs of low volume water use.  
 
 
Public reactions to dearth and free basic water  
In the early phases of the implementation of its water services policy, the South African 
government found itself struggling with the definition of legal access to water as either 
a social or as an economic good. In the former case, water would have to be supplied 
irrespective of ability to pay, while in the latter case, the capital, operation and 
maintenance cost of water supply would always have to be reflected to some degree in a 
price for water at the consumer end. Proponents of the view that water is a social good 
tended to emphasise the fact that water is a basic human need, essential for survival, and 
that therefore to the poorest groups in society, it should be provided free of charge. 
Proponents of the latter view tended to emphasise the sustainability of the service, 
maintaining that there would be no sense of community ownership of or responsibility 
for a service if it was not paid for even at a symbolic price.  This struggle between 
water as a social or as an economic good was manifested in urban settings such as 
Johannesburg through the public reactions to water cut-offs in areas defaulting on 
service payments. The question whether water supplies to a community could be cut off 
as a response to non-payment for services went to the heart of the public debate about 
how government was going to treat the constitutional right to domestic water in practice.  
 On the one hand combating scarcity by institutionalising access to water services as a 
human right is, for the moment at least, unique to South Africa87. Policy documents 
from the Reconstruction and Development Programme onwards emphasised the right to 
water - for domestic use at least – and quantified this right as 25 litres per capita per 
day88 . In the constitution, the right to water was merely stated as a fact, without 
reference to the institutional mechanisms that were to actualise this right. In the White 
Paper on Water Supply and Sanitation, more detail was provided on institutional 
                                                 
87  Section 27 of the South African constitution states that “ Everyone has the right to have access to […]  
sufficient food and water; and […] the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures  
within its available resources. To achieve the progressive realisation of these rights”. Government  
Gazette (1996) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Pretoria: Government Gazette, section  
27. See also ODI (2004): Right to water: legal forms, political channels. London: ODI, p.2. 
88  In section 2.6.6., the RDP announced government’s intention to develop a national water supply and  
sanitation programme “which aims to provide all households with a clean, safe water supply of 20-30  
litres per capita per day within 200 metres” (RDP 1994: 29). In the White Paper on Water Supply and  
Sanitation this was refined to 25 litres per capita per day. 
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mechanisms in that it was recognised that some communities would not be able to pay 
the full cost of water provision: 
 
“The basic policy of government is that services should be self-financing at a local and regional level. 
The only exception is that, where poor communities are not able to afford basic services, Government 
may subsidise the cost of construction of basic minimum services but not the operating, maintenance 
or replacement costs”89.   
 
 While this policy of self-financing local government services was perhaps the 
national objective, it did not in the short to medium term fit well with the capacity of 
local government to answer the call of service delivery. In Johannesburg’s case, again, 
the extreme shortage of funds and the need to salvage municipal finances by cutting 
capital as well as operation and maintenance costs drove local government into a stand 
off with civil society on the payment for water bills.  
 From late 1996 onwards, the Johannesburg Metro began to take strong measures to 
induce payment for water. This included water cut-offs to suburbs which had a ‘bad’ 
track record in their payments for water. It culminated in a metro-wide credit control 
campaign launched late in 1997 which was aimed at recovering the R 1,8 billion owed 
to the city for services. In most areas, cut-offs were met with strong protest from 
residents, most notably in the ‘coloured’ townships such as Westbury, Eldorado park 
and Riverlea. In the latter areas, water cut-offs in early February 1997 led to violent 
riots (including gun battles) between residents and the police over the issue of 
payments90. Interestingly, the same tactics that were used in protest actions against the 
apartheid government were now being used against the ANC government: the 
townships were blockaded with burning barricades to prevent the police from entering, 
and residents were induced (and pressurised) to stay away from work. Nor were these 
reactions restricted to Johannesburg: similar reactions to cut-offs emerged in Springs on 
the east Rand and in Pretoria in the same period91. Protesters pointed out the basic need 
for water for survival, as well as pointing out the constitutional obligation of the state to 
provide water to its citizens. The latter was a sensitive point for the city’s administrators, 
as they could not push the threat of water cut-offs too far. On the one hand there was the 
questionable legal status of cutting off water supplies, while on the other hand there was 
the spectre of mass resistance to the payment of rates which would both tarnish the 
social image of the new Council and undermine further efforts to improve the financial 
situation of the city. During the entire credit control campaign, Council avoided water 
cut-offs in Soweto, possibly for fear of sparking mass resistance to its plans. On the one 
hand, it began to consider reducing water flow to non-payers as an alternative to cutting 
off supplies completely92. On the other hand, it began to target business enterprises 
rather than residents for its water cut-off programme93.  
                                                 
89  DWAF (1996): White Paper on Water Supply and Sanitation, p. 19 
90  See Business Day (07/02/1997): Clashes over water cut-offs 
91  See Mail and Guardian (1997): East Rand municipality bankrupt. Cape Town: Mail and Guardian,  
15/08/1997; 
92  See Mail and Guardian (1997): Council warns of new cuts to riot suburbs. Cape Town: Mail and  
Guardian 28/02/1997 
93  See Mail and Guardian (1997):  Reserve Bank threatened with water cut-off. Cape Town: Mail and  
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 Between 1997 and 2001, the Johannesburg Council skirted around the topic of water 
cut-offs, advocating full payment for services on the one hand but financing continued 
supplies on the other hand: cut-offs never lasted very long. Cut-offs were used as a 
trigger to induce residents to register with the municipality and sign a contract for the 
settlement of arrears. Of the 2400 cut-offs in January 1998, for instance, 1200 
households were immediately reconnected after having paid their outstanding accounts. 
The rest were approached for debt repayment. The cut-off programme thus boosted 
payment levels, but overall payment levels for services in Johannesburg still stood at 
88% compared to an international average of 95%94. Nor did the situation improve over 
time: in 2004, rates and service charge collections were still only 87% of billings95. 
 Gradually, from 2001 onwards, the concept of water as a social good began to take 
hold both in Johannesburg and nationally. Two events were of singular importance in 
this regard – a court case over water cut-offs in Johannesburg on the one hand, and a 
new turn in national water policy on the other hand.  
 Firstly, in September 2001, a resident of the Bon Vista Mansions in Johannesburg 
took the Southern Metropolitan Local Council (SMLC) to court over a disconnection of 
the entire block of flats in which he lived. At issue was section 27(1)(a) of the 
constitution which provides that every South African has a right to water. The court 
eventually ruled that water supply may not be discontinued if it results in a person 
having no access to water due to non-payment where that person is able to prove 
inability to pay for the service 96 . This event provided a legal precedent for an 
interpretation of the constitution that sees access to water as a social good or as an 
essentially inalienable right, irrespective of the problems that may arise in raising the 
finances for the service.  
 Secondly, a year earlier, an interdepartmental task team including the Department of 
Water Affairs and Forestry and the Department of Provincial and Local Government 
commissioned a study looking into the financing of services at local government level. 
The central issue in this study was the feasibility of bringing a quantity of free water to 
the poor97. In his travels around the country, the new Minister of Water Affairs (a 
communist) had come across a woman in the village of Lutshekho who left the village, 
which had water supplies, to fetch water at a nearby stream. She did this to save on the 
R 10.- per month that the Village Water Committee charged for drawing water at the 
public tap, and suddenly, six years into the new era of poverty oriented water policy, the 
concept of inability to pay for water hit home and was drawn into national policy.  
 The policy of free basic water was announced by Thabo Mbeki in September 2000, 
in the run-up to the local government elections in 2001. It guaranteed a free supply of 6 
kilolitres of water per household per month for the whole South African population, 
                                                                                                                                               
Guardian, 22/08/1997 
94  See the Mail and Guardian (1998): Johannesburg’s Councils plan 7000 cut-offs a month. Cape Town:  
Mail and Guardian, 20/01/1998, and Business Day (2006): Jo’burg devises new scheme to help trim  
debtor’s book. Johannesburg: Business Day, 27/03/2006. 
95  City of Johannesburg (2004): Partial Guaranteed Structured Bond International Presale Report, pp.  
8,9. 
96  See Water Aid, www.righttowater.org.uk/code.legal, accessed in May 2007. 
97  See Schmitz (2000): Government looks at new water policy. In: Mail and Guardian, 28/9/2000. 
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which amounted to a recalculation of the original quota of 25 litres per capita per day 
that had lain at the base of the previous policy98. Each local authority was free to decide 
whether only the poor would receive this quota free (leaving the rich to cover the costs 
of service provision in the area) or whether the whole population would receive 6 kl free 
of charge. In Johannesburg, every household was given an allocation of 6kl free, but the 
stepped tariff system ensured that users drawing more than 6kl of water were charged 
progressively more for consumption, the high end users thus cross-subsidising the low 
end users. In effect, the free basic water policy did little more than repackage an already 
existing situation: most of the poor were not paying for water anyway, and the 
Johannesburg Council was having mixed success in its efforts to induce residents to pay. 
By providing free basic water it could henceforth concentrate its efforts on recouping 
costs from those residents who, in consumption terms, made a difference to the overall 
water usage in the city.  
 
Conclusions 
Just as was the case in chapter six, this chapter focussed on responses to scarcity at the 
local level. However, in this case, the attention was turned to the urban dimension. The 
case of the municipality of Johannesburg was selected for analysis because of its sheer 
dominance of the catchment with regard to water demand, supply, distribution and 
quality.  
 At the level of the organisational responses to scarcity the major issues permeating 
the urban debate have been on the one hand the introduction of water demand 
management in an effort to gain control over water consumption and wastage, and on 
the other hand the extension of water supplies to previously disadvantaged communities. 
These issues were almost inextricably interlinked with the broader project of local 
government transformation which impacted on the structure of municipal finances, on 
the integration of the multitude of entities that had managed water in the city under 
apartheid, and on the rollout of public-private partherships in local service delivery.  
 The legacy of water management that the city of Johannesburg inherited in 1994 was 
shaped by three central features. These were firstly, the physical location of the city on 
top of a watershed with very little in the way of local water resources and a resultant 
history marked by a constant battle against scarcity, temporarily held off by successive 
and ever more ambitious water delivery projects. Secondly, scarcity provided impetus 
for a local drive to wrest water management out of the control of gold mining 
companies and place it firmly under the control of public bodies, thus creating Rand 
Water Board.  Thirdly, policies of racial segregation created the apartheid city with a 
low density centre surrounded by impoverished, high density satellite townships, each 
administered separately.  
 In the period between 1994 and the present, Johannesburg lost its status as 
unqualified powerhouse of the South African economy. This status in turn had 
legitimised the large scale resource capture from the eastern hinterland, but it was being 
put to ill use. The resource was being squandered, with the city of Johannesburg being 
                                                 
98  See Kasrils, R. (2001): Speech at the National Workshop on Free Basic Water, 27/03/2001. 
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unable to account for between 30% and 40% of the water it had bought from bulk 
provider Rand Water. Nor could the city recoup the costs of distributing the water 
within the city, as it stumbled over unwillingness and inability to pay for water that was 
in part a legacy of the past and in part generated by new conflicts between the state and 
civil society. As a result, water consumption had to be tackled and cost recovery had to 
increase. These were the two principal organisational responses to scarcity, driving a 
process of institutional change that was itself halted in mid-transition by political forces 
riding on the income generated by water sales.  
 In the introduction to this chapter it was argued that institutional responses to urban 
water scarcity (in Johannesburg) centred on the striking of a balance between the 
introduction of water demand management and the extension of services to the poor. On 
the one hand the city had to introduce measures to gain control over water consumption 
and wastage, while at the same time it had to find the capital means to extend water 
supplies to previously disadvantaged communities. As it turned out, there was in fact an 
overlapping of interests between these two water management goals, as it was hoped 
that the reduction of unaccounted for water would release the capital required for 
unrolling delivery and upgrading programmes to the poor. 
 The policy blueprint centred on the salvaging of municipal finances by financially 
ring-fencing service providers and registering them as separate legal entities which 
would operate on for-profit principles, owned by the municipality and led by a service 
delivery agreement entered into between the city and the service providers. However, 
conflicts of interest between some of the key stakeholders in the water management 
field served to bring the implementation of this plan off course and resulted in at best a 
partial achievement of the envisaged results. The actual ring-fencing of the finances of 
Johannesburg Water was at odds with the urgent financial needs of the municipality, 
who could not hold off its projected income while paying the bills for a wide range of 
municipal activities that were in effect being cross-subsidized from the water account. 
As a result, the city maintained its control over water bills and Johannesburg Water was 
left with major uncertainties with regard to the cash flow from which it was to fund the 
upgrading and extension of services within the city. The end result, instead of ushering 
in the claimed efficiencies of the private sector, has been the hamstringing of the service 
provider with regard to the extension of service delivery and the cutting back on 
wastage, coupled to a firm reassertion of public control over water management in spite 
of the rhetoric of  ’privatisation’, ‘rationalisation’ or ring fencing.  
 
8 
Conclusions 
Introduction  
This research set itself the task of exploring the institutional responses to water scarcity 
in the Crocodile River catchment in South Africa between 1994 and 2004. This task was 
taken on with two key objectives in mind, namely to generate a useful theoretical 
framework for the analysis of institutional responses to water scarcity and to provide a 
number of realistic policy options for efficient, sustainable and equitable catchment 
water management in the Crocodile River Catchment. It was argued that at the time this 
case study was selected, i.e. in the early 1990’s, while the topic of water scarcity had 
burst onto the international scene, the public debate on the issue tended to be ‘flat’ or 
one-sided. This one-sidedness, I maintained, was the result of the fact that the discourse 
tended to focus on the empirical problem of scarcity. Publications bearing dramatic 
titles such as ‘The Dammed’, ‘The Last Oasis’ or ‘Water in Crisis’ certainly helped to 
call attention to the issue, but they did little to unpack the underlying causes of water 
scarcity or to point the way forward with regard to the potential solutions in the policy 
realm. Many such publications set out arrays of quantitative data in support of the 
argument that water scarcity was a mounting problem that required urgent attention. 
Calls were made for ‘integrated water resource management’ and for enhanced water 
security, but the precise meaning of these terms in a concrete setting still required 
elucidation. It therefore seemed logical to explore the institutional responses to water 
scarcity in a concrete setting in order to shed some light on the dynamics of this 
empirical problem in a context in which the issue was being recognised and addressed.  
A shorthand denotation of these institutional responses is encapsulated in the concept of 
a blue revolution, which, it was argued in the introduction, required further analysis and 
research. At the opening of the Third World Water Forum in Kyoto in 2003, UN 
secretary general Kofi Annan used the term to denote a global effort towards enhanced 
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water security in a world in which two thirds of the population was expected to 
experience water scarcity within two decades. Following the traditional bifurcation of 
water policy into water services and sanitation on the one hand and water resource 
management on the other hand, this revolution panned out into the two worlds of the 
Millennium Development Goals on the one hand and Integrated Water Resource 
Management on the other hand1. 
Annan’s opening remarks united a wide diversity of efforts in the water field under a 
common label, bringing together a range of calls made at earlier water forums to break 
the impasse in water services delivery, reduce water pollution, control urban health, 
raise the efficiency of irrigation, check the uncontrolled expansion of large dams, etc. 
The call united the three evaluation criteria of efficiency, equity and sustainability under 
a single banner and (not without risk) introduced a new buzzword to the lexicon of 
those concerned with environment and development2. The ‘blue revolution’, then, was 
not merely a conceptual hype: underlying it was a broadly felt concern with current 
practices in water management. Academics, practitioners, government representatives 
and NGO workers throughout the world were broadly in agreement on the urgent need 
for a thorough transformation of water management institutions, both from the point of 
view of achieving universal coverage in water services provision and from the point of 
view of achieving a more sustainable approach to water resources management. The 
concept, I would argue, holds great value as a point of departure for analysis of a highly 
complex and multi faceted field of enquiry and this is why it is flagged in the context of 
this particular work. 
It is one thing to identify a problem and to assert that it needs to be addressed. To 
define and give content to the way forward, however, is an entirely different matter. 
And so it is with water scarcity: while there is agreement on the worldwide emergence 
of a problem, there is much less agreement on the way in which it should be addressed. 
Even with regard to the concept of scarcity itself, there are differences with regard to the 
interpretation of the concept and hence with regard to the solution brought forward. In 
some circles water scarcity is taken to refer to a lack of access to water for domestic use. 
In other circles it refers to a dwindling supply of fresh water for all sectors of demand. 
Furthermore, water scarcity is generally defined as a per capita measure of water 
availability, whereas factors such as the standard of living, the efficiency of technology 
and the GDP per capita also have a strong effect on overall water utilisation. Combating 
water scarcity therefore refers to different interventions depending on the perspective 
that is used. Also, this cloudy conceptual point of departure is not restricted to the 
concept of scarcity but extends into concepts that appear in the discourse surrounding 
scarcity such as ‘integration’, ‘participation’, ‘efficiency’, ‘equity’ and ‘sustainability’. 
                                                 
1  The speech was delivered on behalf of Kofi Annan by UNEP’s Klaus Toepfer. In this context the  
‘blue revolution’ concept refers to a reform of water management institutions, but it is also used  
frequently to denote the extension of the green revolution into aquaculture and the utilization of the  
genetic resources of lakes and oceans. I would argue that the latter is just ‘more’ green revolution: it  
does not differ from the green revolution in its most essential characteristic of applying biotechnology  
to the increase of yields. 
2  Note the danger of confusion with aquaculture. 
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For this reason, it was argued, a case study would be helpful in the quest to reveal the 
interrelationships between these concepts in a practical setting. It was hoped that such a 
case would be instructive in exposing the ways in which the basic concepts associated 
with the blue revolution find concrete definition. Above all, it was hoped that a case 
study would help to clarify the dynamics of institutional change that underlie a concrete 
attempt to implement this transformation. This would help to shed some light on the 
nature of the task that the world water partnership has set itself. 
To assert that water scarcity goes beyond quantitative overviews of population 
growth and changes in water utilisation patterns, however, is not to deny that scarcity 
has fundamentally quantitative roots. In fact, the decline in the availability of water is 
the central issue, but it only takes on meaning when placed in an institutional setting, 
intermeshed with the politics of institutional and broader social change. The call for 
institutional change emanates from a series of dynamics that are calling existing 
practices into question or simply rendering their continuation impractical. These 
practices, which I have dubbed the ‘supply orientation’, were devoted to the rather 
ambitious but not unfeasible project of ‘replumbing the planet’. The ‘hydropolitical 
privilege’, or the agency with regard to the capture and redirection of water resources, 
was vested in a technocratic elite positioned at some remove from public scrutiny and 
shielded by a barrage of highly technical information. During the golden age of dam 
building, dam construction symbolised progress and enhanced confidence in the 
application of scientific knowledge in the pursuit of greater economic welfare. However, 
we now appear to have arrived at a turning point, characterised by increased awareness 
of the environmental risks associated with the supply orientation. 
It was noted that the last century has witnessed a spectacular expansion of water supply 
capacity represented by a steep exponential curve rising at more than three times the 
rate of world population growth. This growth has led to the burgeoning of water 
management institutions led, as mentioned above, by a technocratic class steeped in the 
tradition of supply expansion. With the passage of time, the finite nature of freshwater 
supplies has begun to impose limits on this growth. The reduction in freshwater 
availability has manifested itself all over the world, albeit against the background of a 
wide variety of climatic zones and water resource endowments. It was argued that the 
traditional water management institutions are ill equipped to deal with the allocation of 
water between competing demands, the financing of the ever-increasing costs of supply, 
the challenge of water pollution or the need to roll out water infrastructure in step with 
population increases. Thus water scarcity is generating a demand for new institutional 
responses which need to be examined in the light of the call for enhanced water security. 
The central question, therefore, is what the manifest organisational responses to scarcity 
are. In the realm of evaluative criteria, this pans out into the contributions that these 
responses are making to greater efficiency, equity or sustainability of water utilisation. 
Given this task, the more practical question emerged as to where a case could be found 
of existing institutional transformation along the lines of the blue revolution that aims to 
achieve integrated river basin management that is at once participatory, efficient, 
equitable and sustainable. South Africa, which entered its democratic period in 1994, 
aimed at just such a transformation in the slipstream of its broader transition. 
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Furthermore, the country was attempting such a wholesale overhaul of its water 
management institutions in the same period that it was shifting from ‘regular’ water 
scarcity to ‘chronic’ water scarcity. At the time when water scarcity was breaking 
through as an environmental theme, here was a country striving both towards universal 
coverage in basic water supply and sanitation and towards the introduction of integrated 
water resource management. The country’s Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) was to be a ‘people-driven process’ and was to be about ‘active 
involvement and growing empowerment’. The wasteful and destructive policies of 
apartheid were to make way for integrated programmes of reconstruction and 
development, including the satisfaction of basic needs and the transition to catchment 
management. The RDP aimed to be sustainable, with citizens rights to access to clean 
water and a clean environment later embedded in the constitution. It was aimed at 
redressing the imbalances of the past, and therefore at greater equity. These 
programmatic aims were later worked out into detailed policies for catchment 
management and water supply and sanitation that aimed at greater efficiency in water 
use, at the redistribution of access to water through a permit system, and at 
sustainability through policy elements such as provision for the Environmental Reserve3. 
In all its elements, therefore, the South African transition contained echoes of key 
elements of the blue revolution. As a result, it was deemed suitable as a country in 
which a case could be selected for study. Within South Africa itself, the Crocodile River 
catchment was selected for study because it is located in South Africa’s arid western 
half, because it is a catchment featuring a high geographical concentration of demand, 
and because it is in many ways a microcosm of many water management issues faced 
throughout the country. Operationally, the catchment was not treated as an independent 
entity, isolated from its institutional surroundings, but rather was placed in the context 
of the national transition on the one hand and local institutional developments on the 
other hand4. The catchment management process, in other words, was affected by the 
transformation of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry and by the 
transformation of urban and rural water management institutions within the catchment 
itself. 
 
Understanding water management institutions  
The first goal that this research set itself was to generate a framework for the analysis of 
institutional responses to water scarcity. In chapter two, it was argued that the first step 
in this process should be to recognise the inherent duality of the transformation of water 
management institutions: water management institutions both affect broader society and 
are affected by events or developments in broader society. Thus, the argument went, 
institutional responses to water scarcity must be analysed, embedded as they are, in 
broader processes of social change. The utility of this statement lies in the analysis of 
the catchment management or water services delivery process, not in isolation, but as 
one among many ‘projects’ of the state and actors in civil society in the period of 
political transition. These projects were sometimes congruent with one another, as in the 
                                                 
3  I.e a quantity of water that is set aside to ensure ecosystem maintenance 
4  I.e. in the context of this dissertation. 
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joint coordination of service delivery under the municipal infrastructure programme, 
and sometimes in conflict with one another, as was the case with the fragmentation of 
environmental governance wherein each ministry sought to bring other ministries into 
its particular forum for ‘integrated’ governance. The fact that ‘integrated catchment 
management’ was diluted to ‘integrated water resources management’ testifies to the 
turf battle that ultimately deferred a more integrated form of environmental governance 
to the future. Nor, for that matter, can the collapse of participation in catchment 
management structures be divorced from the tardy process of land reform: without land, 
water can be put to little use. Therefore, a deeper understanding of the transformation of 
water management institutions is indeed gained by placing them in a broader social and 
political context.  
Next, it was argued, it is necessary to analyse the concept of an institution, and, in 
particular, to focus within this analysis on the ways in which resources are utilised in 
institutions. The approach taken in analysing scarcity should move beyond the older 
structuralist modes of theorising (dependency theory, regulation school thinking, etc.) 
that disregarded human agency and therefore could not explain diversity in the face of 
structural forces. An important inroad into a more balanced approach is the argument 
presented by Giddens that the basic building block of an institution is human interaction 
and that there are no structural properties of the institution that are not the result of 
human intervention. Individuals contribute to structure by affirming particular social 
practices and reproducing particular forms of relations, and alter it by departing from 
regularised practices. This resonates with the dilemma faced by the first director of 
catchment management between creating catchment management agencies ‘at the stroke 
of a pen’ without having achieved real change, and going the long route of admitting to 
the director general that achieving catchment management would be a long process of 
community mobilisation. It resonates equally with the delays in transforming irrigation 
boards into water user associations: the regularised practices of the Hartbeespoort 
Irrigation Board continue much as they have for many years, save for the withdrawal of 
state subsidies on irrigation water. Furthermore, it explains the important role of 
individual leadership in facilitating stakeholder meetings that sustained the Jukskei 
River Forum until its chairman departed.     
 In the specific context of water management, the concept of an institution was 
defined as a water use system that provides the linkage between intake and discharge. 
This rather technical definition should also be interpreted in an institutional sense, i.e. it 
refers to the regularised practices relating to the linkage between intake and discharge. 
The burgeoning of water management institutions and the increase in freshwater 
scarcity is leading to the mutual encroachment of such regularised practices, and water 
related activities in one area are beginning to affect water related activities in other areas. 
On the one hand the sources of water are being sought ever further away from the point 
of demand, on the other hand the discharge from one area is affecting water quantity 
and quality in another area. Increasingly over time, these developments create the 
necessity for joint planning of water resource management in river forums, at the level 
of entire catchments, and where catchments are linked, it requires planning at the level 
of the national ‘water grid’. The analysis of organisational responses to scarcity, 
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therefore, needs to be directed towards these issues of encroachment and conflict in the 
linkages between intake and discharge that take place in a given catchment, and if water 
is imported or exported, these issues need to be explored even above the level of the 
catchment.  
 But the use of the word ‘planning’ may suggest a simple and linear process, which it 
explicitly is not. The transformation of institutions in response to scarcity, it was argued, 
is mediated by a diversity of social actors who interpret reality and devote resources 
towards the achievement of their particular goals. Rather than being unified or 
monolithic, institutions are arenas in which a diversity of actor strategies is played out. 
These strategies may serve to affirm or transform the social practices that are 
characteristic of the institution, and the institution is unified to the extent that it is a 
vessel for structured patterns of interactions. These interactions involve the exercise of 
power, which, in the definition used in this context, refers to the capacity of actors to 
enrol others in their ‘projects’5. This enrolment takes place through discursive means. 
To Giddens, power is transformation, both in the positive sense of liberation and 
production and in the negative sense of repression and destruction. The regularised 
practices that constitute institutions reproduce (or alter) relations of autonomy and 
dependence6. In the Crocodile River catchment, we witness some failures of enrolment. 
The Hartbeespoort Irrigation Board is wary of the new Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry and has not managed to pass its application for registration as a Water User 
Association because it is not seen to be representative enough of the demography in the 
area. It has not managed to enrol previously disadvantaged communities in its 
transformation plans, and the Department in turn has not managed to enrol the Irrigation 
Board in its plans to create ‘developmental’ Water User Associations. The Greater 
Johannesburg Municipal Council has not managed to enrol Johannesburg Water in its 
plans to cut back on water wastage and extend services in the municipal area. On the 
contrary, it has alienated the partner it sought to enrol by reneging on its commitment to 
hand over the billing to the Utility. In the broader process of catchment management, 
participation in stakeholder forums has collapsed and departmental efforts to ‘revitalise’ 
participation are currently underway. There is therefore evidence in support of the idea 
that transformation requires enrolment.      
 Nor does the unfettered operation of market forces offer optimality in resource 
allocation as a response to scarcity. While structuralist interpretations of transformation 
had reached an impasse in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, the analysis of resource 
utilisation presented by neoclassical economists and ‘liberal’ social theorists was 
equally becoming stymied by basic questions around the functioning of institutions in 
the same period. The idea that the free operation of the market is the most efficient way 
of allocating resources in society found itself under attack from the new institutional 
economics, environmental economics and political ecology. Economic behaviour, it was 
argued, is not ‘objective’ or universal but culturally determined and therefore economic 
                                                 
5  Long (2001:17) states that “agency (and power) depend crucially upon the emergence of a network of  
actors who become partially  […] enrolled in the ‘project’ of some other person or persons”, and this  
proceeds by discursive means: “the reaching of decisions […]..entails the explicit or implicit use of  
discursive means”. 
6  Giddens (1995): Op. Cit. Pg 50,51 
 321
activity depends on institutions rather than being hindered by them. Secondly, the 
reduction of society to atomistic individuals seeking nothing else but to maximise 
personal utility is a normative approach, as there are more values than efficiency – such 
as equity or sustainability – by which resource utilisation could be evaluated. To 
Amartya Sen, there are a range of competing evaluative approaches with regard to 
resource utilisation and allocation, and the priority of each depends on the room for 
manoeuvre experienced and the contingencies faced by each particular actor seeking to 
actualise the potential of that actor’s commodity bundle. This approach is broader than 
that taken by neoclassical economics and leads back to the actor approach set out by 
Long. And thirdly, contrary to the assumptions made by neoclassical economists, actor 
decisions are often based on an imperfect overview of the information required to make 
an optimal decision. Both from the point of view of actors in civil society and from the 
point of view of state agencies implementing government policy, there are transaction 
costs involved in obtaining accurate information about the ‘projects’ towards which 
resources are devoted and this limits the ability of each actor to influence outcomes. 
This has particularly prominent implications for the realm of public-private partnerships 
or co-production in which it is assumed that adding a new institutional layer will 
simplify the implementation of government policy.  
Widespread opposition to water cut-offs in Johannesburg bore testimony to the fact 
that water was seen as a social rather than an economic good: enforcing payment for 
water by indigents was a threat to the aim of achieving universal coverage, and the city 
introduced a quota of 6 kilolitres of water per household per month free of charge. 
Above this consumption level, the market functions moderately well, but Johannesburg 
is also faced by opposition to rates increases in the wealthy neighbourhood of Sandton, 
where residents oppose cross-subsidies to poorer neighbourhoods. Residents here would 
advocate market prices for water, and thus there is a political conundrum for the city in 
choosing between water as a social or economic good: both approaches create political 
opposition because somehow the outcome is not seen to be ‘optimal’. What is 
considered optimal, then, depends on where one sits as an actor in the water game. 
Moving to the realm of public-private partnerships, it was assumed that partnership with 
a private sector operator would generate efficiencies in water use and billing from 
which the city could profit. However, the municipality has not relinquished control over 
all of its water billing, and the utility has therefore not been able to embark fully on its 
project of achieving optimality. The municipality requires financial resources to 
produce public goods and is reluctant to hand over control to an external entity. 
Furthermore, there are transaction costs involved for the municipality in obtaining 
accurate and independent information about coverage, service levels and income from 
sales with which it can monitor the performance of the utility. Obtaining this 
information requires the investment of time and energy from which the municipality 
hoped to have withdrawn in the interests of rationalisation. Similarly, the Hartbeespoort 
Irrigation Board was established on the basis of subsidisation of its access to water. 
Now that the subsidies have been withdrawn, the board can only survive economically 
by carrying out minor maintenance to the irrigation system. The irrigation system, last 
maintained in the 1950’s, has gone into long term decline. Emerging farmers settling on 
 322
the scheme are therefore committing themselves to a scheme which does not hold 
prospects for long term sustainability. If charges for catchment management are to be 
added to the water tariff, there is a fear that the board will collapse financially. 
Furthermore, the enormous leakages in the canals are a drain on the water resources of 
the catchment. This means that costing irrigation water at its market value is ultimately 
suboptimal from the point of view of (local) water use efficiency. One could argue in 
response that irrigation in itself is suboptimal and that the system should be allowed to 
collapse, releasing water for purposes which create more value added per litre, such as 
industry or mining. While this is true at face value, there are other criteria by which 
irrigated agriculture may be judged, such as its capacity to absorb labour or the need 
amongst the poor for low cost food production. What is efficient, in other words, is not 
necessarily equitable.      
 The above outlines of a framework for the analysis of organisational responses to 
scarcity present a first step in understanding the mechanisms of change. Next, this 
change needs to be placed against the broader background of the blue revolution project 
of achieving a major and government planned institutional transition in water 
management. The transformation envisaged is one which involves state intervention that 
seeks to alter the basic rules of the game with respect to property, authority and control. 
Crucially, the 1998 Water Act repealed riparian law, ostensibly cutting the ties between 
land ownership and control over water. This set the stage for a potentially fundamental 
shake up of the existing system. Furthermore, the authority to issue water use licenses 
was to be devolved to catchment management agencies as soon as these had been 
established. These agencies were to be stakeholder driven, participatory, and it was 
hoped, representative. However, the state did not implement these changes in an 
unqualified manner. In the absence of catchment management agency in the Crocodile, 
most riparian users currently use water in much the same way as they have always done. 
Existing uses are being registered and ultimately perhaps a catchment management 
agency will begin to intervene in these entitlements. For the moment however de facto 
if not de jure use of water as a resource remains relatively unchanged.  
The state is a point of reference for the strategic manipulation of resources in the 
transformation or reproduction of asymmetries in access to water. However, the state is 
not a monolith but a loosely coherent entity in which a range of internal actor strategies 
are played out. Externally, the state is in dialectical interaction with actors in civil 
society who may seek to alter the course of policy implementation or claim for access to 
resources such as water. Thus while the state may attempt to lay down the rules with 
regard to property authority and control, this cannot take place in a linear fashion, as it 
is subject to contestation by actors which/who interpret the emerging political and 
institutional reality and act upon it on the basis of the information that they have at their 
disposal. Whereas the National Water Act of 1998 required Irrigation Boards to 
transform into water user associations within six months of the promulgation of the Act, 
six years later there still was no water user association at Hartbeespoort. The state is 
demanding greater representation of previously disadvantaged communities in this 
water user association but is not entirely clear on how this should be achieved in 
practice. Attempts to expand the territory of the association to make it more 
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representative have been blocked by the democratically elected and therefore 
representative Madibeng Council. Madibeng opposed the attempts of the erstwhile 
municipality of Hartbeespoort to privatise its assets and transfer them to a private 
company, while the Hartbeespoort Councillors for their part attempted to avoid 
incorporation into the much larger and ANC dominated Madibeng Council. In this 
conflict, the establishment of a ‘representative’ water user association was squeezed out.  
Each actor has acted out its strategy in the contest for control over water resources, and 
in the process, the establishment of a water user association, required by law, has been 
blocked. In much the same way, the Greater Johannesburg Municipal Council entered 
into a service delivery contract with Johannesburg Water amid highly vocal civil society 
opposition to the city’s ‘privatisation’ plans. In the context of the serious financial 
deficits of the city, the income from water sales was being utilised for other purposes 
than just the maintenance and extension of the city’s water and sanitation services. This 
made the ring-fencing of water as an account unpalatable from the point of view of the 
city administration, and the transfer of water bills to the utility was called to a halt after 
the first few batches had been transferred. The utility, for its part, reacted angrily to this 
move, accusing the city of reneging on its contractual obligations and pointing out that 
this created conditions that made difficult if not impossible to carry out its contractual 
obligations in cutting back on water losses and improving billing. This in turn led to a 
discursive battle with regard to what constitutes efficient billing: the city claimed that a 
unified bill for water and electricity managed by the municipality was more efficient, 
and the utility pointed to its progress in improving billing and accurately measuring 
consumption by installing meters.     
  
 
 
Unpacking scarcity 
Having outlined a mode of institutional analysis, the next question was how to apply it 
to the field of water scarcity. Firstly, there are varying definitions of natural resource 
scarcity, of which the classical approach – which defines scarcity as insufficiency in 
relation to demand - is rather limited and uncritically treats demand as a given. A 
broader definition, it was argued, should include critical investigations of demand, 
supply, and distribution, i.e. scarcity has three basic dimensions.  Secondly, institutional 
analysis of water scarcity needs to be located within the range of broader theories of the 
environment which include sociological reductionism, technological determinism, and 
naturalistic reductionism. Sociological reductionism analyses the environmental debate 
and environmental action as social constructs which require sociological enquiry, 
apparently excluding environmental or materialist issues from analysis. Technological 
determinism argues that scarcity induces technological change which in turn tends to 
alleviate scarcity: scarcity is a factor of the state of technological development and there is 
no unqualified tendency towards environmental crisis that does not of itself generate its 
own solutions. Naturalist reductionism, by contrast, focuses on the empirical evidence of 
exponentially increasing damage to the natural environment and is pessimistic about the 
ability of public and private institutions to confront the escalating problem of 
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environmental scarcity and risk. It is argued here that these theories are only mutually 
exclusive in their extreme forms and that they differ in the weight attributed to each of 
three factors, namely technology, institutions, and nature. This means that scarcity is 
influenced by three factors, i.e. by the nature and strength of institutions, by the state of 
technology, and by processes in nature. A broad perspective on natural resource scarcity 
should therefore look at three aspects of scarcity from three angles, i.e. at supply induced, 
demand induced and distributional scarcity from the point of view of the state of 
technology, the nature of the institutions governing or claiming the resource, and the state 
of the resource as provided by nature at any given time and place. This broad approach 
brackets the main elements involved in a model of scarcity whereby resources are drawn 
upon in the instantiation of interaction that underlies social practice. This includes both 
the symbolic and the material, as meaning is attributed and resources are allocated. 
Essentially this perspective pushes the above broad analysis of scarcity into structuration 
theory as developed by Giddens. Actors deploy asset bundles (which they have at their 
disposal by virtue of entitlements and property relations) in interactions which embrace 
both the material and the symbolic and which, if chronically reproduced, become 
established social practices or institutions. However, they are also subject to contestation 
and non-compliance and therefore to change. The essence of change that underlies the 
blue revolution concept therefore depends on the chronically reproduced practices within 
or in relation to water management institutions. Reproduced practices depend upon 
participation, and participation upon entitlements or the prospect of entitlements.  
The history of the Crocodile River catchment shows that scarcity is supply induced. 
Both the gold prospectors in Johannesburg and the irrigators along the Crocodile River 
experienced chronic water scarcity at the beginning of the 20th century and deployed the 
assets at their disposal to increase the security of access to the resource. Private 
initiatives drove the construction of water use systems that led to the buying up of the 
water rights of well watered farms by private companies supplying the gold mines in 
Johannesburg. Private initiatives also drove the construction of the first barrages and 
irrigation furrows in the Hartbeespoort area. Because of the high costs of developing 
water supply schemes, water scarcity could only be overcome with state intervention. 
However, for many years there was no central state, and only after the unification of 
South Africa in 1910 and the delay caused by the First World War could initiatives such 
as the construction of the Vaal Barrage and Hartbeespoort dam be undertaken. Both 
systems served to alleviate scarcity by augmenting supply. However, the demand for 
water in Johannesburg and downstream of Hartbeespoort grew exponentially over time, 
thus the threat of a return to scarcity was induced by an increase in demand. For the 
Black and Indian populations of Johannesburg, scarcity remained a fact of life, as they 
were removed to areas such as the South Western Township (SOWETO) and Lenasia, 
where services were poor and were only improved when a lack of proper sanitation led 
to an outbreak of cholera in Lenasia. In the Hartbeespoort area, the native population 
was forced off the land to live either in arid and badly serviced Native Reserves, or were 
forced to work as labourers on white farms. Because of the introduction of riparian law, 
control over water was tied to land ownership, and thus the dispossession of the African 
population in the catchment included a sharp reduction in the access to water. All in all, 
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the operation of power induced an ethnically defined distribution of scarcity whereby 
most black people suffered an increase in water scarcity while the water security of the 
white population was increased.   
 These three aspects of scarcity are given deeper meaning if interpreted from three 
different angles, i.e. technology, institutions, and natural availability. From the point of 
view of technology, it is clear that the construction of a water use system requires the 
input of technology. The construction of a dam enables peak surface water flows to be 
captured and transforms highly variable flows into relatively dependable flows. The 
drilling and pumping of groundwater enables access to otherwise inaccessible water. 
The creation of a bulk water supply network enables water to be drawn far from its 
natural source. Reticulation systems draw on bulk water supplies and provide it at the 
precise point of need. Thus technology has the capacity to resolve water scarcity, and it 
is therefore important to include it in a model of water scarcity. However, technology is 
not exclusively beneficial: it comes at a financial cost, at a social cost, and at an 
environmental cost. Firstly, the price of technology raises questions about the financing 
of both small and large scale projects as well as about the financing of operating and 
maintenance costs. Secondly, built into technology is a series of in-built assumptions 
about how much water is needed by whom and when. By choosing one kind of 
technology, therefore, one is making social choices on behalf of the user that may or 
may not be socially negotiated with the end user. Thus providing low levels of water 
service to an area provisionally locks users into low levels of use. End users wishing for 
better or more extensive services may extend the supply network through illegal 
connections. Constructing capital intensive irrigation systems locks farmers into high 
per hectare water costs that need to be regained through the sale of agricultural produce. 
Constructing long distance inter-basin water transfer schemes to a particular area 
privileges users in the beneficiary catchment over users in the donor catchment and 
raises the overall cost of water provision. Thirdly, technology abstracts water from the 
natural environment and releases water back into the natural environment. This may 
lead to over-abstraction, leading to the drop in groundwater levels or to the collapse of 
riverine and estuarine habitats. The overloading or insufficiency of water purification 
technology may lead to water pollution and the passing on of the environmental costs in 
one are to the environmental costs in another area. Furthermore, as stated in chapter one, 
technological choices bring with them an associated environmental risk Thus 
technology choice raises social issues that need to be resolved within organisations and 
between organisations and the end user. Assumptions are made about current and future 
demand, designs are brought to the fore, and policies are drafted for the recouping of 
costs incurred on the schemes. Costs are distributed over various parties including the 
national state, a water board, an irrigation board, a municipality, and end users. Some 
costs are known beforehand, and others emerge in the process of project implementation. 
These costs require the deployment of resources by various parties that may meet with 
either acquiescence or opposition. Organisations face multiple demands with regard to 
supply technology that are sourced from a range of different stakeholders with differing 
needs, different resource bases from which to pay for services, and different attitudes 
with respect to the services on offer. With the resources at their disposal, organisations 
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have to meet these challenges as best they can, entering the fray of management 
decisions involving technology choice, service delivery, and responsiveness to client 
needs. These choices need to be made as a map through the options provided by policy, 
the political setting in which they are operating, internal forces such as staff capacity 
and financial resources, and so on. Finally, the natural resource base from which water 
resources are drawn define the concrete limits within which the water use system can 
operate. There is a domain of sources from which water can be drawn which provide 
water of a particular quantity and quality through a specific set of technological means 
which has its advantages and its drawbacks. To the degree that this water is imported 
from elsewhere, polluted on arrival, decreased in quantity or more difficult to access, 
the range of options available to a water management institution are widened or 
narrowed. Whether scarcity will emerge from this set of options depends very much on 
the local context of resource endowments and can differ widely from one place to the 
next. In short, the natural resource base generates a spatial distribution of scarcity that is 
superimposed by the political economy of water use that has redirected this water and 
has thus created a new spatial distribution of scarcity. 
 The Crocodile River catchment provides evidence that this triad of technology, 
institutions and natural availability generates analytic leverage over water scarcity 
issues. Historically, natural availability (or rather scarcity) of water generated a set of 
concrete social problems such as the shortage of fresh water during the early 
development of mining in Johannesburg and during the development of agriculture in 
the Hartbeespoort. This led to the growth of institutions such as cooperative efforts 
between farmers in Hartbeespoort and the registration of water supply companies in 
Johannesburg. In Johannesburg, the competition for water sources amongst water 
companies led ultimately to the creation of Rand Water Board and the dissolution of the 
erstwhile companies. In Hartbeespoort, government intervention on behalf of irrigation 
farming led to the creation of the Hartbeespoort government water scheme for the 
settlement of poor whites. Government intervention, also, led to the initiation of plans 
for the supply of water to the Witwatersrand by importation from the Vaal River which 
provided Rand Water with the natural resource base upon which to develop into the key 
player it is in bulk water provision in South Africa today. These interventions rested on 
technological choices made in the first three decades of the twentieth century: by 1930, 
Johannesburg imported water into the Crocodile River catchment from the Vaal Barrage 
and the Hartbeespoort dam and its associated irrigation works had been built. These 
interventions enabled the growth of the Witwatersrand and the growth of irrigated 
agriculture in Hartbeespoort, thus enabling the growth of related water supply 
institutions such as the Hartbeespoort Government Irrigation Scheme and the water 
supply division of Johannesburg municipality. These institutions gave spatial definition 
to water supply, building the apartheid city with its satellite townships and providing 
subsidised water to white farmers and leaving the unwanted portions of the black 
population to fend for themselves in the homeland of Bophutatswana and in informal 
settlements scattered around the urban conglomerations in the catchment. In fact, the 
spatial organisation of apartheid was such that the map of Bophutatswana was drawn in 
circumvention of the main river channel and most of its tributaries, so that the water 
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rich areas belonged to ‘white’ South Africa and the arid areas belonged to 
Bophutatswana. In general throughout the catchment, local sources such as springs, 
streams and groundwater were developed first to satisfy demand. When demand began 
to outstrip the supply capacity of these systems, the damming of suitable locations in the 
catchment was presented as an option and made possible with the establishment of a 
Department of Irrigation in 1912. In the case of Johannesburg, of course, an inter-basin 
transfer scheme belonged to this second phase. These local dams enabled economic 
growth until many of them eventually reached the upper limits of their supply capacity. 
At this point a number of dams became interconnected through canals and planned 
releases from Hartbeespoort, which remained the key dam in the catchment from the 
point of view of volume commanded. In the case of Hartbeespoort dam, the dam wall 
was later raised to enable greater retention capacity. Over time, the importation of water 
through interbasin transfers increased steadily, commencing with the construction of the 
Vaal Dam and extending further and further into the eastern hinterland until it included 
international transfers from Lesotho and Swaziland, 400 km to the east. This 
incorporated the Crocodile River catchment into a complex national supply grid that 
transferred waters from the water rich eastern areas of the country to its more arid 
western areas. Over time, the technology developed in the early decades of the twentieth 
century became outdated and required additional investment to keep abreast with the 
exponentially increasing water needs in the catchment. To some extent this was 
achieved: fourteen dams were built in the catchment after 1930, the crest of 
Hartbeespoort dam was raised in 1975, Rand Water pumped ever more water across the 
Witwatersrand and into the catchment, and the Hartbeespoort irrigation canals were 
lined with concrete to increase water use efficiency in 1956. However, Johannesburg 
could not keep abreast of its water technology needs and retained a water supply system 
which rested on very old foundations. Eventually, some 30% of the city’s water was 
unaccounted for and lost to users. Despite harsh and autocratic apartheid era measures 
aimed at influx control, the city lured migrants who swelled informal settlements that 
released untreated sewerage into natural water bodies such as the Jukskei River. 
Accidental mine spills occasionally released heavy metals into river channels, and the 
outdated Johannesburg sewerage works could not keep pace with the volume of 
pollutants entering the system or flushed out through storm-water ingress. The 
Hartbeespoort dam became a collection point for pollution passed downstream, creating 
problems for users downstream such as the Municipality of Madibeng. Irrigation below 
Hartbeespoort suffered from water losses reaching 45% of water supply as a result of 
outdated infrastructure. Institutionally, the catchment became part of a national water 
resource planning system that catered for the continued expansion of South Africa’s 
industrial heartland on the Witwatersrand. Within the catchment, the importation of 
water spurred on growth, and the return flow draining into the catchment from 
Johannesburg augmented supplies in the arid north and west, enabling a further 
expansion of irrigation in the rural areas and fuelling the growth of new mining towns 
such as Brits and Rustenburg. Thus, in short, history demonstrates cycles of scarcity 
followed by technological intervention leading to institutional growth.  
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Towards a framework for the analysis of organisational responses to scarcity   
The empirical evidence referred to above shows that there are discrete if interrelated 
components of scarcity, i.e. supply induced, demand induced and distributional scarcity 
which are affected by the state of technology, the nature of the institutions governing or 
claiming the resource, and the state of the resource as provided by nature at any given 
time and place. Scarcity, it is argued here, is treated comprehensively if attention is paid 
to the above six constituent elements. The superimposition of these six elements over a 
specific time period and at a specific location provides an accurate picture of the state of 
scarcity in that period at that place. In so doing, the daunting complexity of 
interventions in and responses to the vagaries of a mobile and fugitive resource are at 
least brought down to a lower level of complexity.  
 This six-dimensional model needs to be inserted into a framework that interprets 
water management institutions first of all as entities which exist in dynamic interaction 
with society at large. Structured patterns of interactions in water management 
institutions both affect structured patterns of interaction in broader society and are 
affected by structured patterns of interactions in society. Second, water management 
institutions refer to the regularised practices relating to the linkage between intake and 
discharge. Third, these structured patterns of interactions depend for their staying power 
and transformative effect upon the enrolment of actors and the resources they command 
in the projects of the institutions concerned. Such enrolment proceeds through 
discursive means and is not without conflict, as the projects may or may not concur with 
the private aims of the actors concerned. Fourth, however, as interventions in water 
expand, so too do the institutions which give them form, the water availability patterns 
is changed, and a diversity of institutions begin to encroach upon one another with 
respect to their structured patterns of interactions. The analysis of organisational 
responses to scarcity, therefore, needs to be directed towards these issues of 
encroachment and conflict in the linkages between intake and discharge that take place 
in a given catchment, and if water is imported or exported, these issues need to be 
explored even above the level of the catchment.  
In this framework, the state forms a central point of reference for actors because it 
attempts to lay down the rules with regard to property authority and control. These rules 
are again subject to contestation by actors which/who interpret the emerging political 
and institutional reality and act upon it on the basis of the information that they have at 
their disposal. In this gamble, given transaction costs in obtaining accurate information, 
optimality remains elusive, and only extensive processes of recruitment and mutual 
adjustment can catalyse the crystallisation of new modes of interaction. This, then, is 
the substance of transformation and therefore too of the blue revolution.  
 In advancing the above model, this dissertation has achieved its first aim, namely to 
generate a framework for the analysis of institutional responses to water scarcity. The 
second aim was to provide a number of realistic policy options for efficient, sustainable 
and equitable catchment water management in the Crocodile River catchment. It is to 
this that I will now turn. 
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Options for efficient, sustainable and equitable catchment water management  
The second aim of this dissertation was to provide a series of realistic policy options for 
efficient, sustainable and equitable catchment management in the Crocodile River 
catchment. Achieving this aim was to proceed by gathering data in support of the 
central research question, i.e. what are the institutional responses to water scarcity in the 
Crocodile River Catchment in South Africa?. The central research question was 
operationalised into five sub questions set out in the introduction encompassing 
historical elements, material elements, entitlements, the economy of water use and the 
process of institutional transition. These elements were inserted into a chapter 
framework that descended spatially from the global level to the national level, from the 
national level to the catchment level, and from the catchment level to cases drawn from 
key rural and urban areas.  
 In chapter three, the global development of water scarcity was described, showing 
an exponential expansion in water demand and a concomitant exponential increase in 
the rollout of supply systems during a phase (roughly the last century) which I have 
referred to as the ‘supply orientation’, characterised by uncritical technocratic responses 
to increasing demand. In the first world, the rollout of water supply systems was 
financed from the treasury, and it was exported to the South through development 
interventions financed by amongst others the World Bank. The boom was not only 
featured by a steady growth of water consumption but also in an increasing diversity of 
the uses to which water was put in an increasingly diverse global economy. Water 
demand was fuelled by population growth, by the boom in irrigation, the increasing 
connection of households to water and sanitation services, the increasing geographical 
concentration of demand in urban areas, and by the growth of mining and industry. This 
supply orientation was uneven in its nature, presenting differing spatial distributions of 
water in response to differing physical and climatic areas, different capacities to apply 
technology to local problems, and the operation of power which excluded some groups 
in society from access to the resource. Over time, with the dwindling of global fresh 
water stocks and with the increasing social and environmental risk associated with new 
interventions, the supply orientation increasingly began to be questioned and led the 
way for the emergence of three basic sets of policy responses, namely water demand 
management, integrated water resources management and rainwater harvesting. Water 
demand management sought to confront scarcity by introducing a range of different 
measures aimed at lowering overall water demand. Integrated Water Resource 
Management sought to optimise water resources planning by integrating all aspects of 
interventions in water resources into a management framework at the level of the 
catchment. Rainwater harvesting criticised the approach to water related interventions 
that focussed on developing surface and groundwater sources where they were naturally 
suited for development, rather than focussing on the large amount of water that is lost to 
evaporation and soil moisture by capturing the rain at the moment that it falls. These 
three approaches have enjoyed varying levels of popularity, with water demand 
management and integrated water resources management often finding their way into 
national policies while rainwater harvesting remained somewhat on the periphery, 
resting within the domain of localised experiments.  
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 South Africa embarked on its supply orientation from a considerably lower base than 
the world average in terms of mean annual rainfall. Its rainfall is unpredictable, 
unevenly spread and subject to high evaporation rates, there is a very low rainfall to 
runoff conversion rate, there are no natural lakes, and groundwater is suitable only for 
small scale uses. The supply orientation lasted somewhat shorter than the global picture, 
starting only after 1912 and tapering off rapidly in the 1970’s. This was extended 
somewhat by growing international imports of water from Lesotho and Swaziland in the 
1980’s and 1990’s, but this added only little to the total storage capacity built up in the 
previous years. In the period described, South Africa’s water storage capacity grew 
exponentially, much as was the case globally, until a total of some 500 government 
dams had been constructed. Groundwater supply amounts to only about one tenth of 
total supply but is strategically important as a back up or ancillary supply to more than 
400 municipalities. Since 1986, a marked slowdown in expansion has set in, and in 
1995, the country as a whole crossed the threshold into the critical water scarcity phase. 
South African water scarcity is strongly distributional, as apartheid forcibly settled 50% 
of the population in arid and badly serviced homelands. Before the transition, black 
households had access to approximately one eighth of the volume of water secured by 
white households. Also, in 1994, some 12 million black South Africans had no access to 
basic water services and sanitation. 
 Further expansion of supply was limited by a decline in the number of logical sites 
for dam construction and the escalation of associated social and environmental costs. 
Secondly, new legislation has demanded that an amount of water be set aside as an 
Ecological Reserve to maintain riverine habitats and supply the population with basic 
water services, thus limiting the total amount that can be used in any one catchment. 
Thirdly, the inequality of water distribution in South Africa that has been described 
above has set consumption limits for the poor which are likely to be transformed into 
much higher consumption levels in the wake of improvements in general welfare. The 
redistribution of access to water is predicated upon water scarcity, i.e. it is linked to an 
increasingly critical focus on reducing overall wastage rather than on expanding overall 
supply. In all these respects, therefore, we witness the end of the supply orientation in 
water resources development. With the advent of democracy in 1994 and the 
establishment of the new Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, the conditions had 
been out in place for a fundamental reorganisation of water policy and water law. 
Between 1994 and 1998, three water related white papers emerged from the Department 
aiming to sweep clean through the legacy of apartheid era water management. The 
Department was reorganised to include a division concerned with the rollout of 
constitutionally guaranteed rights to basic water and sanitation services, the 1956 Water 
Act which tied control over water to land ownership was repealed, and the 1998 Water 
Act nationalised water and called for the development of decentralised and participatory 
catchment management agencies as well as for the development of participatory and 
representative local water user associations. Catchment management agencies were the 
institutional vehicle for Integrated Water Resources Management, to be established 
under the guidance of a new directorate for catchment management from 1998 onwards. 
A national water conservation campaign was launched in 1998 and a directorate for 
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water conservation was established in that same year. The 1997 Water Services Act 
provided for Municipal Service Partnerships that enabled the contracting out of water 
services provision by municipalities to external water services providers in the hope of 
leveraging private sector resources for public water and sanitation provision. Rainwater 
harvesting remained outside the realm of national policy and, as is the case globally, 
remained an experimental field with roots in the environmental movement. 
 In broad lines, the development of scarcity in South Africa and the institutional 
responses to it at the policy level mirrored global developments albeit against the 
background of water resources that were scarcer than the global average and with a 
highly uneven spatial distribution of water. The rush of policy development and 
legislation in the period from 1994 to 1998 created the space for a strong institutional 
response to increasing scarcity, especially through the rollout of water services delivery 
to the poor, the launch of integrated water resources management and the launch of 
water demand management. All these interventions held the promise of efficient, 
equitable and sustainable catchment management. However, on two main fronts, the 
quest for this institutional reform remained challenged or constrained. Firstly, history 
brought with it a legacy of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation in the arid north-
central region of the country leading to technological interventions that transferred 
water westwards from the eastern escarpment across a series of catchments to supply 
the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal triangle. This led to an increasing dependence of 
amongst others the Crocodile River catchment on water imports and a tendency to 
import more water in response to each rise in demand that is unsustainable in the long 
term. Through these transfers, also, the prospect for catchment management is limited 
by the fact that many catchments are tied in to a national water supply grid. This means 
that water rich catchments are not free to develop their own water resources within the 
full capacity of local supply, and water poor catchments are either limited in their water 
resources or dependent on water imports. Twelve of the nineteen water management 
areas already have a water demand in excess of local supply. Catchment management, 
seen as an attempt to manage water at the level of the natural water cycle, is therefore 
limited by the fact that the natural water cycle has been disrupted. Over and above 
catchment management, there is a national water resource strategy which links into 
catchment management in important institutional ways and there is thus a centralised 
strategy that in some respects constrains the attempt to decentralise water resources 
management. This is not merely a quantitative phenomenon, but rather raises important 
questions about the institutional relationship between national policy and local water 
management areas. For water dependent catchments such as the Crocodile, the way in 
which questions such as that around the payment for imported water or the relative 
priority given to water provision for various economic sectors are resolved at the policy 
level will have important implications for the institutional strength of the catchment 
management agency in the future. Given the upper limits on the supply of water, this 
tends to point for the need to ‘ return’ to catchment management in national policy in 
the sense of creating strong disincentives to the further development of dependence on a 
national water supply grid. This requires the development of a national water resource 
management policy that goes beyond just balancing supply and demand but integrates 
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water resource thinking into overall national economic development policy, dovetailing 
economic development with water resource availability rather than the inverse. 
Secondly, the fact that water has historically been developed and harnessed in the 
context of a deeply unequal society has meant that the existing infrastructure is locked 
into the service of a minority and that inducing change requires a fundamental rethink of 
the uses to which water is currently put. Irrigation schemes cannot simply be removed 
to another location and the dispossessed population of South Africa cannot rapidly or 
simply be re-empowered in terms of water access. The project of empowerment follows 
on the heels of a long period of disempowerment, and such empowerment as takes place 
is, however unfortunately, a process that requires insight into population movements, 
insights into shifts in the economy, rural planning, urban planning, land policy, housing 
policy, and many other such ancillary policies. Most of the water related planning 
deadlines such as the supply of water and sanitation, the establishment of catchment 
management agencies or the establishment of water user associations have been shifted 
forward, throwing up key questions that lead back to the assumptions underlying the 
plans for the transformation of water resources management in the country. A selection 
of these issues was dealt with in chapter three, which placed water policy in the context 
of the long swing development of water law, the broad transformation of South African 
society from 1994 onwards, and the internal transformation of the Department of Water 
Affairs. These issues shed more light on options and constraints on efficient, equitable 
and sustainable catchment management from the point of view of changes at the 
national level. In essence I would argue here that ‘legislating for change’ has, until now, 
not provided sufficient handholds for transformation with the very important exception 
of a legally defined and specific right to drinking water irrespective of the ability to pay 
for water. Broadening the range of such handholds in the sense of the extension of 
rights in access to water into specific areas such as access to water for production could 
help remove current blockages to transformation.  
 In chapter four, evidence was brought forward that places the South African policy 
initiatives in the realm of water reform in the context of a long evolution of water law, 
the transformation of the South African state, and the transformation of the Department 
of Water Affairs and Forestry. With regard to water law it was noted that there have 
been a succession of water management regimes in South Africa. It was argued that 
water moves continuously from one place to another, its volume changes, its 
composition changes, it serves a wide and complex variety of sometimes conflicting 
purposes in society, and it is crucial to the maintenance of ecosystems. Attempts by 
institutions in society to regulate it, to apportion it, and to find efficient, equitable and 
sustainable solutions for competing water needs, have historically met with obstacles in 
the natural, institutional and technical arenas. Essentially, therefore, water management 
must be seen as a process, in which regulative frameworks need to adapt to a constantly 
changing set of conditions. The history of water law in South Africa shows that Roman 
law, adapted in the Netherlands to form Roman-Dutch law, was adapted again to the 
water scarce conditions in South Africa by the interpretation of water court hearings in 
such a manner as to introduce the riparian system of allocating water in proportion to 
the land area owned by various parties along a given stream. In this process, water was 
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first common property, thereafter public property, and thereafter allocated by the state to 
users adjacent to the stream. With the introduction of riparian principles into Roman-
Dutch law, private control over water was initially given free play. However over time, 
in response to water scarcity, the definition of what constituted private water was 
gradually reduced, so that not all water flowing over private land could be considered to 
be private and water arising on private land that contributed to a public stream was no 
longer considered to be private. Next, in response to scarcity, a hierarchy of preferences 
in use was introduced so that water use for life support (humans and animals) was given 
preference over water for irrigation and cleaning. With the emergence of the mining 
economy, a third category of water use, i.e. mining and municipal use, had to be 
introduced but was placed on an inferior footing to primary and secondary use. This was 
laid down in the Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act of 1912 which also paved 
the way for the golden age of dam building by making a legal distinction between the 
‘surplus’ or peak flow of a river after a storm and its ‘normal’ flow. Thus surplus flow 
could be stored in government waterworks and the rest could be apportioned amongst 
the users along the stream. 
 The 1912 Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act provided the legal foundation 
for decisions on water management in South Africa for more than four decades. It laid 
the foundations for an agricultural economy in which the rights of irrigators were placed 
on a superior footing to those of municipalities. It defined the then Department of 
Irrigation as the chief player in the war on scarcity, and built many dams where (white) 
rural populations had until then had to secure water through private efforts. It tied 
control over water to land ownership, which effectively placed the bulk of South 
African water in the hands of the white community. The riparian doctrine and the Act’s 
provisions on expropriation worked hand in hand with the 1913 Land Act, creating the 
legal basis for the creation of Native Reserves that later formed the foundations on 
which the apartheid system was built.             
 The Act was bedevilled by definitions that required detailed technical knowledge on 
river flows and rainfall conditions, and the limited information available at the time led 
to the construction of dams and the definition of ‘surplus flow’ and ‘normal flow’ for 
many rivers that rested on a shaky statistical base. Also, no sooner had the Act been 
passed than the rapidly expanding mining towns in South Africa entered the fray, 
applying for rights to mining, industrial and domestic water on an unequal footing with 
irrigators. Water scarce areas suffered from over-abstraction of groundwater, requiring 
state intervention, and the increasing pollution of water required the development of 
water quality legislation. The scarcity of water called for measures to return used water 
to the public stream so that it could be re-used further downstream. The economy, in 
other words, had moved on, using ever more water and requiring a redefinition of 
relations of property, authority and control against which the water game was to be 
played out.   
 By 1956, the Irrigation and Conservation of Waters Act had grown out of synch with 
the needs of the economy. The 1956 Water Act provided for the announcement of 
government water control areas to stem over-abstraction of groundwater. The rights of 
riparian landowners were curbed in municipal areas, providing municipalities in 
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principle with legal access to all the water they required in their area of jurisdiction. The 
use of water for urban purposes (up to a legal maximum) was placed on a footing equal 
to that of irrigation subject to the approval of the minister in respect of a water 
allocation. All effluent returned to a public stream was to conform to water quality 
guidelines specified by the minister for that area. Finally, all water used by both 
riparians and non-riparians was to be returned to the public stream after use without 
undue water loss. Nevertheless, the riparian system remained intact albeit modified until 
the 1956 Water Act was finally repealed in 1998. The effect of these measures was 
essentially to increase the overall efficiency and sustainability of water use and to 
provide for more equal access to water across the various sectors of the South African 
economy. By keeping the riparian system in place, however, the control over water 
remained essentially in white hands, i.e. in broad brush strokes the 1956 Water Act dealt 
with efficiency and sustainability, but not with equity. 
 By 1998, despite efforts aimed at increasing efficiency and sustainability, the scarcity 
of water was becoming more and more apparent and the department was searching ever 
further a field to secure more water supplies for the economy and population of the 
country. The increasing scarcity of water, the rapidly changing nature of the economy, 
and the stark inequities in access to water began to militate against the rigidity of a 
system that accorded permanent rights to one set of users while denying access to other 
sectors of the economy, the natural world and sections of the population. The allocation 
of water in the public interest required a flexible system of water allocation based on 
temporary permits rather than on permanent rights. The 1998 Water Act commenced by 
taking the giant leap of nationalising South Africa’s water bulk. Second, it placed the 
authority for the issuing of water use permits at the door of the envisaged participatory 
catchment management agencies. In other words, local stakeholders were to be given a 
say in the overall management of water in a given catchment. Third, the 1998 Water Act 
adapted the rules such that water use efficiency could become a criterion to judge 
applications for water use. Fourth, water abstractions by South Africans were 
increasingly encroaching on the natural realm from which this water was being drawn. 
This raised the question what ‘rights’ the natural environment had to its share of the 
water resources of the country. The 1998 Water Act made provision for an 
Environmental Reserve to ensure that ecosystem maintenance would become one of the 
foundations upon which water utilisation henceforth rested.  
Fifth, the distributional scarcity generated by the riparian doctrine was one of the many 
factors generating the civil unrest and opposition to the apartheid government, as civic 
movements and political leaders pushed for better living conditions for the poor 
majority. The new permit system needed to recognise that access to water was a basic 
human right, and the new water allocation system needed to take cognisance of the 
needs of the poor. Equity, therefore, was to become a new allocation criterion. 
 In all these respects, the 1998 Water Act created legal room for the emergence of 
efficient, equitable and sustainable catchment management. It provided for the creation 
of catchment management agencies and placed criteria in place against which water 
utilisation and allocation was to be judged. New concepts such as ‘use it or lose it’ (an 
efficiency measure) and the Environmental Reserve (a sustainability and equity measure) 
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began to find their way into the jargon of water officials and experts, and newly created 
directorates in the ministry began to develop policy aimed at the support of catchment 
management and water demand management. On the other hand, no guarantees were 
provided in respect of access to water for production for the poor, and as described in 
chapters four and five, ideas on what catchment management entailed or how existing 
water user organisations should be transformed were still rather fuzzy. In the praxis of 
emerging governance measures across the government apparatus, new issues were 
thrown up that gave added content and provided new dilemmas for the prospects of 
catchment management. The evolution of South African Water law reveals a gradual 
increase in state control over water resources and the gradual broadening of the group of 
stakeholders given rights in access to water. Seen in this light, attempts to create water 
markets or farm out the provision of water services to the private sector run counter to 
the long term trend. Although creating participatory institutions for integrated water 
resources management have met with little success as yet, they would appear to be the 
long term prerequisite for efficient, equitable and sustainable water resources 
management.  
 Institutional responses to water scarcity took place amid the turmoil of South 
Africa’s broad transition to nationhood, in which for a period lasting from 1992 to 
approximately 1996, the foundations were laid for an overarching system of governance 
and definition was given to the overarching policy frameworks which would inform 
individual ministerial policies. In this period the ‘sunset clause’ provided security for 
existing civil servants, ensuring that whatever changes would be wrought to the 
governance system, they would be grafted onto the ministries that were already in 
existence. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), launched as the 
central point of reference for the new nation, was interpreted and reinterpreted in so 
many ways that it began to lose meaning. On the one hand it was characterised as a 
loose ‘wish list’ containing something for all and therefore containing the ingredients of 
nationhood. On the other hand the efforts to leverage transformation by creating a 
‘ministry of everything’ housed in the office of the President rapidly began to fuel 
suspicions of centralist tendencies within the ruling party. Between April and June 1996, 
the mists of the RDP suddenly cleared and a new document, known as the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution programme (GEAR), rapidly gained ascendancy as the 
key point of reference for government programmes.  
 As a result of the ascendancy of GEAR, the post-1996 period became one 
characterized by an emphasis on cost recovery, economic growth, and an emphasis on 
the provision of basic needs rather than a fundamental redistribution of natural resources. 
Land reform was locked into a willing seller, willing buyer model that predicated land 
transfer on the availability of capital to purchase land, while the nationalisation of the 
water bulk and the redistribution of water resources was deferred to catchment 
management agencies that were at that time not yet conceived. Water services for 
domestic consumption became the key priority within the Department of Water Affairs, 
and water resources management remained on the back burner for some time to come. 
The emphasis had (in the main) shifted from nation building to delivery, and delivery 
was predicated on the protection of private property.  
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 During the first years of the transition, from 1994 to 1998, the Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry got off to a rapid start, integrating the eleven separate water and 
forestry related departments that apartheid had generated into one ministry. Delivery of 
community water supply and sanitation received top priority, and the Chief Directorate 
responsible soon came to command the lions´ share of departmental resources. This 
move shifted the emphasis of the department away from water resource management, 
which was attended to at a later stage, i.e. in the context of the water law review process 
that culminated in the White Paper on a National Water Policy in 1997. While water 
supply and sanitation delivery rocketed ahead, ´driving at 120 km-h while still building 
the car, the reform of water resource management was placed on the back burner´7. In 
1997, in the wake of the water law review process, a new Chief Directorate was 
established to usher in a range of new policies such as demand management and 
catchment management, but without disbanding the former provincially structured 
regional offices. This remained and still remains a sensitive issue, and as chapter four 
shows in more detail, the future role of the regional offices has not yet been resolved.   
 As soon as the Department of Water Affairs began to formulate its policies on 
catchment management, it stumbled upon the difficult problem of the fragmentation of 
environmental governance. On the one hand the natural world functions as a relatively 
unified whole, and on the other hand human intervention in the environment was 
divided functionally across a range of departments including the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, the 
Department of Agriculture, the Department of Land Affairs, and the Department of 
Public Works. The problem of environmental management thus throws up key 
questions regarding the distribution of responsibilities amongst line departments which 
require resolution for the development of a coordinated response to environmental 
issues8. During the period from 1994 to 2004, despite a range of initiatives, this problem 
remains essentially unresolved. Rather than creating structures for the integrated 
planning of natural resource management in South Africa, each department has used the 
rhetoric of integration independently from other departments in the establishment of 
structures suited to the furtherance of their own internal goals. In the process, the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry has had to dilute its vision of integrated 
catchment management involving the integrated planning of all environmental resources 
to a vision of integrated water resource management involving only water.   
The deadlock in cooperative governance lasted until 1999, when it became clear that 
because poverty was predominantly rural, a clear and coordinated effort at poverty 
reduction would be needed that involved a range of line departments in a flexible 
system of service delivery. Spearheaded by the Department of Provincial and Local 
Government (DPLG), this took form in the shape of the Integrated Sustainable Rural 
Development Strategy which was to take municipalities as its point of entry. Essentially, 
therefore, integration at the national level made place for integration at the local level 
                                                 
7 See chapter four. 
8  Of course the legal requirement that plans for the development of large scale infrastructure be  
accompanied by Environmental Impact Assessments brings with it a certain amount of integration of  
environmental issues at the local level.  
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with the onus being placed on each Municipality to select from a basket of choices the 
combination of development interventions that best fitted its particular development 
goals. The DPLG had earned its stripes with the integrated Municipal Infrastructure 
Programme, and it was hoped that this experience could be applied in rural areas. With 
its mandate to ensure vertical integration of governance, the DPLG was the natural party 
to break the deadlock and bring the other line departments in to its vision. As of 2004, 
the ISRDS was little more than a concept due to be implemented, but the unanimity 
with which it has been endorsed certainly heralds change for interdepartmental 
cooperation9 . 10 . The question for the future is to what extent merely shifting the 
integration problem down to the municipal level will help to ensure a coordinated 
programme. With regard to catchment management, the consequence is that 
municipalities will probably feature more prominently than expected in local resource 
management issues. On the one hand this may raise efficiency and contribute to the 
battle on poverty by targeting the rural poor. On the other hand, because municipal 
boundaries do not coincide with catchment boundaries, this constitutes a dilution of 
DWAF’s ideal of catchment-based water management. There is a fundamental problem 
of the fragmentation of environmental governance amongst a range of line ministries 
tasked with the management of a portion of the environment. Yet it is in integrated 
catchment management rather than integrated water resource management that the key 
to sustainable environmental management needs to be sought. The ISRDS holds 
potential with regard to achieving interdepartmental integration, but the cases in this 
book appear to show that this is dependent on strong support from central government, 
as local authorities are financially stressed and dependent on external factors for the 
resolution of their local water resource issues.      
 In chapter five, the attention was turned to the institutional responses to water 
scarcity at the level of the Crocodile River catchment itself. The chapter described five 
phases in the build up of water scarcity. The first of these is the direct usage of water at 
its natural source. The second is the development of local water resources. The third is 
the development of high potential dams within the catchment and the transportation of 
this water to places of need. The fourth phase is the optimisation of all water resources 
of the catchment by linking water resources to each other in a catchment-wide water use 
system. The fifth phase is the importation of water from other catchments. The history 
of the catchment shows that these phases did not appear in the sequence described here, 
as phase five occurred simultaneously with phase three. The chapter also showed that 
local water user associations developed in response to scarcity and, as their operations 
expanded and the consequences of their interventions became felt elsewhere, they began 
to encroach on each other’s terrain and over time local River forums emerged as a 
                                                 
9  Although apparently the national policy document on agricultural water use that I participated in  
formulating in 2001 has now resulted in the establishment of CCAWS (Coordinating Committees on  
Agricultural Water Supply) which function as a one stop shop where project proposals in this area can  
at once be authorised by The Department of Land Affairs, The Department of Agriculture and the  
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. Telephone call to DWAF’s chief director for irrigation,  
Francois v.d. Merwe, October 2006.  
10  Ministry in the office of the deputy president (November 2000): The Integrated Sustainable 
  Development Strategy (ISRDS). Pretoria: RDP Office  
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means for consultation amongst users with regard to collective interests in respect of 
water utilisation.  
 It was argued that in essence, the physical aspects of the catchment could be 
simplified in a model consisting of three key zones, namely urban areas, areas of white 
commercial irrigation development, and arid, poor and overpopulated areas. The urban 
areas were organised spatially according to the design of the apartheid city, with 
sparsely populated and well watered white neighbourhoods, extensive mining and 
industrial areas with high water consumption levels, densely populated and badly 
serviced black townships, and densely populated and unserviced informal settlements. 
Each of these spatial developments had its own set of consequences for catchment 
management. The continued rapid expansion of what were formerly sparsely populated 
white suburbs is contributing to the rapid growth in water demand in the catchment and 
especially so in the upper reaches of the catchment. Greater Johannesburg, which 
straddles the watershed along the Witwatersrand, is expanding northwards, and the 
proportion of water utilisation accounted for by urban consumption is increasing fastest 
of all. On the one hand this is contributing to the increase in chlorine levels in the water 
decanting into the rest of the catchment. On the other hand it increases the volume and 
speed of storm water runoff which forces its way into the sewerage system and further 
pollutes water flowing out of the urban conglomerate into rural areas. Mining, for its 
part, contributes substantially to environmental risk by concentrating highly polluted 
water in underground shafts and slimes dams above ground. Occasionally these systems 
leak or fail altogether, releasing highly toxic substances such as arsenic into surface 
water and polluting groundwater. This situation has not improved much between 1994 
and 2004. In fact, the expansion of mining in Brits and Rustenburg and the continued 
leakage of mines along the Witwatersrand is slowly increasing the level of risk faced 
from this quarter. The black townships, for their part, brought with them the legacy of 
poor services and poor maintenance. On the one hand improvements in the levels and 
quality of services have been carried out in many quarters, thus reducing distributional 
water scarcity. On the other hand the challenge of increasing water use efficiency by 
introducing water meters, measuring consumption and charging for water use has met 
with political resistance in townships, where access to water is seen as a social right. 
This issue is dealt with in more detail in chapter six. Finally, in informal settlements the 
lack of water and sanitation services was acutest of all, bringing high health risks which 
were epitomised by the situation in Alexandra where diarrhoea, unsafe water and risk 
from flooding were the order of the day. Between 1994 and 2004, a marked 
improvement was achieved in these areas by providing tankered water in informal 
settlements, providing water services coverage of close to 100%. However the planned 
(re)settlement of residents of informal areas to serviced plots met with considerable 
social resistance, and thus to an extent the public health issues associated with informal 
settlements remain. For the institutional process of catchment management, the 
pollution of the Jukskei River drove the creation of a river forum that had an active 
stakeholder membership, and yet the lengthy process of establishing a catchment 
management agency has eroded public support for even this forum which was seen as 
the strongest forum in the catchment. Urban development as a whole contributed 
 339
strongly to urban water demand in the catchment, leading to a situation in which 70% of 
the urban water needs of the catchment are satisfied by importing water. The result is 
that some 500 million m³ of water flows out of the Witwatersrand annually into the 
downstream area of the catchment. On the one hand this enables further expansion 
downstream but on the other hand it contributes significantly to overall pollution levels 
in lower lying areas.  
 The second key feature of the catchment is the development of irrigation along the 
river’s main channels. This development consists both of private irrigation and of 
government sponsored irrigation, and it laid the foundations for much of the water 
resources development that exists in the catchment today. The 1912 irrigation and 
Conservation of Waters Act paved the way for a complex series of calculations with 
respect to water allocation in the catchment, leading to the distribution of ‘normal’ river 
flow amongst riparian farmers and the reservation of ‘surplus’ river flow for collection 
in the dams built in the catchment. Irrigation expanded rapidly from 2000 ha before the 
advent of dams to some 60,000 ha nowadays, led first by private irrigation and later 
overtaken by government irrigation schemes. Currently the irrigation sector is, on its 
own, consuming more water than is naturally available in the catchment 11 . This 
situation is made possible by the return flow from urban areas referred to above. At the 
time of the transition there were five government irrigation schemes in operation in the 
catchment, while many private irrigators profited from the stable and dependable water 
flow that the construction of dams in the middle reaches of the catchment had provided. 
Irrigators under government irrigation schemes profited from highly subsidized access 
to water that covered both the construction costs of the infrastructure and part of the 
operation and maintenance costs. Beyond the realm of water, white farming in general 
was a highly protected form of production, a situation which changed rapidly after 1994. 
The legacy in 1994 was therefore one in which most of the land in the catchment 
available for irrigation had been occupied by white farmers, and this land was being 
serviced by state subsidized irrigation infrastructure. Little room remained for the 
expansion of non-white irrigation unless through land reform or the construction of new 
schemes that tapped the increasing return flow from the Witwatersrand and harnessed 
this for a new group of entrants.  
 The third area of importance in the catchment is the area which, in the past, fell 
within the former homeland of Bophutatswana. Bophutatswana is overpopulated and 
has a poverty rate of some 67%, and in 1994 only 60% of the population had access to 
reasonable drinking water supplies. During apartheid this area was structurally deprived 
of access to water, receiving less than 15% of the water available in the catchment and, 
in fact, the map of Bophutatswana was so drawn as to avoid the main water channels. 
Most of the water in this area is sourced from groundwater, which is limited in supply 
and fails during drought periods such as the drought of 1992, when many pumps fell dry. 
Most natural resources in the former homeland area are under stress, and deforestation 
and soil erosion combine to release silt into the main water channels. As of 1994 
Bophutatswana was administratively reincorporated into South Africa and its 
settlements became the target of community water supply and sanitation schemes. This 
                                                 
11  I.e. 87% of mean annual runoff compared with 62% that can on average be captured. 
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required a north and westward extension of bulk water supply systems that continues to 
this day, placing more pressure on upstream sources to deliver water for the satisfaction 
of basic human needs. In part, this process has been assisted by a changed role of the 
water boards in the catchment, whose area of supply has been redrawn and whose area 
of responsibility has been extended to include retail supply. The former homeland now 
falls within the jurisdiction of a number of municipalities which may apply for rural 
development projects such as bulk water supply schemes and have been enabled to do 
this since 1999 in the context of the ISRDS. 
 The large role played by the Witwatersrand in determining the overall quantity and 
quality of water in the catchment was treated separately in chapter four. It was shown 
that the battle with scarcity was a cyclical process, whereby institutions developed one 
supply scheme after another to stave off scarcity for a number of years. Starting with a 
Diggers’ Committee amongst gold prospectors, organisational responses to scarcity 
evolved through the development of local water companies into the establishment of a 
water board for the entire Witwatersrand, i.e. Rand Water Board. When Rand Water 
Board was established in 1903, its Zuurbekom scheme delivered 7.83 Mega litres per 
day. Today, Rand Water sells 2.65 trillion litres per day to roughly half of South 
Africa’s population from a series of schemes extending 400km to the east. In 1923 it 
sourced water from the government’s first inter basin transfer scheme in the Vaal River, 
but this only provided relief until 1932 when shortages again began to be manifested, 
leading to the construction of the Vaal dam in 1938. By the 1970’s the upper reaches of 
the Vaal were being transferred to the Eastern Highveld to cool the coal fired electricity 
plants that supplies the PWV area with electricity. By 1981 the lower reaches of the 
Vaal were supplied by the Bloemhof dam, enabling irrigation development, mining and 
urban development in the Northern Cape. This brought the development of the Vaal 
catchment to its maximum capacity. From 1969 onward, the construction of a national 
water grid began in earnest, including the Tugela-Vaal scheme (1969), the Usutu-Vaal 
scheme (1985), the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (1986), the Slang-Vaal scheme 
(1989), and the Maguga dam project (1992). All these projects, as well as the growth of 
Rand Water Board, cross-cut catchments and limited the space for catchment-level 
management given the growth of institutions geared to national level water management.   
 This, then, was the legacy of water resource management in the Crocodile River 
catchment in 1994. From 1996 onwards, emerging water policy created the overall 
conditions for the emergence of efficient, equitable and sustainable catchment 
management. However the way in which this policy began to find its way into the 
existing institutions of water resource management created a set of paradoxes which 
strongly affected the transition to catchment management. First, it was left to 
historically centralist and non-participatory organisations at the national and regional 
level to create decentralized and participatory organisations at the catchment level. 
Second, the policy provided insufficient clarity on the relative roles of state and civil 
society in managing catchments, represented by the question whether a catchment 
management institution was to become an agency or an authority. Third, the 1998 
Water Act had stated broadly that the interests of equity should be pursued but had 
stopped short of providing a legal guarantee for the poor of access to water for 
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production. Fourth, the pursuit of equity was deferred to the future by placing the right 
to allocate water use licenses at the door of Catchment Management Agencies which 
had not yet been established. Fifth, clarity was lacking on the structure of the 
intermediary level between grassroots-level organisations and the umbrella structure of 
the CMA. Taken together, these issues formed a group of interlinked constraints that 
effectively hobbled catchment management in the form that was originally foreseen. To 
create participatory catchment management organisations, therefore, catchment 
management policy needs to be rights based, offering legal entitlements to control water 
to ‘entrants’ wishing to realise these entitlements in irrigation schemes, recreational 
areas, urban centres, and so on. The central thrust of the catchment management process 
needs to be in overcoming concrete, individual, local obstacles to accessing water rather 
than on the management and further refinement of macro-processes. There are already 
participatory and inclusive organisations in each region in the form of elected local 
government, which needs to be delegated the authority to intervene in water resources 
on behalf of its resident population.   
 The first directors of catchment management described the initial process as ‘woolly’, 
and faced the choice between creating institutions at the stroke of a pen and going the 
long route of creating real structures based on ongoing community mobilisation. Given 
that the department chose the long route, this immediately brought with it the question 
what role the department was to play and how much it was prepared to delegate to the 
catchment level. The task of creating catchment management agencies rested with the 
department, which operated from within its existing structures to create participatory 
bodies. This meant that regional offices located close to or in the catchments in question, 
had the task to create structures that would eventually make them obsolete. The regional 
offices, by taking the stance that catchment management required capacity building, 
carved out a role for themselves in ‘capacitating’ catchment management agencies and 
in so doing defined catchment management as an issue for ‘experts’. This shifted the 
focus away from institutions which were governed essentially by civil society with the 
state at arms’ length. Where the concept of catchment management authorities, or civil 
society-led bodies, featured in early policy thinking, this rapidly made way for the 
concept of catchment management agencies as agencies of government receiving input 
from civil society. Also, instead of an open-ended process in which civil society would 
be left to form the structures it wished to establish, government policy began to emerge 
on ‘umbrella’ water user associations as an intermediary form between local water user 
associations and the catchment management body at the apex. Thus the state began to 
take charge of the institutional process, and the existing forums that had sprung up 
along various tributaries of the Crocodile River catchment for instance were not 
mentioned in the 1998 Water Act or given any official status in policies that followed. 
In the process of mobilising participation towards the establishment of the Crocodile 
Marico Catchment Management Agency, the issue of what constituted ‘sufficient’ 
participation raised its head. In general the stakeholders who participated in river 
forums and catchment forums were oriented towards ‘green’ rather than ‘brown’ 
environmental issues, and it proved difficult to sustain participation from poorer 
communities who did not have an existing stake in catchment management but 
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participated with a view to securing entitlements to water in the future. This 
development has given catchment management a ‘green’ slant, and it leaves as an open 
question the degree to which interventions in the interests of equity can be taken on 
board in the future. All in all the deadlines put in place by the Water Act have proved to 
be unrealistic and the structures that have been put in place to implement catchment 
management have not yet resulted in increased efficiency, equity or sustainability of 
water resource management.  
 In chapter six, the analysis shifted to local institutional change in rural areas by 
looking at institutional changes in the Hartbeespoort area. By virtue of its location, 
Hartbeespoort is a central node with regard to catchment management practices. It is 
here that water is collected from the upper reaches of the catchment and it is a 
powerhouse of water allocation by virtue of being the location of the largest dam in the 
catchment. Institutional changes that have taken place between 1994 and 2004 have 
their roots in the historical development of the water resources of the area, and these 
were treated in some detail. Three waves of colonisation affected the area, dispossessing 
the local Po tribe, installing Boer farmers, reducing the native population to 
sharecroppers or farm labourers, and placing both under the charge of a British-
controlled administration in Pretoria. After 1830, private Boer initiatives led to the 
construction of irrigation furrows along the Crocodile River, enabling a limited degree 
of irrigation development that subsisted on the natural flow of the river until the 
Hartbeespoort dam was constructed in 1925. In the run up to the construction of the 
dam, and in the wake of legislation passed in 1913 and 1912, the expropriation of black 
residents of the Crocodile valley floor commenced, continuing into the apartheid era 
and resulting in white ownership of the fertile and well-watered part of the Crocodile 
River valley extending 10 km to the east and west of the river. The effect of this 
expropriation was compounded by the government policy of employing as many white 
labourers on the scheme as possible, thus excluding blacks from an alternative form of 
employment. The Hartbeespoort government irrigation scheme was designed to absorb 
white labour after the First World War, and it was hoped that many workers on the 
scheme would eventually become agriculturalists. The flipside of these policies was the 
forced resettlement of black farmers to arid Native Reserves which were later 
consolidated into the homeland of Bophutatswana. Upon completion, the scheme 
opened some 12800 ha of land to irrigation, enabled white settlement, and introduced a 
government controlled irrigation scheme to an area which was well positioned to supply 
the emerging markets in Johannesburg and Pretoria with produce. From the start, the 
scheme was not geared towards efficiency but towards poverty relief for a select ethnic 
group. It evolved in the context of depressed markets and an inability of farmers to pay 
irrigation rates. Over time farmers came to enjoy subsidized water rates as part and 
parcel of a broader package of farming support such as soft loans for land purchase and 
farming equipment from the Land Bank. In 1954, the scheme was revamped by lining 
the canals with concrete in the hope of releasing water for the expansion of irrigation, 
but within two decades the diversification of demand led to increasing pressure for 
multi sectoral utilisation of the water in Hartbeespoort dam. Since 1926, and despite the 
raising of the Hartbeespoort dam wall in 1970, the total land under irrigation in the 
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upper Crocodile River remained relatively constant as water supply development from 
local sources had reached its peak. However this coincided with the completion of the 
Vaal barrage in 1923, and from this time on, the catchment began to receive increasing 
return flows from the Witwatersrand area. These return flows were used to supply the 
growing towns such as Brits downstream of the dam, and were used for the expansion 
of irrigation in the lower reaches of the catchment. Importation increased from some 40 
million m³/annum in 1960 to some 280 million m³ in 2000, enabling further economic 
growth, but the western areas of the catchment and the homeland areas still experienced 
acute water scarcity conditions. By 1994, the role of irrigation in accounting for overall 
water demand had decreased to 37%, while urban consumption accounted for 47% of 
the total and industry and mining outside urban areas accounted for 11% of demand. At 
the dam itself, downstream of the catchment’s primary urban areas, irrigation still 
accounted for 77% of water demand, but urban and industrial demand had begun to 
make significant inroads into this hegemony with 6% and 15% of total demand 
respectively in 2006. The towns of Brits, Rustenburg and Thabazimbi, which grew 
rapidly in the transition period in the wake of the discovery of platinum in North West 
Province, have accounted for an increasing proportion of demand and have amongst 
other thing necessitated a transfer from Hartbeespoort to Vaalkop dam to provide the 
bulk supplier in the West, Magalies Water, with additional reserves. The newly created 
Municipality of Madibeng, stretching from the dam far north into the former homeland 
of Bophutatswana, is now also abstracting directly from the dam and from the Crocodile 
River further downstream to enable delivery to far flung settlements which have until 
now had unprotected, unreliable or insufficient water supplies.  
 Since it was built in 1925, the Hartbeespoort dam has witnessed widespread 
urbanisation and the expansion of mining activity in its upstream areas as well as an 
increasing demand for its water downstream. The impoundment acts as a trap for all 
pollutants that are transported downstream from the towns, mines and farms, and over 
time, the quality of the water impounded in the dam has deteriorated severely. This is 
caused by increasing releases of nutrients from purification plants upstream, the 
flushing and leaking of sewerage out of existing urban infrastructure, pollution from 
informal settlements, and the occasional release of heavy pollution from mines and 
industries. Nitrate, chloride, phosphate and salt concentrations in the dam water are 
steadily increasing, bringing with them a gradual increase in the alkalinity of the water. 
The water in the dam is over-enriched or eutrophied, and this has affected the ability of 
downstream users to access the water directly for drinking purposes as well as 
negatively affecting the tourist economy of the area. Furthermore, increasing salt levels 
downstream of the dam are limiting the utility of the water for irrigation purposes, and 
crops such as tobacco can no longer be grown downstream of the dam. Despite the 
increase in return flows from urban areas, therefore, the availability of water 
downstream of the dam has been negatively affected in the realm of water quality. 
There are emerging inequalities in the access to clean, unpolluted water between 
upstream users who generally have access to clean water and downstream users who are 
dependent on upstream users for the water quality they receive. There is a need to 
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develop policy related to the distribution of pollution loads over a catchment or the 
distribution of payment for purification in the interests of sustainability and equity  
 The set of conditions referred to above constituted the legacy of water resource 
management in the area when the new political dispensation was introduced in 1994. 
They formed the central point of reference for a range of local institutions during the 
transition period, whose activities cast light on the ways in which local transformations 
fit into the broader picture of catchment management. Three primary institutional 
responses to water scarcity have taken place in the Hartbeespoort area, namely the 
voluntary establishment of a Water User Association on the basis of civil society 
mobilisation for the sustainable utilisation of water, the compulsory transformation of a 
former irrigation board, and the claims on water resources made by a new Local 
Municipality seeking to achieve developmental goals. In terms of the 1998 Water Act 
local institutions wishing to provide a water related service are required to establish a 
water user association, and this requirement as well as the re-demarcation of municipal 
boundaries set in motion some of the key changes in water management in the area. 
Firstly, in 2001, the action of a number of individuals living in the Hartbeespoort area 
led to the establishment of the Hartbeespoort Water Action Group (HWAG), a non-
profit, community oriented volunteer organisation working to rebalance the ecosystem 
of the dam. The need for such a group was voiced at a meeting of actors with either an 
economic stake or political responsibility in the area: residents, tourism operators, 
government departments and Rand Water Board. Its chairman was appointed by the 
group on the basis of his extensive network in the area and his experience in community 
work during the 1992 drought. Studies of pollution in the dam since the 1950’s had not 
yet resulted in action, and with the assistance of the Department of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism a study of the pollution of the dam with accompanying 
recommendations was carried out. In the meantime HWAG carried out volunteer work 
involving the removal of water hyacinth and surface pollution on the dam as well as 
tests of water quality. In 2003, the organisation received funds from the Department of 
Water Affairs and Forestry for the removal of an algal bloom from the dam, and from 
this year onwards the organisation began to explore the possibility of becoming 
registered as a water user association. Thus far however the formal institutional process 
has made little headway as a result of difficulties in getting the plans approved by the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, the large number of stakeholders involved in 
the process and the prohibitive costs of implementing a plan that will make a difference 
to overall pollution levels in the dam. However due to the support that the process has 
received from actors in the environmental movement, the HWAG has been given a new 
lease of life through a plan to create artificial wetlands and rehabilitate existing 
wetlands in the area upstream of the dam. This plan ties into the ‘working for wetlands’ 
programme spearheaded by the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, and 
combines nature conservation with a labour intensive public works programme that 
generates jobs along the lines of the successful Working for Water Programme of the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. This programme however is limited to 
piecemeal interventions until such time as external donor funding can be found to 
enlarge the scale of operations initiated by government. 
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The tardiness of the institutional process around the establishment of water user 
associations is not restricted to the HWAG: in chapter four reference was made to the 
slow transformation of irrigation boards into water user associations at national level, 
and it is further confirmed by the experiences reported by the Hartbeespoort Irrigation 
Board.  
 The Hartbeespoort Irrigation Board, for its part, underwent significant change 
between 1994 and 2004. Starting in 1994 as a government water scheme consuming 
69% of the water in Hartbeespoort dam, the organisation became an independent 
irrigation board in a process of irrigation management transfer that took place in 1998. 
The members of the board initially resisted the changes, given the age of the system 
being inherited and the difficulties they would experience in raising the capital required 
to rehabilitate the system. Given that government was not willing to invest in 
rehabilitation, the board ultimately accepted the situation and turned its attention to the 
reduction of overheads in the hope of bringing down the overall per hectare water costs. 
This was achieved over a four year period which coincided with the phasing out of 
subsidies on irrigation water, although the funds received cover only smaller scale 
operation and maintenance costs. In the wake of the 1998 Water Act, the board was 
required to transform into a water user association through a public participation 
process. However given the existing structure of entitlements in the area it was unlikely 
that the board would be considered to be representative in racial or gender terms, and 
the initial strategy followed was to submit an application for the creation of a multi-
sectoral water user association with greater geographical reach so that the new 
organisation could be seen to be more inclusive. A few black farmers had been settled 
on the scheme in the context or land redistribution programmes, but they still formed a 
minority and certainly did not make the board representative. The application for the 
establishment of a water user association suffered delays because the issue of 
representation had not been resolved to the satisfaction of the department, and it ran into 
further trouble in 2001 when a court case erupted between the new Municipality of 
Madibeng and the former Municipality of Hartbeespoort over the control of the assets of 
the latter municipality. Madibeng Municipality had claimed access to the assets of 
Hartbeespoort following the latter’s incorporation into Madibeng under the Municipal 
Structures Act in 1998. The response of the white councillors was to privatise the assets 
of Hartbeespoort and transfer these to a newly established private company, a move 
which was blocked by court judgement and gave Madibeng the right to charge for water 
and electricity in the Hartbeespoort area. 
 The Hartbeespoort Irrigation Board, then, has not transformed into a Water User 
Association. Although the board is now farmer managed and the overheads have been 
brought down, the key issue of water losses in the ageing irrigation system have not 
been dealt with. As a result, an organisation which accounts for 69% of water utilisation 
from the Hartbeespoort dam is still reporting water losses of the order of 45% and 
higher in drought periods. A little has been achieved in the realm of efficiency in 
bringing water tariffs down, and similarly in the realm of equity some ‘emerging’ 
farmers have been settled on the scheme. On the whole however this scheme has not 
undergone major transformation and much work remains to be done in the three fields 
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of efficiency, equity and sustainability. Increased efficiency could release large 
quantities of water for other uses downstream and much could still be done to settle and 
support emerging farmers on the scheme. In the realm of sustainability, the scheme has 
gone into long term decline and its life can only be extended by a major upgrade of the 
works. Furthermore, the quality of the water in the canals is dependent on the activities 
of upstream users aimed at reducing overall pollution levels. These issues also hold 
potential in their ability to draw the irrigation board into broader catchment 
management processes in which they have a large stake. Evidence form the cases 
studied seems to suggest that very large increases in overall water efficiency could be 
achieved in the catchment through the revitalisation of the Hartbeespoort irrigation 
scheme, an option which has been laid down in intergovernmental policy on agricultural 
water use but not yet implemented in this case. Revitalisation of such a scheme could 
provide considerable leverage over transformation.      
 Madibeng, for its part, is a new municipality which was demarcated, as were all 
South Africa’s new municipalities, with a view to creating financially viable structures 
that were representative of the demographics of the area and contained a balanced 
distribution of services such as health care and water supply facilities. Thus in the 
demarcation of Madibeng, the rich white former municipalities of Hartbeespoort and 
Brits were incorporated into the overall structure in order to include economically viable 
assets within the municipality, and it is precisely this that was resisted by the former 
Hartbeespoort councillors. Madibeng council fought and won the court case over 
incorporation of the Hartbeespoort and its assets into its area of jurisdiction, thus legally 
enforcing the decisions taken by the demarcation board. In so doing, a new, 
predominantly rural municipality was created with a democratically elected Council, 
albeit delayed in its activities for more than a year by the court case over Hartbeespoort.  
 Despite the inclusion of Hartbeespoort and Brits into its asset stock, the municipality 
is hovering on the brink of financial collapse. Its deficits have accumulated to a point at 
which they can no longer be recovered from increases of tariffs such as on water sales, 
and it is dependent for its survival on financial transfers from provincial and central 
government as well as on donor aid. Nevertheless, financial transfers from higher 
government organs and from donors have enabled the expansion of municipal 
infrastructure such that some 97,000 people have been connected to the public tap in the 
period from 1994 to 2006. The municipality has thus made great strides forward in the 
realm of equitable water provision, albeit against the background of still highly skewed 
water distribution in the catchment. Furthermore, the area is experiencing relatively 
rapid economic growth which holds promise for the municipality’s income in the future. 
On the other hand, the expansion of the ‘platinum corridor’ brings with it a rapid 
increase in water demand which needs ultimately to be fuelled from the polluted water 
in the Hartbeespoort dam. 
The municipality has also benefited from presidential lead projects in the ODI area 
west of Pretoria where funds from central government were invested in the extension of 
water services to peri - urban settlements that extend into Madibeng12. Historically, 
water security in the northern area of the municipality where village water supplies are 
                                                 
12 ODI is a dense peri-rural settlement formerly located in the homeland of Bophutatswana 
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dependent on groundwater has been problematic during droughts. In the period from 
1994 to 2004, this situation has been ameliorated in that drinking water is tankered into 
villages during droughts. The council has achieved near universal water services 
coverage through its new water supply projects, but in view of the dire financial 
situation in which the municipality finds itself the question remains to what extent these 
systems will be maintained and for how long they will continue to provide the services 
rendered.  
 In general, Madibeng experiences chronic problems in ensuring access to water 
resources. Neither the purification plants at Schoemansville, Brits nor Vaalkop could 
face up to the demands placed on these systems since water services expansion 
commenced in earnest in 2001. All systems are operating at peak capacity, with plans 
underway to double the purification capacity at Brits and upgrade the facility at Vaalkop. 
The municipality is exceeding its formal water allocation, and the Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry has announced that as a water saving measure, Madibeng will not 
be allowed to import water from the Vaal river system in the foreseeable future, thus 
locking it into the re-use of effluent from Johannesburg. Ultimately this means that 
Madibeng is paying the cost for pollution that has taken place upstream, and given the 
precarious financial situation the municipality finds itself in, this is an added burden to 
the cost of extending services to the poor. Policies aimed at sustainable water utilisation 
are not equally distributed throughout the catchment if downstream users do not have 
equal rights to upstream water users in the catchment with regard to the importation of 
purified water. On the other hand, while these measures generate problems for the 
municipality, it also indicates a fundamental shift in policy in that a halt is being called 
to the continuous expansion of water imports from other catchments. This in turn does 
enhance the overall sustainability of water utilisation in the catchment.     
 In chapter seven, the attention was turned to local organisational responses to 
scarcity in an urban setting by analysing the institutional changes in water management 
in the Johannesburg area. It was argued first of all that the organisational responses to 
scarcity in Johannesburg were embedded within a broader set of political changes 
including municipal finances, the amalgamation of fragmented apartheid era local 
government structures, the separation of governance from service delivery through 
public-private partnerships and the general turbulence of institutional change during the 
transition. Secondly, it was argued that historical developments laid the basis upon 
which the transition in water management was to take place, including the 
amalgamation of private water supply companies into the public body of Rand Water 
Board, the development of large and neglected townships for the non-white population 
at a large distance from the town centre and the fragmentation of the water management 
of the city into eleven separate but interconnected entities. Thirdly, it was argued that 
the transformation of Johannesburg’s water management system emerged at a time 
when there was a global movement towards the ‘globalisation’ of local government in 
the sense that the farming out of service provision to external parties by local 
government was very much in vogue.   
 The transformation of Johannesburg’s water management systems began in 1997 in 
the wake of a serious financial crisis within the municipality. To avoid total paralysis, a 
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plan known as iGoli 2002 was launched. This plan involved the rationalisation of the 
two-tier municipal governance structure under a single council and mayor as well as the 
ring fencing of financial structures including the establishment of ten independent 
utilities, agencies or corporatised entities. The utilities were to be separated from the 
financial statements of the municipality in the hope that they could raise funds for 
capital development that would not normally be available to the municipality. On the 
other hand, the municipality would retain control by exclusive ownership of the shares 
of the utilities, by appointing the members of the utilities’ boards, and by monitoring 
service provision through service provision contracts.  
 In this way, in July 2000, Johannesburg Water was born, with a five year contract for 
its executive aimed at reshaping its internal management, and a thirty year concession 
for the utility to manage the city’s water on the latter’s behalf. Given that unaccounted 
for water was estimated at 30% of total consumption, it was expected that investments 
in efficiency measures would rapidly repay themselves through the potentially massive 
reduction in company overheads. The contract was opened to tender and awarded to a 
consortium consisting amongst others of the British water company Northumbrian and 
the French company Suez Lyonnaise. This consortium was seen by the management of 
the city to be desperate to gain a foothold on South African soil and therefore prepared 
to accept 0.18% of returns on investment in return for the awarding of the contract. In 
civil society, the awarding of the contract to the consortium was eyed with much 
suspicion by the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the South African 
Communist Party. Many public demonstrations were held in opposition to the 
‘privatisation’ plans of the municipality, and Johannesburg Water was launched in a 
politically charged atmosphere.  
 In the realm of equity, Johannesburg Water was held to equity provisions that 
entailed the achievement of universal water services provision in its area of supply. In 
the realm of efficiency, it was expected that gains would accrue by making inroads into 
unaccounted for water such that losses would be reduced and the utility would release 
substantial dividends to the municipality at the end of each financial year. In the realm 
of sustainability, it was hoped that Johannesburg Water would reduce water wastage by 
investing in the expansion and maintenance of the city’s dilapidated infrastructure. 
Furthermore, it was expected that this ‘turn-around’ would be achieved within a period 
of five years.  
 These transformations, however, met with a number of formidable obstacles. The 
first such obstacle was in essence a contradiction between rationalisation of government 
on the one hand and the maintenance of its control over services on the other hand. The 
tasks of the city manager in overseeing transformation were rapidly overloaded, and this 
led to the spawning if new institutions rather than the cutting back of administrative 
structures. This led amongst other things to the establishment of a Contract 
Management Unit within the municipality to oversee municipal relations with the 
utilities. However, the Contract Management Unit itself was understaffed in the sense 
that four staff members were overseeing the transformation of operations amounting to 
70% of the municipal budget. It spent most of its time on institution building, with the 
result that the monitoring of service delivery took a back seat. It took a year to establish 
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the Contract Management Unit and a further 18 months to bed down the institutional 
processes, so that half of the five year transformation process had elapsed before the 
actual monitoring of service delivery could begin to take place. Therefore, while the 
municipality had allowed the utility to be established, it had little capacity to provide 
oversight over its day to day operations. Furthermore, the more the municipality tried to 
effect control over the utility, the less the utility could operate as an independent entity 
on the open market as was foreseen in the iGoli plans. While the iGoli system was 
originally conceived in the interests of efficiency, in the period between 1994 and 2004 
it in fact created administrative overload and led to the creation of new administrative 
functions.  
 A second major obstacle to the transformation of water management in the city 
occurred in the area of financial control. While the intention was to create financially 
ring-fenced utilities that were independent from the municipality, effectively this would 
serve to cut the municipality off from its main source of revenue and prevent transfers 
of funds between line functions. The process of ring fencing was to take place through 
the transfer of bills to Johannesburg Water in batches of 20 000 at a time once every 
three months, starting with the bulk consumers. However, only one transfer of bills took 
place, accounting for the top 3% of customers in the city and some 33% of total 
consumption. After this no further bills were transferred and a conflict emerged between 
the utility and the municipality over the control of the billing. The municipality asserted 
that it was more efficient to bill customers of all city services from a Shared Service 
Centre to be established under the control of the municipality, and the utility asserted 
that the municipality was reneging on its contractual obligations and Johannesburg 
Water could not implement its plans without the revenue from water sales or the ability 
to control and check the billing system. Rather than becoming an independent for-profit 
entity, therefore, Johannesburg Water has become an entity which needs to apply to the 
municipality for the capital expenditures necessary to cut back on water consumption. 
Privatisation as a means to gain control of water scarcity has ground to a halt in mid-
process, and the majority of the water bills remain in the hands of the Municipality. The 
most significant about-turn in policy terms lies in the legitimisation provided for the 
establishment of the Shared Services – a legitimisation that is based on efficiency 
arguments. Whereas in the run-up to iGoli 2000 efficiency was used as the central 
argument to establish the service entities and ring- fence finances, now the same 
argument is used to achieve the opposite. In essence, the presentation of co-production 
or public private partnerships as an efficient tool for the management of water in 
stressed financial conditions has been disproved by this case. Evidence from the case of 
Johannesburg seems to suggest that privatisation is not bringing with it the expected 
leverage of private sector capital or increased efficiency of operations. On the contrary, 
it has bled resources from a cash strapped municipality which in turn responded by 
halting the privatisation process. This would seem to suggest that transforming, rather 
than outsourcing, municipal services, is the most effective way of bolstering the 
efficiency and sustainability of water services in the city.   
 Nevertheless, some transfer of billing has taken place between the municipality and 
the utility and this has provided the latter with some room for manoeuvre in terms of 
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increasing efficiency through cutting back on water losses and increasing the 
effectiveness of billing services. Johannesburg Water now claims to be collecting 
income from sales at a rate of 92% rate, 5% above the 87% rate that it has estimated that 
it needs in order to fulfil its obligations in terms of capital infrastructure extension and 
maintenance of the existing network. The utility estimates that it could gain some R 320 
million per annum through efficiency gains throughout the city. This would require an 
investment of some R 220 million per year, of which at least half would be invested in 
the extension of new services and the upgrading of existing infrastructure. While it has 
only managed to change the management of the top consumption bills, it is nevertheless 
going ahead with the unrolling of new water delivery infrastructure and the upgrading 
of existing systems. Coverage in Johannesburg was high from the start, with 99% of the 
population receiving at least a basic level of service, and most of the investments went 
into upgrading of service levels, maintaining existing systems, and tankering water into 
informal settlements where there had previously been no access to clean water. Also, 
overall consumption continues to increase at some 2% per annum, driven to a large 
extent by improved service levels and the geographical expansion of the city.  
 A key area for the utility was Soweto, accounting for some 30% of total consumption 
and with some 50% of water unaccounted for, i.e. lost to leakages and illegal 
connections. Major investments were to be initiated in Soweto in the form of ring mains 
and tankered water for those who did not yet have a permanent water service. However 
without income from the sales of 66% of the city’s water the utility was not capable of 
generating the investments for this project on its own and had to enter into discussions 
with the city administration to get this project off the ground. Thus instead of creating a 
financially viable utility able to raise capital where the municipality could not, the 
utility was made dependent on the municipality for funds for major capital investments.  
Before Johannesburg Water had been established, the city had embarked on a major 
campaign to boost payment levels for services and between 1994 and 2001 had sparked 
much protest in civil society by cutting off water to payment defaulters in poorer areas. 
This issue was not restricted to Johannesburg but had led to unrest throughout the 
country and had given rise to a public debate on the question whether water was a social 
or an economic good. Led in by a successful court case in Johannesburg over rights to 
water in which the judge ruled that inability to pay should not lead to water cut-offs, a 
policy process began to unfold that was to lead to the approval of a quota of free basic 
water for all South African citizens. This policy was announced in the run up to local 
government elections in 2001, and in terms of the stepped tariff system announced by 
the city of Johannesburg it meant that all expenses incurred in extending services for the 
poor would have to be recouped from water sales to bulk water users in the city. For the 
utility this meant that instead of expending energy on the recouping of costs from low 
income consumers it could focus on billing high end consumers and cross-subsidise the 
services to the poor from this income.  
 Between 1994 and 1998, white residents in the city opposed the rates increases 
introduced by the new administration through means such as the Sandton rates boycott. 
Payment levels in Sandton dropped from 90% to 60% during the boycott, threatening 
the municipal income on which the extension of services depended. However a court 
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ruling in 1998 held that the rates increase was in line with national redistribution policy 
and the residents were forced to repay their debts to council. Despite (and partly 
because of) considerable unrest in civil society, therefore, the idea of access to water as 
a social right was introduced in Johannesburg and free basic water is now being 
financed from income from bulk users.     
 All in all, the provision of an efficient, equitable and sustainable water service in the 
city has been compromised by the institutional developments that have taken place. The 
public-private partnership which was held out as the solution to the water problems of 
the city has been halted in mid process and the results that it has achieved are 
correspondingly half hearted. Nevertheless, major strides have been made in the field of 
equity where almost universal coverage has been achieved and whereby the social right 
to a basic allocation of drinking water has been laid down as a benchmark.   
 
Conclusion 
In the above, I have created and applied a conceptual and analytic framework with 
which to explore and analyse water scarcity and competition for water use. This 
framework integrated supply induced, demand induced and distributional scarcity and 
placed them in the light of a triad of perspectives encompassing the state of technology, 
the nature of the institutions governing or claiming the resource, and the state of the 
resource as provided by nature at any given time and place. Secondly, I have pointed to 
the policy options for efficient, sustainable and equitable catchment water management 
in the Crocodile River catchment. This has been done by describing the development of 
water scarcity in South Africa, by describing the material parameters of water supply 
and demand in the Crocodile River Catchment, by describing the water use economy in 
the catchment and by describing the process of institutional transition in the 
management of water resources in the catchment. Much of the material gained is in the 
form of pointers drawn from rural and urban cases that may not apply to other areas in 
the catchment but which certainly apply to key areas in terms of water management, i.e. 
Hartbeespoort and the Johannesburg area. While the central goals of the 1998 Water Act 
may not have been achieved yet, it is my hope that through this analysis I have cast light 
on a number of the major issues that require resolution in order for the process to make 
effective progress. Tsamaea lo e patela sa bophelo13!   
                                                 
13  Go and attack / clear up the future. 
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Nederlandse samenvatting  
 
In het onderzoek dat aan dit boek ten grondslag ligt stelde ik mijzelf ten doel de respons 
van organisaties op toenemende waterschaarste te verkennen in het stroomgebied van de 
Krokodilrivier in Zuid Afrika in de periode tussen 1994 en 2004. Deze taak werd om 
een tweetal redenen ondernomen. Ten eerste was dit om een theoretisch raamwerk te 
genereren dat in algemene zin bruikbaar zou zijn bij het analyseren van de responsen 
van organisaties op waterschaarste, omdat het onderwerp waterschaarste een relatief 
nieuw werkveld was die tot dan toe slechts in beperkte mate gekenmerkt werd door de 
toepassing van theoretische kaders. Anderzijds streefde ik ernaar om een aantal 
realistische beleidsopties te genereren voor efficiënt, duurzaam en op rechtvaardige 
verdeling gebaseerdwater gebruik in het stroomgebied van de Krokodilrivier14.  
Aanleiding tot het onderzoek was het feit dat in de vroege jaren ‘ 90 het onderwerp 
van waterschaarste weliswaar op grote schaal was doorgedrongen tot het internationale 
debat, maar het publieke debat eenzijdig en vlak van karakter was. Deze eenzijdigheid, 
zo luidde mijn argument, kwam voort uit het feit dat het discours zich vooral richtte op 
waterschaarste als empirisch probleem. De stroom van destijds verschijnende 
publicaties over waterschaarste, met dramatische titels zoals ‘The Dammed’, ‘ The Last 
Oasis’ of ‘ Water in Crisis’ hielpen zeker om de publieke aandacht te vestigen op het 
onderwerp, maar zij deden weinig om de onderliggende oorzaken van waterschaarste te 
ontleden of om mogelijke beleidsoplossingen te identificeren. Vele van dergelijke 
publicaties zetten arsenalen van kwantitatieve gegevens in ter ondersteuning van het 
argument dat waterschaarste een nog niet erkend en groeiend probleem was.  
Er ontstond een roep om de invoering van ‘integraal waterbeheer’, gekoppeld aan 
toegenomen ‘waterzekerheid’, maar de precieze betekenis van deze termen in de context 
van een analyse van waterschaarste moest nog uitgewerkt worden. Dit was voor mij 
aanleiding om onderzoek te doen naar de respons van organisaties op waterschaarste in 
een concrete omgeving. Met het onderzoek hoopte ik licht te kunnen werpen op de 
manieren waarop organisaties op verschillende niveaus dit probleem in de eigen 
operationele context het hoofd probeerden te bieden.  
 Het vertrekpunt van deze verkenning was de roep door milieuorganisaties, academici 
en ambtenaren om een volledige transformatie van bestaande organisaties voor 
waterbeheer. De toenemende mondiale vraag naar water en het beperkte en geografisch 
geconcentreerde aanbod daarvan impliceert de toename van de mondiale concurrentie 
om toegang tot deze hulpbron. Water wordt in snel tempo een schaarse hulpbron, en is 
onderhevig aan concurrerende aanspraken dan wel manifeste conflicten over 
toegangsrechten. De watercrisis in het Midden Oosten, bijvoorbeeld, is prominent en 
urgent en deze manifesteert zich onder andere in internationale conflicten in de 
opvangbekkens van de Jordaan, de Eufraat en de Nijl. Echter, de crisis is niet beperkt tot 
het Midden Oosten, en het is ook niet beperkt tot conflicten die over landsgrenzen heen 
grijoen. Elk land heeft te maken met een terugloop in de kwantiteit en kwaliteit van haar 
zoetwatervoorraad. In elk stroomgebied maken belanghebbenden tegenstrijdige en 
                                                 
14 Hiermee bedoel ik de Engelse term ‘equity’ of ‘ equitable’; 
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elkaar concurrerende aanspraken op de bestaande waterbronnen. Dit kan leiden tot  
latente en soms tot manifeste conflicten. De organisaties die traditioneel belast zijn met 
het beheer van het water zijn van oorsprong niet ingesteld op de toegenomen druk die 
voortvloeit uit het verdelen van water over concurrerende partijen, het financieren van 
alsmaar stijgende leveringskosten, het hoofd bieden aan de uitdaging van vervuiling of 
de noodzaak om water te blijven leveren aan een alsmaar aanwassende bevolking. Om 
deze redenen leidt waterschaarste, daar waar het een bepaald niveau van urgentie heeft 
bereikt, tot de roep om een herinrichting en/of transformatie van de bestaande 
organisaties voor waterbeheer. Gezien de grote schaal waarop het probleem zich 
voordoet, is het van belang om recente ervaringen uit concrete cases te documenteren en 
evalueren.  
 Vanaf 1992 staat internationaal een grondige herinrichting van waterbeheer op de 
agenda. Dit begon met de oproep om een overgang tot integraal waterbeheer tijdens een 
internationale conferentie over water en het milieu in Dublin in juni van dat jaar. De 
zogeheten Dublin conferentie legde het fundament voor hoofdstuk 18 van Agenda 21 
van UNCED later in hetzelfde jaar, waardoor de invoering van integraal en participatief 
waterbeheer tot de basis van internationale milieuafspraken ging behoren. Vanaf 1992 
groeide de erkenning dat gangbare systemen van waterbeheer vernieuwd moesten 
worden omdat de ingezette koers van centralistische en technocratische interventie in 
een steeds groter wordend bestand aan infrastructurele werken noch ecologisch, noch 
sociaal te handhaven was. Hiermee groeide ook de erkenning dat dit nieuwe beleid om 
niets minder vroeg dan een revolutie binnen de organisaties voor waterbeheer ten 
aanzien van het waarborgen van waterzekerheid en het beheren van conflicten. Bij de 
opening van het Derde Wereld Water Forum in Kyoto in 2003 riep toenmalig VN 
Secretaris Generaal Kofi Annan op tot een ‘blauwe revolutie’ om conflicten over water 
te voorkomen. Met de oprichting van het World Water Forum in 1996 stond 
waterschaarste stevig op de internationale agenda en konden vier wereld water forums 
worden georganiseerd in achtereenvolgens Marrakech (1997), Den Haag (2000), Kyoto 
(2003) en Mexico Stad (2006). Als gevolg van deze forums nam het concept van 
waterzekerheid in kracht toe, evenals de daaraan verbonden criteria van gelijkheid en 
duurzaamheid. Deze concepten vormden samen de hoekstenen van het concept van de 
‘blauwe revolutie’.  
 Vanaf 1993 begon de Wereldbank door middel van haar publicaties ook aandacht te 
schenken aan het onderwerp van waterschaarste, vanaf 1995 werd waterschaarste een 
vast onderdeel van de World Development Reports van deze organisatie, en in 2000 
werd de bijeenkomst van de World Water Forum in zijn geheel gewijd aan 
waterschaarste en waterzekerheid.  
 Het was tegen de achtergrond van deze ontwikkelingen dat ik in 1995 een voorstel 
inleverde bij de vakgroep Ontwikkelingsstudies van de (toenmalige) Katholieke 
Universiteit Nijmegen voor onderzoek dat aan de basis ligt van dit werk. Mijn argument 
was, dat het zowel academisch als beleidsmatig van belang was dat er exploratief 
onderzoek uitgevoerd zou worden in die gebieden waar concurrerende aanspraken op 
een beperkte hulpbron worden gemaakt. Het was tevens belangrijk om onderzoek uit te 
voeren, dat de praktijk van ‘schaarste’, ‘integratie’, ‘participatie’, 
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‘efficiëntie‘,’gelijkheid’ en ‘duurzaamheid’ in een concrete setting kon uiteenzetten. 
Dergelijk onderzoek zou diepere betekenis kunnen geven aan debatten over het respons 
van organisaties op waterschaarste. Ook zou het aanwijzingen kunnen geven ten aanzien 
van de mogelijkheden en beperkingen van de uitvoering van de ‘blauwe revolutie’ in 
een concrete setting. Voor de deskundigen op het gebied van waterbeheer kon het nuttig 
zijn om zowel maatschappelijke concurrentie rondom toegang tot water als de daaruit 
voortvloeiende institutionele respons in kaart te brengen om het potentieel van 
duurzaam watergebruik in te schatten. Bovendien moest er nog veel werk verricht 
worden om perspectieven te ontwikkelen die ons begrip van de onderliggende 
structuren van strijd om water en verschuivingen in de verdeling van water in de 
maatschappij bevorderen.  
 De standaard case studie leek de meest toepasselijke methode om licht te werpen op 
het complex van reacties op schaarste binnen organisaties. De methode van de case 
studie is goed toegerust om sociale processen in hun volle complexiteit te bestuderen. 
De data worden verzameld met een minimum aan abstrahering, vereenvoudiging of 
stereotypering. Tegelijkertijd wordt ernaar gestreefd de relevante factoren te bestuderen 
zonder dat men hun onderliggende relaties verstoort. Het doel is om licht te werpen op 
de factoren die het fenomeen veroorzaken binnen de context van de casus. Zo kan het 
etiket van de ‘blauwe revolutie’ doorgelicht worden met behulp van zijn centrale 
concepten zoals ‘schaarste’, ‘institutionele verandering’, ‘integratie’, ‘participatie’, 
‘efficiëntie’, ‘gelijkheid’ en ‘duurzaamheid’. Hierdoor wordt duidelijk hoe deze 
concepten ingebed zijn in een bestaand organisatorisch project dat op zijn beurt ingebed 
is in de bredere dynamiek van de omliggende maatschappij. Verder leek het, omdat 
institutionele verandering aan de basis ligt van ‘institutionele respons op 
waterschaarste’, evident dat de analyse gebaseerd zou moeten worden op een 
longitudinale studie.  
 Gegeven deze taak deed de meer praktische vraag zich voor waar een casus 
gevonden zou kunnen worden van institutionele transformatie in de richting die 
vormgegeven werd door het gedachtegoed van de ‘blauwe revolutie’. Met andere 
woorden, het zoeken was naar een casus waarin als gevolg van toenemende 
waterschaarste de overstap werd gemaakt naar integraal waterbeheer met als 
onderliggende doelen grotere efficiëntie, duurzaamheid en gelijkheid in het 
watergebruik. Zuid Afrika, die haar democratische periode in 1994 inging, beoogde 
precies een dergelijke overgang in het kielzog van haar bredere sociale en politieke 
transitie. Ook maakte Zuid Afrika in dezelfde periode eende overgang mee van 
‘reguliere’ naar ‘chronische’ waterschaarste. In de periode dat waterschaarste doorbrak 
als aandachtsgebied voor internationale instellingen en binnen de milieuwetenschappen, 
streefde Zuid Afrika een overgang na naar universele toegang tot drinkwater en de 
invoering van integraal waterbeheer. Het waterbeleid richtte zich op de omschakeling 
van een technocentrisch naar een participatief programma gericht op grotere efficiëntie 
in het gebruik van water, op de herverdeling van toegang tot water door de invoering 
van een vergunningenstelsel, het in de grondwet vastgelegde recht op drinkwater, en op 
duurzaamheid door elementen zoals de zgn. ‘Environmental Reserve’. Het lag voor de 
hand binnen Zuid Afrika te zoeken naar een casus van deze blauwe revolutie. 
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 Binnen Zuid Afrika heb ik gekozen mijn onderzoek uit te voeren in het stroomgebied 
van de Krokodilrivier, dat in noord-westelijke richting stroomt vanaf Johannesburg tot 
de samenloop met de Limpopo aan de grens met Botswana. Dit stroomgebied 
vertegenwoordigt een aantal elementen welke kenmerkend zijn voor Zuid Afrikaans 
waterbeheer – lokale bronnen worden op of tegen de maximumcapaciteit benut, het is 
een stroomgebied met geografisch geconcentreerde vraag naar water is, er zijn blanke 
agrarische gebieden die historisch gepriviligeerde toegang tot water hebben genoten, en 
er zijn uitgestrekte dorre gebieden met een hoge concentratie van armoede en slechte 
toegang tot water.  
 Het stroomgebied van de Krokodilrivier werd beschouwd in dynamische relatie tot 
organisatieprocessen die zich zowel op het nationale vlak als op het lokale vlak afspelen. 
De organisatieprocessen op het niveau van het stroomgebied worden beïnvloed door 
zowel veranderingen op nationaal niveau als door veranderingen op het niveau van de 
individuele watergebruikers in het stroomgebied. Het eerste doel dat in het onderzoek 
gesteld werd was om een raamwerk te genereren voor het analyseren van institutionele 
respons op waterschaarste. De eerste stap hiervoor, zo stelde ik, was om te onderkennen 
dat het project van de transformatie van instellingen voor waterbeheer zowel beïnvloed 
wordt door veranderingen in de maatschappij als geheel als op zijn beurt invloed 
uitoefent op die maatschappij. Om institutionele verandering te analyseren werd 
gekozen voor de theoretische insteek van Anthony Giddens, waarbij instituties worden 
gedefinieerd als chronisch herhaalde sociale interacties, die op hun beurt betrekking 
hebben op het geven van betekenis en op de verdeling van hulpbronnen. Hierin wordt 
de staat gezien als het centrale referentiepunt voor de strategische manipulatie van 
hulpbronnen door actoren in de transformatie of reproductie van asymmetrie in de 
toegang tot water. Vervolgens werd dit gekoppeld aan een zesdelig model van 
waterschaarste. Ik stelde dat een brede analyse van waterschaarste gebaseerd zou 
moeten worden op drie aspecten van schaarste, namelijk schaarste die wordt 
veroorzaakt door factoren op het gebied van achtereenvolgens aanbod, vraag en 
verdeling. Deze drie aspecten van schaarste zouden vanuit drie invalshoeken bekeken 
moeten worden, namelijk vanuit het perspectief van achtereenvolgens de staat van de 
gebruikte technologie, de aard van de instellingen onder welke waterbeheer valt, en de 
staat van de hulpbron zoals gegeven door de natuur op een bepaalde locatie en tijd. 
 De geschiedenis van het stroomgebied van de Krokodilrivier laat inderdaad zien dat 
waterschaarste gedreven werd door factoren op het gebied van het aanbod van water, de 
vraag naar water, en de verdeling van het water. Zowel de gouddelvers in Johannesburg 
als de boeren langs de Krokodilrivier beleefden in het begin van de twintigste eeuw 
chronische schaarste, en beide groepen actoren zetten privé -hulpbronnen in om de 
toegang tot deze hulpbron te verzekeren. Echter, vanwege de hoge kosten van het 
ontwikkelen van infrastructuur voor de levering van water en het grillige 
regenvalpatroon, kon waterschaarste slechts het hoofd worden geboden met behulp van 
staatsinterventie, wat pas na de vorming van de Unie van Zuid Afrika in 1910 mogelijk 
werd. De infrastructuur voor de levering van water werd in snel tempo uitgebreid, maar 
door de exponentiele groei in de vraag naar water dreigde in de honderd jaar daarna 
continu een terugkeer naar schaarste. Voor de niet-blanke bevolking van Zuid Afrika 
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bleef schaarste een feit: in stedelijke gebieden werden zij gedwongen zich te vestigen in 
gebieden als de South Western Township (Soweto) en Lenasia, waar de kwaliteit van de 
geleverde diensten erg laag was. Pas toen er in het begin van de negentiende eeuw in 
Lenasia cholera uitbrak werd er aanleiding gezien ook in deze gebieden een 
rudimentaire dienstverlening op te bouwen. Op het platteland werd in de omgeving van 
Hartbeespoort vanaf het einde van de negentiende eeuw de zwarte bevolking onteigend 
en ofwel gedwongen verhuisd naar droge en onvruchtbare thuislanden, ofwel aan het 
werk gezet als arbeider op land dat ingenomen was door blanke boeren, Op deze manier 
ontstond er een etnisch gedefinieerde verdeling van waterschaarste in het opvangbekken.  
 Deze aspecten van schaarste – aanbod, vraag en verdeling – krijgen een diepere 
betekenis als zij geïnterpreteerd worden vanuit drie invalshoeken, namelijk technologie, 
organisaties en natuurlijke beschikbaarheid. De geschiedenis van het opvangbekken laat 
zien dat de natuurlijke beschikbaarheid (dat wil zeggen de schaarste) van water een 
reeks sociale problemen genereerde zoals het tekort aan drinkwater in de vroege jaren 
van de ontwikkeling van Johannesburg en het tekort aan irrigatiewater voor de 
ontwikkeling van landbouw rondom Hartbeespoort. Dit leidde zowel tot de groei van 
organisaties ten behoeve van samenwerking tussen boeren bij het graven van 
irrigatievoren in Hartbeespoort als tot de opkomst van waterbedrijven in Johannesburg. 
In Johannesburg leidde de concurrentie rondom toegang tot water uiteindelijk tot de 
vorming van Rand Water Board en de opheffing van deze bedrijven. In Hartbeespoort 
leidde staatsinterventie ten behoeve van de ontwikkeling van geïrrigeerde landbouw tot 
de ontwikkeling van de ‘Hartbeespoort Staatswaterskema’ voor de vestiging van arme 
blanken. Staatsinterventie leidde ook tot de ontwikkeling van de watertoevoer naar de 
Witwatersrand door water te importeren van de Vaal rivier. De uitvoering van dit laatste 
plan gaf Rand Water toegang tot een grote hoeveelheid water, op basis waarvan deze 
organisatie zich kon ontwikkelen tot de grote speler die het tegenwoordig in de Zuid-
Afrikaanse watersector is.  
 Deze interventies rustten op technologische keuzes die gemaakt werden in de eerste 
drie decennia van de twintigste eeuw: Johannesburg begon water te importeren vanuit 
de Vaal barrage en uitvoering werd gegeven aan de plannen voor een dam bij 
Hartbeespoort ten behoeve van irrigatie. Deze interventies maakten zowel de groei van 
het stedelijke gebied langs de Witwatersrand als de groei van geïrrigeerde landbouw 
onder Hartbeespoort mogelijk. Zij stimuleerden de bloei van organisaties voor 
waterbeheer zoals de Hartbeespoort Government Irrigation Scheme en de Dienst: Water 
van de gemeente Johannesburg. Deze organisaties gaven ruimtelijke invulling aan het 
aanbod van water en lagen ten grondslag aan het ontwerp van de stad onder apartheid en  
aan de voorziening van gesubsidieerd irrigatiewater voor blanke boeren. De crisis van 
schaarste onder de ongewenste delen van de zwarte bevolking in Bophutatswana of in 
de satelliet -‘townships’ die rondom de grote steden werden aangelegd bleef relatief 
onveranderd, hoewel de stedelijke zwarte bevolking kon rekenen op betere 
dienstverlkening dan de landelijke zwarte bevolking. De grenzen van Bophutatswana 
liepen om de belangrijkste waterbronnen heen getekend, zodat de Krokodilrivier en haar 
vruchtbare oevers het thuisland met een strook van 40km breed doorklieft.  
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 Over het algemeen geldt voor het stroomgebied dat locale waterbronnen zoals 
bronnen, stromen en grondwater het eerst worden ontwikkeld als respons op de vraag 
naar water. Toen de vraag naar water groter dreigde te worden dan dit aanbod, werden 
dammen gebouwd op geschikte locaties binnen het stroomgebied, een ontwikkeling die 
mogelijk werd gemaakt door de vorming van het Departement voor Irrigatie in 1912. In 
het geval van Johannesburg hoorde bij deze tweede fase meteen de import van water uit 
een ander stroomgebied. Deze lokale dammen maakten economische groei mogelijk 
totdat zij op hun beurt niet meer toereikend waren voor de regionale vraag. Toen dit 
punt bereikt werd, werden een aantal dammen met elkaar verbonden door middel van 
zowel kanalen als door de natuurlijke stroming van de Krokodilrivier. Ook werd de 
muur van de Hartbeespoort dam, tevens de belangrijkste dam binnen het stroomgebied, 
verhoogd om zijn retentiecapaciteit te verhogen. Door de jaren heen groeide de import 
van water uit andere stroomgebieden. Dit proces begon met de vervanging van de Vaal 
barrage door de Vaal dam en reikte steeds verder het binnenland in totdat er uit de 
buurlanden Lesotho en Swaziland in het oosten over een afstand van meer dan 400 km 
water geïmporteerd begon te worden. Op deze manier werd de Krokodilrivier 
opgenomen in een netwerk van watervoorziening dat water van het vochtigere 
oostelijke gedeelte van het land onttrok ten behoeve van economische ontwikkeling in 
het drogere binnenland. Na verloop van tijd verouderde de infrastructuur die in de eerste 
decennia van de twintigste eeuw was gebouwd. Zowel de ouderdom van de fysieke 
structuren als de exponentieel groeiende vraag naar water noopte tot een continue reeks 
extra investeringen in de bestaande infrastructuur. Na 1930 werden er nog veertien 
dammen gebouwd in het stroomgebied, de top van de Hartbeespoort dam werd 
verhoogd, Rand Water Board pompte steeds meer water over de waterscheiding heen en 
de aarden irrigatiekanalen in Hartbeespoort werden gevoerd met beton.  
 Echter, de gemeente Johannesburg kon het onderhoud van het alsmaar uitdijende 
waternetwerk niet bijhouden, en het behield daardoor een watervoorzieningsnetwerk dat 
op zeer oude fundamenten rustte. In 1994, toen de politieke transitie begon, verloor de 
stad ongeveer 30% van zijn jaarlijks ingekochte water. Ondanks de onmenselijke, 
autocratische maatregelen die onder apartheid werden afgekondigd om de stroom 
migranten naar de stad tegen te houden zette de intocht zich voort. Migranten vestigden 
zich vaak noodgedwongen op plekken waar geen gemeentelijke diensten aanwezig 
waren, waardoor sloppenwijken begonnen te ontstaan met de gebruikelijke daaraan 
gekoppelde gezondheidsrisico’s. Ongelukken met mijnafwatering leidden regelmatig tot 
de vervuiling van rivieren en stromen door zware metalen, en de verouderde 
zuiveringsinstallaties konden het niveau van vervuiling nauwelijks bijhouden. De 
Hartbeespoort dam werd een verzamelpunt voor afval afkomstig van hoger gelegen 
delen van het stroomgebied en veroorzaakte problemen voor stroomafwaarts gelegen 
afnemers van water zoals de gemeente Madibeng. Irrigatie stroomafwaarts van 
Hartbeespoort leed onder de veroudering van infrastructuur, met waterverlies tot 45% 
van het aangevoerde volume. Op nationaal niveau werd het stroomgebied een onderdeel 
van een nationaal systeem van watervoorziening dat voorzag in de waterbehoefte van 
Zuid Afrika’s industrieel centrum langs de Witwatersrand. Binnen het stroomgebied 
kon de economie groeien als gevolg van de import van water, en het water dat na 
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gebruik in Johannesburg naar het noorden stroomde creëerde mogelijkheden voor de 
uitbreiding van irrigatie op het platteland en de groei van nieuwe mijnsteden zoals Brits 
en Rustenburg. Samenvattend laat de geschiedenis van waterschaarste in het 
stroomgebied cyclussen zien van schaarste gevolgd door technologische interventie en 
vervolgens tot de groei van watergerelateerde organisaties. 
 Het tweede doel van dit proefschrift was om een aantal realistische beleidsopties te 
genereren voor een efficiënt, duurzaam en op sociale gelijkheid berustend beheer van 
het stroomgebied van de Krokodilrivier. Voor het behalen van deze doelstelling werden 
gegevens verzameld gericht op de beantwoording van de centrale vraag van dit 
onderzoek, namelijk ‘wat is de respons van organisaties op waterschaarste in het 
stroomgebied van de Krokodilrivier in Zuid Afrika?’ Deze centrale vraag werd 
uitgewerkt in vijf subvragen die betrekking hadden op achtereenvolgens de geschiedenis 
van het waterbeheer, de materiele/fysieke aspecten van het waterbeheer, de formele 
wetten en regels die controle over water vastleggen en verdelen, de economie van het 
watergebruik en het proces van organisatie verandering. Deze elementen werden 
ingevoerd in een hoofdstukkenindeling die ‘afdaalt’ van het mondiale niveau naar het 
nationale niveau, van het nationale niveau naar het niveau van het stroomgebied, en van 
het niveau van het stroomgebied naar de ontwikkelingen in geselecteerde landelijke en 
stedelijke gebieden. 
In hoofdstuk drie beschrijf ik de mondiale ontwikkeling van waterschaarste. In dit 
hoofdstuk beschrijf ik een exponentiele toename in zowel de mondiale vraag naar water 
als in de technische ingrepen in de natuur ten behoeve van de aanvoer van water naar 
door de mens geschapen afnamepunten. Deze fase, die in tijd ongeveer overeenkomt 
met de vorige eeuw, noem ik de ‘supply orientation’. Zij wordt gekenmerkt door een 
onkritische, technocratische respons op de alsmaar toenemende vraag. In de eerste 
wereld werden deze infrastructurele werken gefinancierd door de staat en in armere 
landen veelal door internationale financiële instellingen zoals de Wereldbank. De 
expansie werd onder andere gekenmerkt door een gestage groei in het gebruik van zoet 
water en een toenemende diversiteit in de vraag naar water in de wereldeconomie. Aan 
het eind van de twintigste eeuw leidden de snel dalende beschikbare hoeveelheid 
zoetwater en de snel toemende sociale en milieurisico’s van nieuwe projecten tot drie 
belangrijke typen institutioneel respons. Deze zijn achtereenvolgens integraal 
waterbeheer, ‘water demand management’, en ‘rainwater harvesting’.  
Ook in Zuid Afrika, waar tegen het eind van de vorige eeuw twaalf van de negentien 
stroomgebieden te maken kregen met een vraag naar water die hoger was dan het 
beschikbare aanbod, deden deze institutionele ontwikkelingen zich voor. De Nationale 
Waterwet uit 1998 nationaliseerde water en voorzag in de invoering van integraal 
waterbeheer. De Water Diensten Wet uit 1997 bood een institutioneel raamwerk voor de 
leverantie van drinkwater aan de twaalf miljoen Zuid Afrikanen die nog geen toegang 
hadden tot deze hulpbron. In 1998 werd een directoraat binnen het ministerie opgericht 
die zich zou richten op het beheer van water consumptie.  
In hoofdstuk vier worden de institutionele veranderingen op het gebied van 
waterbeheer op nationaal niveau geplaatst tegen de achtergrond van zowel de evolutie 
van waterwetgeving in Zuid Afrika als de nationale transitie naar democratie. De 
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evolutie in waterwetgeving laat een geleidelijke toename zien in de invloed van de staat 
op waterbeheer over een periode van meer dan 300 jaar. Deze historische trend staat 
haaks op de recente tendens tot ‘privatisering’ van het stedelijke waterbeheer, en biedt 
juist hoop voor het idee van participatieve vormen van integraal waterbeheer dat met de 
Water Wet uit 1998 is gelanceerd. Het verhaal van de nationale transitie laat zien hoe 
het project van de blauwe revolutie in Zuid Afrika beïnvloed werd door de complexe 
institutionele veranderingen van en institutionele relaties tussen diverse ministeries. 
Vooral laat het zien hoe de natuur, dat van zichzelf een integraal systeem is, zich 
moeilijk laat inpassen in een in functionele verantwoordelijkheden opgedeelde 
bureaucratie. Het slachtoffer hiervan was uiteindelijk het idee van integraal beheer van 
de stroomgebieden, dat plaats moest maken voor het veel beperktere integraal 
waterbeheer.  
In hoofdstuk vijf werd de aandacht gericht op de respons van organisaties op water 
schaarste op het niveau van het stroomgebied. Het hoofdstuk beschrijft vijf fasen in de 
opbouw van waterschaarste. De eerste hiervan is het rechtstreeks gebruiken van water 
bij de natuurlijke natuurlijke bron. De tweede is het intervenieren in deze lokale 
bronnen ten behoeve van verhoogde lokale consumptie. De derde is de ontwikkeling 
van dammen op locaties met veel potentieel binnen het stroomgebied. De vierde is het 
optimaliseren van alle waterbronnen in het stroomgebied door lokale bronnen aan elkaar 
te koppelen in een regionaal systeem. Tenslotte is de vijfde fase het importeren van 
water uit andere stroomgebieden.  
In het stroomgebied van de Krokodilrivier werd de invoering van efficiënt, duurzaam 
en op sociale gelijkheid berustende integraal waterbeheer door een aantal factoren 
bemoeilijkt. Ten eerste werd het aan centralistische, non-participatieve nationale 
instituties voor waterbeheer overgelaten om decentrale, participatieve instituties te 
creëren op het niveau van de stroomgebieden. Ten tweede bood het beleid onvoldoende 
duidelijkheid ten aanzien van de rolverdeling tussen de staat en de burgersamenleving in 
het beheer van de stroomgebieden. Dit wordt gesymboliseerd door de in het begin van 
het beleidsproces bediscussieerde vraag of het zou moeten gaan om ‘Catchment 
Management Agencies’ of ‘Catchment Management Authorities’. Ten derde had de 
Water Wet uit 1998 in brede zin gesteld dat bij de verdeling van water sociale gelijkheid 
voorop gesteld moest worden, maar de wet bood geen vaste ankerpunten in de zin van 
een recht water voor productieve doeleinden. Alleen op het gebied van drinkwater 
werden dergelijke garanties geboden. Ten vierde werd sociale gelijkheid in de toegang 
tot water naar de toekomst verschoven door het recht om waterlicenties uit te geven toe 
te kennen aan zgn. ‘Catchment Management Agencies’ die nog niet opgericht waren. 
Ten slotte ontbrak er enige duidelijkheid ten aanzien van het in institutionele niveau 
tussen het lokale niveau (irrigatiewerken, steden) en dat van het stroomgebied in. 
In hoofdstuk zes werd de aandacht gericht op lokale institutionele veranderingen in 
landelijke gebieden door in te zoemen op de ontwikkelingen in het gebied rond 
Hartbeespoort. Hier bevindt zich de grootste dam in het stroomgebied, en Hartbeespoort 
speelt dan ook een sleutelrol in het beheer van het water van de Krokodilrivier. 
Institutionele veranderingen die plaatsvonden tussen 1994 en 2004 hadden hun wortels 
in de historische ontwikkeling van waterbronnen in het gebied. Over een periode van 
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honderd jaar spoelden drie golven van kolonisatie over het gebied heen, als gevolg 
waarvan de Po, die de oorspronkelijke controle over het gebied hadden, gereduceerd 
werden tot landarbeiders op land dat in beslag was genomen door Boeren en die allebei 
onder het gezag vielen van een door Britten gedomineerde administratie in Pretoria.  
 ‘Overtollige’ zwarten werden gedwongen te verhuizen naar het thuisland 
Bophutatswana, terwijl arme blanken gestimuleerd werden zich te vestigen op het 
Hartbeespoort Government Water Scheme en voorzien werden van subsidies in de 
toegang tot water. Op deze manier werd een etnisch bepaalde en zeer scheve verdeling 
in de toegang tot water ingebouwd in de demografie van het stroomgebied, een 
ontwikkeling dat zich tot 1994 voortzette. De ontwikkeling van geïrrigeerde landbouw 
in de bovenloop van de Krokodlrivier bereikte een plafond in de jaren twintig van de 
vorige eeuw, maar door de toename van de import van water uit andere stroomgebieden 
werd economische groei en diversificering van het gebruik van water mogelijk gemaakt 
in een gebied waarin de industrialisering van Zuid Afrika zich voltrok. Deze 
industrialisering vond voornamelijk plaats in de bovenloop van de Krokodilrivier, 
waardoor gebieden stroomafwaarts van Hartbeespoort in toenemende mate te maken 
kregen met achteruitgang in de kwaliteit van het in Hartbespoort dam opgeslagen water. 
De vervuiling van de Krokodilrivier, de scheve verdeling in de toegang tot het water in 
het stroomgebied en de inefficiëntie van het gebruik van het water in sterk verouderde 
irrigatiewerken hadden tijdens de politieke transitie op organisatieniveau een aantal 
gevolgen rondom Hartbeespoort. De eerste hiervan was de vrijwillige vorming van een 
zgn. Water User Association, de Hartbeespoort Water Action Group, om de 
achteruitgang in de kwaliteit van het rivierwater te agenderen. De tweede was de 
gedwongen transformatie van de Hartbeespoort Government Water Scheme en haar 
onsuccesvolle pogingen om een Water User Association te vormen. De derde waren de 
claims op het water van de Krokodilrivier die geplaatst werden door de nieuw gevormde 
en democratisch gekozen gemeente Madibeng om de onder haar verantwoordelijkheid 
vallende bevolking te kunnen voorzien van toegang tot drinkwater. Uit de eerste twee 
voorbeelden blijkt een reeks beperkingen te bestaan rondom het vormen van lokale 
‘Water User Associations’ die terug te voeren zijn tot o.a. geldgebrek, verwarring 
rondom het concept ‘participatie’ binnen het ministerie van water zaken, en het plaatsen 
van ‘participatie’ vóór het toekennen van rechten in toegang tot productief water. Deze 
omstandigheden leiden er onder anderen toe dat een organisatie die verantwoordelijk is 
voor meer dan twee derde van het watergebruik in Hartbeespoort dam, nog niet veel 
heeft bereikt op het gebied van toegenomen efficiëntie of de toegang van zwarte boeren 
tot land en water.  
 In hoofdstuk zeve werd de aandacht gericht op de stedelijke omgeving binnen het 
stroomgebied, waarbij gekeken werd naar de veranderingen in waterbeheer in 
Johannesburg.  
Ten eerste werd beargumenteerd dat de veranderingen op organisatieniveau als 
gevolg van waterschaarste in Johannesburg ingebed zijn in een bredere verzameling 
politieke en institutionele veranderingen betreffende de gemeentelijke financiën, de 
fusie van tijdens apartheid gescheiden administratieve eenheden, de scheiding tussen 
bestuur en de levering van diensten, en de algemene hubris van de transitie.  
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Ten tweede werd gesteld dat de huidige transitie in waterbeheer sterke wortels had in 
het verleden, zoals onder andere de fusie van private waterbedrijven leidend tot de 
vorming van het publieke lichaam van Rand Water Board, evenals de ontwikkeling van 
grote en verwaarloosde townships voor de niet-blanke bevolking op grote afstand van 
het stadscentrum en de fragmentatie van de stad in elf verschillende administratieve 
eenheden.  
Ten derde werd gesteld dat de transformatie van het systeem van waterbeheer in 
Johannesburg plaatsvond op het moment dat er een mondiale tendens was tot de 
‘globalisering’ van lokaal bestuur door middel van de uitbesteding van dienstenlevering.  
De omwenteling van het systeem van waterbeheer in Johannesburg werd ingezet door 
een financiële crisis binnen de gemeente die in 1997 zijn hoogtepunt bereikte. Deze 
crisis leidde tot de vorming van een reeks dienstverlenende eenheden die op 
verschillende niveaus van onafhankelijkheid van het stadsbestuur zouden gaan 
functioneren. Uiteindelijk werd in 2000 Johannesburg Water gevormd, een 
dienstverlenende instantie die onder de leiding stond van een privaat consortium. De 
taak van dit consortium was om het verlies aan water, dat op ongeveer 30% van de 
totale consumptie stond, terug te dringen en tevens toegang tot drinkwater en sanitatie te 
verlenen voor dat deel van de stadsbevolking dat nog geen toegang had kunnen genieten, 
of dat slechts toegang had tot een slecht functionerend en onbetrouwbare dienst. Het 
verlenen van een contract aan een privaat consortium creëerde veel onrust in 
Johannesburg, en vooral de vakbonden en de Zuidafrikaanse Communistische Partij 
verzetten zich tegen de voorgenomen ‘privatisering’ van delen van de gemeente.  
 Op het gebied van sociale gelijkheid in de toegang tot water was Johannesburg Water 
gehouden aan de contractuele verplichting om universele toegang tot drinkwater binnen 
de stadsgrenzen te bereiken in overeenstemming met het recht op water dat vastgelegd 
werd in de grondwet. Op het gebied van efficiëntie werd verwacht dat de vermindering 
van de hoeveelheid verloren water in de stad aan het eind van elk jaar grote winsten zou 
opleveren voor de gemeente, die alle aandelen bezit van Johannesburg Water. Op het 
gebied van duurzaamheid werd verwacht dat Johannesburg Water verspilling zou 
tegengaan door te investeren in verbetering vanm de sterk verouderde infrastructuur van 
de stad.  
 Het behalen van deze doelstellingen werd op een aantal fronten echter bemoeilijkt. 
Allereerst moest de gemeente enerzijds de controle over waterzaken prijsgeven en 
anderzijds deze controle verscherpen. Uiteindelijk werd een nieuwe eenheid gecreëerd, 
de Contract Management Unit (CMU), die alle contracten van de gemeente moest 
overzien. Deze CMU had slechts 4 stafleden, beheerde taken die samen 70% van het 
voormalige budget van de stad bedroegen, en kon uiteindelijk de eerste 18 maanden 
haar controlerende taken ten aanzien van Johannesburg Water niet uitvoeren. Wat 
bedoeld was als een systeem dat efficiëntie zou bevorderen, creëerde in de periode 
tussen 1994 en 2004 slechts overbelasting van de administratie en de vorming van 
nieuwe administratieve eenheden.  
 Ten tweede ontstond er een obstakel in de vorm van financiële controle. Terwijl de 
vorming van Johannesburg Water mede bedoeld was als middel om financieel 
onafhankelijke dienstverlenende eenheden te creëren, zou dit het effect hebben gehad de 
 362
stad van een van zijn belangrijkste bronnen van inkomsten te hebben afgesneden. Na de 
overdracht van slechts 3% van alle waterrekeningen van de gemeente naar 
Johannesburg Water werd het proces stilgezet en behield de stad door middel van de 
zgn. Shared Services Centre zelf de controle over de waterrrekeningen. Terwijl in de 
aanloop naar de vorming van Johannesburg Water efficiëntie werd gebruikt als 
argument om Johannesburg Water te creëren, werd nu hetzelfde argument gebruikt om 
haar vrijheid in te perken. Johannesburg Water schat in dat zij door de invoering van 
efficiëntie-maatregelen jaarlijks ongeveer R 320 miljoen zou kunnen besparen. Dit zou 
een investering vergen van ongeveer R 220 miljoen per jaar waarvan ongeveer de helft 
zou worden gestoken in het verlenen van nieuwe diensten en het vernieuwen van oude 
infrastructuur. Echter, zonder de inkomsten van waterrekeningen, zo stelt Johannesburg 
Water, kan dit onmogelijk bereikt worden.  
Op het gebied van sociale gelijkheid in de toegang tot water begon Johannesburg al 
vanuit een gunstige startpositie in die zin dat in 1994, 99% van de bevolking toegang 
had tot veilig drinkwater. De grootste investeringen op dit gebied vielen uiteen in het 
verbeteren van bestaande diensten in de zwarte woonwijken, het onderhoud van 
bestaande systemen (een onderdeel dat onder apartheid zwaar te lijden had) en het per 
tanker leveren van drinkwater aan de diverse sloppenwijken. Soweto vormde een sleutel 
tot de problemen van Johannesburg Water in die zin dat het 30% van de consumptie van 
de stad vertegenwoordigt en verantwoordelijk was voor 50% van het ‘verdwenen’ water. 
Echter zonder inkomsten van de rest van de stad uit de verkoop van water kon de 
organisatie de verbeteringen die in Soweto nodig waren niet uitvoeren, en in plaats van 
onafhankelijk te worden werd de organisatie juist afhankelijk van de gemeente voor de 
middelen voor dit soort investeringen. Op het front van inkomsten door verkoop van 
water had de stad te maken met de boycot op de betaling van diensten die onder 
apartheid begonnen was en die na apartheid moeilijk om te keren bleek. Het afsluiten 
van wanbetalers leidde tot felle protesten in de stad en leidde uiteindelijk in 2001 tot de 
invoering van een quotum van gratis water van 6 kiloliter per gezin per maand. Deze 
gratis dienst moest betaald worden van inkomsten uit de verkoop van bulk water aan 
grote gebruikers in de stad, en leidde onder anderen tot forse stijging van de prijzen 
voor water in de blanke woonwijken. Blanke wijken zoals Randburg en Sandton 
organiseerden op hun beurt boycots tegen deze maatregelen, maar verloren hun zaak 
uiteindelijk in 1998 in een uitspraak van het hof. Het concept van toegang tot water als 
sociaal recht werd hiermee geïntroduceerd in Johannesburg.  
 Al met al werd de levering van efficiënt, duurzaam en op sociale gelijkheid 
berustende toegang tot water bemoeilijkt door de veranderingen die plaatsvonden. De 
publiek-private samenwerking die gepresenteerd werd als de oplossing van de 
problemen van de stad is halverwege zijn uitvoering stopgezet en de resultaten die 
bereikt zijn tonen een gemengd beeld. Niettemin is er op het gebied van sociale 
gelijkheid veel bereikt en is het recht op toegang tot water bekrachtigd.  
In dit boek heb ik een conceptueel en analytisch raamwerk gecreëerd waarmee 
waterschaarste en de concurrentie om toegang to water geëxploreerd en geanalyseerd 
kan worden. Dit raamwerk integreerde aspecten van schaarste die worden veroorzaakt 
door aanbod, door vraag, en door verdelingsvraagstukken en plaatste deze in het kader 
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van een drietal perspectieven die de staat van technologie, de aard van de organisaties  
die de hulpbron beheren en de staat van de hulpbron zoals deze door de natuur op een 
specifiek moment en op een specifieke locatie benadrukken, behelst. Ten tweede heb ik 
een reeks beleidsopties aangegeven voor efficiënt, duurzaam en op sociale gelijkheid 
berustend beheer van het stroomgebied van de Krokodilrivier. Dit heb ik gedaan door de 
materiele aspecten van het waterbeheer in het stroomgebied te beschrijven, door de 
economie van het watergebruik in het stroomgebied te beschrijven en door het proces 
van institutionele verandering in het stroomgebied te schetsen. Hoewel de kerndoelen 
van de Waterwet uit 1998 nog niet behaald zijn is het mijn hoop dat ik door deze 
analyse licht heb geworpen op een aantal van de belangrijkste aspecten die de aandacht 
van beleidsmakers en andere betrokkenen verdienen wil het proces in de toekomst 
effectieve vooruitgang kunnen boeken.  
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